Partie 2 ou 3 Nouvelle conomie lectrique - Centre International de ...

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Partie 2 ou 3 Nouvelle conomie lectrique - Centre International de ...

- 28 -In developing and emerging countries facing rapid and irregular growth in their electricalindustries, it appears that the sector should be organised principally according to the need toinstall new capacities in response to the rapid but uncertain increase in demand. In view of theimportance of what is at stake, the concepts particular to electricity industry reforms in Northcountries, which are already imperfect, cannot be transferred without further reflection. If thecompetition-based, de-integrated model is adopted, it will have to include the competitionbasedimperfections in order to allow ongoing exercise of market power in order to allowprices to rise above competition prices, or else the model must allow the removal of asignificant percentage of transactions outside the scope, most notably through theauthorisation of long-term bilateral contracts.The two main ways identified for getting round the problems of investments are the coordinationof investment decisions and the limitation of risks for investors through long-termcontracts aimed at obtaining the necessary finance. The Single Buyer model could be a goodalternative if one wishes to avoid the twists and turns of the competition paradigm, but inorder for it to provide an undisputed solution, the institutional environment must be stabilisedand the macroeconomic environment predictable, neither of which is the case. The reversal tothe public, vertically and horizontally integrated monopoly model as an alternative is notconceivable without major change in incentives for productive and allocative efficiency.There is therefore a need to find hybrid solutions adapted to suit each case but able, in oneway or another, to confer the power of co-ordinating investments in production (as in thenetwork) in the ministerial or regulatory authority and to create possibilities for long-termcontractual arrangements that allow the outlet and price risks to be limited for investors.So it is much more logical to design systems that are organised around the need to arrange theinvestments through the long-term co-ordination and reduction of investment risks. Theindustrial organisation must be carefully designed, being less concentrated than the old publicmonopolies and keeping the public authorities at a distance in order to introduce incentives toefficiency. It is likely that in future, there will be a requirement to return to principles similarto that of the Single Buyer model and to give priority to long-term contractual undertakings indeveloping countries.incentives inv elec north south energy policy.doc created by Dominique Finon on 14/05/2004printed by JQ on 12/22/2004 at 11:43 28/31

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