global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESAs a result of this lag in safety standards, any increase inthe attack readiness and operati<strong>on</strong>al tempo of their forceswill incur increased <strong>risk</strong> of accidental det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s (as wellas unauthorized det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s and terrorist capture). The earlyexperience of the United States is instructive. During thegrowing pain years from 1950 until 1968, at least 1,200 U.S.<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s were involved in incidents of varying degreesof severity. The United States came close to disastermany times. 39The accident records for recent years have not been fullydeclassified. One recently released list of so-called “DullSword” incidents shows that 1,500 <strong>report</strong>able incidents involvingU.S. Air Force <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s happened over thefour-year period from 2009 to 2013. 40 They involved everythingfrom mechanical failures of weap<strong>on</strong>s or the equipmentused in handling them, to lapses of security, to violati<strong>on</strong>s of<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong> safety rules – intenti<strong>on</strong>al violati<strong>on</strong>s in someinstances. The <strong>risk</strong> of a catastrophic accident will alwayshover above <str<strong>on</strong>g>zero</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and it increases as <strong>nuclear</strong> forces climbthe ladder of alert readiness.There have been a number of c<strong>on</strong>temporary incidents thatdramatically illustrate operati<strong>on</strong>al hazards. The most notoriousof them occurred in 2007 when six <strong>nuclear</strong> cruisemissiles were loaded by mistake <strong>on</strong>to a U.S. strategic bomberand flown across the country (from Minot AFB, NorthDakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana). For more than a day,no <strong>on</strong>e knew the payload was <strong>nuclear</strong> and no <strong>on</strong>e knew thenukes went missing. C<strong>on</strong>sequently, they were not guarded.Soviet and Russian <strong>nuclear</strong> forces also have crashed and sunk<strong>on</strong> many occasi<strong>on</strong>s. Just three years ago, a Russian strategicsubmarine caught fire in dry dock with a full complementof <strong>nuclear</strong>-tipped ballistic missiles <strong>on</strong>board. 41 More recent-39 Eric Schlosser, Command and C<strong>on</strong>trol: Nuclear Weap<strong>on</strong>s, the DamascusAccident, and the Illusi<strong>on</strong> of Safety (New York: Penguin Books,2013).40 The full list of Dull Sword incidents can be accessed <strong>on</strong>line at http://speakingtruthtopower.org/DullSword.pdf.41 “Armagedd<strong>on</strong> averted? Nukes ‘<strong>on</strong> board’ blazing sub,” RT, February14, 2012, http://rt.com/news/<strong>nuclear</strong>-sub-fire-missile-165.ly, the Orel, a Russian <strong>nuclear</strong> submarine, caught fire whileundergoing maintenance at a shipyard in Severodvinsk, althoughit was <strong>report</strong>ed that no weap<strong>on</strong>s or <strong>nuclear</strong> fuel were<strong>on</strong> board at the time. 42Countries with a less advanced safety culture, far fewer resources,and lacking the technological sophisticati<strong>on</strong> ofRussia and the United States are bound to run even higher<strong>risk</strong>s of an accidental <strong>nuclear</strong> det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, unauthorizeduse, or theft or seizure of weap<strong>on</strong>s. These <strong>risk</strong>s underscorethe dangers posed by proliferati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>nuclear</strong> terrorism.The <strong>risk</strong>s are compounded by a growing insider threat insome of the <strong>nuclear</strong> countries. If jihadist sympathizers succeededin infiltrating the armed forces of <strong>on</strong>e of these countries,for instance, <strong>nuclear</strong> security could be significantlycompromised, particularly since most <strong>nuclear</strong> security arrangementsassume that insider collusi<strong>on</strong> would not involvemore than <strong>on</strong>e pers<strong>on</strong>. That assumpti<strong>on</strong> needs to be revisitedal<strong>on</strong>g with the two-man safety rule that stems from it.A three-man rule makes more sense in an era of extremismand cyber warfare (see next secti<strong>on</strong>).Russia and the United States should more fully engage othernati<strong>on</strong>s’ <strong>nuclear</strong> establishments to share knowledge <strong>on</strong>matters of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s safety and security. PresidentObama’s Nuclear Security Summits have set a precedent forthis. So far the agenda of these summits has studiously c<strong>on</strong>centrated<strong>on</strong> enhancing the security of civilian <strong>nuclear</strong> materials.It would be good to extend the discussi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s security, and command and c<strong>on</strong>trol, and begin todefine best practices in this arena.D. CYBER WARFARE THREATS TO NUCLEARCOMMAND AND CONTROLA new worry about <strong>nuclear</strong> command and c<strong>on</strong>trol and missiles<strong>on</strong> high alert status is that they may be exploitable bycyber infiltrators. Questi<strong>on</strong>s abound: could unauthorizedactors – state or n<strong>on</strong>-state – spoof early warning networks42 Anna Nemtsova, “Russian Nuclear Submarine Goes Up in Flames,”The Daily Beast, April 7, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/07/russian-<strong>nuclear</strong>-submarine-goes-up-in-flames.html.29