global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESthe largest range of options across the spectrum – includingdiplomatic, economic, and various “soft” power tools thatexpand U.S. policymakers’ “decision space” between crisisdiplomacy and conventional intervention. The U.S. governmentis constantly churning out new diplomatic and financialinstruments – for example, financial sanctions, rights ofsea passage, proposals for resolving territorial disputes inthe East and South China Seas, cyber warfare “rules of theroad,” to name just a random smattering. Arms control initiativesconstitute another critical set of options in this space– bilateral nuclear negotiations with Russia, multilateraltalks to reverse North Korea’s nuclear program and containthe Iranian nuclear program, and multilateral operations toeliminate chemical weapons in Syria, to name a few. Suchefforts obviously lie at the heart of U.S. <strong>global</strong> leadership.When successful, they suppress escalatory updrafts and aggression.The United State also enjoys the richest menu of optionsin conventional military operations. U.S. conventional superiority,augmented by allies’ military capabilities, confersenormous flexibility in dealing with security threats of allkinds. The U.S. conventional juggernaut generally supplantsnuclear forces in this space. As the head of the U.S. StrategicCommand recently testified before the U.S. Congress:[…] Conventional forces do, in fact, make adifference in terms that we are no longer ina position where we have to threaten nuclearuse in order to overcome a conventionaldeficiency […] overwhelming, conventionalpower projection that we can bring to beararound the world has made a difference inthe role of our nuclear deterrent […] we havebeen able to narrow the role of that nucleardeterrent, accordingly. 10U.S. conventional hegemony stems mainly from American10 General C. Robert Kehler (USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command),“Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Commandin Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year2014 and the Future Years Defense Program before the Senate ArmedServices Committee,” March 12, 2013.technological superiority in practically every importantmilitary technology in today’s battle space – precision-guidedconventional munitions, <strong>global</strong> all-source intelligencecollection and fusion, stealth warplanes, directed energyweapons, ballistic missile defenses, hypersonic glide vehicles,special operations and cyber warfare among others.(Anti-satellite weaponry is a conspicuous exception.) Owingto its prowess in these domains, and a deep-pocketedDepartment of Defense, the United States has been able tore-balance its security strategy over the past several decadesto steadily reduce reliance on nuclear forces and shift tonon-nuclear tools that are far more useable in conflict.This rebalancing has increased U.S. credibility in dealingwith threats that previously required a nuclear response, andboosted the confidence of U.S. allies around the world (particularlyNATO allies, South Korea and Japan) in the abilityof U.S. forces to protect them without resorting to nuclearweapons. For instance, South Korea once needed a huge liftfrom U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to deal with North Korea’sprolific artillery batteries north of Seoul. But nuclearstrikes would have exposed Japan as well as South Korea todeadly radioactive fallout. The specter of massive collateralcasualties in friendly populations greatly undermined thecredibility and acceptability of the nuclear option. By contrast,South Korea with U.S. backing today has conventionalsuperiority over the North and the profile of U.S. nuclearweapons for war-fighting on the Peninsula has very substantiallyebbed. The North’s fledgling nuclear program doesrevive somewhat the role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in extendingdeterrence in the region. However, the U.S. alliancecapabilities in the non-nuclear sphere go a very long way towardreassuring allies in peacetime and parrying the North’snuclear spear in wartime. These capabilities may also workto deter the North. (No one really knows.)The nuclear default option remains in the U.S. repertoire,however. Despite having a kitbag brimming with diplomaticand conventional tools, they are not so robust and versatilethat U.S. leaders cannot imagine any need for nuclear firepower.In a conflict situation, non-nuclear options are veryrapidly crossed.Nuclear proliferation is one of the sticky wickets responsible17