Refutation of Samkhya – Yoga Philosophy

CHAPTER IIREFUTATION OF SËMKHYA-YOGAPHILOSOPHIES22

CHAPTER - IIREFUTATION OF SËMKHYA – YÕGA PHILOSOPHIESIntroduction23

The S¡mkhya –Yoga schools of philosophy are considered as apair – system in Indian philosophy .One important difference betweenthem is that S¡mkhya does not accept the existence of God , while Yogaaccepts it as the 26 th principle apart from the 25 principles accepted byS¡mkhya.S¡mkhya PhilosophyS¡mkhya philosophy is systematized by the great sage Kapila. It isconsidered to be the most ancient of all the philosophical schools.S¡mkhya accepts three pram¡¸¡s: pratyakÀa, anum¡na and ¡gama. Theyaccept twenty five principles.24

Theory of cause and effectThe S¡mkhya-s accept the theory of Pari¸¡mav¡da, according towhich there is a real transformation of the cause into the effect, likewood being transformed into a chair andmilk into curd. Theydeveloped elaborate explanations to establish that the cause changesinto the effect. They gives five proofs for the establishment of this theory.They are, asadak¡ra¸a, upadanagrahana, sarvasambhav¡bh¡va, ¿¡ktasya¿¡kyak¡ra¸a, and k¡ra¸abh¡va. Through these proofs, they say that aneffect must already exist in its cause before it is produced 1 . By means of25

these arguments the S¡mkhya philosophers established the theory ofPari¸¡mav¡da.According to this theory, an effect is already existent inunmanifested form in its cause.The S¡mkhya philosophers hold the viewthat no one can convert non-existence into existence nor can that whichexists be entirely destroyed. For example, gold ornaments such as ringsand earrings are not different from the gold used to make them.Unconscious and Conscious Principle (Prak¤ti and PuruÀa)(1) Prak¤ti26

The S¡mkhya philosophy accepts the ultimate cause of the worldas Prak¤ti.Prak¤ti is neither atomic substance nor consciousness, but itpossesses the three gu¸¡s-sattva, rajas and tamas. The balancedcondition of sattva, rajas and tamas is called prak¤ti-“satvarajas-tamogu¸¡n¡m s¡my¡vastha prak¤ti” 2 . One can only imagine a state inwhich all nature is balanced and there is no levity, no motion, noheaviness, no light, no darkness, no opposing forces, in which theimagination itself, being a product of the mind, is dissolved. TheS¡mkhya philosophers describe this state as uncaused, unmanifested,eternal, all-pervading, devoid of effect-producing actions, without asecond, independent and partless.27

(2)PuruÀaS¡mkhya is a dualistic philosophy. It aspects two realities, that is,PuruÀa and Prak¤ti. PuruÀa is a conscious principle, both the subjectof knowledge and object of knowledge. S¡mkhya offers five argumentsto prove the existence of PuruÀa.They are, samgh¡ta par¡rthatva ,trigu¸¡diviparyaya, adhiÀt¡na, bhokt¤bhavat and kaivaly¡rtham prav¤tti 3 .Through these arguments, they say that there must be a consciousprinciple. That conscious principle is PuruÀa.(3) Proof of the Existence of many selves.. The S¡mkhya-s accept the existence of many selves. They give fivereasons for approving the existence of manyselves. They are,28

jananamara¸akara¸an¡m pratiniyama, ay£gapatprav¤tti and traigu¸y¡diviparya 4 .Based on these reasons, they accept the plurality of selves that areeternal and intelligent. S¡mkhya accepts two realities,prak¤ti andpuruÀa. Prak¤ti is the material cause of the world. PuruÀas are manypure concious intelligent entities who are not subject to change. It isfrom the interaction of these two principles that evolution occurs.Thatmeans, the mahattattva is originated from prak¤ti, the ahamk¡ra isoriginated from mahattattva, from ahamk¡ra the sense organs, thephysical organs, five tanmatr¡s and manas are originated, from the a29

called liberation.According to them, the liberation is of two kindsj¢vanmukti and videhamukti 6 .The liberation attained in one’s lifetime is called j¢vanmukti . Init, a person continues his existence in this world as a liberated being.He enjoys the worldly objects until he lasts in his body . When all thesamsk¡ras are finished , then the last breath goes off his body and he issaid to enter into videhamukti, which is the liberation after death.The concept of God.The S¡mkhya philosophers do not talk about God because theywanted to teach human beings to be independent and courageous so31

that they would explore all the potentials hidden within. So theS¡mkhya philosophers do not accept the existence of God.Yoga PhilosophyThe practical aspect of S¡mkhya is the yoga system. Pataµjali wasthe first sage to systematise the yoga philosophy. The yoga system ishighly practical. It discusses the nature of mind, its modifications,impediments to growth, afflictions, and the method for attaining thehighest goal of life that is kaivalya. This method is described in eightsteps and it is known as AÀta´gayoga.The Concept of God.32

Pataµjali accepts the existence of God: kle¿akarmavibh¡ga¿ayairapar¡m¤ÀaÅ puruÀavi¿eÀaÅ ¢¿varaÅ 7 . Thisconception of god can give hope to human beings, for, when oneovercomes all afflictions and does not allow himself to identify with hisKarmas andwhen one becomes free from all samsk¡ras, then hebecomes liberated and merges into God consciousness.According to Pat¡µjali, the individual in essence is God. There isonly one God. It is ignorance that creates duality from the one singlereality called God. When ignorance is dissolved into the light ofknowledge, all dualities are dissolved and full union is achieved. When33

one overcomes ignorance, duality dissolves and he merges with theperfect single being. That perfect single being always remains perfectand one.Refutation of S¡mkhya Philosophyáa´kara considers S¡mkhya as the chief opponent (pradh¡namalla). In the words of Dr. Shivkumar, áa´kara is the chief critic ofS¡mkhya. The criticism of S¡mkhya as offered by other commentators ofthe Brahmas£tra does not display any excellence of arguments incomparison to those by áa´kara 8 . Jerald James also explains: “áa´kara inBrahmas£trabh¡Àya gives more detailed and precise attention to the34

criticism of S¡mkhya than he does to any other system, and is influentialin the sense that áa´kara’s criticism not only encompasses most of theimportant critical issues in classical S¡mkhya in its own time but isconsidered to be a locus classicus for the criticism of S¡mkhya byorthodox thinkers down to the present day” 9 . But the crucial problemfor the interpreter of S¡mkhya is that there is no extant classicalS¡mkhya text. In the classical period, there was a series of commentarieson the S¡mkhyak¡rika, and the latter is not a polemical text in themanner of classical philosophical á¡stra. Dasgupta says: “The basictext S¡mkhyas£tra was not referred to by any writer until it wascommented upon by Aniruddha in the 14 th century A. D. The present35

work S¡mkhya¿£tra contains the refutation of other philosophicaldoctrines” 10 .Therefore, we can say that the present work ofS¡mkhyas£tra was written after the other S£tras . So áa´kara takes theS¡mkhyak¡rika as the basic text to refute the S¡mkhya concept. AllenThrasher has noted that áa´kara’s presentation of S¡mkhya clearlyshows that the S¡mkhyak¡rika of Ì¿varak¤À¸a was evidently a potentrival in Br¡hma¸ical philosophical circles at the beginning of the 8 thcentury 11 .áa´kara does not totally reject the S¡mkhya concepts. He has noobjection in accepting the S¡mkhya theories such as the important36

nature of the soul which does not contradict the position of Advaita, butthey do not accept the plurality of self. According to KollaChenchulakÀmi, “though the followers of S¡mkhya –yoga and also ofthe áa´kara school of Advaita Ved¡nta do subscribe to Satk¡ryav¡da, anddiffer in their explanation of the production which involves real change(pari¸¡ma) of the cause into effect, the followers of the áa´kara school ofAdvaita Ved¡nta hold the view that production in the ultimate analysisis only illusory (vivarta) and does not involve real change(pari¸¡ma)” 12 .The Advaitins do not accept Pradh¡na as the cause of theuniverse 13 (Pradh¡nak¡ra¸av¡da).37

The main points of refutation of S¡mkhya are: -1. Pradh¡na is the cause of the universe. 2. The term ¡nandamayarepresents pradh¡na. 3. The term akÀara represents pradh¡na. 4. Theterm avyaktarepresents pradh¡na. 5. The term sat representspradh¡na.6.The term aj¡ represents pradh¡na. 7. Refutation of the concept, theresting place of heaven and earth in Pradh¡na. 8. The theory ofPuruÀabahutva. 9. Authority of Sm¤tis . 10. Refutation of the concept ofÌ¿vara. These are the main grounds for by áa´kara to criticize S¡mkhyaphilosophy.38

1 Pradh¡na as the cause of the Universe.In ÌkÀatyadhikara¸a of Brahmas£tra, áa´kara primarily aims atdisproving the scriptural basis of the theory of Pradh¡na of S¡mkhya. Inthat adhikara¸a, he discusses the following passage of theChandogyopaniÀad – “s¡deva somyedamagre¡s¢dekamevadvit¢yam”,“tadaikÀata bahu sy¡m praj¡yeya tattejo¿¤jata” 14 . According toS¡mkhya, the word sat stands for the cause of the universe, and theterm idam in this passage denotes modifications of the ultimate causeconditioned by names and forms. The passage implies that the worldwas existent in the form of sat before its evolution. Therefore, the sat39

denotes the causal form of the manifold world. This can be explainedby the S¡mkhya theory of Satk¡ryav¡da 15 . According to this theory, theeffect is the attainment of another condition by a causal substance.According to Advaitins, áruti speaks of sat as the ultimate self.Sat is said to be the fundamental entity which enters into objects interms of j¢v¡tman . According to áruti, the world originated from sat .“tasm¡dva etasm¡d¡tmanaÅ ¡k¡¿aÅ sambh£taÅ 16 ”.So, the pradh¡na ofS¡mkhya is not the cause of the world .The S¡mkhya-s argue that the pradh¡na is all – knowingnessbecause it has Sattva quality. The sm¤ti also says that “Sattva brings40

the knowledge” 17 . áa´kara refutes this by saying that Sattva is notpredominant in pradh¡na, because the state of equilibrium of threegu¸¡-s is called pradh¡na . If we accept that pradh¡na is capable ofproducing knowledge, then the two gu¸¡-s (Rajas and Tamas) must beequally capable of retarding knowledge. So Sattva will make it allknowing,and others (Rajas and Tamas) will make it partly knowing ,which is a contradiction. Besides, if the Sattva is not illumined by thewitnessing soul, there is no chance to say that it is knowledge. TheS¡mkhya’s pradh¡na is insentient in nature. The insentient pradh¡nahas no power to illumine. Therefore the omnnisicience of pradh¡na does41

not happen 18 . So áa´kara does not accept the Pradh¡nak¡ra¸av¡da ofS¡mkhya.áa´kara says that the omniscient and sentient Brahman is thecause of the universe. But the S¡mkhya-s have another objection againstthe causality of Brahman. They say that Brahman is not omniscient inits figurative sense. It is omniscient in its primary sense only. So, theomniscient Brahman is not the cause of the world. áa´kara refutes thisconcept by saying that the knowledge of Brahman is eternal. It doesnot depend upon any external thing such as instrument or object ofknowledge. For example, in the case of the sun, the natural heat and42

light do not depend upon any external agency 19 . So the omniscientBrahman is the cause of the world. áa´kara says there is no scope for thecausality of pradh¡na in áruti. But S¡mkhya-s argue for the áruti basisof pradh¡na. In wordly experience, we can see that the qualities ofsentient beings are figuratively spoken of as belonging to non-sentientobjects, like the sentence ‘k£lam pipat¢Àati’ (The bank wishes to fall)and áruti also says that the qualities of sentient beings are figurativelyascribed to fire, water, etc 20 . Therefore, the S¡mkhya-s argue that thepradh¡na is the cause of the universe. áa´kara rejects this concept bysaying that the árutis attribute acts of thinking to water, fire, etc.because they are dependent upon Brahman. In the context, the water43

and fire are identified with the Highest reality i.e., Brahman.The termsat in the passage from the CandogyopaniÀad; sadevasomyedamagreasit’ ityupakramya ‘tadaikÀata… tattejo-s¤jata ’21 –refers to the intelligent principle, the J¢va. The insentient pradh¡nacannot refer to an intelligent principle like the J¢va as its Self 22 .The S¡mkhya-s try to reject this objection (cause of the universe is sat)on the ground that the term ¡tman can be used in the secondary sense,as one person is figuratively called ¡tman of another man wherepurpose is accomplished by the former. A king calls the servant whostakes his life for the king, as his own Ëtman. In the same way,44

pradh¡na which executesall the purposes of puruÀa by way ofcontributing to its enjoyment (bhoga) and release (apavarga) may becalled ¡tman 23 .Sankara criticizes this device too. Ëtman (Brahman) is the causeof the universe. It is identical with the J¢v¡tman. Counsels likeknowledge tattvamasi 24are given to the disciple for attainment ofliberation through the idea of non-difference between the disciple andthe Brahman. If the position that sat represents the pradh¡na isaccepted, the teachings would be falsely equating the two, i.e., nonsentientpradh¡na and sentient disciple, which are diametrically45

opposed to each other in nature. If the S¡mkhya view was true, árutiwould be regarded as teaching that soul is non-sentient, and this wouldprevent the possibility of release. The term Ëtman can be used in thefigurative sense. It can however, not lead to assume that figurative senseof word is applicable everywhere. Otherwise it will lead to a generalwant of confidence 25 . It is also not plausible to say that the same termËtman denotes sentient as well as non-sentient objects, because a worddoes not have many meanings 26 . Hence the term Ëtman primarilydenotes sentient objects and is applied to elements by a figurativeatribution of sentience to them. If the word Ëtman is used in two senses,the sense applicable in certain contexts cannot be ascertained without46

some determining attributive word. The fact that Ëtman is spoken of asthe self of ávetaketu is sufficient to decide that it does not refer topradh¡na which is non- sentient in nature 27 .áa´kara states that the S¡mkhya-s infer cause from commonproperties of effects. All the outward and inward effects are endowedwith common qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence theyshould have pleasure, pain and indifference as their cause, just as jar,dishes, etc. have clay as their common property. Clay is theUp¡danakara¸a of those things. The pleasure, pain and indifferenceconstitute the threefold pradh¡na. The pradh¡na which is essentially47

non-sentient and productive spontaneously evolves into itsmodifications to serve the purpose of puruÀa 28 .áa´kara argues that the existence of pradh¡na cannot beestablished inferentially. It is not conclusive enough to establish non-sentient pradh¡na as the cause of the universe. For example, the lumpof clay cannot transform itself into a pot. Non-sentient objects withoutbeing guided by some sentient being, cannot produce a special form foraccomplishment of the purpose of the sentient being. The world withdifferent things, variegated objects, etc. cannot be created by non-48

sentient pradh¡na. The manifold yet special orderliness in universeleads to the conclusion contrary to the position of áa´kara 29 .The cause is twofold, Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a and Nimittak¡ra¸a.Consequently, the effect has two sets of properties:those derived fromthe Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a, like acetanatva and m¤d¡tmakatva, and thosecaused by the nimittak¡ra¸a like the vi¿iÀtaracan¡ as is evident in thejar. S¡mkhya highlights the properties of up¡danak¡ra¸a and argues infavour of the non-sentient nature of the cause. We are not, however,bound to rely upon the properties of Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a of world. Relying49

upon the properties of Nimittak¡ra¸a we may argue for the sentientnature of the cause 30 .Moreover, the logical reason put forward by S¡mkhya is notvalid. It is not proved that individual objects are of the pleasure, painand indifference. The feeling of pleasure, pain etc is internal and isaccessioned by the objects according to the mental disposition ofsentient beings. This is why, even though the objects like sound etc.remain the same, the particular feeling of pleasure, pain. etc. isexperienced differently by different people 31 .50

The theory that all finite objects originate from the combinationof many materials does not prove the existence of Pradh¡na as theultimate cause of the universe. It involves the undesired contingency ofadmitting some cause for Gu¸¡-s also, as they are separate and infinite.The finiteness of gu¸¡-s is held to be unlimited in magnitude andconsequently omnipresent, there will be no disturbance then in thestate of equilibrium. Hence to explain the possibility of evolution, thefinite nature of Gu¸¡-s must be admitted. The reason that alone which iscapable produces the effect, also proves thesentient nature of thecause, because no activity can be found in a non-sentient object. Theparticular nature of the relation of cause and effect also equally points51

to the causality of the sentient being. The relation of cause and effectthat exists in the case of things like couches, bed etc, can be createdonly with the help of a sentient agent 32 .The theory of Sv¡bh¡vikapari¸¡ma (spontaneous modification) ofpradh¡na is also untenable. The S¡mkhya-s held that pradh¡na isautomatically transformed into effect as the grass, independent of anyinstrumental cause, is transformed into milk 33 . According to áa´kara,this analogy is not effective. The grass itself cannot transform intomilk.It changes into milk due to some other cause, i.e., when it issupervised by a sentient being. This is made evident by the fact that52

grass transforms into milk only when it is eaten by the cow and notwhen it is eaten by a bull. Moreover ,grass eaten by the cow does notchange into the horns of the cow; it is changed into only milk. So, thisanalogy does not prove the sv¡bh¡vikapari¸¡ma of pradh¡na 34 .According to áa´kara, the state of pradh¡na is a condition ofbalance of the three Gu¸¡-s (Sattva, Rajas, Tamas), which areindependent of each other and in a state of equilibrium before creation.This equilibrium is upset, when one Gu¸a becomes more predominantthan the other two. The equilibrium cannot be upset with the help an53

external force; there can be no origin of Mahat. Hence creation wouldbe impossible.The S¡mkhya-s say against the above concept that the Gu¸¡-s arenaturally unsteady. From this it follows that even during equilibriumthe Gu¸a-s exist in a state of potential divergence. Accordng to áa´kara,this also is refutable because, if we accept the above concept of S¡mkhya,there can be no origin of Mahat. So áa´kara refuted thePradh¡nak¡ra¸av¡da of S¡mkhya by saying that the sentient objectcannot be produced by the nonsentient principle like pradh¡na.2.The term sat represents pradh¡na54

áa´kara argues that the term sat 35 does not represent pradh¡na. Ifit had been intended to be so, the teacher might have made anendeavour to tell the disple thatPradh¡na is different from what isdenoted by sat in tattvamasi 36 . He might have asked the disciple todiscard his own self. The stand on sat or pradhana is taught as thehelping stage to reach correct connotation. For example a personintending to inform another as to which star is Arundhati, draws hisattention to near by star and asks him to shift his attention to realArundhati which is adjacent to the one seen first. In the present case,identity between denotation of the term sat and the self is established.Thus Pradh¡na cannot be the denotation of the term sat.55

If we accept pradh¡na the cause of the universe is denoted by theterm sat it would imply falsity of the statements like “all is known byknowing one 37 . According to the upaniÀads through the knowledge ofone cause all its effects become known 38 . The knowledge of pradhanagives rise to knowledge of its effect through object of experience only.The subject experience which is not the modification of pradh¡na, willstill remain un-known since the knowledge of non-sentient pradh¡nacannot generate the knowledge of the intelligent soul 39 .áa´kara argues that in the state of deep sleep the Jiva is unifiedwith its our self (¡tman) called sat, Pradh¡na cannot be this self, as56

sentient cannot be unified with non-sentient pradh¡na. The difficultycannot be overcome by interpreting self (J¢va) as pradh¡na because itwill lead to the absurdity of resolving sentient self into non-sentientpradh¡na. More over, it will contradict the ¿ruti that the soul in thestate of suÀupt is resolved into sentient entity 40 .Therefore,the term sat denotes the sentient entity in which allsouls are resolved.3.Anandamaya does not represent pradh¡naThe S¡mkhy¡-s argue that in Tattir¢yopaniÀad passage “ tasm¡dva etasm¡d vijµanamay¡d anyotar¡tm¡nandamayaÅ” 41 , the term57

¡nandamaya denotes pradh¡na. Ënandamaya, being described as aninternal factor, can denote cause only and no effect. In this waypradh¡na seems to be referred to in the áruti 42 .According to áankara, the áruti speaks of the act of desire withreference to ¡nandamaya. Desire is the quality of a sentient being. Theact of desiring cannot be ascribed to the non-sentient pradh¡na. Thepassage ofthe UpaniÀad speaks about the union (yoga) of theindividual soul with the ¡nandamaya in the state of liberation. Theindividual self cannot merge into the non- sentient ¡nandamaya whichdoes not respresents pradh¡na 43 .58

1. The term akÀara does not represent Pradh¡naáa´kara establishes that the term akÀara in the followingB¤had¡ra¸yaka áruti doesnot refer to Pradh¡na. Kasmin nu khalv¡k¡¿aota¿ca prota¿ceti sahov¡caitad vai tadaksaram g¡rgi brahma¸aabhivadanty asth£lam ana¸u 44 .The S¡mkhya-s may argue that the term akÀara is said to be asupport of Pradh¡na, which is the general cause, and as such can besaid to be the ¡dh¡ra (support) of everything 45 . áa´kara says that theword akÀara in the áruti cannot denote pradh¡na. Because the árutispeaks of the art of command with reference to akÀara and such an act59

is not possible in the case of pradh¡na which is non-sentient innature 46 . the Non-sentient objects like clay are not capable ofcommanding the effect, jar and the like 47 .The passage which speaks ofakÀara negates qualities of principles. Other than Brahman, pradh¡namay be designated as unseen etc but qualities like seen point to sentientprinciple and consequently negate pradh¡na which is non-sentient innature 48 .árut itself speaks of the act of seeing, hearing, knowing, etc., withreference to the cause of the universe. These acts are not applicable topradh¡na. So akÀara cannot represent pradh¡na.60

5.The term avyakta does not represent pradh¡naThe kathopaniÀad says: “mahatah param avyaktam avyakt¡tpuruÀah param” 49 . áa´kara attempts to establish that the termavyakta in this passage does not refer to the S¡mkhya concept ofpradh¡na.According to S¡mkhya, the term avyakt¡ denotes theUpad¡nak¡ra¸a, of universe, i.e., pradh¡na, prak¤ti, avyakt¡. The termavyakt¡ is conventionally used in the sense of pradh¡na. The derivationof the term supports the view of S¡mkhya. Etymologically, avyakt¡61

means that ‘which is not manifest’. This corresponds to pradh¡na ofS¡mkhya which is devoid of sound and other qualities 50 .According to áa´kara, the meaning of the word avyakt¡ can beunderstood in two ways, etymologically and conventionally. The wordavyakt¡ is neither etymologically nor conventionally applicable topradhana. Etymologically ,the term avyakt¡ means that which is notvyakt¡ or manifest. It is applicable to anything which is subtle, thus itcannot be restricted to the pradh¡na of S¡mkhya. This convention ofS¡mkhya goes against the sense of the áruti. As regards the order ofmentioning the categories, áankara states that the identity of objects62

cannot be proved by similarity of order of treatment, unless the identityis recognized independently. No sensible person, who comes to perceivea cow in place of a horse, comes to ascertain that what he is perceiving isin fact a horse 51 .S¡mkhya controverts this argument by stating that thekathopaniÀad itself speaks of Pradh¡na as the object of knowledge 52 .The qualities attributed to the object of knowledge in the áruti are thequalities which are ascribed to pradh¡na by áamkhya. áa´kara refutedthis point.According to him, that which is referred to in such passagesis not pradh¡na . The subject matter of this passage is the Supreme self.63

In all the statements of the UpaniÀads, such attributes as soundless etc.are connected with the self alone. Pradh¡na is neither spoken of asobject of knowledge nor is said to be endowed with qualities mentionedin the áruti. If the passage is regarded as referring to Pradh¡na it willnot improve the position of S¡mkhya. The S¡mkhya-s do not mentionthat one becomes free by knowing Pradh¡na only, but they connect thatresult rather with the recognition of the intelligent self (puruÀa). Thusthe áruti passages in no way prescribe the knowledge of pradh¡na forattainment of liberation 53 . So the word avyakt¡ also does not denotepradh¡na for the terms in áruti are not used in the technical sense asdecided upon by S¡mkhya. In the case of Mahat, it is interpreted by64

S¡mkhya as the first evolute of pradh¡na. In áruti, it is used in quite adifferent sense as the term is used in connection with the highest self 54 .Similarly, the term avyakt¡ also cannot denote the technical sense ofpradh¡na in áruti.6. The term aj¡ does not represent pradh¡naThe S¡mkhya argues that the term aj¡ in the following upaniÀadportion denotes pradh¡na.“aj¡mek¡m lohita¿uklak¤À¸¡mbahv¢Å praj¡Å s¤jam¡n¡m sar£p¡h65

ajohyeko juÀam¡¸onu¿eteJah¡tyen¡m bhuktabhogamajonyaÅ 55”Accoding to them ,the three adjectives of aj¡ denote the threegu¸¡-s of pradh¡na. Rajas is symbolised by lohit¡ on account of itscolouring and influencing quality. The Sattv¡ is indicated by ¿uklabecause itis of the nature of light and k¤À¸a signifies tamas onaccount of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise,i.e., prak¤ti is expressed through qualities of its avayavadharm¡s(components). The word aj¡ 56 means unborn and refers to pradh¡na inits derivative sense pradh¡na, which produces manifold effects of66

uniform nature, in so far as they are endowed with the three gu¸¡-s, isuncaused and is the cause of everything. The second half of the verseunder consideration speaks of two unborn principle. Of the two unbornprinciples, one is deluded by indiscrimination which falsely identifiesitself with prak¤ti and is considered itself as the experiencer of pleasureand pain. The other puruÀa, whose power of discrimination has beenaroused after enjoying her discards aj¡(prak¤ti) and attains liberation 57 .This provides scope for the ¿rutipram¡¸ya of S¡mkhya.According to the Advaitins, the passage itself is incapable ofjustifying the philosophical position. The term aj¡ denotes different67

principles 58 . The passage contains no special characteristic to enable theterm aj¡ to signify pradh¡na and to exclude its other possibleconnotations. Its purpose and the context of the passage do not favourto S¡mkhya to áruti without consideration of its context, purpose etc.The passage afterwards speaks of power of the highest Lord 59 . Thesubsequent passages also describe the same on the ground of thegeneral context. We may conclude that no entity independent ofParame¿vara can be indicated by the term aj¡ 60 .7. Refutation of the concept, the resting Place of Heaven and Earth inPradh¡na68

According to áankara, the s£tra ‘n¡num¡nam atacchabd¡n¡m 61proves against that Pradh¡na is the resting place of heaven and earthmentioned in the MundakopaniÀad passage –“yasmin dyuÅ p¤thv¢c¡ntar¢kÀamotam manaÅ sahapr¡¸a¿ca sarvaiÅevaikam jµ¡t¡tman¡m anyav¡co vimuµcatham¤tasyaiÀasetuÅ” 62S¡mkhya may argue that the abode of heaven and earth isdeclared to be the bridge of immortality 63 . The bridge pre-supposes69

something else beyond it. Brahman cannot serve as the bridge, for,there is nothing to be beyond it. Pradh¡na being the cause of everything,can be the general abode.Advaitins criticize the stand of S¡mkhya on the ground that thereis no word in the passage to denote pradh¡na. On the contrary, thereare several words indicating that this abode is the sentient principle.The MundakopaniÀad 64 describes AkÀara Brahman as the abode ofheaven and earth 65 . The same is called the bridge of immortalitybecause it is the knowledge of the AkÀara Brahman, which leads toliberation 66 . The passage in the MundakopaniÀad, ‘brahmavit70

ahmaiva bhavati’shows that the subject matter of the wholeupaniÀad from beginning to end is this Brahman. Therefore, it is thesame Brahman which is spoken of as the abode of heaven and earth.2. Refutation of the theory of PuruÀabahutvaThe term puruÀa has been used in the Vedic literature to denoteboth the ¡tman which means the embodied being or personality, andthe supreme creator 67 . The author of S¡mkhyas£tra has dealt with thesein two separate s£tras, viz., s¡mkhata par¡rthatv¡t, and trigu¸¡diviparyay¡t 68 . According to S¡mkhya the puruÀ¡s are many and identicalin nature 69 . All puruÀ¡s are of the nature of pure consciousness, devoid71

of qualities and all pervasive in nature 70 . S¡mkhya puts five proofs forestablishing puruÀabahutva. 71 According to S¡mkhya-Yoga, there is aseparate puruÀa for each individual,which provides enjoyment andliberation. Anima sen Gupta says that, “the first four arguments seek toprove the existence of the soul as the controller and enjoyer of the worldof composite things 72 . The last argument is based on the observed factsof the world which is striving for freedom, and that itself is the Supremegoal. Dr. Radhakrishanan, says that, the puruÀ¡s have different senseorgans and motor organs and they undergo death and birth separately.If the soul were just one, the knowledge gained by one would mean theknowledge by all, i.e., liberation of all. The above argument strictly72

speaking, is not helping to prove the plurality of the puruÀa which isexplained in the K¡rika 73 .áa´kara negates this theory of S¡mkhya in a logical way. Thetheory of S¡mkhya implies confusion of the acts done by the beings andtheir fruits. The impressions of acts as well as their fruits in here withpradh¡na. Every puruÀa will equally be associated with happiness andsorrows of all puruÀ¡s 74 . The S¡mkhya-s may object to it by saying thatpradh¡na will evolve in a certain direction to cause the difference ofactions in assigning them to different puruÀ¡s. The pradh¡nawillevolve for puruÀ¡s who are bound and will not effect the release. It will73

desist from a particular activity for a particular puruÀa. In thisway,there will be difference in respect of happiness and sorrows ofpuruÀ¡s 75 .áa´kara says, that the difference is not meant for explaining themotive of pradh¡na’s evolution. There should be some proof for thedifference too. In the absence of such a proof we cannot think of releasewhich presupposes such a difference 76 .The S¡mkhya-s may further argue thatthe unseen result ofactions in a·¤Àa will regulate the experience of pleasure and pain.According to them, a·¤Àa or the unseen principle is religious merit or74

demerit acquired by the souls; it inheres not in the soul, but in thepradh¡na.The pradh¡na is common to all souls. So there is nothing tofix that a particular a·¤Àa operates in a particular soul 77 .The resolution also cannot restrict the particular a·¤Àaofaction toa particular person. They are produced from contact ofinternal organs with the soul. The soul, being pervasive, will come intocontact with all internal organs. So there is no restriction to balance thepleasure and pain.The S¡mkhya-s may further argue that the limitations can befurnished by space. The ¡tman is all-pervasive, and the particular75

experience of pleasure and pain will pertain to that part of the soulwhich comes into contact with the internal organ. It will involve furtherabsurdities. All the souls will permeate all bodies because there isnothing to restrict a particular body to a particular soul. There will bethe confusion of acts and their fruits. The supposition of parts of soulsimplies that two souls having the same potential results of acts mayexperience the results of acts by one body. The supposition of souls willfurther lead to the impossibility of enjoyments in heaven; the a·¤Àta iseffective in a particular place, i.e., the body, After , there is no body sothere is no enjoyment in heavenly world. Therefore soul, being devoid ofa·¤Àta, cannot experience the fruit of a·¤Àa in heaven 78 .76

Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly pointed out that the S¡mkhyaarguments for the existence of puruÀa turn out to be proof for theexistence of the empirical individuals and not of the transcendentalsubjects. Let us see the arguments that establish the multiplicity of thepuruÀa. The S¡mkhya system recognizes the plurality of puruÀ¡s.S¡mkhya argues that puruÀa is the spirit, the subject, the knower. It isneither body nor the mind, nor ego (ahamk¡ra) nor intellect (buddhi).It is not a substance which possesses the quality of consciousness as isheld by the system of Ny¡ya-Vai¿eÀika 79 . It is consciousness which ispure immutable.77

The S¡mkhya view of puruÀa is determined by the conception of¡tman in the UpaniÀads. It is without beginning or end, without anyqualities, soluble and omnipresent, an eternal seer, beyond the senses,beyond the mind, beyond the sweep of intellect, beyond the range oftime, space and causality, which form the warp and woof of the mosaicof the empirical world. It is unproduced and unproducing. Its eternityis not merely everlastingness, but immutability and perfection. It is ofthe form of consciousness (cidr£pa). PuruÀa is unrelated to prak¤ti. Itis a mere witness, a solitary, indifferent, passive spectator. áa´karaaccepts the S¡mkhya concept of the puruÀa as pure consciousness. Herefutes their concept of puruÀabahutv¡, because there is no proof for78

the plurality of souls. According to áa´kara, there is no worldly exampleto support the all-pervasiveness of many entities. It can be controvertedon the basis of common experience.He states that there is only one Self.The plurality of selves is accepted by Advaita, as only a product ofignorance and not as a reality. The self, according to áa´kara is allpervassiveand eternal.9. Refutation of the authority of sm¤tisIn Sm¤tyadhikara¸a, there is a discussion about the authority ofSm¤tis, like Kapilasm¤ti (S¡mkhya), Pataµjalasm¤ti (yoga),Manusm¤ti, etc. There, the p£rvapakÀins raises the problem of79

sm¤tyanav¡k- ¡¿adoÀaprasanga 80 . If it be said that the Brahman is thecause of the world ,there would be the defect of leaving no scope forcertain Sm¤tis. The S¡mkhya-s argue for the validity of S¡mkhyasm¤ti.They say that the Sm¤tis and Tantr¡s are written by great sages likeKapila and accepted by the good people. The Sm¤tis of Kapila arecomposed from the standpoint of the fullest insight leading toliberation. The vedic passages should be interpreted in the light of theSm¤ti of Kapila which is primarily concerned with philosophicalknowledge. The Sm¤tis composed by eminent men like Kapila, Manu,etc, are the authentic source of interpretation of Vedic passages forthose who are unable to understand the meaning of the Ved¡s80

themselves.The Sm¤tis of Manu etc. find their aim fulfilled in layingdown the rules regarding religious duties and moral conduct. The sageKapila is extolled in áruti as possessing unobstructedknowledge.Therefore his opinion about the philosophical doctrines,should not be doubted. Moreover, the views of the authors of the Sm¤tisare supported by reason 81 . The theories propounded in the Sm¤ti ofKapila should be interpreted in the light of these árutis.The Advaitins deny the arguments of the P£rvapakÀins andargue that all the sm¤tis are not valid. According to áa´kara, if theparticular sm¤tis which propound the causality of Pradh¡na are81

accepted, the rest of the sm¤tis which declare the causality of Brahmanwill be irrelevant. In case of conflict of views among the Sm¤tis, thosewhich conform to áruti should be accepted 82 . áruti is the absoluteauthority regarding matters which are not cognized by perception andother means of empirical knowledge. The S¡mkhya-s say that the ¿rutishave to be interpreted in the light of the Sm¤tis. The argument that theviews of eminent sages like Kapila should surely be accepted is also notfaultless. It is not reasonable to question á¤uti on the basis of words ofpersons even though they may possess supersensuous powers, becausethe attainment of these powers depends upon religious duties enjoinedby áruti.82

áa´kara states that the interpretation of áruti, offered by eminentsages like Kapila, should not be attached to any Sm¤ti without ceasingand should ascertain the truth on the basis of Sm¤tis based on árutis.Otherwise,the final decision regarding the ultimate reality will beunstable because there are different Sm¤tis holding different views. Asregards the mention of Kapila in áruti as possessing unobstructedknowledge, áa´kara says that there are several Kapilas in tradition (82) . Itcannot be ascertained ,which Kapila is praised in the árutis. Theexponent of S¡mkhya (Kapila) is criticized by Mahabh¡rata for themultiplicity of souls 83 . Moreover, Kapila cannot be allowed tomonopolize learnedness. Manu, the author of a Sm¤ti, is also praised in83

the á¤uti and emphasizes the unity of the self which condemnsKapila’s view of multiplicity of souls. Thus, the authority of the Vedabeing direct and final, requires no further proof. Hence the Sm¤ti ofKapila deserves no consideration in so far as it contradicts áruti.Refutation of Yoga philosophy.áa´kara refutes the Yoga philosophy through the commentary ofBrahmasutra-etena yogaÅ pratyuktaÅ 84 . In it, he says that by therefutation of the S¡mkhya Sm¤ti , it is to be understood that the YogaSm¤ti is also refuted 85 . Because, like the S¡mkhya philosophy, the Yogaphilosophy also accepts the non-sentient pradh¡na as the cause of the84

world and the principles of Mahat and Ahamk¡r a re derived frompradh¡na. These concepts are contradictory to á¤uti. At the sametime,Yoga philosophy is spoken of in UpaniÀads likeáveta¿vataropaniÀad B¤had¡ra¸yakopaniÀad KathopaniÀad ,etc 86 .Yoga helps the concentration of mind and it is a means to knowledge.So Yoga Sm¤ti, being based on the árutis, is authentic. So áa´kara saysthat the portions which are in accordance with áruti are accepted byhim, and other portions which contradict áruti are unacceptable to him.Therefore, áa´kara refutedthe Yoga philosophy in a special adhikarana.(Yogapratyuktyadhikara¸a.)Refutation of Ì¿vara85

The major difference between S¡mkhya and Yoga is about theirconcept of God. S¡mkhya does not accept the authority of God. So it iscalled nir¢¿vara S¡mkhya. But yogins accept authority of God. So theyare known as se¿vara S¡mkhya. According to their principles, God isthe ruler of pradh¡na and puruÀa. Pataµjali says that Ì¿vara is a specialkind of being, untouched by ignorance and products of ignorance , notsubject to karmas or the result of action: kle¿a karma vibh¡ga¿ayair-raparam¤tÀ¡Å puruÀa vi¿eÀaÅ 87 . Yogins, say that God is the ruler ofpradh¡na. That is why Pataµjali describes God as a “special kind ofBeing”. Man is subject to the law of birth and death and the laws ofkarma. But Ì¿vara is unborn and undying. Man is subject to his86

s¡mskar¡s. Ì¿vara is free from s¡msk¡r¡s and desires. He is not involvedin the results of action. According to the yogins, the kaivalya meansliberation, the amalgamation of satt¡ and puruÀa.áa´kara refutes the above concept of God. He says that the Lord(Brahman) is both the material and efficient cause of the world. TheYogins view is that the Lord is the ruler of pradh¡na, which shows thatpradh¡na is different from him. This idea leads to inconsistency,because it makes the Lord partial to some and prejudiced against other,for some people are well off in this world, while others are miserable.áa´kara says that the Lord cannot be accused of any partially. He directsthe individuals according to their merits and demerits earned in their87

previous experience of life just as the rain helps different seeds to sprouteach according to their nature. So the God is the efficient cause inbringing the latent tendencies of each individual to fruit 88 . Therefore,áa´kara says that God has no partiality. The scriptures declare eÀahyeva s¡dhu karma k¡rayati tam yamadha nin¢Àate 89 , and Pu¸yovaipu¸yena karma¸¡ bhavati p¡paÅ p¡pena 90 . Sm¤ti also says: that yeyath¡m¡m prapadyante tamstathaiva bhaj¡myaham 91If we accept the Lord as a “special kind of being”, that also isuntenable,because the puruÀa is admitted to be indifferent 92 .If we accept the concept that God is different from pradhana andpuruÀa. He cannot rule them unless it be through some relationship.88

But the relationship of conjunction is not possible because thepradh¡na, puruÀa and God are omnipresent and partless. So áa´karasays that the argument of Yoga about God is not acceptable. Accordingto Advaitins the relationship of God with the world is are ofinexpressible identity, because it depends on the áruti, soyamdevataikÀata hant¡hamim¡stisro devata anenajiven¡tm¡namanupravi¿ya n¡mar£pe vy¡karav¡¸¢ti. t¡s¡m t¤v¤tamt¤v¤tamekaik¡m karav¡¸¢ti . 93 . So the Yoga concept of God is notaccepted by áa´kara.89

ResumeAccording to áa´kara, the S¡mkhya concepts are refutablebecause there are various contradiction in their principles. For example,sometimes S¡mkhya says that the senses are seven and again they aresaid to be eleven. In the case of tanm¡tr¡s, in some places they say thattanm¡tr¡s are derived from Mahat, and in another place they say thattanm¡tr¡s are derived from Ahamk¡ra. Sometimes they mention thatAntakara¸a are three in number and sometimes they mentionAntakara¸a as only one number. This contradiction of S¡mkhya theorywith áruti and Sm¤ti is well known 94 . So áa´kara refutes the S¡mkhya90

philosophy. By the support of áruti, Sm¤ti and Yukti áa´kara refutedthe unacceptable concepts of S¡mkhya and Yoga. áa´kara employesyukti on the basis of d¤À¡nta, ie, parallel instances available in ourdaytoday experience. According to him, through he ¡gama and¡gam¡nus¡ritarka, we can arrive at Brahman as the cause of the world.S¡mkhya believes that through inference we can know that pradh¡na isthe cause of the world. In refutation of this concept, áa´kara says thatanum¡na cannot give us any knowledge about the cause of the world.Because áruti says that the cause of the world is a sentient object. Thissentient objectBrahman has no connection with other means ofknowledge. This is the view of áa´kara, whereas in S¡mkhya anum¡na91

has a major role to play in determining prak¤ti or pradhan as thecause of the world. This is a major difference between S¡mkhya andAdvaita.According to áa´kara, Brahman is the Up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a andNimittak¡rana of the Universe. Words such as avyakta, akÀara, sat etc,used in the UpaniÀads do not represent the S¡mkhya concept ofpradh¡na. They are not independent. Moreover, the plurality of puruÀais also unacceptable to the Advaitins, because áruti in no way admitsplurality. So, that theory also is denied by áa´kara with by the help of92

áruti, Sm¤ti and Yukti. Those doctrines of S¡mkhya which do not clashwith Advaita, are accepted by áa´kara.93

Notes and References1asadak¡ra¸adup¡nagraha¸¡tsarvasambhav¡bhad ¿aktasya ¿akyakara¸¡d k¡ra¸a bh¡v¡d ca satk¡ryam. Sa.Ka.92trigu¸amavivek¢viÀayaÅ s¡m¡nyam acetanamprasavadharm¢vyaktam,that¡ Pradh¡namTadvipar¢tastath¡ ca pum¡n Sa.Ka113 samkh¡ta par¡rthatv¡t trigu¸adiviparyay¡dadhiÀ¡nadpuruÀostu bhokt¤bh¡v¡d kaivaly¡rtham prav¤tte¿ca. Sa.Ka.174jananamara¸ak¡ran¡n¡m pratiniyamadayagapat prav¤tte- ¿catraigu¸ya viparyay¡ca puruÀab¡vutvam siddham Sa. Ka .94

5prakrterm¡h¡nstatohamk¡rastasm¡dga¸a¿caÀoda¿akaÅtasm¡dapiÀo·a¿ak¡t paµcebhyaÅ paµcabh£t¡ni. Sa.Ka.186 pr¡pte ¿ar¢rabhede c¡rit¡rthatv¡t aikantika-m¡tyantikam ubhayam kaivalyamapnoti Sa.Ka.687 Y.S,1.248 Dr. Shivkumar, S¡mkhya thought in the Br¡hma¸ical Systems ofIndian Philosophy , p. 182.9 Jerald James Larson, Classical S¡mkhya , p. 209.10S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indain Philosophy Vol. I,p. 22295

11Allen W. Thrasher, the Dates of Mandana Mi¿ra andáa´kara, p. 11712 Kolla chechulekshmi, The Concept of Pari¸¡ma in Indian Philosophy.P. 8813s¡mkhyaday¡stu pari¸istitam vastu pram¡¸antaraga-myamevetimany¡man¡Åpradh¡nidini k¡ra¸¡ntara¸y¡nu-mim¡n¡statparatayaivaved¡nta v¡ky¡ni yojayanti BSSB . 1.1.5.514 Ch. Up. 6.2.1. and 3.115 sataÅ sajjayate iti v¤ddh¡Å.S.K. p. 22316 Tai. Up. 3.196

17 satvat samjayate jµ¡nam. B.G.14.1618yatt£ktam sattva dharme¸a jµ¡nenasarvajµ¡mpradhanambhaviÀyat¢ti,tannopaphyate.nahipradh¡navasth¡yamgu¸a¡my¡tsatv¡dharmajµ¡namsambh¡v¡tnan£ktamsarvajaµ¡na¿aktimatvenasarvajµam bhaviÀyat¢ti. tad¡pinopaphyate yadigu¸¡s¡myesatisatvavyap ¡¿rayamjµ¡na¿aktim¡¿ritya sarvajµ¡mpradhanamucyeta,k¡mamrajastamovyap¡¿ra-yamapijµ¡napratibandhaka¿aktim¡¿ritya kimcijµamu-cyeta. apican¡s¡kÀik¡sattvav¤ttirj¡n¡tin¡bhidh¢yate.n¡-97

cacetanasyapradh¡nasyas¡kÀitvamasti.tasm¡danupapanmpradh¡nasya sarvajnatyam. BSSB 1.1.5.5.19nasaujµ¡nanityatvedoÀosti.jµ¡nanityatvejµ¡naviÀayaÅsv-¡tantryayapade¿onopapadhyataiticenna,pratatauÀ¸ya-prk¡¿pisavitari dahati prak¡¿ayatiti sav¢tatry vyapadeÀa dar¿nat. BSSB1.1.5.5.20‘tattejoaikÀata’‘t¡paikÀantaitic¡cetanayirapy¡ptejasosc-cetanavadup¡c¡ra dar¿an¡t. Ch.Up.6.2,34.21Ch.Up.6.98

22j¢vo hi n¡ma ctanaÅ ¿ar¢r¡dhyakÀaÅ pra¸¡n¡m dh¡rayita,tatprasiddhernirvacan¡cca.BSSB.1.1.5.6.23yadhi hyacetanam pradh¡nam saccabdav¡cyam tad¡s¢tigr¡hyenmumukÀu cetanam santamacatanositi. t¡t¡vipa-r¢tav¡di¿¡stram puruÀasy¡narth¡yetyapram¡¸¡m. BSSB. 1.1.5.7.24 Ch.Up.6.14.325 api ca kvacitgau¸¡Å ‘¿abdo’ d¤Àa iti naitavata ¿abdapram¡¸ake¡rtha gau¸¢kalpan¡ny¡ya, sarvatr¡n¡¿v-¡saprasa´g¡t. BSSB. 1.1.5.7.99

26yattuktam cetan¡cetanayoÅ sadh¡ra¸a ¡tma¿abdaÅ k¤tujvalanayorivajyoti¿abda iti, tanna, anekarth¡va¿y¡ny¡-yyatvat. Ibid.27prak¤tam tu sadiksit¤, s¡mn¢hita¿cetanaÅ ¿vetaket£Å, nahicetanasya ¿vetaketoracetan¡tma sambhavat¢tyavoc¡ma Ibid.28 yattadsukha duhkha moh¡tmakam sam¡nyam tatrigu¸am pradh¡namm¤dvat¡cetanam cetanasya puruÀ¡rthe sadhayitum svabh¡venaivavicitre¸a vic¡r¡tmana vivartata iti.BSSB 2.2.1.129 tatedam jagadakhilam p¤thvy¡di n¡n¡karmabhalopabho-gayogyamb¡hyam, adhy¡tmikam ca ¿¡r¢r¡di n¡n¡jat-yanvitampratiniyat¡vayaviny¡samanekakarmabhal¡nu-bhav¡dhiÀ¡nam100

d¤¿yam¡nam prajµ¡v¡dbhiÅ sambh¡vi-t¡tamaiÅ ¿ilpibhirmanasapy¡locayitu masakyam satkat-ham acedanam pradh¡nam racayet.Ibid.30ato racan¡nupatte¿ca hetorn¡cetanam jagatk¡ra¸amanu- m¡tavyambhavati.Ibid31nahi bahy¡dhy¡tmik¡n¡m bhed¡n¡m sukhadukhamoha-tmakatay¡nvaya upapadhyate, sukhadinam c¡nta-ratvaprat¢teÅ,¿abd¡d¢n¡m c¡tadr£patva prat¢teÅ. tan-nimittatva prat¢te¿ca.Ibid.101

32k¡ryak¡ra¸abh¡v¡stuprekÀap£rvakanirmit¡n¡m ¿ayan¡-san¡d¢n¡m·¤Àa iti nak¡ryakara¸abh¡v¡tb¡hyadhy¡tm-ik¡n¡m bhedan¡macetanap£rvakatvam ¿akyam kalp-ayitum .Ibid.33yath¡ t¤¸a pallavodak¡di nimitt¡ntaranirapekÀam sva-bh¡v¡devaks¢r¡dhy¡k¡rena parinamat¡ evampradh¡n-amapimah¡d¡dhy¡k¡re¸a pari¸amasyaa iti. BSSB. 2.2.1.5.34dhenvaiva hyupayuktam t¤¸¡di kÀ¢r¢bhavati na prah¢nama¸a·ud¡dhyupayuktam va yadi hi nirnimittametatsy¡ddhenu¿ar¢rasambandh¡danyatr¡pit¤¸¡di kÀ¢ribhavet. nacayath¡k¡mam m¡nuÀairna ¿akyam samp¡dayitum-ityet¡vata102

nirnimittam bhavati. bhavati hi kimcitk¡ryamm¡nuÀasamp¡dhyam kimcit daivasamp¡dhyam. manu-Ày¡ api¿aknuvantye vocitenop¡yena t¤¸a dyup¡d¡yakÀ¢ramm¡p¡tayayitumprabh£tam hi kÀ¢ram k¡mayama-naÅprabh£tam khasm dhenum c¡rayanti. tata¿ca prab-h£tam kÀ¢ramlabhanta. tasm¡nna t¤¸¡divat svabh¡vikaÅ pradh¡nasya pari¸¡maÅ.Ibid.35 sadeva somayedamagre¡s¢t. Ch. Up. 1.3.36yadhyan¡tmaiva pradh¡nam ‘saccabdav¡cyam’ s¡ ¡tma tattvamasiit¢hopatiÀam sy¡tsa tadupade¿a¿rava¸ada-n¡tmajµatay¡ ,103

tanniÀom ¡bh£titi mukhyam¡tm¡namum-upadidi¿kÀustasya,heyatvam br£y¡t. BSSB.1.1.5.8.37ekavijµ¡nena sarvavijµ¡tam pratiÀitam Ch.Up 6.38uta tamade¿amapr¡kÀyo yen¡¿rutam ¿rutam bhavaty-amatammatamavijµ¡tam vijµ¡tamitikatham nu bhagavaÅ sa ¡de¿obhavat¢tiyath¡ somyaikena m¤pin·ena sarva-mm¤¸mayamvijµ¡tam sy¡d v¡c¡rambha¸amvik¡ro n¡-madheyam m¤iketyevasatyam evam somya sa ¡de¿o bhavat¢ti. Ch. Up. 6. 1. 1 - 339naca satccabdav¡cye pradh¡ne bhogyapavargak¡ra¸eheyatven¡hyatvena va vijµ¡ta bhok¤vargo vijµ¡to bhavati,104

apradh¡navikaratv¡dbhokt¤vargasya tasm¡nna pradh¡-namsaccabdav¡cyam. BSSB.1.1.5.840 YeÀ¡ ¿rutiÅ svapit¢tyetatpuruÀasya lokaprasiddham n¡ma nirvakti.sva¿abdeneh¡tmocyate.yaÅprak¤ataÅsaccabdav-accyastamap¢tobhavantyapigato bhavat¢tyarthaÅ BSSB .1.1.5.941 Tai.Up.2.5 T.V42 s¡mkhya parikalpitam acetanam pradh¡nam ¡nandamay-atvenak¡ra¸atvena v¡pekÀitavyam BSSB.1.1.6.1843¡nandam brahma¸o vidv¡n nabibhedi kuta¿cana (Tai.Up 2.9) tatrapr¡k¿ar¢r¡dhyulpatterabhidÅy¡nam s¤jyam¡n-¡n¡m ca105

vik¡r¸¡ms¤ÀturavyatirekaÅ sarvavik¡ras¤Ài¿ca naparasm¡d¡tmano anyatropapaphyate. BSSB.1.1.6.16.44 Br.UP.3.8.7.845 sy¡detat k¡ryasya c¡tk¡ra¸¡dh¢natvamambar¡ntaghrti¤abhyupagamyate, pradh¡na k¡ra¸av¡dinoap¢yamupapadh-yate.BSSB.1.3.3.1046etasya v¡ akÀarasya pra¿¡sana g¡rgi s£ryacandramasau vidh¤tautiÀau. Br.up.3.8.9106

47pra¿¡sanam ca parame¿varam karma¸¡ cetanasya, pradh¡nasyapra¿¡sanam bhavati na hyacetananam gha¡dik¡ra¸¡n¡mm¤d¡d¢n¡m gha¡diviÀayam pra¿¡s-anamasti. BSSB.1.3.3.1148 tatr¡d¤Àatv¡divyapade¿aÅ pradh¡nasy¡pi sambhavati. d¤À¤tv¡divyapade¿astu na sambhavatyacetanatv¡t. BSSB.1.3.3.1249Katha Up. 1.3.1150yaduktam radh¡nasy¡¿abdatvam tadasiddham. k¡sucit-cc¡kh¡supradh¡nasamarpa¸¡bh¡s¡n¡m, sabd¡n¡m ¿r£yam¡¸atv¡t ataÅpradh¡nasya k¡ra¸atvam vedasidd-hameva mahadbhih107

parama¤Àibhih kapilaprabh¤tibhiÅ parig¤h¢tamiti prasajyate.BSSB. 1.4.1.151na ca kramam¡tras¡m¡ny¡tsam¡n¡rthapratipattirbhavat-iyasatitadr£paprapatyabhijµ¡ne.nahya¿vasth¡ng¡mpa¿-yanna¿voyamitya m£·o adhyavasyati. Ibid.52indriyebhyaÅ par¡ hyarth¡ arthebhya¿caparam manaÅ manasastupar¡buddhirbuddheratmamah¡n paraÅ maha-taÅparamavyaktamav yaktattpuruÀaÅ paraÅ. puruÀ¡nna paramkimcits¡ k¡À¡ s¡par¡gatiÅ. Katha. UP. 1.3 10, 11108

53nahi pradh¡nam¡tram nicayya m¤tyumukh¡t pramucyata itis¡mkhyairiÀyate. cetan¡tmavijµ¡n¡dhi m¤tyumukh¡t pramucyate ititeÀ¡mabhyupagamaÅ. Tasm¡nna pradh-¡nasy¡tra jµeyatvamavyakta ¿abdanirdistatvam v¡ BSSB 1. 4. 1. 5.54yath¡ mahatccabdaÅ s¡mkhyaiÅ s¡tt¡matrepi prathamaje prayuktona tameva vaidikepi prayoge abhidatte. BSSB 1. 4. 1. 755Sve. Up. 4-556 na j¡yata itycaja sy¡t.m£laprak¤tiravik¤tih ityabhyupag- am¡t. BSSB1.4.2.8109

57 anyaÅ punarajaÅ puruÀa ulpannavivekajµ¡no virakto jah¡tyenamprak¤tim bhukta bhogapavargo parityajati, mucyata ityarthaÅ.Ibid.58arvagkilascamas¡ £rdhvab£dhnaÅ Br. Up. 2.2.359ityasmin mantre sv¡tantrye¸¡yam n¡m¡sau camasobhi-pretati na¿akyate nir£payitum BSSB 1.4.2.860m¡y¡mtu prak¤tim vidhy¡nm¡yinam tu mahe¿varam iti yo yonimyonimadhitiÀtastyekaÅ (Sve. Up. 4.10,11) itica tasya ev¡vagam¡nnasvatantr¡ kacitprak¤tiÅ pradh¡nam n¡majanm¡ntre¸¡mn¡yata iti¿akyate vaktum. BSSB. 1.4.2.9110

61B.S. 1.3. 1.562Mun. Up. 2.2.563atra yadetadhyuprabh¤tin¡motatvavacanadayatanam kicidavagamyate,tatkim param brahma sy¡d¡hosvidart-h¡ntaramitisamdihyate. tatr¡rt¡ntaram kimapy¡yatanam sy¡diti pr¡ptam.Kasm¡t, am¤dasyaiÀa setuÅ iti ¿rava¸¡t. p¡rava¸kiÅ loke setuÅprakhy¡taÅ na ca parasya brah-ma¸aÅ p¡ravatvam¿akyamabhyupagantum, anatamap¡-ram (Br. Up..2.4.12) iti srava¸¡tarth¡ntare c¡yatane parig¤hyam¡ma¸e sm¤tiprassiddham111

pradh¡nam parig¤-h¢tayvam tasya k¡ra¸atv¡d¡yatanatvopapatteÅ.BSSB. 1.3.1.164puruÀa evedam vi¿vam karma tapo brahma par¡m¤tam iti.“Brahmaivedamam¤tam purast¡tbrahma pa¿c¡t bra-hmadakÀi¸¡ta¿cottare¸a” iti ca. Mun. Up. 2.2.11.65 sarvam brahmeti tu sam¡n¡dhik¡ra¸yam prapaµcapra-vil¡pan¡rtamnanekaresat¡pratip¡dan¡rtham. “sayatha saindhavakhanaanantanroab¡hyaÅ k¤tsno rasakhana evaivam v¡areyam¡tman¡ntaroab¡hyaÅ k¤tsnaÅ prajµ¡-nakhana eva” (Br. Up.112

4.5.13) ityekarasat¡¿rava¸¡t. tas-m¡dhyubhv¡dhy¡yatanam parambrahma. BSSB 1.3.1.166yatt£ktam, sethu¿ruteÅ seto¿cap¡ravatvopapatterbrahm-a¸o arth¡ntare¸a dhyubhv¡dhy¡yatanena bhavitavyamiti. Ibid.67 Îg.Veda .10.81,10.129.368 Sa. Su. 1.140 and 1.14169janana mara¸a kara¸¡n¡m pratiniyam¡dayugapat prav¤-the¿capuruÀa babutvam siddham traigumy¡di viparya-y¡caa Sa .Ka.28.113

70 bahavo vibha¿c¡tmana¿caitanyam¡trasvar£pa nirgu¸¡ nirati¿ay¡¿catadartham sadh¡ra¸am pradh¡nam tannimi-ttai¿¡mbhog¡pavargasidd- hiriti s¡mkhy¡Å. BSSB 2.3.17.5071samkh¡ta par¡rthatv¡t trigu¸¡tiviparyay¡dadhiÀ¡n¡tpuruÀostu bhokt¤bh¡v¡t kaivaly¡rtham prav¤the¿ca.Sa. Ka.17.72 Anima sen Gupta, The Classical S¡mkhya. p.p.1 to 873 Dr. S. Radhakrisnam, Indian Philosophy. Vol. II, p. 32174tatra s¡mkhy¡nam t¡vatcaitanyasvar£patv¡t sarv¡tma-n¡msamnidh¡nadhyavi¿eÀ¡caikasya sukhadukha samb-andhe sarve¿¡msukhadukha sambandhaÅ pr¡pnoti. BSSB. 2.3.17.50114

75bahuÀv¡tmasv¡k¡¿avatsarvagateÀu prati¿ar¢ram b¡hy¡-bhyantaravi¿eÀa¸a samnihiteÀu manov¡kk¡yairdharm¡-dharmalakÀa¸amad¤Àamuparjyate. BSSB 2.3.17.5176abhisamdhy¡d¢n¡mapi s¡dh¡ra¸enaiv¡tmanaÅ samyo-genanupapatteruktadoÀ¡nuprasa´gaÅ eva. BSSB 2.3.17.5277 athocyete vibhutvepy¡tmanaÅ ¿ar¢rapratiÀena manas¡ samyogaÅ¿ar¢ravaccinna ev¡tmaprade¿e bhaviÀyati ataÅprade¿ak¤tavyavasth¡bhisamdhy¡d¢n¡mad¤Àasyasarv¡tmasamnidhau kriyam¡¸¡n¡m niyamahetutv¡-sukhadukhayo¿cabhaviÀy¡titi. BSSB 2.3.17.53115

78brahma¸¡di¿ar¢raprade¿eÀvad¤Àa niÀpatteÅ prade¿¡n-taravartitv¡cca svarg¡dhyupabhogasya. Ibid.79 Dr. Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy. Vol. II, pp. 282. 283, 32180B. S. 2.1.1.181paratantraprajµ¡stu praye¸ajanaÅ sv¡tantrye¸a ¿rutyarthamavadh¡rayituma¿aknuvantaÅprakhyatapra¸et¤k¡susm¤tiÀvalamberan tatbalena ca ¿rutyartham pratipipseran.asmatk¤te ca vyakhy¡ne na vi¿vasyurbahum¡n¡tsm¤t-¢n¡mpra¸et¤Àu kapilaprabh¤d¢nam c¡rÀam jµ¡nama-pratihatamsmaryate BSSB. 2.1.1.1.116

82sm¤ti¿ca tantr¡khy¡param¤Àipra¸¢ta ¿iÀaparig¤h¢ta anya-¿catadanus¡ri¸yaÅ sm¤tayaÅ evam satyanavak¡¿apras-a´gaÅprasajyeran tasu hyacetanampradh¡nam svatan-tram jagataÅk¡ra¸amupanibadhyate. asyavar¸asyasmin-kale anenavidh¡nenopanayanam, ¢d¤¿cac¡rah,ittham ved¡dhyayam, itthamsam¡vartanam, ittam sahadharma-cari¸¢samyoga iti. That¡puruÀartha¿ca var¸¡¿rama dha-rm¡nn¡navidh¡nvidadhati. naivamkalpil¡dism¤tinama-nuÀeye viÀaye avake¿o asti. mokÀas¡dhanameva hi samyagdar¿anamadik¤tyataÅ pra¸itaÅ. Ibid.117

83mah¡bh¡ratepi ca bahavaÅ puruÀa brahmannut¡Å eka eva tu itivic¡rya ‘bahavaÅ puruÀas¡mkhya yoga vic¡ri¸¡m itiparapakÀamupanyasy¡ tadvyud¡sena bahu¸¡m puruÀ-¡¸¡m hiyathaika yonirucyate.tatha tam puruÀamva m¡khy¡sy¡migu¸¡dhikam. Ityupakramya “mamantar¡tma tava ca yac¡nyedahasamsthitaÅ. sarve¿am s¡kÀibh£to asau na gr¡hyaÅkenacitkvacit”. BSSB 2.1.1.1.84B.S. 2.1.2.3.85etena s¡mkhya sm¤ti praty¡khyena yogasm¤tirapipraty¡khy¡tod¤Àavyety¡tidi¿ati.BSSB.2.1.2.3118

86“trinnutamsth¡pyasamam¿ar¢ram” (Sve.Up.2.8) “¿rotav-yomantavyonididhyosditavyaÅ”(Br.Up.2.4.5)“tamyogamitimanyantesthir¡midriyadh¡ra¸am” “vidhy¡metam yogavi-dhimcak¤À¸am” Katha.Up.2.6.18.87 Y.S.1.2488 s¡pekÀo h¢¿varo viÀamam ¿riÀim nirmim¢te kimapekÀata iticet.dharm¡dharm¡vapekÀata iti vad¡maÅ ataÅ s¤jyam¡-napra¸idharm¡dhar manapekÀa viÀama s¤Àiriti n¡yam¢¿varasy¡par¡dhaÅ.¢¿varastu parjany¡vad¤Àavya¤. yath¡hi parjanyovr¢h¢yav¡di¿rÀuÅ s¡dh¡ra¸am k¡ra¸am bhavati119

vr¢hiyav¡divaiÀamye tu tatb¢jagetanyev¡s¡dh¡ra¸¡ni s¡-marthy¡nik¡ra¸¡ni bhavati, evam¢¿var¡devamanuÀy¡di¿r-Àau s¡dh¡ra¸amk¡ra¸am bhavati deva manuÀy¡di vaiÀa-mye tu tatb¢jagat¡nyevas¡dh¡ra¸¡ni karma¸I k¡ra¸¡ni bhavantyevam¢¿varaÅsapekÀatv¡nna vaiÀamy¡naikh¤¸y¡- bhy¡m d£Àayati. B. SS. B.2.1.12.3489 Kau. Brah. 3.890 B¤. UP. 3.2.1391 B. G. 4.11120

92puruÀavi¿eÀatv¡bhyupagama¿ce¿varasya puru¿asyacau- d¡s¢ny¡bhyupagam¡dasamaµjasyam. BSSB.2.2.7.3793 Ch. UP. 6.3.294parasparaviruddha¿c¡yams¡mkhy¡n¡mabhyupagamaÅkvacitsaptendriya¸yanukr¡manti,kvacid¡k¡¿a.tath¡kvacitindriy¡¸yantakara¸¡ni var¸ayanti, kvacidekamiti. prasidd-haevatu¿rutyesvarakara¸¡d¢ny¡virodhastadnuvartiny¡ ca sm¤tya.tasm¡dasamaµjasam s¡mkhy¡n¡m dar¿anam. BSSB. 2.2.1.10121