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global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESfor achieving a world free of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s.A new opportunity has emerged to revamp their <strong>nuclear</strong> policiesand postures as the United States and Russia c<strong>on</strong>tinuethe historic drawdown of their <strong>nuclear</strong> stockpiles. Guided bya desire to shrink their oversized and costly arsenals followingthe end of the Cold War and driven by the emergence of newthreats such as <strong>nuclear</strong> terrorism and proliferati<strong>on</strong> that largearsenals do not address, the two sides reduced the size of theircollective stockpile from a peak of nearly 70,000 total <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s in the mid-1980s to today’s level of 16,000 totalweap<strong>on</strong>s, of which about 6,000 are slated for dismantling.Under the current <strong>nuclear</strong> arms treaty that regulates these arsenals,the two sides are each allowed a maximum of 1,550operati<strong>on</strong>ally deployed strategic weap<strong>on</strong>s. The United Statesseeks further reducti<strong>on</strong>s to 1,000.Cuts below this level would put the United States and possiblyRussia <strong>on</strong> the cusp of a policy transformati<strong>on</strong> entailing ashift from a Triad to Dyad of strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> forces, drivenin no small measure by the exorbitant cost of re-capitalizingall three legs of the strategic forces. This financial crunch presentsan unusual opportunity to overhaul the entire system andshift to a new strategy that combines <strong>nuclear</strong> and n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong>capabilities.From a U.S. perspective, the ideal paradigm shift would enablethe United States to rebalance its security strategy awayfrom a predominantly <strong>nuclear</strong> strategy featuring three <strong>nuclear</strong>legs and toward <strong>on</strong>e in which the pillars of a “total forcetriad” include key n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> elements as well: (i) c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>aland <strong>nuclear</strong> offense – the latter mainly composed ofa Dyad of survivable strategic submarines and bombers, (ii)active and passive defense, encompassing a wide range ofcomp<strong>on</strong>ents from ballistic missile defense to protective sheltering,and (iii) command and c<strong>on</strong>trol, providing survivableinformati<strong>on</strong> processing, the ability to identify the source ofaggressi<strong>on</strong> (<strong>nuclear</strong>, c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al, or cyber), and the meansto flexibly direct this “total force triad” to coherent nati<strong>on</strong>alpurposes at all times.This shift in operati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cept and strategy would allowthe United States to make a host of important adjustments.The United States could substantially reduce the number oftotal <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, delivery systems, and weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong>alert; eliminate launch <strong>on</strong> warning tactics; increase decisi<strong>on</strong>time and reduce pressure to “use or lose” forces; focus <strong>on</strong>increasing the survivability of forces and command-c<strong>on</strong>trolnetworks; de-mate weap<strong>on</strong>s from delivery platforms and centrallystore the weap<strong>on</strong>s in high security storage facilities; introduceadvanced security technologies throughout the weap<strong>on</strong>scomplex; and augment <strong>nuclear</strong> systems with a broader setof n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> capabilities that increase operati<strong>on</strong>al flexibilityand the perceived credibility of the extended deterrenceguarantee to allies. As a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of these steps, the <strong>risk</strong>sof accidental, unauthorized, and mistaken launch <strong>on</strong> warningwould decrease drastically.The revamped architecture could also optimize <strong>nuclear</strong> securityagainst terrorist theft, and build more nearly foolproofcommand-c<strong>on</strong>trol networks against cyber warfare. Such architecturewould mitigate a plethora of <strong>risk</strong>s while preservingbasic deterrence and operati<strong>on</strong>al cohesi<strong>on</strong>.If Russia would move in the same strategic directi<strong>on</strong>, and Chinaand other <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries followed suit, then agenuine shift that ensures the sovereignty of the world’s majorpowers at much lower levels of <strong>nuclear</strong> stockpiles could bepossible. In the real world, disparities in resources and otherfactors work against a smooth collective transiti<strong>on</strong>. A shift inU.S. strategy may have destabilizing effects <strong>on</strong> other countries’security. It is vital to take such externalities into accountand devise ways to mitigate the untoward c<strong>on</strong>sequences.A fundamental shift in strategy could be undertaken as a projectof the executive branch of the U.S. government, and wouldnot necessarily require perfectly symmetrical U.S.-Russian<strong>nuclear</strong> arms reducti<strong>on</strong>s. While negotiated reducti<strong>on</strong>s are almostalways preferable, progress in this arena has stalled andmay not resume anytime so<strong>on</strong>. Therefore, until their relati<strong>on</strong>sreturn to normal, bilateral reducti<strong>on</strong>s may proceed in parallelin a manner similar to the past reducti<strong>on</strong>s in which the twosides independently culled their over-stocked arsenals. Today,it makes strategic sense for both the United States and Russiato shed vulnerable forces and depend up<strong>on</strong> leaner, smaller buthighly survivable <strong>nuclear</strong> forces (mainly U.S. missile submarinesand Russian road-mobile missiles) while strengtheningthe n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> pillars of their military strategies.3

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