On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Fort Irwin “replicated” the enemy in accordance with that estimate. In a manner of speaking,Grimsley’s troops fought the escarpment fight before ever reaching Iraq. Major Mike Oliver,TF 3-69 AR’s operations officer, noted that his task force performed much better against theactual enemy they confronted on the escarpment than they had against the “opposing forces”provided by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin in the fall of 2002. 15But this anecdote simply does not tell the whole story. No one anticipated that theparamilitary forces would fight with the fanaticism they showed or that the “mother of allsandstorms” would strike. Training, even in anticipation of highly specific conditions such asthe escarpment, cannot alone produce the agility, innovation, and adaptation that the Army’stroops and leaders showed. Soldiers from private to general demonstrated “values” the Armyhas sought to inculcate, including loyalty to each other, integrity, and courage. These must betaught and learned. Similarly, the tolerance for ambiguity that unit commanders showed—thatability to understand that even with great technology there are some things you cannot know,is also, at least in part, learned.Toleration for ambiguity, innovation, and technical competence all contribute to effectivedecision making. But while sound decision making is necessary in effective leaders, it is notsufficient. The ability to lead and motivate stems from many factors, including talent. Buteven talented leaders can be taught how to become more effective. The Army’s leaders in OIFshowed they understood their business, could motivate troops, respected troops, and handledthemselves with the courage, candor, and competence their troops expected. Examining howthe training and education system in the Army and in the joint community contributed both toeffective leadership and decision making will be an important component of helping US forcesmaintain the edge.Battle Command—Enabling Commanders to Lead from the FrontThe ability to describe what is to be done, to visualize the end state, and to direct executionare components of the art and science of battle command. Art implies, among other things,intuition and a feel for the battlefield. Because combat operations remain, even in the early 21stcentury, human endeavors, commanders must also be able to assess the battlefield for themselvesand inspire and direct important actions. The best commanders, therefore, also are good leaderswho lead from the front. The science of command lends itself more to the technical competencesoldiers expect in their commanders, but also to the means of effecting control in execution.Lieutenant General Wallace developed and executed a battlefield circulation scheme to visiteach of his divisions daily to see his commanders and look them in the eye. When LieutenantGeneral McKiernan needed to make critical decisions, he went forward, as he did on his visitto Jalibah on 28 March, to see and hear from his commanders personally. To lead from the frontand to command effectively, commanders need support. They need the tools to communicatetheir vision and aids to command that enable or support control and direction. They need themeans to communicate and they need the support staff to assist in assessing enemy intentions,planning operations, and directing execution. The following sections discuss aids to command,battle command on the move, and the way in which staffs operate and organize to facilitatebattle command.393