On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

through one ambush afteranother. 3-7 CAV learnedsome important lessonsduring the fight up “AmbushAlley” and refinedtactical techniques on theway. For example, theirsupporting artillery reactedto calls for fire quicklybecause they “went toground” and laid the gunson the direction of potentialtargets as soon as theyheard a spot report. Therefore,when they receivedan immediate call for fire,the guns responded veryDodging RPGsThe operations M577 armored vehicle in the TOC, commanded byCaptain Brett Bair, fought through one of the ambushes along [AmbushAlley]. Inside the M577, Major John Keith, the ground executive officer,and operations officer Captain Adam Beard controlled the squadron’sfight through the multiple, simultaneous ambushes extended over 20km. Suddenly, a large explosion twisted Bair completely around in thetrack commander’s hatch. As he fell back into the track, Beard wasdragging him down into the compartment. Beard breathed a sigh ofrelief as Bair glanced up at him; he had expected Bair’s face to “notstill exist.” Bair offered a few choice words and climbed back up intothe hatch. The RPG that was marked for their track had collided witha tree a few feet off the roadside, saving Bair and possibly the rest ofthe vehicle’s occupants.3-7 Cavalry Unit Historyquickly. Lieutenant Colonel Terry Ferrell remembered that the all-night fight through the ambushes“traumatized everyone.” According to Ferrell, “We do own the night, but we also trainto own the night with standoff. When you have the guys crawling up beside your tank and youare using the 9 mil (Beretta 9 mm pistol) or stepping off to draw an AK to shoot somebody,your average tank crew does not train to do that.” 52The fighting at RAMS,at the escarpment, and onthe way to FLOYD demonstratedthat the enemywould fight with courage,even dedication, but notwith great skill. For onething the enemy did notshoot accurately. They did,however, fill the air withbullets. The Iraqis literallyattacked in waves againstfar-better-armed coalitionunits. On the other hand, theenemy reached sound conclusionson where to fight asat the escarpment. They alsoused other techniques suggestingmore sophisticationM88A1 Recovery VehiclesThe M88A1 fleet issued to 3-7 CAV could not perform asthe unit’s tank recovery unit. It was too slow and prone tobreakdown to tow M1 tanks over desert terrain for anythingmore than a very short distance. [Doctrine for recoveryrequires units equipped with the M88A1 to use tandem towingvehicles to tow M1 tanks.] The unit performed like-vehicletowing of disabled equipment, with M1s towing M1s. . . .Inthe vicinity of An Najaf, one squadron unit had three M1tanks mired after the shoulder of the road along a canal theywere traveling on collapsed and mired the tanks in the canal.The unit could not free the tanks with like-vehicle recoveryor the unit’s M88s. I directed a D9 bulldozer operator fromthe engineer unit attached to the squadron to fill in the ditch,creating a ramp so the tanks could drive out of the canal.Interview with Chief Warrant Officer 4 Rocky Yahn,3-7 CAV Squadron Maintenance Officerthan some might credit them with, including turning city lights on and off to signal an ambushof the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. Grimsley observed that at night, as the Americansapproached towns, the lights went off, suggesting the Iraqis perceived they might have an170