On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

NOTES1. General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., “TRADOC at 20: Where Tomorrow’s Victories Begin,” ARMY, October1993, 51.2. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little,Brown, and Company: 1993), 64-80.3. General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method (New York: TimesBusiness, Random House, 1996), 5.4. Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC Press,1997), xv.5. Gordon R. Sullivan, General, CSA, SUBJECT: “Reshaping Army Doctrine,” Memorandum for LieutenantGeneral Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 29 July 1991.6. Personal Message for General Galvin, et al. (senior Army commanders), “Louisiana Maneuvers, 1994,”DTG 091415MAR92.7. John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1990),26-27.8. Ibid., 21-27.9. US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, June 1993, vi.10. Romjue, 113-127.11. US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 6-23; and Romjue, 113-128.12. TRADOC Pamphlet, Battle Labs, Maintaining the Edge (Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1994). On thedevelopment of the LAM-TF, see Hope is not a Method and General Jack N. Merritt, US Army, Retired, “A TalkWith the Chief,” ARMY, June 1995, 14-24. The major directives to establish these efforts include General Sullivan’sletter to General Franks dated 29 July 1991; General Sullivan’s letter to the field titled “Force XXI,” dated 12March 1994; and General Sullivan’s memorandum titled “Force XXI Experimental Force Prime Directive,” dated14 February 1995. This last memorandum took the effort from concepts in labs to a fielded force experimentationprogram that ultimately resulted in fielding and certifying 4th ID as the first “digital” division. Force XXI is thecarrier that produced the digital battle command systems that are discussed in this study.13. General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., US Army, Retired, telephonic interview conducted by Colonel GregoryFontenot , US Army, Retired, 12 August 2003.14. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 did a first-rate job of describing the future strategic environment and therange of operations that the Army would have to conduct. The manual also identified places where the conductof warfare seemed to be changing and accounted for those changes by advancing concepts such as depth andsimultaneous attack. FM 3-0, which succeeded the 1993 edition, built on that work and the discussion that followed.Finally, experience in operations enabled the realization of the vision posited in the 1993 FM 100-5 in FM 3-0,published in 2001.15. Steven L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other Than War,” Military Review, December 1993, , accessed 11 February 2003.16. Allen Buchanan, “Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law,” in Robert McKim and JeffMcMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 301-323.17. US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Bosnia-Herzegovina After-Action Review Conference Report (CarlisleBarracks, PA: US Army War College).18. There are a number of good sources for understanding the history of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Ofthese, Susan L. Woodward’s Balkan Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995) is perhapsthe most comprehensive. See also Lori F. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in InternalConflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 22-26; Peacekeeping and the Challenge of CivilConfl ict Resolution; David A. Charters, ed. (Center for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1994);William J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” in William J. Durch,ed. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996),199-200; Max G. Manwaring, “Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia,” PARAMETERS, Winter 1998.19. Certification of the 4th ID occurred in two parts. In the spring, Phase 1 put a brigade of the division througha certification exercise at the NTC. The division executed Phase 2 at Fort Hood in October 2001. It was a long roadfrom inception to combat ready. From the time that General Sullivan issued his prime directive in March 1995 untilthe conclusion of the final certification exercise in October 2001, the division either served as a test bed or wasfielding and testing objective equipment for Force XXI. It took six long years, but it produced thoroughly testedsystems that are fielded widely in the Army.27