global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESThe short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces compoundthe risks. One-half of their strategic arsenals arecontinuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missilescarrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at amoment’s notice. These legacy postures of the Cold War areanachronisms but they have not yet been consigned to thetrash heap of history. They remain fully operational.These postures – geared to very rapid reaction – reflect anentrenched mindset of “use or lose” with roots in the ColdWar and in past decisions that perpetuated vulnerabilitiesin strategic forces and their chain of command. Bureaucraticinertia perpetuated a status quo that featured vulnerableland-based forces and nuclear command, control, and communicationsnetworks prone to collapse under the weight ofattack, even a small-scale strike. These vulnerabilities havenot gone away. In some respects the situation was betterduring the Cold War than it is today. Vulnerability to cyberattack, for example, is a new wild card in the deck. Havingmany far-flung missiles controlled electronically through anaging and flawed command-control network and ready tolaunch upon receipt of a short stream of computers signalsis a nuclear (surety) risk of the first order. It seems the heightof folly in an era of rapidly mutating cyber warfare capabilities.This concern is reason enough to remove nuclearmissiles from launch-ready alert.The old architecture responsible for the short fuses onthe nuclear forces and the compressed timelines of decision-makingneeds to be updated. A modern architecturecould be designed to optimize nuclear security (against terroristtheft and similar types of scenarios), ensure survivableforces and command systems, build nearly foolproofcommand-control networks (against cyber warfare andunauthorized launch), and extend the control of nuclearweapons beyond the launch stage into the flight stage. Sucha design would achieve three critical objectives that togetherwould substantially reduce reliance on nuclear weapons andgreatly reduce nuclear risk. First, it would remove the “useor lose” imperative. Second, it would greatly increase warningand decision time during a nuclear crisis. And third, itwould reduce the need for large numbers of nuclear forcesin the stockpile and on alert. Such architecture would eliminatea number of risks while preserving deterrence and operationalcohesion. It could be strengthened further throughmissile defense and other augmentations.Such architecture could and should be designed as an integralpart of a shift in security strategy to place less emphasison nuclear threats and more on non-nuclear capabilities, asdiscussed in the executive summary.The proposed overhaul is not even a massive undertaking.It would involve taking steps as elementary as eliminatingthe vulnerable land-based nuclear forces; building nuclearstorage facilities to be harder, deeper, and more hidden; replacinglarge static command posts with mobile and evasiveposts; manufacturing information-processing componentson home soil and tightly controlling electronics assembly;and strapping onto weapons (ballistic, cruise, and gravity)sensors, auto-pilots and communications equipment. Theoverhaul would not entail re-designing the guts of weapons(the “physics package”) nor would it be prohibitively expensive.The size of the stockpile would shrink by a substantialfraction (without weakening the deterrent mission), thenumber of weapons on alert would be greatly reduced, andthe cost of future modernization would be slashed. Thesesavings would pay for the overhaul.Old nuclear habits and strategies die hard, however. Thecurrent nuclear modernization programs in both Russia andthe United States are essentially replicating the old legacypostures with newer hardware. Unable to shake loose fromthe entrenched model, both cling to the Triad construct andto vulnerable silo-based missiles.Further clouding the nuclear horizon is the prospect thatother nuclear weapons countries will copy the old U.S.-Russiamodel. This will introduce all the liabilities mentionedabove. In particular, it will increase pressure to raise the levelof their nuclear attack readiness, and shorten their warningand decision times. This emulation appears to be underwayas a natural progression of maturing nuclear force operations,stimulated further by tit-for-tat increases in the attackreadiness of opposing forces. With as many as eight or ninecountries heading in this direction – and more proliferatorsin the wings – the risks will multiply of accidental, unauthorized,inadvertent, and irrational launch under short and6
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESpressure-packed decision timelines.It is not too late to slow or halt this trend. On the contrary, atthe current stage of their development, the nuclear posturesof the majority of the nuclear weapons countries includingChina, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and the United Kingdomare “models” compared to the U.S. and Russian postures.Their architectures have provided for lower alert ratesand afforded decision-makers more time to consider theirnuclear options. The United States and Russia could learnfrom these models.In the absence of a fundamental makeover of U.S. andRussian nuclear policies and postures, it is still possible tore-model their nuclear postures on the margins to reducenuclear risk. Central to this approach is to help create an internationalnorm that pressures nations to operate their nuclearforces at a low level of attack readiness. This would helpdiminish the salience of nuclear weapons and reinforce theirrole as weapons of last, not first, resort. Like policies of “solepurpose” and “no first use,” a lowering of launch readinesswould represent a step toward the final objective of <strong>global</strong><strong>zero</strong> – the total elimination of nuclear weapons.This norm should be embodied in physical, organizationaland operational constraints – “de-alerting” measures –that eliminate the ability to fire nuclear forces quickly, andconversely require lengthy visible preparations to get themready for launch. Imposing such measures on nuclear posturesoriginally designed for high alert status and promptlaunch is a suboptimal remedy for the ills that concern us.But de-alerting is certainly feasible and it can be effectivein increasing warning and decision time and foiling the exploitationof nuclear command and control by unauthorizedactors and hackers. Even a set of ad hoc “quick fixes” canoffer an efficacious solution to many dangers.De-alerting should be codified by a politically or legallybinding agreement among the nuclear weapons countriesthat includes provisions for verification. Essentially, this reportdevelops a de-alerting framework which has two pillars:(i) an emergency agreement between the U.S. and Russiathat seeks to get them both off their current launch-readyposture and in particular eliminate from both sides theirleanings toward launch on warning, and (ii) a longer-termagreement that can be implemented <strong>global</strong>ly with all nuclearweapons countries. The report recommends other cooperativemeasures designed to reduce nuclear risks, reflecting abelief that nuclear weapons countries’ joint efforts to fashionnuclear risk reduction plans can produce modest and sometimesimpressive success. Security cooperation is an underlyingtheme of the prescriptive agenda of this study.A high immediate priority is to eliminate any possibilitythat U.S. or Russian missiles would be launched promptly inthe mistaken belief that the other side has initiated a nuclearattack. This risk of launching on the basis of false attackindications from malfunctioning early warning sensors orinformation processing networks declined at the end of theCold War but it has begun to climb as a result of the estrangementin U.S.-Russian relations and the recent loss ofRussia’s space-based surveillance capability. The presidentsof the United States and Russia should reach an executiveagreement to modify their postures physically and procedurallyin order to reduce to the risk to <strong>zero</strong>. The fixes wouldentail lengthening the current hasty timelines for launchdecision-making and implementation of launch. The partiesshould aim to extend the timelines from a few minutestoday to a period of days in future. In this report, the minimumproposed timeline is 24-72 hours.The procedural fixes would mainly involve ending high-levelexercises and training for prompt launch. For silo-basedrockets, whose vulnerability to counterforce strikes partiallydrives both sides’ reliance on prompt launch (vulnerable nuclearcommand-control infrastructure also drives it), wartimetargets could be removed from the missiles’ computersand the missiles “safed” in their silos. That latter wouldisolate them completely from outside launch control. Physicalchanges would mainly involve the removal and storageof essential components – warheads and flight batteries– and the deactivation of the explosive and gas generatordevices used to open silo lids prior to missile lift-off. Formobile missiles on land, flight batteries could be removedand the retractable roofs of mobile missile garages could beobstructed from opening quickly. For submarine-launchedmissiles, restrictions on patrol patterns could be imposed toeliminate short-flight-time strikes and provide more warn-7
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