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global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESThe popular narrative of the Cold War slid past these facts<strong>on</strong> the ground in favor of the abstract theory that the <strong>nuclear</strong>arsenals provided a stable balance of terror based <strong>on</strong> mutualassured destructi<strong>on</strong> (MAD). Every instituti<strong>on</strong> of Americansociety accepted and even internalized the narrativethat U.S. <strong>nuclear</strong> forces were prepared to absorb the worstattack the enemy could mount, and then mount a counterattack<strong>on</strong> presidential orders that would destroy the attacker’sec<strong>on</strong>omy and populati<strong>on</strong>. A rati<strong>on</strong>al adversary would neverdare to strike under these c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. Moreover, the factthat the Soviets could do the same to the United States <strong>on</strong>lystrengthened the stability of mutual deterrence, accordingto a narrative that led many people to celebrate rather thanlament the mutual vulnerability of entire populati<strong>on</strong>s.Those resp<strong>on</strong>sible for carrying out the <strong>nuclear</strong> missi<strong>on</strong> knewotherwise. In the real world, U.S. and Soviet <strong>nuclear</strong> strategyyielded operati<strong>on</strong>al postures that could not reliably ride outan attack. They were geared to such rapid and massive reacti<strong>on</strong>to signs of enemy attack that little room was allowedfor rati<strong>on</strong>al deliberati<strong>on</strong> and real leadership in a crisis. Rotedecisi<strong>on</strong>-making and rapid enactment of a prepared scriptwere the orders of the day <strong>on</strong> both sides. The dynamic interacti<strong>on</strong>of their operati<strong>on</strong>al postures in the midst of a c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>tati<strong>on</strong>carried grave <strong>risk</strong>s of losing c<strong>on</strong>trol and sparkingan intenti<strong>on</strong>al or inadvertent <strong>nuclear</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. The situati<strong>on</strong>was anything but stable.As a technical matter, nothing has essentially changed sincethen.Planning to launch <strong>on</strong> warning is obviously a cosmic gamble,given the significant <strong>risk</strong> of ill-c<strong>on</strong>sidered judgmentbased <strong>on</strong> incomplete or false informati<strong>on</strong>. And indeed, Russiaand the United States have come close to disaster <strong>on</strong> severaloccasi<strong>on</strong>s involving false alarms. 70 And yet, PresidentObama in 2013 reiterated the need to maintain the capabili-70 For informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> known close calls see Patricia Lewis et al, “TooClose for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Opti<strong>on</strong>s for Policy,”Chatham House Report, April 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclearUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf.ty for prompt launch in his <strong>nuclear</strong> employment guidance. 71The half-life of this tactic is l<strong>on</strong>g indeed.The <strong>risk</strong> of mistaken launch would appear to be even highertoday because of the decrepit state of Russia’s early warningnetwork. For many past years Russia’s obsolescing earlywarning satellites provided <strong>on</strong>ly a few hours of reliablelaunch detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage over the U.S. Minuteman fields.In the fall of 2014, Russia lost its last two remaining functi<strong>on</strong>alearly warning satellites m<strong>on</strong>itoring that area. 72 Lackingspace-based coverage of U.S. Trident missile launchesfrom the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Russia now dependscompletely up<strong>on</strong> ground radar sites to detect and assess incomingU.S. ballistic missile warheads fired from land orsea. Russia’s ability to detect low-flying <strong>nuclear</strong>-armed cruisemissiles fired by bombers or submarines is even worse.As the graph below shows, the lack of satellite early warningdrastically reduces the timeliness of Russian detecti<strong>on</strong> of aU.S. strategic ballistic missile attack. Russia’s radar detecti<strong>on</strong>timelines vary from ten minutes for a U.S. submarine missilefired from the Norwegian Sea to 17 minutes for a U.S.land-based missile raid launched from a Minuteman field inthe Midwestern United States. 73 By comparis<strong>on</strong>, U.S. warningsensors provide nearly twice as much warning time (18-28 minutes) of a Russian strategic strike, assuming Russiadoes not deploy its ballistic missile submarines closer to U.S.shores. However, the U.S. ability to detect Russian <strong>nuclear</strong>-armedcruise missiles flying at low altitudes is very poor.Russia’s attack indicati<strong>on</strong>s emanate from ground radar <strong>on</strong>ly,whereas two types of U.S. detecti<strong>on</strong> systems – ground radar71 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report <strong>on</strong> Nuclear Employment Strategyof the United States Specified in Secti<strong>on</strong> 491 of 10 U.S.C.,” Washingt<strong>on</strong>,D.C.: June 12, 2013, p. 5.72 See Pavel Podvig, “Russia lost all its early-warning satellites,” Russianstrategic <strong>nuclear</strong> forces (blog), February 11, 2015 http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/02/russia_lost_all_its_early-warn.shtml.73 These are maximum performance estimates that may not be realisticat the present time because Russia has not yet completed the modernizati<strong>on</strong>of its ground radar warning network. Some newer radars may beoperating in “test” mode and may not come <strong>on</strong>line with full operati<strong>on</strong>alcapability for some time.36

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