12.07.2015 Views

global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESOld <strong>nuclear</strong> habits and strategies die hard, however. The current<strong>nuclear</strong> modernizati<strong>on</strong> programs in both Russia and theUnited States are essentially replicating the old legacy postureswith newer hardware. Unable to shake loose from theentrenched model, both cling to the Triad c<strong>on</strong>struct and tovulnerable silo-based missiles.Further clouding the <strong>nuclear</strong> horiz<strong>on</strong> is the prospect that other<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries will copy the old U.S.-Russiamodel. This will introduce all the liabilities menti<strong>on</strong>ed above.In particular, it will increase pressure to raise the level of their<strong>nuclear</strong> attack readiness, and shorten their warning and decisi<strong>on</strong>times. This emulati<strong>on</strong> appears to be underway as a naturalprogressi<strong>on</strong> of maturing <strong>nuclear</strong> force operati<strong>on</strong>s, stimulatedfurther by tit-for-tat increases in the attack readinessof opposing forces. With as many as eight or nine countriesheading in this directi<strong>on</strong>, and more proliferators in the wings,the <strong>risk</strong>s will multiply of accidental, unauthorized, inadvertentand irrati<strong>on</strong>al launch under short and pressure-packeddecisi<strong>on</strong> timelines.It is not too late to slow or halt this trend. On the c<strong>on</strong>trary, atthe current stage of their development, the <strong>nuclear</strong> posturesof the majority of the <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries includingChina, India, Pakistan, France and the United Kingdom are“models” compared to the Russian and U.S. postures. Theirarchitectures have provided for lower alert rates and affordeddecisi<strong>on</strong>-makers more time to c<strong>on</strong>sider their <strong>nuclear</strong> opti<strong>on</strong>s.The United States and Russia could learn from these models.In the absence of a fundamental makeover of the U.S. andRussian <strong>nuclear</strong> policies and postures, it is still possible toremodel their <strong>nuclear</strong> postures <strong>on</strong> the margins to reduce <strong>nuclear</strong><strong>risk</strong>. Central to this approach is to help create an internati<strong>on</strong>alnorm that pressures nati<strong>on</strong>s to operate their <strong>nuclear</strong>forces at a low level of attack readiness. This norm should beembodied in physical, organizati<strong>on</strong>al, and operati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>straints–“de-alerting” measures – that eliminate the ability tofire <strong>nuclear</strong> forces quickly and c<strong>on</strong>versely require lengthy visiblepreparati<strong>on</strong>s to get them ready for launch. Imposing suchmeasures <strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> postures originally designed for highalert status and prompt launch is a suboptimal remedy for theills that c<strong>on</strong>cern us. But de-alerting is certainly feasible and itcan be effective in increasing warning and decisi<strong>on</strong> time andfoiling the exploitati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>nuclear</strong> command and c<strong>on</strong>trol byunauthorized actors and hackers. Even a set of ad hoc “quickfixes” can offer an efficacious soluti<strong>on</strong> to many dangers.De-alerting should be codified by a politically or legally bindingagreement am<strong>on</strong>g the <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries thatincludes provisi<strong>on</strong>s for verificati<strong>on</strong>. Essentially, this <strong>report</strong>develops a de-alerting framework which has two pillars: (i)an early, priority agreement between Russia and the UnitedStates that seeks to get them both off their current launchreadyposture and in particular eliminate from both sides theirleanings toward launch <strong>on</strong> warning, and (ii) a l<strong>on</strong>ger-termagreement that can be implemented <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly with all <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s countries. The <strong>report</strong> recommends other cooperativemeasures designed to reduce <strong>nuclear</strong> <strong>risk</strong>s, reflecting abelief that joint efforts am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries tofashi<strong>on</strong> plans to reduce <strong>nuclear</strong> <strong>risk</strong> can produce modest andsometimes impressive success. Security cooperati<strong>on</strong> is an underlyingtheme of the prescriptive agenda of this study.These efforts would affirm support for the N<strong>on</strong>-Proliferati<strong>on</strong>Treaty (NPT), which c<strong>on</strong>tinues to be the bedrock of the internati<strong>on</strong>alcommunity’s effort to prevent and roll back proliferati<strong>on</strong>.The Article VI obligati<strong>on</strong> to pursue good faith negotiati<strong>on</strong>sfor <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmament may have been “essentiallyhortatory” at <strong>on</strong>e time, but today it is and must be taken seriously.Through <strong>nuclear</strong> arms c<strong>on</strong>trol, the United States, Russiaand other <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s powers show respect for the<strong>nuclear</strong> disarmament aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of the vast majority of thetreaty’s 189 signatories, and in return these powers can expectthem to stiffen their resolve in enforcing the NPT, supportingthe P5+1 talks with Iran, and in c<strong>on</strong>tinuing to pursue NorthKorea to end its <strong>nuclear</strong> pursuits and return to compliancewith its NPT obligati<strong>on</strong>s (notwithstanding its proclaimedwithdrawal). The days of U.S. and Russian lax and introspectivecompliance with the disarmament clause of the treatyare over if we hope to preserve and strengthen the treaty inthe face of growing proliferati<strong>on</strong> pressures around the world.And the more the <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries regulate and reducetheir <strong>nuclear</strong> stockpiles, the more vigilant the world willbecome in ferreting out and clamping down <strong>on</strong> clandestineprograms and other NPT violati<strong>on</strong>s. This collective resolve iscrucial to the security of all countries.4

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!