On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

humanitarian assistance supplies, while US and Royal Navy minesweepers began to clear thewaterways leading to Umm Qasr of mines. UK forces succeeded in preventing any reinforcementof Basra and, along with the Marines, secured the southern oil fields. Special forces troopsoperated throughout the theater. In the west, Joint Special Operations Task Force-West workedto reduce the theater ballistic missile (TBM) threat to Iraq’s neighbors. In the north, JointSpecial Operations Task Force-North, along with Kurdish troops, maintained pressure on thenorthern Iraqi forces.Throughout it all, CFACC continued to degrade the regime’s ability to command andcontrol its forces and provided exceptional CAS to the coalition ground forces in contact.Coalition air forces roamed the skies over Iraq at will, providing CAS, interdicting enemyforces, and striking strategic targets across all of Iraq. Coalition ground forces maneuveredwith impunity, knowing that the coalition determined what flew. Coalition air attacks wereresponsive, accurate, and precise.In addition to operations on the ground and in the air, several related and associatedactions took place that either enabled the fight or prepared the battlefield for future operations.Those actions ranged from the anti-tactical ballistic missile fight to efforts to meet logisticsrequirements of units in the field.The events over the next five days reflected Lieutenant Generals McKiernan’s andWallace’s constant balancing of rapid maneuver against the need to secure the LOCs and ensurethe forces did not reach a culmination point due to logistics shortfalls. Factors playing on thisbalancing act included the scope and distance of the operation and the reality of initiatingcombat operations before the logistics base was fully established. That they were successful inachieving this balance is a testament to the depth and breadth of planning; the command’s clearsense of operational and strategic objectives; and of course, the hard work and dedication ofthe soldiers on the ground. 6 At the end of this series of operations, V Corps had uncoiled nearly400 km into Iraq and was ready to take the fight to Baghdad. What followed was an operationalground maneuver at impressive speeds. 7Triggering the Running StartOn 19 March 2003, “D-day,” Phase II “Shaping” operations started. Combat operationsbegan with a combined F-117 and Tomahawk Missile strike to decapitate the regime bykilling the leadership and forcing an early disintegration of the Iraqi defenses. Accordingto open media reporting, the decision was based on highly perishable intelligence reportingthat Saddam Hussein and several key subordinate leaders were gathered together in a knownlocation. Unsure if such an opportunity would present itself again, the president authorizedthe strike. Although the strike failed, it presaged the remainder of the phase’s operations andresulted in major ground operations preceding the initiation of the air campaign.Concurrent with the decapitation strike, other operations occurred across Iraq. In the south,SOF secured gas and oil platforms and other key objectives. CFLCC conducted reconnaissanceand screening operations along the border. V Corps and I MEF units continued to prepare forcombat operations. In the west, special operations troops prepared to secure key airfields andfacilities and moved to preempt the Iraqis’ use of WMD and tactical missiles. In the north, SOFworked with the Kurdish opposition to fix Iraqi forces on the Green Line as well as to deter90