global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESpercent de-alerted, although China’s opaque nuclear postureleaves room for doubt. A small number of warheads may beforward deployed in a dismantled state at the six main landbasedmissile bases of the Chinese 2 nd Artillery, the centralnuclear command organization of the Chinese People’s LiberationArmy (PLA).The time required to generate these forces to launch-readystatus is lengthy. Warheads would need to be transported byrail or road – or by air in emergencies – considerable distances(typically many hundreds of miles) to rendezvousand mate up with delivery systems at the main missile bases,at hidden locations near these bases (if mobile missileshad already been dispersed out of garrison during a crisis),at the main heavy bomber base at Datong, and at the mainsubmarine base at Qingdao. 16 Transportation and uploadingwould take days to achieve an initial operational capabilityand weeks to complete the mating for the entire force of landmissiles, bombers and submarines.China thus runs minimal peacetime risks of mistaken, hastyor unauthorized launches, accidents, weapons falling intothe hands of terrorists during transportation, or rapid escalationto their deliberate use in a crisis. The surging of forcesto high combat readiness in a crisis would of course run significantlyhigher risks. As a leading Western expert puts it:er, with warheads most vulnerable to theft oraccident during transportation, the system’sreliance on mobility creates opportunities forincidents and terrorist action. 17China’s restraint may not last for long. It is deploying itsfirst strategic submarine as well as new land mobile rockets.China’s nuclear leadership may well want to improvethe survivability of these forces by putting them on higheralert, sending at least some of them out on patrol armedwith warheads, or at least pre-positioning nuclear payloadsat forward locations in peacetime (e.g., naval facilities nearsubmarine pens) to streamline the uploading of weapons todelivery platforms in crisis circumstances.Marrying up warheads to land-mobile rockets or to strategicsubmarines presupposes high Chinese confidence intheir safeguards against unauthorized launch. It must bepresumed that China’s technological prowess in the areasof electronic locking devices and cryptology is sufficientlyadvanced that it could install strict if not fool-proof safeguardson the weapons themselves (so-called “permissiveaction links”) and on the delivery and command-controlsystems (so-called “coded switch devices”). Soviet strategicforces were mated up in the late 1960s after Soviet leadersgrew confident in the integrity of the technical safeguardsdevices installed on their forces. China can be expected tofollow this pattern. China’s forces in fact may be alreadyundergoing this transition to higher readiness under tightcentral command and control. Given that centralization isa hallmark of its political culture, China’s national leadershipand its General Staff will presumably retain the keysto the kingdom – the authorization and unlock codes, andperhaps the target coordinates – until a launch decision hasbeen made at the pinnacle of national command. If the centralizedRussian system is any guide to Chinese thinkingon the question of nuclear command and control, launchauthority will not be pre-delegated very far down the chainof command. (By contrast, the United States took the riskof decentralizing and pre-delegating a great deal of launchA preliminary examination of China’s nuclearwarhead storage and handling system indicatesthat Beijing takes security and safetyseriously. With the bulk of its nuclear warheadstockpile nestled deep in secure mountainpalaces, the 22 Base’s physical protectionsystem appears to be founded upon morethan “guns, gates, and guards.” In fact, indefending against real and perceived threats,Taibai may be one of the most secure warheadstockpile facilities in the world. Howevproject2049.net/half_lives_china_nuclear_warhead_program.pdf.16 See Li Bin’s discussion of mobile missile operations in “TrackingChinese Strategic Mobile Missiles,” Science and Global Security, Vol.15,2007, pp.1-30.17 Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System, op.cit., p. 11.22