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Refutation of Samkhya – Yoga Philosophy

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CHAPTER IIREFUTATION OF SËMKHYA-YOGAPHILOSOPHIES22


CHAPTER - IIREFUTATION OF SËMKHYA – YÕGA PHILOSOPHIESIntroduction23


The S¡mkhya –<strong>Yoga</strong> schools <strong>of</strong> philosophy are considered as apair – system in Indian philosophy .One important difference betweenthem is that S¡mkhya does not accept the existence <strong>of</strong> God , while <strong>Yoga</strong>accepts it as the 26 th principle apart from the 25 principles accepted byS¡mkhya.S¡mkhya <strong>Philosophy</strong>S¡mkhya philosophy is systematized by the great sage Kapila. It isconsidered to be the most ancient <strong>of</strong> all the philosophical schools.S¡mkhya accepts three pram¡¸¡s: pratyakÀa, anum¡na and ¡gama. Theyaccept twenty five principles.24


Theory <strong>of</strong> cause and effectThe S¡mkhya-s accept the theory <strong>of</strong> Pari¸¡mav¡da, according towhich there is a real transformation <strong>of</strong> the cause into the effect, likewood being transformed into a chair andmilk into curd. Theydeveloped elaborate explanations to establish that the cause changesinto the effect. They gives five pro<strong>of</strong>s for the establishment <strong>of</strong> this theory.They are, asadak¡ra¸a, upadanagrahana, sarvasambhav¡bh¡va, ¿¡ktasya¿¡kyak¡ra¸a, and k¡ra¸abh¡va. Through these pro<strong>of</strong>s, they say that aneffect must already exist in its cause before it is produced 1 . By means <strong>of</strong>25


these arguments the S¡mkhya philosophers established the theory <strong>of</strong>Pari¸¡mav¡da.According to this theory, an effect is already existent inunmanifested form in its cause.The S¡mkhya philosophers hold the viewthat no one can convert non-existence into existence nor can that whichexists be entirely destroyed. For example, gold ornaments such as ringsand earrings are not different from the gold used to make them.Unconscious and Conscious Principle (Prak¤ti and PuruÀa)(1) Prak¤ti26


The S¡mkhya philosophy accepts the ultimate cause <strong>of</strong> the worldas Prak¤ti.Prak¤ti is neither atomic substance nor consciousness, but itpossesses the three gu¸¡s-sattva, rajas and tamas. The balancedcondition <strong>of</strong> sattva, rajas and tamas is called prak¤ti-“satvarajas-tamogu¸¡n¡m s¡my¡vastha prak¤ti” 2 . One can only imagine a state inwhich all nature is balanced and there is no levity, no motion, noheaviness, no light, no darkness, no opposing forces, in which theimagination itself, being a product <strong>of</strong> the mind, is dissolved. TheS¡mkhya philosophers describe this state as uncaused, unmanifested,eternal, all-pervading, devoid <strong>of</strong> effect-producing actions, without asecond, independent and partless.27


(2)PuruÀaS¡mkhya is a dualistic philosophy. It aspects two realities, that is,PuruÀa and Prak¤ti. PuruÀa is a conscious principle, both the subject<strong>of</strong> knowledge and object <strong>of</strong> knowledge. S¡mkhya <strong>of</strong>fers five argumentsto prove the existence <strong>of</strong> PuruÀa.They are, samgh¡ta par¡rthatva ,trigu¸¡diviparyaya, adhiÀt¡na, bhokt¤bhavat and kaivaly¡rtham prav¤tti 3 .Through these arguments, they say that there must be a consciousprinciple. That conscious principle is PuruÀa.(3) Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Existence <strong>of</strong> many selves.. The S¡mkhya-s accept the existence <strong>of</strong> many selves. They give fivereasons for approving the existence <strong>of</strong> manyselves. They are,28


jananamara¸akara¸an¡m pratiniyama, ay£gapatprav¤tti and traigu¸y¡diviparya 4 .Based on these reasons, they accept the plurality <strong>of</strong> selves that areeternal and intelligent. S¡mkhya accepts two realities,prak¤ti andpuruÀa. Prak¤ti is the material cause <strong>of</strong> the world. PuruÀas are manypure concious intelligent entities who are not subject to change. It isfrom the interaction <strong>of</strong> these two principles that evolution occurs.Thatmeans, the mahattattva is originated from prak¤ti, the ahamk¡ra isoriginated from mahattattva, from ahamk¡ra the sense organs, thephysical organs, five tanmatr¡s and manas are originated, from the a29


called liberation.According to them, the liberation is <strong>of</strong> two kindsj¢vanmukti and videhamukti 6 .The liberation attained in one’s lifetime is called j¢vanmukti . Init, a person continues his existence in this world as a liberated being.He enjoys the worldly objects until he lasts in his body . When all thesamsk¡ras are finished , then the last breath goes <strong>of</strong>f his body and he issaid to enter into videhamukti, which is the liberation after death.The concept <strong>of</strong> God.The S¡mkhya philosophers do not talk about God because theywanted to teach human beings to be independent and courageous so31


that they would explore all the potentials hidden within. So theS¡mkhya philosophers do not accept the existence <strong>of</strong> God.<strong>Yoga</strong> <strong>Philosophy</strong>The practical aspect <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya is the yoga system. Pataµjali wasthe first sage to systematise the yoga philosophy. The yoga system ishighly practical. It discusses the nature <strong>of</strong> mind, its modifications,impediments to growth, afflictions, and the method for attaining thehighest goal <strong>of</strong> life that is kaivalya. This method is described in eightsteps and it is known as AÀta´gayoga.The Concept <strong>of</strong> God.32


Pataµjali accepts the existence <strong>of</strong> God: kle¿akarmavibh¡ga¿ayairapar¡m¤ÀaÅ puruÀavi¿eÀaÅ ¢¿varaÅ 7 . Thisconception <strong>of</strong> god can give hope to human beings, for, when oneovercomes all afflictions and does not allow himself to identify with hisKarmas andwhen one becomes free from all samsk¡ras, then hebecomes liberated and merges into God consciousness.According to Pat¡µjali, the individual in essence is God. There isonly one God. It is ignorance that creates duality from the one singlereality called God. When ignorance is dissolved into the light <strong>of</strong>knowledge, all dualities are dissolved and full union is achieved. When33


one overcomes ignorance, duality dissolves and he merges with theperfect single being. That perfect single being always remains perfectand one.<strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya <strong>Philosophy</strong>áa´kara considers S¡mkhya as the chief opponent (pradh¡namalla). In the words <strong>of</strong> Dr. Shivkumar, áa´kara is the chief critic <strong>of</strong>S¡mkhya. The criticism <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya as <strong>of</strong>fered by other commentators <strong>of</strong>the Brahmas£tra does not display any excellence <strong>of</strong> arguments incomparison to those by áa´kara 8 . Jerald James also explains: “áa´kara inBrahmas£trabh¡Àya gives more detailed and precise attention to the34


criticism <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya than he does to any other system, and is influentialin the sense that áa´kara’s criticism not only encompasses most <strong>of</strong> theimportant critical issues in classical S¡mkhya in its own time but isconsidered to be a locus classicus for the criticism <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya byorthodox thinkers down to the present day” 9 . But the crucial problemfor the interpreter <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya is that there is no extant classicalS¡mkhya text. In the classical period, there was a series <strong>of</strong> commentarieson the S¡mkhyak¡rika, and the latter is not a polemical text in themanner <strong>of</strong> classical philosophical á¡stra. Dasgupta says: “The basictext S¡mkhyas£tra was not referred to by any writer until it wascommented upon by Aniruddha in the 14 th century A. D. The present35


work S¡mkhya¿£tra contains the refutation <strong>of</strong> other philosophicaldoctrines” 10 .Therefore, we can say that the present work <strong>of</strong>S¡mkhyas£tra was written after the other S£tras . So áa´kara takes theS¡mkhyak¡rika as the basic text to refute the S¡mkhya concept. AllenThrasher has noted that áa´kara’s presentation <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya clearlyshows that the S¡mkhyak¡rika <strong>of</strong> Ì¿varak¤À¸a was evidently a potentrival in Br¡hma¸ical philosophical circles at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the 8 thcentury 11 .áa´kara does not totally reject the S¡mkhya concepts. He has noobjection in accepting the S¡mkhya theories such as the important36


nature <strong>of</strong> the soul which does not contradict the position <strong>of</strong> Advaita, butthey do not accept the plurality <strong>of</strong> self. According to KollaChenchulakÀmi, “though the followers <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya –yoga and also <strong>of</strong>the áa´kara school <strong>of</strong> Advaita Ved¡nta do subscribe to Satk¡ryav¡da, anddiffer in their explanation <strong>of</strong> the production which involves real change(pari¸¡ma) <strong>of</strong> the cause into effect, the followers <strong>of</strong> the áa´kara school <strong>of</strong>Advaita Ved¡nta hold the view that production in the ultimate analysisis only illusory (vivarta) and does not involve real change(pari¸¡ma)” 12 .The Advaitins do not accept Pradh¡na as the cause <strong>of</strong> theuniverse 13 (Pradh¡nak¡ra¸av¡da).37


The main points <strong>of</strong> refutation <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya are: -1. Pradh¡na is the cause <strong>of</strong> the universe. 2. The term ¡nandamayarepresents pradh¡na. 3. The term akÀara represents pradh¡na. 4. Theterm avyaktarepresents pradh¡na. 5. The term sat representspradh¡na.6.The term aj¡ represents pradh¡na. 7. <strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the concept, theresting place <strong>of</strong> heaven and earth in Pradh¡na. 8. The theory <strong>of</strong>PuruÀabahutva. 9. Authority <strong>of</strong> Sm¤tis . 10. <strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong>Ì¿vara. These are the main grounds for by áa´kara to criticize S¡mkhyaphilosophy.38


1 Pradh¡na as the cause <strong>of</strong> the Universe.In ÌkÀatyadhikara¸a <strong>of</strong> Brahmas£tra, áa´kara primarily aims atdisproving the scriptural basis <strong>of</strong> the theory <strong>of</strong> Pradh¡na <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya. Inthat adhikara¸a, he discusses the following passage <strong>of</strong> theChandogyopaniÀad – “s¡deva somyedamagre¡s¢dekamevadvit¢yam”,“tadaikÀata bahu sy¡m praj¡yeya tattejo¿¤jata” 14 . According toS¡mkhya, the word sat stands for the cause <strong>of</strong> the universe, and theterm idam in this passage denotes modifications <strong>of</strong> the ultimate causeconditioned by names and forms. The passage implies that the worldwas existent in the form <strong>of</strong> sat before its evolution. Therefore, the sat39


denotes the causal form <strong>of</strong> the manifold world. This can be explainedby the S¡mkhya theory <strong>of</strong> Satk¡ryav¡da 15 . According to this theory, theeffect is the attainment <strong>of</strong> another condition by a causal substance.According to Advaitins, áruti speaks <strong>of</strong> sat as the ultimate self.Sat is said to be the fundamental entity which enters into objects interms <strong>of</strong> j¢v¡tman . According to áruti, the world originated from sat .“tasm¡dva etasm¡d¡tmanaÅ ¡k¡¿aÅ sambh£taÅ 16 ”.So, the pradh¡na <strong>of</strong>S¡mkhya is not the cause <strong>of</strong> the world .The S¡mkhya-s argue that the pradh¡na is all – knowingnessbecause it has Sattva quality. The sm¤ti also says that “Sattva brings40


the knowledge” 17 . áa´kara refutes this by saying that Sattva is notpredominant in pradh¡na, because the state <strong>of</strong> equilibrium <strong>of</strong> threegu¸¡-s is called pradh¡na . If we accept that pradh¡na is capable <strong>of</strong>producing knowledge, then the two gu¸¡-s (Rajas and Tamas) must beequally capable <strong>of</strong> retarding knowledge. So Sattva will make it allknowing,and others (Rajas and Tamas) will make it partly knowing ,which is a contradiction. Besides, if the Sattva is not illumined by thewitnessing soul, there is no chance to say that it is knowledge. TheS¡mkhya’s pradh¡na is insentient in nature. The insentient pradh¡nahas no power to illumine. Therefore the omnnisicience <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na does41


not happen 18 . So áa´kara does not accept the Pradh¡nak¡ra¸av¡da <strong>of</strong>S¡mkhya.áa´kara says that the omniscient and sentient Brahman is thecause <strong>of</strong> the universe. But the S¡mkhya-s have another objection againstthe causality <strong>of</strong> Brahman. They say that Brahman is not omniscient inits figurative sense. It is omniscient in its primary sense only. So, theomniscient Brahman is not the cause <strong>of</strong> the world. áa´kara refutes thisconcept by saying that the knowledge <strong>of</strong> Brahman is eternal. It doesnot depend upon any external thing such as instrument or object <strong>of</strong>knowledge. For example, in the case <strong>of</strong> the sun, the natural heat and42


light do not depend upon any external agency 19 . So the omniscientBrahman is the cause <strong>of</strong> the world. áa´kara says there is no scope for thecausality <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na in áruti. But S¡mkhya-s argue for the áruti basis<strong>of</strong> pradh¡na. In wordly experience, we can see that the qualities <strong>of</strong>sentient beings are figuratively spoken <strong>of</strong> as belonging to non-sentientobjects, like the sentence ‘k£lam pipat¢Àati’ (The bank wishes to fall)and áruti also says that the qualities <strong>of</strong> sentient beings are figurativelyascribed to fire, water, etc 20 . Therefore, the S¡mkhya-s argue that thepradh¡na is the cause <strong>of</strong> the universe. áa´kara rejects this concept bysaying that the árutis attribute acts <strong>of</strong> thinking to water, fire, etc.because they are dependent upon Brahman. In the context, the water43


and fire are identified with the Highest reality i.e., Brahman.The termsat in the passage from the CandogyopaniÀad; sadevasomyedamagreasit’ ityupakramya ‘tadaikÀata… tattejo-s¤jata ’21 –refers to the intelligent principle, the J¢va. The insentient pradh¡nacannot refer to an intelligent principle like the J¢va as its Self 22 .The S¡mkhya-s try to reject this objection (cause <strong>of</strong> the universe is sat)on the ground that the term ¡tman can be used in the secondary sense,as one person is figuratively called ¡tman <strong>of</strong> another man wherepurpose is accomplished by the former. A king calls the servant whostakes his life for the king, as his own Ëtman. In the same way,44


pradh¡na which executesall the purposes <strong>of</strong> puruÀa by way <strong>of</strong>contributing to its enjoyment (bhoga) and release (apavarga) may becalled ¡tman 23 .Sankara criticizes this device too. Ëtman (Brahman) is the cause<strong>of</strong> the universe. It is identical with the J¢v¡tman. Counsels likeknowledge tattvamasi 24are given to the disciple for attainment <strong>of</strong>liberation through the idea <strong>of</strong> non-difference between the disciple andthe Brahman. If the position that sat represents the pradh¡na isaccepted, the teachings would be falsely equating the two, i.e., nonsentientpradh¡na and sentient disciple, which are diametrically45


opposed to each other in nature. If the S¡mkhya view was true, árutiwould be regarded as teaching that soul is non-sentient, and this wouldprevent the possibility <strong>of</strong> release. The term Ëtman can be used in thefigurative sense. It can however, not lead to assume that figurative sense<strong>of</strong> word is applicable everywhere. Otherwise it will lead to a generalwant <strong>of</strong> confidence 25 . It is also not plausible to say that the same termËtman denotes sentient as well as non-sentient objects, because a worddoes not have many meanings 26 . Hence the term Ëtman primarilydenotes sentient objects and is applied to elements by a figurativeatribution <strong>of</strong> sentience to them. If the word Ëtman is used in two senses,the sense applicable in certain contexts cannot be ascertained without46


some determining attributive word. The fact that Ëtman is spoken <strong>of</strong> asthe self <strong>of</strong> ávetaketu is sufficient to decide that it does not refer topradh¡na which is non- sentient in nature 27 .áa´kara states that the S¡mkhya-s infer cause from commonproperties <strong>of</strong> effects. All the outward and inward effects are endowedwith common qualities <strong>of</strong> pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence theyshould have pleasure, pain and indifference as their cause, just as jar,dishes, etc. have clay as their common property. Clay is theUp¡danakara¸a <strong>of</strong> those things. The pleasure, pain and indifferenceconstitute the threefold pradh¡na. The pradh¡na which is essentially47


non-sentient and productive spontaneously evolves into itsmodifications to serve the purpose <strong>of</strong> puruÀa 28 .áa´kara argues that the existence <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na cannot beestablished inferentially. It is not conclusive enough to establish non-sentient pradh¡na as the cause <strong>of</strong> the universe. For example, the lump<strong>of</strong> clay cannot transform itself into a pot. Non-sentient objects withoutbeing guided by some sentient being, cannot produce a special form foraccomplishment <strong>of</strong> the purpose <strong>of</strong> the sentient being. The world withdifferent things, variegated objects, etc. cannot be created by non-48


sentient pradh¡na. The manifold yet special orderliness in universeleads to the conclusion contrary to the position <strong>of</strong> áa´kara 29 .The cause is tw<strong>of</strong>old, Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a and Nimittak¡ra¸a.Consequently, the effect has two sets <strong>of</strong> properties:those derived fromthe Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a, like acetanatva and m¤d¡tmakatva, and thosecaused by the nimittak¡ra¸a like the vi¿iÀtaracan¡ as is evident in thejar. S¡mkhya highlights the properties <strong>of</strong> up¡danak¡ra¸a and argues infavour <strong>of</strong> the non-sentient nature <strong>of</strong> the cause. We are not, however,bound to rely upon the properties <strong>of</strong> Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a <strong>of</strong> world. Relying49


upon the properties <strong>of</strong> Nimittak¡ra¸a we may argue for the sentientnature <strong>of</strong> the cause 30 .Moreover, the logical reason put forward by S¡mkhya is notvalid. It is not proved that individual objects are <strong>of</strong> the pleasure, painand indifference. The feeling <strong>of</strong> pleasure, pain etc is internal and isaccessioned by the objects according to the mental disposition <strong>of</strong>sentient beings. This is why, even though the objects like sound etc.remain the same, the particular feeling <strong>of</strong> pleasure, pain. etc. isexperienced differently by different people 31 .50


The theory that all finite objects originate from the combination<strong>of</strong> many materials does not prove the existence <strong>of</strong> Pradh¡na as theultimate cause <strong>of</strong> the universe. It involves the undesired contingency <strong>of</strong>admitting some cause for Gu¸¡-s also, as they are separate and infinite.The finiteness <strong>of</strong> gu¸¡-s is held to be unlimited in magnitude andconsequently omnipresent, there will be no disturbance then in thestate <strong>of</strong> equilibrium. Hence to explain the possibility <strong>of</strong> evolution, thefinite nature <strong>of</strong> Gu¸¡-s must be admitted. The reason that alone which iscapable produces the effect, also proves thesentient nature <strong>of</strong> thecause, because no activity can be found in a non-sentient object. Theparticular nature <strong>of</strong> the relation <strong>of</strong> cause and effect also equally points51


to the causality <strong>of</strong> the sentient being. The relation <strong>of</strong> cause and effectthat exists in the case <strong>of</strong> things like couches, bed etc, can be createdonly with the help <strong>of</strong> a sentient agent 32 .The theory <strong>of</strong> Sv¡bh¡vikapari¸¡ma (spontaneous modification) <strong>of</strong>pradh¡na is also untenable. The S¡mkhya-s held that pradh¡na isautomatically transformed into effect as the grass, independent <strong>of</strong> anyinstrumental cause, is transformed into milk 33 . According to áa´kara,this analogy is not effective. The grass itself cannot transform intomilk.It changes into milk due to some other cause, i.e., when it issupervised by a sentient being. This is made evident by the fact that52


grass transforms into milk only when it is eaten by the cow and notwhen it is eaten by a bull. Moreover ,grass eaten by the cow does notchange into the horns <strong>of</strong> the cow; it is changed into only milk. So, thisanalogy does not prove the sv¡bh¡vikapari¸¡ma <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na 34 .According to áa´kara, the state <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na is a condition <strong>of</strong>balance <strong>of</strong> the three Gu¸¡-s (Sattva, Rajas, Tamas), which areindependent <strong>of</strong> each other and in a state <strong>of</strong> equilibrium before creation.This equilibrium is upset, when one Gu¸a becomes more predominantthan the other two. The equilibrium cannot be upset with the help an53


external force; there can be no origin <strong>of</strong> Mahat. Hence creation wouldbe impossible.The S¡mkhya-s say against the above concept that the Gu¸¡-s arenaturally unsteady. From this it follows that even during equilibriumthe Gu¸a-s exist in a state <strong>of</strong> potential divergence. Accordng to áa´kara,this also is refutable because, if we accept the above concept <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya,there can be no origin <strong>of</strong> Mahat. So áa´kara refuted thePradh¡nak¡ra¸av¡da <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya by saying that the sentient objectcannot be produced by the nonsentient principle like pradh¡na.2.The term sat represents pradh¡na54


áa´kara argues that the term sat 35 does not represent pradh¡na. Ifit had been intended to be so, the teacher might have made anendeavour to tell the disple thatPradh¡na is different from what isdenoted by sat in tattvamasi 36 . He might have asked the disciple todiscard his own self. The stand on sat or pradhana is taught as thehelping stage to reach correct connotation. For example a personintending to inform another as to which star is Arundhati, draws hisattention to near by star and asks him to shift his attention to realArundhati which is adjacent to the one seen first. In the present case,identity between denotation <strong>of</strong> the term sat and the self is established.Thus Pradh¡na cannot be the denotation <strong>of</strong> the term sat.55


If we accept pradh¡na the cause <strong>of</strong> the universe is denoted by theterm sat it would imply falsity <strong>of</strong> the statements like “all is known byknowing one 37 . According to the upaniÀads through the knowledge <strong>of</strong>one cause all its effects become known 38 . The knowledge <strong>of</strong> pradhanagives rise to knowledge <strong>of</strong> its effect through object <strong>of</strong> experience only.The subject experience which is not the modification <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na, willstill remain un-known since the knowledge <strong>of</strong> non-sentient pradh¡nacannot generate the knowledge <strong>of</strong> the intelligent soul 39 .áa´kara argues that in the state <strong>of</strong> deep sleep the Jiva is unifiedwith its our self (¡tman) called sat, Pradh¡na cannot be this self, as56


sentient cannot be unified with non-sentient pradh¡na. The difficultycannot be overcome by interpreting self (J¢va) as pradh¡na because itwill lead to the absurdity <strong>of</strong> resolving sentient self into non-sentientpradh¡na. More over, it will contradict the ¿ruti that the soul in thestate <strong>of</strong> suÀupt is resolved into sentient entity 40 .Therefore,the term sat denotes the sentient entity in which allsouls are resolved.3.Anandamaya does not represent pradh¡naThe S¡mkhy¡-s argue that in Tattir¢yopaniÀad passage “ tasm¡dva etasm¡d vijµanamay¡d anyotar¡tm¡nandamayaÅ” 41 , the term57


¡nandamaya denotes pradh¡na. Ënandamaya, being described as aninternal factor, can denote cause only and no effect. In this waypradh¡na seems to be referred to in the áruti 42 .According to áankara, the áruti speaks <strong>of</strong> the act <strong>of</strong> desire withreference to ¡nandamaya. Desire is the quality <strong>of</strong> a sentient being. Theact <strong>of</strong> desiring cannot be ascribed to the non-sentient pradh¡na. Thepassage <strong>of</strong>the UpaniÀad speaks about the union (yoga) <strong>of</strong> theindividual soul with the ¡nandamaya in the state <strong>of</strong> liberation. Theindividual self cannot merge into the non- sentient ¡nandamaya whichdoes not respresents pradh¡na 43 .58


1. The term akÀara does not represent Pradh¡naáa´kara establishes that the term akÀara in the followingB¤had¡ra¸yaka áruti doesnot refer to Pradh¡na. Kasmin nu khalv¡k¡¿aota¿ca prota¿ceti sahov¡caitad vai tadaksaram g¡rgi brahma¸aabhivadanty asth£lam ana¸u 44 .The S¡mkhya-s may argue that the term akÀara is said to be asupport <strong>of</strong> Pradh¡na, which is the general cause, and as such can besaid to be the ¡dh¡ra (support) <strong>of</strong> everything 45 . áa´kara says that theword akÀara in the áruti cannot denote pradh¡na. Because the árutispeaks <strong>of</strong> the art <strong>of</strong> command with reference to akÀara and such an act59


is not possible in the case <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na which is non-sentient innature 46 . the Non-sentient objects like clay are not capable <strong>of</strong>commanding the effect, jar and the like 47 .The passage which speaks <strong>of</strong>akÀara negates qualities <strong>of</strong> principles. Other than Brahman, pradh¡namay be designated as unseen etc but qualities like seen point to sentientprinciple and consequently negate pradh¡na which is non-sentient innature 48 .árut itself speaks <strong>of</strong> the act <strong>of</strong> seeing, hearing, knowing, etc., withreference to the cause <strong>of</strong> the universe. These acts are not applicable topradh¡na. So akÀara cannot represent pradh¡na.60


5.The term avyakta does not represent pradh¡naThe kathopaniÀad says: “mahatah param avyaktam avyakt¡tpuruÀah param” 49 . áa´kara attempts to establish that the termavyakta in this passage does not refer to the S¡mkhya concept <strong>of</strong>pradh¡na.According to S¡mkhya, the term avyakt¡ denotes theUpad¡nak¡ra¸a, <strong>of</strong> universe, i.e., pradh¡na, prak¤ti, avyakt¡. The termavyakt¡ is conventionally used in the sense <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na. The derivation<strong>of</strong> the term supports the view <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya. Etymologically, avyakt¡61


means that ‘which is not manifest’. This corresponds to pradh¡na <strong>of</strong>S¡mkhya which is devoid <strong>of</strong> sound and other qualities 50 .According to áa´kara, the meaning <strong>of</strong> the word avyakt¡ can beunderstood in two ways, etymologically and conventionally. The wordavyakt¡ is neither etymologically nor conventionally applicable topradhana. Etymologically ,the term avyakt¡ means that which is notvyakt¡ or manifest. It is applicable to anything which is subtle, thus itcannot be restricted to the pradh¡na <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya. This convention <strong>of</strong>S¡mkhya goes against the sense <strong>of</strong> the áruti. As regards the order <strong>of</strong>mentioning the categories, áankara states that the identity <strong>of</strong> objects62


cannot be proved by similarity <strong>of</strong> order <strong>of</strong> treatment, unless the identityis recognized independently. No sensible person, who comes to perceivea cow in place <strong>of</strong> a horse, comes to ascertain that what he is perceiving isin fact a horse 51 .S¡mkhya controverts this argument by stating that thekathopaniÀad itself speaks <strong>of</strong> Pradh¡na as the object <strong>of</strong> knowledge 52 .The qualities attributed to the object <strong>of</strong> knowledge in the áruti are thequalities which are ascribed to pradh¡na by áamkhya. áa´kara refutedthis point.According to him, that which is referred to in such passagesis not pradh¡na . The subject matter <strong>of</strong> this passage is the Supreme self.63


In all the statements <strong>of</strong> the UpaniÀads, such attributes as soundless etc.are connected with the self alone. Pradh¡na is neither spoken <strong>of</strong> asobject <strong>of</strong> knowledge nor is said to be endowed with qualities mentionedin the áruti. If the passage is regarded as referring to Pradh¡na it willnot improve the position <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya. The S¡mkhya-s do not mentionthat one becomes free by knowing Pradh¡na only, but they connect thatresult rather with the recognition <strong>of</strong> the intelligent self (puruÀa). Thusthe áruti passages in no way prescribe the knowledge <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na forattainment <strong>of</strong> liberation 53 . So the word avyakt¡ also does not denotepradh¡na for the terms in áruti are not used in the technical sense asdecided upon by S¡mkhya. In the case <strong>of</strong> Mahat, it is interpreted by64


S¡mkhya as the first evolute <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na. In áruti, it is used in quite adifferent sense as the term is used in connection with the highest self 54 .Similarly, the term avyakt¡ also cannot denote the technical sense <strong>of</strong>pradh¡na in áruti.6. The term aj¡ does not represent pradh¡naThe S¡mkhya argues that the term aj¡ in the following upaniÀadportion denotes pradh¡na.“aj¡mek¡m lohita¿uklak¤À¸¡mbahv¢Å praj¡Å s¤jam¡n¡m sar£p¡h65


ajohyeko juÀam¡¸onu¿eteJah¡tyen¡m bhuktabhogamajonyaÅ 55”Accoding to them ,the three adjectives <strong>of</strong> aj¡ denote the threegu¸¡-s <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na. Rajas is symbolised by lohit¡ on account <strong>of</strong> itscolouring and influencing quality. The Sattv¡ is indicated by ¿uklabecause itis <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> light and k¤À¸a signifies tamas onaccount <strong>of</strong> its covering and obscuring property. The state <strong>of</strong> equipoise,i.e., prak¤ti is expressed through qualities <strong>of</strong> its avayavadharm¡s(components). The word aj¡ 56 means unborn and refers to pradh¡na inits derivative sense pradh¡na, which produces manifold effects <strong>of</strong>66


uniform nature, in so far as they are endowed with the three gu¸¡-s, isuncaused and is the cause <strong>of</strong> everything. The second half <strong>of</strong> the verseunder consideration speaks <strong>of</strong> two unborn principle. Of the two unbornprinciples, one is deluded by indiscrimination which falsely identifiesitself with prak¤ti and is considered itself as the experiencer <strong>of</strong> pleasureand pain. The other puruÀa, whose power <strong>of</strong> discrimination has beenaroused after enjoying her discards aj¡(prak¤ti) and attains liberation 57 .This provides scope for the ¿rutipram¡¸ya <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya.According to the Advaitins, the passage itself is incapable <strong>of</strong>justifying the philosophical position. The term aj¡ denotes different67


principles 58 . The passage contains no special characteristic to enable theterm aj¡ to signify pradh¡na and to exclude its other possibleconnotations. Its purpose and the context <strong>of</strong> the passage do not favourto S¡mkhya to áruti without consideration <strong>of</strong> its context, purpose etc.The passage afterwards speaks <strong>of</strong> power <strong>of</strong> the highest Lord 59 . Thesubsequent passages also describe the same on the ground <strong>of</strong> thegeneral context. We may conclude that no entity independent <strong>of</strong>Parame¿vara can be indicated by the term aj¡ 60 .7. <strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the concept, the resting Place <strong>of</strong> Heaven and Earth inPradh¡na68


According to áankara, the s£tra ‘n¡num¡nam atacchabd¡n¡m 61proves against that Pradh¡na is the resting place <strong>of</strong> heaven and earthmentioned in the MundakopaniÀad passage –“yasmin dyuÅ p¤thv¢c¡ntar¢kÀamotam manaÅ sahapr¡¸a¿ca sarvaiÅevaikam jµ¡t¡tman¡m anyav¡co vimuµcatham¤tasyaiÀasetuÅ” 62S¡mkhya may argue that the abode <strong>of</strong> heaven and earth isdeclared to be the bridge <strong>of</strong> immortality 63 . The bridge pre-supposes69


something else beyond it. Brahman cannot serve as the bridge, for,there is nothing to be beyond it. Pradh¡na being the cause <strong>of</strong> everything,can be the general abode.Advaitins criticize the stand <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya on the ground that thereis no word in the passage to denote pradh¡na. On the contrary, thereare several words indicating that this abode is the sentient principle.The MundakopaniÀad 64 describes AkÀara Brahman as the abode <strong>of</strong>heaven and earth 65 . The same is called the bridge <strong>of</strong> immortalitybecause it is the knowledge <strong>of</strong> the AkÀara Brahman, which leads toliberation 66 . The passage in the MundakopaniÀad, ‘brahmavit70


ahmaiva bhavati’shows that the subject matter <strong>of</strong> the wholeupaniÀad from beginning to end is this Brahman. Therefore, it is thesame Brahman which is spoken <strong>of</strong> as the abode <strong>of</strong> heaven and earth.2. <strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the theory <strong>of</strong> PuruÀabahutvaThe term puruÀa has been used in the Vedic literature to denoteboth the ¡tman which means the embodied being or personality, andthe supreme creator 67 . The author <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhyas£tra has dealt with thesein two separate s£tras, viz., s¡mkhata par¡rthatv¡t, and trigu¸¡diviparyay¡t 68 . According to S¡mkhya the puruÀ¡s are many and identicalin nature 69 . All puruÀ¡s are <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> pure consciousness, devoid71


<strong>of</strong> qualities and all pervasive in nature 70 . S¡mkhya puts five pro<strong>of</strong>s forestablishing puruÀabahutva. 71 According to S¡mkhya-<strong>Yoga</strong>, there is aseparate puruÀa for each individual,which provides enjoyment andliberation. Anima sen Gupta says that, “the first four arguments seek toprove the existence <strong>of</strong> the soul as the controller and enjoyer <strong>of</strong> the world<strong>of</strong> composite things 72 . The last argument is based on the observed facts<strong>of</strong> the world which is striving for freedom, and that itself is the Supremegoal. Dr. Radhakrishanan, says that, the puruÀ¡s have different senseorgans and motor organs and they undergo death and birth separately.If the soul were just one, the knowledge gained by one would mean theknowledge by all, i.e., liberation <strong>of</strong> all. The above argument strictly72


speaking, is not helping to prove the plurality <strong>of</strong> the puruÀa which isexplained in the K¡rika 73 .áa´kara negates this theory <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya in a logical way. Thetheory <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya implies confusion <strong>of</strong> the acts done by the beings andtheir fruits. The impressions <strong>of</strong> acts as well as their fruits in here withpradh¡na. Every puruÀa will equally be associated with happiness andsorrows <strong>of</strong> all puruÀ¡s 74 . The S¡mkhya-s may object to it by saying thatpradh¡na will evolve in a certain direction to cause the difference <strong>of</strong>actions in assigning them to different puruÀ¡s. The pradh¡nawillevolve for puruÀ¡s who are bound and will not effect the release. It will73


desist from a particular activity for a particular puruÀa. In thisway,there will be difference in respect <strong>of</strong> happiness and sorrows <strong>of</strong>puruÀ¡s 75 .áa´kara says, that the difference is not meant for explaining themotive <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na’s evolution. There should be some pro<strong>of</strong> for thedifference too. In the absence <strong>of</strong> such a pro<strong>of</strong> we cannot think <strong>of</strong> releasewhich presupposes such a difference 76 .The S¡mkhya-s may further argue thatthe unseen result <strong>of</strong>actions in a·¤Àa will regulate the experience <strong>of</strong> pleasure and pain.According to them, a·¤Àa or the unseen principle is religious merit or74


demerit acquired by the souls; it inheres not in the soul, but in thepradh¡na.The pradh¡na is common to all souls. So there is nothing t<strong>of</strong>ix that a particular a·¤Àa operates in a particular soul 77 .The resolution also cannot restrict the particular a·¤Àa<strong>of</strong>action toa particular person. They are produced from contact <strong>of</strong>internal organs with the soul. The soul, being pervasive, will come intocontact with all internal organs. So there is no restriction to balance thepleasure and pain.The S¡mkhya-s may further argue that the limitations can befurnished by space. The ¡tman is all-pervasive, and the particular75


experience <strong>of</strong> pleasure and pain will pertain to that part <strong>of</strong> the soulwhich comes into contact with the internal organ. It will involve furtherabsurdities. All the souls will permeate all bodies because there isnothing to restrict a particular body to a particular soul. There will bethe confusion <strong>of</strong> acts and their fruits. The supposition <strong>of</strong> parts <strong>of</strong> soulsimplies that two souls having the same potential results <strong>of</strong> acts mayexperience the results <strong>of</strong> acts by one body. The supposition <strong>of</strong> souls willfurther lead to the impossibility <strong>of</strong> enjoyments in heaven; the a·¤Àta iseffective in a particular place, i.e., the body, After , there is no body sothere is no enjoyment in heavenly world. Therefore soul, being devoid <strong>of</strong>a·¤Àta, cannot experience the fruit <strong>of</strong> a·¤Àa in heaven 78 .76


Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly pointed out that the S¡mkhyaarguments for the existence <strong>of</strong> puruÀa turn out to be pro<strong>of</strong> for theexistence <strong>of</strong> the empirical individuals and not <strong>of</strong> the transcendentalsubjects. Let us see the arguments that establish the multiplicity <strong>of</strong> thepuruÀa. The S¡mkhya system recognizes the plurality <strong>of</strong> puruÀ¡s.S¡mkhya argues that puruÀa is the spirit, the subject, the knower. It isneither body nor the mind, nor ego (ahamk¡ra) nor intellect (buddhi).It is not a substance which possesses the quality <strong>of</strong> consciousness as isheld by the system <strong>of</strong> Ny¡ya-Vai¿eÀika 79 . It is consciousness which ispure immutable.77


The S¡mkhya view <strong>of</strong> puruÀa is determined by the conception <strong>of</strong>¡tman in the UpaniÀads. It is without beginning or end, without anyqualities, soluble and omnipresent, an eternal seer, beyond the senses,beyond the mind, beyond the sweep <strong>of</strong> intellect, beyond the range <strong>of</strong>time, space and causality, which form the warp and wo<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the mosaic<strong>of</strong> the empirical world. It is unproduced and unproducing. Its eternityis not merely everlastingness, but immutability and perfection. It is <strong>of</strong>the form <strong>of</strong> consciousness (cidr£pa). PuruÀa is unrelated to prak¤ti. Itis a mere witness, a solitary, indifferent, passive spectator. áa´karaaccepts the S¡mkhya concept <strong>of</strong> the puruÀa as pure consciousness. Herefutes their concept <strong>of</strong> puruÀabahutv¡, because there is no pro<strong>of</strong> for78


the plurality <strong>of</strong> souls. According to áa´kara, there is no worldly exampleto support the all-pervasiveness <strong>of</strong> many entities. It can be controvertedon the basis <strong>of</strong> common experience.He states that there is only one Self.The plurality <strong>of</strong> selves is accepted by Advaita, as only a product <strong>of</strong>ignorance and not as a reality. The self, according to áa´kara is allpervassiveand eternal.9. <strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the authority <strong>of</strong> sm¤tisIn Sm¤tyadhikara¸a, there is a discussion about the authority <strong>of</strong>Sm¤tis, like Kapilasm¤ti (S¡mkhya), Pataµjalasm¤ti (yoga),Manusm¤ti, etc. There, the p£rvapakÀins raises the problem <strong>of</strong>79


sm¤tyanav¡k- ¡¿adoÀaprasanga 80 . If it be said that the Brahman is thecause <strong>of</strong> the world ,there would be the defect <strong>of</strong> leaving no scope forcertain Sm¤tis. The S¡mkhya-s argue for the validity <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhyasm¤ti.They say that the Sm¤tis and Tantr¡s are written by great sages likeKapila and accepted by the good people. The Sm¤tis <strong>of</strong> Kapila arecomposed from the standpoint <strong>of</strong> the fullest insight leading toliberation. The vedic passages should be interpreted in the light <strong>of</strong> theSm¤ti <strong>of</strong> Kapila which is primarily concerned with philosophicalknowledge. The Sm¤tis composed by eminent men like Kapila, Manu,etc, are the authentic source <strong>of</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> Vedic passages forthose who are unable to understand the meaning <strong>of</strong> the Ved¡s80


themselves.The Sm¤tis <strong>of</strong> Manu etc. find their aim fulfilled in layingdown the rules regarding religious duties and moral conduct. The sageKapila is extolled in áruti as possessing unobstructedknowledge.Therefore his opinion about the philosophical doctrines,should not be doubted. Moreover, the views <strong>of</strong> the authors <strong>of</strong> the Sm¤tisare supported by reason 81 . The theories propounded in the Sm¤ti <strong>of</strong>Kapila should be interpreted in the light <strong>of</strong> these árutis.The Advaitins deny the arguments <strong>of</strong> the P£rvapakÀins andargue that all the sm¤tis are not valid. According to áa´kara, if theparticular sm¤tis which propound the causality <strong>of</strong> Pradh¡na are81


accepted, the rest <strong>of</strong> the sm¤tis which declare the causality <strong>of</strong> Brahmanwill be irrelevant. In case <strong>of</strong> conflict <strong>of</strong> views among the Sm¤tis, thosewhich conform to áruti should be accepted 82 . áruti is the absoluteauthority regarding matters which are not cognized by perception andother means <strong>of</strong> empirical knowledge. The S¡mkhya-s say that the ¿rutishave to be interpreted in the light <strong>of</strong> the Sm¤tis. The argument that theviews <strong>of</strong> eminent sages like Kapila should surely be accepted is also notfaultless. It is not reasonable to question á¤uti on the basis <strong>of</strong> words <strong>of</strong>persons even though they may possess supersensuous powers, becausethe attainment <strong>of</strong> these powers depends upon religious duties enjoinedby áruti.82


áa´kara states that the interpretation <strong>of</strong> áruti, <strong>of</strong>fered by eminentsages like Kapila, should not be attached to any Sm¤ti without ceasingand should ascertain the truth on the basis <strong>of</strong> Sm¤tis based on árutis.Otherwise,the final decision regarding the ultimate reality will beunstable because there are different Sm¤tis holding different views. Asregards the mention <strong>of</strong> Kapila in áruti as possessing unobstructedknowledge, áa´kara says that there are several Kapilas in tradition (82) . Itcannot be ascertained ,which Kapila is praised in the árutis. Theexponent <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya (Kapila) is criticized by Mahabh¡rata for themultiplicity <strong>of</strong> souls 83 . Moreover, Kapila cannot be allowed tomonopolize learnedness. Manu, the author <strong>of</strong> a Sm¤ti, is also praised in83


the á¤uti and emphasizes the unity <strong>of</strong> the self which condemnsKapila’s view <strong>of</strong> multiplicity <strong>of</strong> souls. Thus, the authority <strong>of</strong> the Vedabeing direct and final, requires no further pro<strong>of</strong>. Hence the Sm¤ti <strong>of</strong>Kapila deserves no consideration in so far as it contradicts áruti.<strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yoga</strong> philosophy.áa´kara refutes the <strong>Yoga</strong> philosophy through the commentary <strong>of</strong>Brahmasutra-etena yogaÅ pratyuktaÅ 84 . In it, he says that by therefutation <strong>of</strong> the S¡mkhya Sm¤ti , it is to be understood that the <strong>Yoga</strong>Sm¤ti is also refuted 85 . Because, like the S¡mkhya philosophy, the <strong>Yoga</strong>philosophy also accepts the non-sentient pradh¡na as the cause <strong>of</strong> the84


world and the principles <strong>of</strong> Mahat and Ahamk¡r a re derived frompradh¡na. These concepts are contradictory to á¤uti. At the sametime,<strong>Yoga</strong> philosophy is spoken <strong>of</strong> in UpaniÀads likeáveta¿vataropaniÀad B¤had¡ra¸yakopaniÀad KathopaniÀad ,etc 86 .<strong>Yoga</strong> helps the concentration <strong>of</strong> mind and it is a means to knowledge.So <strong>Yoga</strong> Sm¤ti, being based on the árutis, is authentic. So áa´kara saysthat the portions which are in accordance with áruti are accepted byhim, and other portions which contradict áruti are unacceptable to him.Therefore, áa´kara refutedthe <strong>Yoga</strong> philosophy in a special adhikarana.(<strong>Yoga</strong>pratyuktyadhikara¸a.)<strong>Refutation</strong> <strong>of</strong> Ì¿vara85


The major difference between S¡mkhya and <strong>Yoga</strong> is about theirconcept <strong>of</strong> God. S¡mkhya does not accept the authority <strong>of</strong> God. So it iscalled nir¢¿vara S¡mkhya. But yogins accept authority <strong>of</strong> God. So theyare known as se¿vara S¡mkhya. According to their principles, God isthe ruler <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na and puruÀa. Pataµjali says that Ì¿vara is a specialkind <strong>of</strong> being, untouched by ignorance and products <strong>of</strong> ignorance , notsubject to karmas or the result <strong>of</strong> action: kle¿a karma vibh¡ga¿ayair-raparam¤tÀ¡Å puruÀa vi¿eÀaÅ 87 . Yogins, say that God is the ruler <strong>of</strong>pradh¡na. That is why Pataµjali describes God as a “special kind <strong>of</strong>Being”. Man is subject to the law <strong>of</strong> birth and death and the laws <strong>of</strong>karma. But Ì¿vara is unborn and undying. Man is subject to his86


s¡mskar¡s. Ì¿vara is free from s¡msk¡r¡s and desires. He is not involvedin the results <strong>of</strong> action. According to the yogins, the kaivalya meansliberation, the amalgamation <strong>of</strong> satt¡ and puruÀa.áa´kara refutes the above concept <strong>of</strong> God. He says that the Lord(Brahman) is both the material and efficient cause <strong>of</strong> the world. TheYogins view is that the Lord is the ruler <strong>of</strong> pradh¡na, which shows thatpradh¡na is different from him. This idea leads to inconsistency,because it makes the Lord partial to some and prejudiced against other,for some people are well <strong>of</strong>f in this world, while others are miserable.áa´kara says that the Lord cannot be accused <strong>of</strong> any partially. He directsthe individuals according to their merits and demerits earned in their87


previous experience <strong>of</strong> life just as the rain helps different seeds to sprouteach according to their nature. So the God is the efficient cause inbringing the latent tendencies <strong>of</strong> each individual to fruit 88 . Therefore,áa´kara says that God has no partiality. The scriptures declare eÀahyeva s¡dhu karma k¡rayati tam yamadha nin¢Àate 89 , and Pu¸yovaipu¸yena karma¸¡ bhavati p¡paÅ p¡pena 90 . Sm¤ti also says: that yeyath¡m¡m prapadyante tamstathaiva bhaj¡myaham 91If we accept the Lord as a “special kind <strong>of</strong> being”, that also isuntenable,because the puruÀa is admitted to be indifferent 92 .If we accept the concept that God is different from pradhana andpuruÀa. He cannot rule them unless it be through some relationship.88


But the relationship <strong>of</strong> conjunction is not possible because thepradh¡na, puruÀa and God are omnipresent and partless. So áa´karasays that the argument <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yoga</strong> about God is not acceptable. Accordingto Advaitins the relationship <strong>of</strong> God with the world is are <strong>of</strong>inexpressible identity, because it depends on the áruti, soyamdevataikÀata hant¡hamim¡stisro devata anenajiven¡tm¡namanupravi¿ya n¡mar£pe vy¡karav¡¸¢ti. t¡s¡m t¤v¤tamt¤v¤tamekaik¡m karav¡¸¢ti . 93 . So the <strong>Yoga</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> God is notaccepted by áa´kara.89


ResumeAccording to áa´kara, the S¡mkhya concepts are refutablebecause there are various contradiction in their principles. For example,sometimes S¡mkhya says that the senses are seven and again they aresaid to be eleven. In the case <strong>of</strong> tanm¡tr¡s, in some places they say thattanm¡tr¡s are derived from Mahat, and in another place they say thattanm¡tr¡s are derived from Ahamk¡ra. Sometimes they mention thatAntakara¸a are three in number and sometimes they mentionAntakara¸a as only one number. This contradiction <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya theorywith áruti and Sm¤ti is well known 94 . So áa´kara refutes the S¡mkhya90


philosophy. By the support <strong>of</strong> áruti, Sm¤ti and Yukti áa´kara refutedthe unacceptable concepts <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya and <strong>Yoga</strong>. áa´kara employesyukti on the basis <strong>of</strong> d¤À¡nta, ie, parallel instances available in ourdaytoday experience. According to him, through he ¡gama and¡gam¡nus¡ritarka, we can arrive at Brahman as the cause <strong>of</strong> the world.S¡mkhya believes that through inference we can know that pradh¡na isthe cause <strong>of</strong> the world. In refutation <strong>of</strong> this concept, áa´kara says thatanum¡na cannot give us any knowledge about the cause <strong>of</strong> the world.Because áruti says that the cause <strong>of</strong> the world is a sentient object. Thissentient objectBrahman has no connection with other means <strong>of</strong>knowledge. This is the view <strong>of</strong> áa´kara, whereas in S¡mkhya anum¡na91


has a major role to play in determining prak¤ti or pradhan as thecause <strong>of</strong> the world. This is a major difference between S¡mkhya andAdvaita.According to áa´kara, Brahman is the Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a andNimittak¡rana <strong>of</strong> the Universe. Words such as avyakta, akÀara, sat etc,used in the UpaniÀads do not represent the S¡mkhya concept <strong>of</strong>pradh¡na. They are not independent. Moreover, the plurality <strong>of</strong> puruÀais also unacceptable to the Advaitins, because áruti in no way admitsplurality. So, that theory also is denied by áa´kara with by the help <strong>of</strong>92


áruti, Sm¤ti and Yukti. Those doctrines <strong>of</strong> S¡mkhya which do not clashwith Advaita, are accepted by áa´kara.93


Notes and References1asadak¡ra¸adup¡nagraha¸¡tsarvasambhav¡bhad ¿aktasya ¿akyakara¸¡d k¡ra¸a bh¡v¡d ca satk¡ryam. Sa.Ka.92trigu¸amavivek¢viÀayaÅ s¡m¡nyam acetanamprasavadharm¢vyaktam,that¡ Pradh¡namTadvipar¢tastath¡ ca pum¡n Sa.Ka113 samkh¡ta par¡rthatv¡t trigu¸adiviparyay¡dadhiÀ¡nadpuruÀostu bhokt¤bh¡v¡d kaivaly¡rtham prav¤tte¿ca. Sa.Ka.174jananamara¸ak¡ran¡n¡m pratiniyamadayagapat prav¤tte- ¿catraigu¸ya viparyay¡ca puruÀab¡vutvam siddham Sa. Ka .94


5prakrterm¡h¡nstatohamk¡rastasm¡dga¸a¿caÀoda¿akaÅtasm¡dapiÀo·a¿ak¡t paµcebhyaÅ paµcabh£t¡ni. Sa.Ka.186 pr¡pte ¿ar¢rabhede c¡rit¡rthatv¡t aikantika-m¡tyantikam ubhayam kaivalyamapnoti Sa.Ka.687 Y.S,1.248 Dr. Shivkumar, S¡mkhya thought in the Br¡hma¸ical Systems <strong>of</strong>Indian <strong>Philosophy</strong> , p. 182.9 Jerald James Larson, Classical S¡mkhya , p. 209.10S. N. Das Gupta, A History <strong>of</strong> Indain <strong>Philosophy</strong> Vol. I,p. 22295


11Allen W. Thrasher, the Dates <strong>of</strong> Mandana Mi¿ra andáa´kara, p. 11712 Kolla chechulekshmi, The Concept <strong>of</strong> Pari¸¡ma in Indian <strong>Philosophy</strong>.P. 8813s¡mkhyaday¡stu pari¸istitam vastu pram¡¸antaraga-myamevetimany¡man¡Åpradh¡nidini k¡ra¸¡ntara¸y¡nu-mim¡n¡statparatayaivaved¡nta v¡ky¡ni yojayanti BSSB . 1.1.5.514 Ch. Up. 6.2.1. and 3.115 sataÅ sajjayate iti v¤ddh¡Å.S.K. p. 22316 Tai. Up. 3.196


17 satvat samjayate jµ¡nam. B.G.14.1618yatt£ktam sattva dharme¸a jµ¡nenasarvajµ¡mpradhanambhaviÀyat¢ti,tannopaphyate.nahipradh¡navasth¡yamgu¸a¡my¡tsatv¡dharmajµ¡namsambh¡v¡tnan£ktamsarvajaµ¡na¿aktimatvenasarvajµam bhaviÀyat¢ti. tad¡pinopaphyate yadigu¸¡s¡myesatisatvavyap ¡¿rayamjµ¡na¿aktim¡¿ritya sarvajµ¡mpradhanamucyeta,k¡mamrajastamovyap¡¿ra-yamapijµ¡napratibandhaka¿aktim¡¿ritya kimcijµamu-cyeta. apican¡s¡kÀik¡sattvav¤ttirj¡n¡tin¡bhidh¢yate.n¡-97


cacetanasyapradh¡nasyas¡kÀitvamasti.tasm¡danupapanmpradh¡nasya sarvajnatyam. BSSB 1.1.5.5.19nasaujµ¡nanityatvedoÀosti.jµ¡nanityatvejµ¡naviÀayaÅsv-¡tantryayapade¿onopapadhyataiticenna,pratatauÀ¸ya-prk¡¿pisavitari dahati prak¡¿ayatiti sav¢tatry vyapadeÀa dar¿nat. BSSB1.1.5.5.20‘tattejoaikÀata’‘t¡paikÀantaitic¡cetanayirapy¡ptejasosc-cetanavadup¡c¡ra dar¿an¡t. Ch.Up.6.2,34.21Ch.Up.6.98


22j¢vo hi n¡ma ctanaÅ ¿ar¢r¡dhyakÀaÅ pra¸¡n¡m dh¡rayita,tatprasiddhernirvacan¡cca.BSSB.1.1.5.6.23yadhi hyacetanam pradh¡nam saccabdav¡cyam tad¡s¢tigr¡hyenmumukÀu cetanam santamacatanositi. t¡t¡vipa-r¢tav¡di¿¡stram puruÀasy¡narth¡yetyapram¡¸¡m. BSSB. 1.1.5.7.24 Ch.Up.6.14.325 api ca kvacitgau¸¡Å ‘¿abdo’ d¤Àa iti naitavata ¿abdapram¡¸ake¡rtha gau¸¢kalpan¡ny¡ya, sarvatr¡n¡¿v-¡saprasa´g¡t. BSSB. 1.1.5.7.99


26yattuktam cetan¡cetanayoÅ sadh¡ra¸a ¡tma¿abdaÅ k¤tujvalanayorivajyoti¿abda iti, tanna, anekarth¡va¿y¡ny¡-yyatvat. Ibid.27prak¤tam tu sadiksit¤, s¡mn¢hita¿cetanaÅ ¿vetaket£Å, nahicetanasya ¿vetaketoracetan¡tma sambhavat¢tyavoc¡ma Ibid.28 yattadsukha duhkha moh¡tmakam sam¡nyam tatrigu¸am pradh¡namm¤dvat¡cetanam cetanasya puruÀ¡rthe sadhayitum svabh¡venaivavicitre¸a vic¡r¡tmana vivartata iti.BSSB 2.2.1.129 tatedam jagadakhilam p¤thvy¡di n¡n¡karmabhalopabho-gayogyamb¡hyam, adhy¡tmikam ca ¿¡r¢r¡di n¡n¡jat-yanvitampratiniyat¡vayaviny¡samanekakarmabhal¡nu-bhav¡dhiÀ¡nam100


d¤¿yam¡nam prajµ¡v¡dbhiÅ sambh¡vi-t¡tamaiÅ ¿ilpibhirmanasapy¡locayitu masakyam satkat-ham acedanam pradh¡nam racayet.Ibid.30ato racan¡nupatte¿ca hetorn¡cetanam jagatk¡ra¸amanu- m¡tavyambhavati.Ibid31nahi bahy¡dhy¡tmik¡n¡m bhed¡n¡m sukhadukhamoha-tmakatay¡nvaya upapadhyate, sukhadinam c¡nta-ratvaprat¢teÅ,¿abd¡d¢n¡m c¡tadr£patva prat¢teÅ. tan-nimittatva prat¢te¿ca.Ibid.101


32k¡ryak¡ra¸abh¡v¡stuprekÀap£rvakanirmit¡n¡m ¿ayan¡-san¡d¢n¡m·¤Àa iti nak¡ryakara¸abh¡v¡tb¡hyadhy¡tm-ik¡n¡m bhedan¡macetanap£rvakatvam ¿akyam kalp-ayitum .Ibid.33yath¡ t¤¸a pallavodak¡di nimitt¡ntaranirapekÀam sva-bh¡v¡devaks¢r¡dhy¡k¡rena parinamat¡ evampradh¡n-amapimah¡d¡dhy¡k¡re¸a pari¸amasyaa iti. BSSB. 2.2.1.5.34dhenvaiva hyupayuktam t¤¸¡di kÀ¢r¢bhavati na prah¢nama¸a·ud¡dhyupayuktam va yadi hi nirnimittametatsy¡ddhenu¿ar¢rasambandh¡danyatr¡pit¤¸¡di kÀ¢ribhavet. nacayath¡k¡mam m¡nuÀairna ¿akyam samp¡dayitum-ityet¡vata102


nirnimittam bhavati. bhavati hi kimcitk¡ryamm¡nuÀasamp¡dhyam kimcit daivasamp¡dhyam. manu-Ày¡ api¿aknuvantye vocitenop¡yena t¤¸a dyup¡d¡yakÀ¢ramm¡p¡tayayitumprabh£tam hi kÀ¢ram k¡mayama-naÅprabh£tam khasm dhenum c¡rayanti. tata¿ca prab-h£tam kÀ¢ramlabhanta. tasm¡nna t¤¸¡divat svabh¡vikaÅ pradh¡nasya pari¸¡maÅ.Ibid.35 sadeva somayedamagre¡s¢t. Ch. Up. 1.3.36yadhyan¡tmaiva pradh¡nam ‘saccabdav¡cyam’ s¡ ¡tma tattvamasiit¢hopatiÀam sy¡tsa tadupade¿a¿rava¸ada-n¡tmajµatay¡ ,103


tanniÀom ¡bh£titi mukhyam¡tm¡namum-upadidi¿kÀustasya,heyatvam br£y¡t. BSSB.1.1.5.8.37ekavijµ¡nena sarvavijµ¡tam pratiÀitam Ch.Up 6.38uta tamade¿amapr¡kÀyo yen¡¿rutam ¿rutam bhavaty-amatammatamavijµ¡tam vijµ¡tamitikatham nu bhagavaÅ sa ¡de¿obhavat¢tiyath¡ somyaikena m¤pin·ena sarva-mm¤¸mayamvijµ¡tam sy¡d v¡c¡rambha¸amvik¡ro n¡-madheyam m¤iketyevasatyam evam somya sa ¡de¿o bhavat¢ti. Ch. Up. 6. 1. 1 - 339naca satccabdav¡cye pradh¡ne bhogyapavargak¡ra¸eheyatven¡hyatvena va vijµ¡ta bhok¤vargo vijµ¡to bhavati,104


apradh¡navikaratv¡dbhokt¤vargasya tasm¡nna pradh¡-namsaccabdav¡cyam. BSSB.1.1.5.840 YeÀ¡ ¿rutiÅ svapit¢tyetatpuruÀasya lokaprasiddham n¡ma nirvakti.sva¿abdeneh¡tmocyate.yaÅprak¤ataÅsaccabdav-accyastamap¢tobhavantyapigato bhavat¢tyarthaÅ BSSB .1.1.5.941 Tai.Up.2.5 T.V42 s¡mkhya parikalpitam acetanam pradh¡nam ¡nandamay-atvenak¡ra¸atvena v¡pekÀitavyam BSSB.1.1.6.1843¡nandam brahma¸o vidv¡n nabibhedi kuta¿cana (Tai.Up 2.9) tatrapr¡k¿ar¢r¡dhyulpatterabhidÅy¡nam s¤jyam¡n-¡n¡m ca105


vik¡r¸¡ms¤ÀturavyatirekaÅ sarvavik¡ras¤Ài¿ca naparasm¡d¡tmano anyatropapaphyate. BSSB.1.1.6.16.44 Br.UP.3.8.7.845 sy¡detat k¡ryasya c¡tk¡ra¸¡dh¢natvamambar¡ntaghrti¤abhyupagamyate, pradh¡na k¡ra¸av¡dinoap¢yamupapadh-yate.BSSB.1.3.3.1046etasya v¡ akÀarasya pra¿¡sana g¡rgi s£ryacandramasau vidh¤tautiÀau. Br.up.3.8.9106


47pra¿¡sanam ca parame¿varam karma¸¡ cetanasya, pradh¡nasyapra¿¡sanam bhavati na hyacetananam gha¡dik¡ra¸¡n¡mm¤d¡d¢n¡m gha¡diviÀayam pra¿¡s-anamasti. BSSB.1.3.3.1148 tatr¡d¤Àatv¡divyapade¿aÅ pradh¡nasy¡pi sambhavati. d¤À¤tv¡divyapade¿astu na sambhavatyacetanatv¡t. BSSB.1.3.3.1249Katha Up. 1.3.1150yaduktam radh¡nasy¡¿abdatvam tadasiddham. k¡sucit-cc¡kh¡supradh¡nasamarpa¸¡bh¡s¡n¡m, sabd¡n¡m ¿r£yam¡¸atv¡t ataÅpradh¡nasya k¡ra¸atvam vedasidd-hameva mahadbhih107


parama¤Àibhih kapilaprabh¤tibhiÅ parig¤h¢tamiti prasajyate.BSSB. 1.4.1.151na ca kramam¡tras¡m¡ny¡tsam¡n¡rthapratipattirbhavat-iyasatitadr£paprapatyabhijµ¡ne.nahya¿vasth¡ng¡mpa¿-yanna¿voyamitya m£·o adhyavasyati. Ibid.52indriyebhyaÅ par¡ hyarth¡ arthebhya¿caparam manaÅ manasastupar¡buddhirbuddheratmamah¡n paraÅ maha-taÅparamavyaktamav yaktattpuruÀaÅ paraÅ. puruÀ¡nna paramkimcits¡ k¡À¡ s¡par¡gatiÅ. Katha. UP. 1.3 10, 11108


53nahi pradh¡nam¡tram nicayya m¤tyumukh¡t pramucyata itis¡mkhyairiÀyate. cetan¡tmavijµ¡n¡dhi m¤tyumukh¡t pramucyate ititeÀ¡mabhyupagamaÅ. Tasm¡nna pradh-¡nasy¡tra jµeyatvamavyakta ¿abdanirdistatvam v¡ BSSB 1. 4. 1. 5.54yath¡ mahatccabdaÅ s¡mkhyaiÅ s¡tt¡matrepi prathamaje prayuktona tameva vaidikepi prayoge abhidatte. BSSB 1. 4. 1. 755Sve. Up. 4-556 na j¡yata itycaja sy¡t.m£laprak¤tiravik¤tih ityabhyupag- am¡t. BSSB1.4.2.8109


57 anyaÅ punarajaÅ puruÀa ulpannavivekajµ¡no virakto jah¡tyenamprak¤tim bhukta bhogapavargo parityajati, mucyata ityarthaÅ.Ibid.58arvagkilascamas¡ £rdhvab£dhnaÅ Br. Up. 2.2.359ityasmin mantre sv¡tantrye¸¡yam n¡m¡sau camasobhi-pretati na¿akyate nir£payitum BSSB 1.4.2.860m¡y¡mtu prak¤tim vidhy¡nm¡yinam tu mahe¿varam iti yo yonimyonimadhitiÀtastyekaÅ (Sve. Up. 4.10,11) itica tasya ev¡vagam¡nnasvatantr¡ kacitprak¤tiÅ pradh¡nam n¡majanm¡ntre¸¡mn¡yata iti¿akyate vaktum. BSSB. 1.4.2.9110


61B.S. 1.3. 1.562Mun. Up. 2.2.563atra yadetadhyuprabh¤tin¡motatvavacanadayatanam kicidavagamyate,tatkim param brahma sy¡d¡hosvidart-h¡ntaramitisamdihyate. tatr¡rt¡ntaram kimapy¡yatanam sy¡diti pr¡ptam.Kasm¡t, am¤dasyaiÀa setuÅ iti ¿rava¸¡t. p¡rava¸kiÅ loke setuÅprakhy¡taÅ na ca parasya brah-ma¸aÅ p¡ravatvam¿akyamabhyupagantum, anatamap¡-ram (Br. Up..2.4.12) iti srava¸¡tarth¡ntare c¡yatane parig¤hyam¡ma¸e sm¤tiprassiddham111


pradh¡nam parig¤-h¢tayvam tasya k¡ra¸atv¡d¡yatanatvopapatteÅ.BSSB. 1.3.1.164puruÀa evedam vi¿vam karma tapo brahma par¡m¤tam iti.“Brahmaivedamam¤tam purast¡tbrahma pa¿c¡t bra-hmadakÀi¸¡ta¿cottare¸a” iti ca. Mun. Up. 2.2.11.65 sarvam brahmeti tu sam¡n¡dhik¡ra¸yam prapaµcapra-vil¡pan¡rtamnanekaresat¡pratip¡dan¡rtham. “sayatha saindhavakhanaanantanroab¡hyaÅ k¤tsno rasakhana evaivam v¡areyam¡tman¡ntaroab¡hyaÅ k¤tsnaÅ prajµ¡-nakhana eva” (Br. Up.112


4.5.13) ityekarasat¡¿rava¸¡t. tas-m¡dhyubhv¡dhy¡yatanam parambrahma. BSSB 1.3.1.166yatt£ktam, sethu¿ruteÅ seto¿cap¡ravatvopapatterbrahm-a¸o arth¡ntare¸a dhyubhv¡dhy¡yatanena bhavitavyamiti. Ibid.67 Îg.Veda .10.81,10.129.368 Sa. Su. 1.140 and 1.14169janana mara¸a kara¸¡n¡m pratiniyam¡dayugapat prav¤-the¿capuruÀa babutvam siddham traigumy¡di viparya-y¡caa Sa .Ka.28.113


70 bahavo vibha¿c¡tmana¿caitanyam¡trasvar£pa nirgu¸¡ nirati¿ay¡¿catadartham sadh¡ra¸am pradh¡nam tannimi-ttai¿¡mbhog¡pavargasidd- hiriti s¡mkhy¡Å. BSSB 2.3.17.5071samkh¡ta par¡rthatv¡t trigu¸¡tiviparyay¡dadhiÀ¡n¡tpuruÀostu bhokt¤bh¡v¡t kaivaly¡rtham prav¤the¿ca.Sa. Ka.17.72 Anima sen Gupta, The Classical S¡mkhya. p.p.1 to 873 Dr. S. Radhakrisnam, Indian <strong>Philosophy</strong>. Vol. II, p. 32174tatra s¡mkhy¡nam t¡vatcaitanyasvar£patv¡t sarv¡tma-n¡msamnidh¡nadhyavi¿eÀ¡caikasya sukhadukha samb-andhe sarve¿¡msukhadukha sambandhaÅ pr¡pnoti. BSSB. 2.3.17.50114


75bahuÀv¡tmasv¡k¡¿avatsarvagateÀu prati¿ar¢ram b¡hy¡-bhyantaravi¿eÀa¸a samnihiteÀu manov¡kk¡yairdharm¡-dharmalakÀa¸amad¤Àamuparjyate. BSSB 2.3.17.5176abhisamdhy¡d¢n¡mapi s¡dh¡ra¸enaiv¡tmanaÅ samyo-genanupapatteruktadoÀ¡nuprasa´gaÅ eva. BSSB 2.3.17.5277 athocyete vibhutvepy¡tmanaÅ ¿ar¢rapratiÀena manas¡ samyogaÅ¿ar¢ravaccinna ev¡tmaprade¿e bhaviÀyati ataÅprade¿ak¤tavyavasth¡bhisamdhy¡d¢n¡mad¤Àasyasarv¡tmasamnidhau kriyam¡¸¡n¡m niyamahetutv¡-sukhadukhayo¿cabhaviÀy¡titi. BSSB 2.3.17.53115


78brahma¸¡di¿ar¢raprade¿eÀvad¤Àa niÀpatteÅ prade¿¡n-taravartitv¡cca svarg¡dhyupabhogasya. Ibid.79 Dr. Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy. Vol. II, pp. 282. 283, 32180B. S. 2.1.1.181paratantraprajµ¡stu praye¸ajanaÅ sv¡tantrye¸a ¿rutyarthamavadh¡rayituma¿aknuvantaÅprakhyatapra¸et¤k¡susm¤tiÀvalamberan tatbalena ca ¿rutyartham pratipipseran.asmatk¤te ca vyakhy¡ne na vi¿vasyurbahum¡n¡tsm¤t-¢n¡mpra¸et¤Àu kapilaprabh¤d¢nam c¡rÀam jµ¡nama-pratihatamsmaryate BSSB. 2.1.1.1.116


82sm¤ti¿ca tantr¡khy¡param¤Àipra¸¢ta ¿iÀaparig¤h¢ta anya-¿catadanus¡ri¸yaÅ sm¤tayaÅ evam satyanavak¡¿apras-a´gaÅprasajyeran tasu hyacetanampradh¡nam svatan-tram jagataÅk¡ra¸amupanibadhyate. asyavar¸asyasmin-kale anenavidh¡nenopanayanam, ¢d¤¿cac¡rah,ittham ved¡dhyayam, itthamsam¡vartanam, ittam sahadharma-cari¸¢samyoga iti. That¡puruÀartha¿ca var¸¡¿rama dha-rm¡nn¡navidh¡nvidadhati. naivamkalpil¡dism¤tinama-nuÀeye viÀaye avake¿o asti. mokÀas¡dhanameva hi samyagdar¿anamadik¤tyataÅ pra¸itaÅ. Ibid.117


83mah¡bh¡ratepi ca bahavaÅ puruÀa brahmannut¡Å eka eva tu itivic¡rya ‘bahavaÅ puruÀas¡mkhya yoga vic¡ri¸¡m itiparapakÀamupanyasy¡ tadvyud¡sena bahu¸¡m puruÀ-¡¸¡m hiyathaika yonirucyate.tatha tam puruÀamva m¡khy¡sy¡migu¸¡dhikam. Ityupakramya “mamantar¡tma tava ca yac¡nyedahasamsthitaÅ. sarve¿am s¡kÀibh£to asau na gr¡hyaÅkenacitkvacit”. BSSB 2.1.1.1.84B.S. 2.1.2.3.85etena s¡mkhya sm¤ti praty¡khyena yogasm¤tirapipraty¡khy¡tod¤Àavyety¡tidi¿ati.BSSB.2.1.2.3118


86“trinnutamsth¡pyasamam¿ar¢ram” (Sve.Up.2.8) “¿rotav-yomantavyonididhyosditavyaÅ”(Br.Up.2.4.5)“tamyogamitimanyantesthir¡midriyadh¡ra¸am” “vidhy¡metam yogavi-dhimcak¤À¸am” Katha.Up.2.6.18.87 Y.S.1.2488 s¡pekÀo h¢¿varo viÀamam ¿riÀim nirmim¢te kimapekÀata iticet.dharm¡dharm¡vapekÀata iti vad¡maÅ ataÅ s¤jyam¡-napra¸idharm¡dhar manapekÀa viÀama s¤Àiriti n¡yam¢¿varasy¡par¡dhaÅ.¢¿varastu parjany¡vad¤Àavya¤. yath¡hi parjanyovr¢h¢yav¡di¿rÀuÅ s¡dh¡ra¸am k¡ra¸am bhavati119


vr¢hiyav¡divaiÀamye tu tatb¢jagetanyev¡s¡dh¡ra¸¡ni s¡-marthy¡nik¡ra¸¡ni bhavati, evam¢¿var¡devamanuÀy¡di¿r-Àau s¡dh¡ra¸amk¡ra¸am bhavati deva manuÀy¡di vaiÀa-mye tu tatb¢jagat¡nyevas¡dh¡ra¸¡ni karma¸I k¡ra¸¡ni bhavantyevam¢¿varaÅsapekÀatv¡nna vaiÀamy¡naikh¤¸y¡- bhy¡m d£Àayati. B. SS. B.2.1.12.3489 Kau. Brah. 3.890 B¤. UP. 3.2.1391 B. G. 4.11120


92puruÀavi¿eÀatv¡bhyupagama¿ce¿varasya puru¿asyacau- d¡s¢ny¡bhyupagam¡dasamaµjasyam. BSSB.2.2.7.3793 Ch. UP. 6.3.294parasparaviruddha¿c¡yams¡mkhy¡n¡mabhyupagamaÅkvacitsaptendriya¸yanukr¡manti,kvacid¡k¡¿a.tath¡kvacitindriy¡¸yantakara¸¡ni var¸ayanti, kvacidekamiti. prasidd-haevatu¿rutyesvarakara¸¡d¢ny¡virodhastadnuvartiny¡ ca sm¤tya.tasm¡dasamaµjasam s¡mkhy¡n¡m dar¿anam. BSSB. 2.2.1.10121

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