ISSUE 190 : Mar/Apr - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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ISSUE 190 : Mar/Apr - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

33. Samuel Morrison, History of the US Naval Operations in World War II: Coral Sea, Midway andsubmarine operations, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1988, p. 189.34. Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 320.35. However, Morrison in History of the US Naval Operations in World War II provides an additionaldriver for this rapid change in orientation towards unrestricted submarine operations. He assertsthat Japan’s calculated breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor absolved the US fromobserving restrictions on naval warfare. While this may have played a small part in the calculationsof US planners, the inherent logic of using submarines to choke off Japan’s supply of overseasmaterials—as had been required by continuous iterations of War Plan Orange—was the more likelyreason. As Dean-Burns notes in ‘Regulating Submarine Warfare, 1921-41’, p. 60, ‘it was not reprisalso much as the military imperative that caused Washington to reverse its opinion on naval laws’.36. These SORG groups employed IBM machines to analyse the debriefings of submarine crews. SeeMeigs, Slide Rules and Submarines, pp. 169-75. For the impact of the SORG, see also Friedman, USSubmarines Through 1945, p. 234.37. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 236.38. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation1941-1945, Transportation Division: Washington DC, May 1947, p. 114.39. Arthur Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, Peter Davies: London, 1967, p. 215.40. DeRose, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 170.41. Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, p. 215.42. Parrish, The Submarine, p. 407.43. Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, pp. 219-20.44. Blair, Silent Victory, p. 552.45. From 19.4 to 16.4 million tons46. The situation with tankers saw a net increase in tonnage from 686,000 tons to 863,000 tons. SeeBlair, Silent Victory, p. 552.47. Lautenschlager, ‘The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001’, p. 120.48. Imports of bulk commodities in 1943 showed a sharp drop, from 19.4 million tons in 1942 to 16.4million tons in 1943. As Atsushi Oi has noted, in August 1943 the Japanese also discovered that thesinking rate of torpedoed ships had drastically increased. Oi was a Japanese naval officer during theSecond World War and served on the Grand Escort Fleet headquarters. See Atushi Oi, ‘Why Japan’sAnti-Submarine Warfare Failed’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 78, No. 6, June, 1952, p. 593.49. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 273.50. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 276. See also Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, p. 225. Whenorganised in December 1943, the 901st Air Flotilla was composed of one unit equipped with 48land-based twin-engine bombers and another unit equipped with 32 four-engine flying boats. InJanuary 1945, it reached its maximum strength of 168 aircraft of various types. See US Government,‘Interrogation Nav No. 74, Anti Submarine Warfare – Captain Kamide, 12 November 1943’ in TheUnited States Strategic Bombing Survey: interrogations of Japanese officials, OPNAV-P-03-100.51. After the death of Admiral Kogo in 1944, his replacement Admiral Toyoda retained this concept,while revising it as the ‘A-Go’ operational plan. See Samuel Morrison, History of the US NavalOperations in World War II, Vol. VIII: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944, Little,Brown and Company: Boston, 1989, pp. 12-4. Also Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 357.52. Holmes, Undersea Victory, pp. 302-29.53. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 273.54. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation1941-1945, p. 49.74

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