Partie 2 ou 3 Nouvelle conomie lectrique - Centre International de ...

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Partie 2 ou 3 Nouvelle conomie lectrique - Centre International de ...

- 27 -Brazilian government which are still quite low for a number of class of consumers do notseem to guarantee recovery of costs a priori, which could pose real problems of keeping thesystem profitable if it is exposed to any opportunism on the part of the public authority.4. ConclusionCapacity adequacy seen as a public good and investment incentives have been the majoromissions from the electricity industry reforms in both North and South countries. The reasonis the optimism on the reformers’ part over the capacity of market signals to ensure thedevelopment of resources necessary for reliability in the mid- and long-term and to createincentives to invest in base-load and peak equipment.The solutions designed in North countries for facing up to the deficiencies in the marketshould be understood in relation to the maturity of their electrical systems and their moderateneed for new capacities. It has been seen that this problem is being dealt with through theshort-term reliability and peak capacity adequacy. However, the Pigouvian and Coasiansolutions devised for the peak offers do not appear to be obviously effective, and they are notproved to be a response to the need for base-load equipment in these countries. Theovercapacity in most countries’ electricity industry has pushed this question back to a laterstage. Some countries have put it back indirectly by pursuing other aims, especially incentivesto entry through the regulatory authorisation of long-term contracts with higher pricesbetween entrants and distributors with captive markets as in the UK, or the continued verticalintegration of production and supply by principal operators, as in Germany, France, Spain andBelgium. These indirect solutions, however, will not indefinitely keep away the need to set uplong-term methods of co-ordination, at least for the peak demand, if price crises and shortageskeep following each other.Table 3 : Institutional options for securing generation investments in non-matureelectricity industriesStructural charactersAvantage/inconvénientpour l’investisseur etle prêteurRegulated VerticalizedmonopolyVertical et horizontal integrationPublic regimeContrôle des risque-prix etrisque- quantitéCompetitive modelDe-intégration verticale ethorizontalePrivatisationCredibilization of institutionalenvironment by provision ofmarket rulesSingle buyer modelLong term ContractSingle buyerDivesture of distributionPrice-risk et quantity-riskDependency upon the financingmecanisms- by public budget- and by StateborrowingDifficulty of control of price-riskand quantity risk (answer: searchof long term contracts)Generic defectsProductive et managerialinefficiencyGovernmental InstrumentationAbsence of private andinternational financingNecessity of imperfectcompetition for attractinginvestors :-1. Horizontal concentration andwholesale price control-2. Long term Contracts-3. Capture of the regulatorComplexity of projectcontractual architectureTransaction costHigh financial costs in IPPs/BOTprojectsRisk of squeeze for the singlebuyer (currency-risk)Imperfect incentives todistributors’ solvabilityincentives inv elec north south energy policy.doc created by Dominique Finon on 14/05/2004printed by JQ on 12/22/2004 at 11:43 27/31

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