On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

two types of forces closer together continued to build. By Operation ANACONDA, specialforces, conventional, and interagency leaders were sitting side-by-side planning, coordinating,and executing operations. It was not always smooth or elegant, but soldiers on both sidesworked to tear down the barriers between SOF and conventional soldiers.Integration continued to improve during the planning for OIF. Collaborative planningbetween Third Army and USSOCOM units began early in 2002 and continued right throughthe campaign. The Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) embedded inV Corps served as an active participant in all V Corps planning, preparation, and deployment.Throughout 2002 and the spring of 2003, 3rd ID brigades and special forces units executingOperation DESERT SPRING worked and trained closely together. When the time came forexecution, 3rd ID and its SOF colleagues were ready. As other conventional units arrived, thepattern of integration continued.In the 1990s the mark of success for an Army unit was to conduct a successful trainingrotation at a Combat Training Center, combining heavy and light forces (called a heavy-lightrotation). Conventional units believed that heavy-light rotations were the most complicated,but critical combination of forces because the capabilities and requirements of the two areso different. Eventually, though, training and employing diverse units, most of which hadno chance to train together at home, became second nature. In OIF, the Army illustrated thebenefits of heavy-light training.Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq raised the bar for integration. In the future, effectiveintegration must be the standard. This will require cultural, doctrinal, organizational, andtraining changes across the Army. In that regard, there is much to be learned from the executionof OIF in terms of SOF and conventional force integration and interoperability. Some lessonsare subtle, some are easily discerned; all must be resourced and translated into action if trueintegration is to be achieved.The effective conduct of SOF-conventional operations requires trained leaders and units.For example, battalion and brigade pre-command courses are already effective at teachinghow to integrate combined arms and contributed significantly to the lethality of Army brigadecombat teams in OIF. Adding instruction on integrating SOF and conventional forces wouldbuild on that success. OIF experience suggests that captains’ education also ought to addressthe tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to integrate these operations.Effective joint SOF and Army conventional operations are dependent on common doctrineand training, understood and practiced by all. Currently, Army doctrine does not providefor integrated operations. For example, FM 3-90, Tactics, fails to address joint SOF andconventional operations for offensive or defensive operations. This lack of common doctrinecan have disastrous effects. In OIF the SOF and conventional units’ approaches to planning andexecution varied, requiring adjustments on the way. As joint and Army doctrine developmentmoves forward, it must draw SOF and conventional forces toward a common language andintegrated operations. Training together at the CTCs can further the cause of integrating SOFand conventional operations. Presently, conventional and SOF elements rarely train together.Although Army SF units regularly train at the CTCs, their training rotations are usually notlinked directly with conventional units. Training together will produce the trust and confidencerequired to assure that successful integration is the rule rather than the exception.404