global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESof minutes to a future launch time of at least 24-72 hours for alldeployed strategic forces, and much l<strong>on</strong>ger for <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>sc<strong>on</strong>signed to the active reserve force.F. ELIMINATING LAUNCH-ON-WARNINGThis aim is the brainchild of Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin,former head of the 4 th Central Institute of the RussianStrategic Rocket Forces. Dvorkin is very familiar with thetechnical and operati<strong>on</strong>al characteristics of the Russian strategicforces. He writes and publishes extensively <strong>on</strong> the subjectof de-alerting, and he c<strong>on</strong>tributed analyses, facts and ideas tothis <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <strong>report</strong>.Dvorkin argues that it is “quite urgent” that Russia and theUnited States agree to aband<strong>on</strong> their current plans for launching<strong>on</strong> warning. 99 His c<strong>on</strong>cern is that “the leaders at the highestlevels have just a few minutes to make the decisi<strong>on</strong> for aretaliatory counterstrike based <strong>on</strong> the informati<strong>on</strong> from earlywarning systems; therefore, there is always a <strong>risk</strong> that the decisi<strong>on</strong>will be wr<strong>on</strong>g.” 100 Worse, Dvorkin – and this <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>– believe that the deteriorating relati<strong>on</strong>ship between Russiaand the United States is increasing the danger of inadvertent<strong>nuclear</strong> strikes stemming from false informati<strong>on</strong> from earlywarning sensors.Dvorkin therefore advocates a “program of phased withdrawalof strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> forces from the state of high alert,” butpending the completi<strong>on</strong> of this program, which he believesmay “take a c<strong>on</strong>siderably l<strong>on</strong>g period of time,” he urges thetwo sides to take “emergency measures to prevent the possibilityof missile launches <strong>on</strong> the basis of false warnings.” 101In additi<strong>on</strong> to beginning to implement de-alerting measuresthat lower the attack readiness of the individual land-, sea-,and air-based strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, the two sides shouldadopt organizati<strong>on</strong>al, procedural, and technical measures that“c<strong>on</strong>firm and strengthen their commitment to end the pos-sibility of launching strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> the basisof informati<strong>on</strong> from early warning systems.” 102 This commitmentwould require a radical departure not <strong>on</strong>ly from currentoperating practices, but also from the mindset and culture ofstrategic organizati<strong>on</strong>s. It represents quite a tall order, but anecessary <strong>on</strong>e if we wish to eradicate the <strong>risk</strong> of an inadvertent<strong>nuclear</strong> exchange or accidental or unauthorized launch.G. EMERGENCY AND 10-YEAR MEASURES TOELIMINATE LAUNCH-ON-WARNING ANDREDUCE THE ATTACK READINESS OFU.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES 103A core part of Dvorkin’s proposal for eliminating launch-<strong>on</strong>warningis to stop practicing it. At present, the two sides routinelyexercise it. Dvorkin urges Russia and the United Statesimmediately to “stop any exercises that involve the use of theirland, sea, and air [strategic] missiles launched <strong>on</strong> the basis ofinformati<strong>on</strong> from early warning systems; exchange informati<strong>on</strong>about <strong>on</strong>going and planned [<strong>nuclear</strong>] military exercises;invite observers to each others’ top command positi<strong>on</strong> duringfull-scale exercises; and also, if requested by the other side,to invite observers to any exercises of their strategic <strong>nuclear</strong>forces.”Furthermore, Dvorkin calls <strong>on</strong> the two sides immediately torefrain from anti-satellite experiments that could interferewith the functi<strong>on</strong>ing and performance of missile attack earlywarning sensors. He also implies that they refrain from anyacts, such as cyber attack, that could intenti<strong>on</strong>ally or inadvertentlyderange early warning networks.Other organizati<strong>on</strong>al, procedural, and technical measurescan be introduced to eliminate prompt launch opti<strong>on</strong>s andthereby increase warning and decisi<strong>on</strong> time. Two proceduralchanges involve altering the <strong>nuclear</strong> war plans and their implementingprocedures (known as Emergency War Orders, or99 Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, “Once Again, C<strong>on</strong>cerning theTransformati<strong>on</strong> of the Principles of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence forRussia and the United States,” unpublished paper.100 Ibid.101 Ibid.102 Ibid.103 This secti<strong>on</strong> draws <strong>on</strong> Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin’s draft“Executive Agreement Between the Presidents of the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>and the United States <strong>on</strong> Urgent Measures to Exclude the Possibility ofStrategic Missile Launch <strong>on</strong> False Alarm” (See Appendix B.)55