ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal


A U S T R A L I A NDEFENCEForceJOURNALNO. 150CONTENTSEditorIrene M. CoombesContributors are urged to ensure theaccuracy of the information contained intheir articles; the Board of Managementaccepts no responsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journalwill generally be readily given by theEditor after consultation with theauthor. Any reproduced articles should bearan acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are theauthor’s own and should not be construed asofficial opinion or policy.September/October20013. Letters to the Editor5. Australia’s Regional EnvironmentBlunting the Knowledge Edge?Lieutenant Colonel Dean K. Bowley andMajor Steven R. Brewer19. Australian Perspectives on NetworkCentric Warfare: PragmaticApproaches with Limited ResourcesEd Kruzins and Jason Scholz35. A Force for All Seasons ... and all theright reasonsLieutenant Commander John P.Robinson, RANR47. UNTAC and INTERFET - AComparative AnalysisBrigadier Steve Ayling and Ms Sarah Guise57. Overcoming Learned HelplessnessJames Warn62. ReviewsFront Cover HMAS Darwin outside Sydney heads.Printed in Australiaby National Capital Printing,Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Gunners from 8/12 Medium Regiment fire in support of the final live-fire phase of Exercise Tandem Thrust 01Photographer: Corporal J. Weeding

Letters to the Editor3NAVY INVITES SUBMISSIONS TO HMASSYDNEY (2) SEMINARDear Editor,The Royal Australian Navy is invitinginterested individuals and organisations toprovide submissions to a forthcoming seminaron the sinking of the cruiser HMAS Sydney.On 19 November 1941 Sydney wassunk with all hands off the Western Australiancoast in an engagement with the Germanauxiliary cruiser HSK Kormoran.On 16 November 2001 the RoyalAustralian Navy will be sponsoring a seminarin Fremantle.The seminar, which is being organised inconjunction with the Western AustralianMaritime Museum and the HMAS SydneyFoundation Trust, will consider the likely sitesof the wreck, review any recent informationand assess viability of mounting a possiblesearch for the wreck.Prior to the seminar, three workshopswill be held to review all the available evidencefrom archival, oral and oceanographic records,while a fourth workshop will examine thetechnical feasibility of finding the wreck. Theseworkshops will present their findings at theseminar.On conclusion of the seminar a reportrecommending future actions, including anypossible search for the wreck, will beforwarded to the Chief of Navy, Vice AdmiralDavid Shackleton.Much of this information is already inthe public domain. However, the seminarorganisers are keen to explore any newinformation that might have come to lightsince the 1997-99 Inquiry into the loss ofSydney by the Joint Standing Committee onForeign Affairs, Defence and Trade.Any person or organisation thatbelieves it has information that may be of useto the seminar is encouraged to submit it to theorganisers as soon as possible.Further information and details ofseminar registration are available from theNaval History Directorate, Sea Power Centre,Defence, Canberra.Telephone (02) 626 64797,Facsimile (02) 626 62782,Email: David Stevens (02) 626 62423Naval History Directorate

Australia’s Regional Environment Bluntingthe Knowledge Edge?By Lieutenant Colonel Dean K. Bowley and Major Steven R. Brewer5A widely accepted paradigm in the development of the Australian Army After Next (AAN) is thattechnology will continually improve the ability of future land forces to acquire knowledge. Technology,however, is only one of many factors contributing to the “knowledge edge”. We argue that increases ineffectiveness in the land environment provided by technological innovation are not as great as originallyanticipated; but are limited by the complex nature of the land environment and the adaptive nature ofthe enemy. This article focuses on the impact of the physical and enemy environments on theinformation domain; aspects that are normally constrained through assumptions that may oversimplifytheir nature. Observations and results from the recent Restructuring The Army (RTA) and ArmyExperimentation Framework (AEF) Studies have provided insights about these aspects and their likelyimpact on information age technologies. It is the impact of the physical and enemy environments that isthe emphasis of this article, not the technical characteristics of new technologies.IntroductionIt is not the strongest that survive, nor the mostintelligent, but the most adaptable.Charles DarwinThe Australian Army is embracing theconcept of “the knowledge edge” as adecisive advantage it requires in future combat.The doctrinal realisation of the knowledge edgeis network centric warfare, or in Australianterms network enabled warfare. 1 Wherenetwork enabled warfare relies upon three keytechnologies: sensors, information managementand transportation, and precision weapons.While this direction is not disputed, what isneeded is a thorough and challenginginvestigation of the capabilities required, so thatinformed conclusions can be made about howthe knowledge edge is best pursued for landoperations within Australia’s region and whennetwork enabled warfare should be thedominant concept of operations.Four broad factors must be understood tomake informed decisions: the friendlyenvironment, the physical environment, theenemy environment and the neutral or nonparticipatingenvironment, and how thesefactors shape the application and utility ofknowledge edge technologies. The approachadopted in this article is to analyse the impactof the physical, neutral and enemyenvironment on the capabilities that supportthe concept. This is a different approach tonormal force development studies where anumber of friendly force options are usuallycompared against a narrow set of scenarioswith tightly constrained physical and enemyconditions (environments). Therefore ouranalysis is constrained by assumptions madeabout friendly factors, not physical or enemyfactors. The result is an analysis of theflexibility and robustness of a force structure aswell as its effectiveness. The key outcome ofthis analysis is an understanding of the enemyand physical environments in which thecapabilities are useful and when and where theconcept of network enabled warfare is likely tobe valid.The focus of this article is, therefore, on theanalysis of the physical and enemyenvironments (the effect of the neutralenvironment is the subject of ongoing studywithin the current AEF program) and how theyaffect the application of knowledge edgetechnologies. These two factors correlate closely

6AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001with the “enduring characteristics of war”. 2These characteristics include weather, climateand terrain (the physical environment), theenemy, and uncertainty, friction, chaos anddanger, (which arguably are a consequenceof the physical and enemy environment).To conduct an analysis of this breadth, anumber of assumptions must be made. Asmuch as possible we have made theseassumptions about the friendly environmentas this is considered the most predictable ofthe factors; some generalisations are madeabout the physical environment, but as fewconstraints as possible are applied to theenemy. Consequently this article is relevantto sensor technologies, and the tactical levelof land operations in Australia and herregion of interest. As such, the conclusionsmay not be directly relevant to theoperational or strategic levels of war or themaritime and air environments.Friendly Environment… an age where firepower can be projectedfrom afar with great selectivity.Francois Heisbourg, quoted in LWD 1The Australian Army’s present strategicenvironment can be summarised as “anelement of a joint force conductingoperations to defend Australia’s interestswithin a maritime strategy”. Within thisstrategy there are two primary modes ofemploying land forces: as the “back stop” onmainland Australia for combined air andmaritime forces attempting to close the airseagap to the north of Australia, or as amanoeuvre force within the maritimeapproaches (the “inner arc”, see Figure 1 onpage 9). 3 Since 1940 the Australian Army hasoperated mainly within our region, forexample, the South West Pacific in 1941-45,Korea, Malaya, Borneo, Vietnam, Cambodia,Bougainville, Papua New Guinea and EastTimor, and throughout the spectrum ofconflict from general war to peacekeepingoperations and humanitarian assistance. Thequestion this raises is: what are thecapabilities required for operations within theregion throughout the spectrum of conflict,including peace, asymmetric andconventional operations?Australia’s current strategy reflects anenduring preference to prevent the conditionsunder which a direct threat to the mainlandcould develop. Now, as previously, Australiawill seek a decision in its northernapproaches, before a threat reaches thecontinent. These regions will remainstrategically important to Australia because,for the foreseeable future, any sustained andsubstantial threat to Australia’s physicalintegrity must arise from or move throughthis area. For this reason, Australia willcontinue to work cooperatively with regionalstates, to prevent or defeat the emergence ofsecurity threats that may have a destabilisingeffect on the near region.The Australian Army’s philosophy onwarfighting can be broadly summarised aswinning the land battle through close combat,manoeuvre and the indirect approach withcombined arms teams using their initiativeand teamwork. 4,5 Command is exercised byapplying a doctrine that seeks to influence theflow of action rather than to control eachevent (Directive Control). 6 While fighting waris conducted through many mediums (e.g.electronic or psychological warfare), closecombat will remain a key component of theland battle but “the knowledge edge” is seenas a major force multiplier.The knowledge edge is usually described asa system, made up of command and control,communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)integrated with weapon systems and logisticsupport. The weapon systems are characterisedby improved precision, accuracy anddiscrimination, especially in open terrain(author’s italics). Knowledge is an importantaspect of the Army’s “fighting smart” conceptand is to be gained from, and disseminated

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 7through, the C4ISR system, informationoperations and professional mastery.Information operations include the protectionof our information systems and the penetrationof the enemy’s. Professional mastery is thecomposite of training and experience thatallows commanders and staff to quicklyprocess information, weigh up risks, then makeand implement operational decisions.Enemy Environment… the enemy has three courses open to him,and of these three he will adopt the fourth.Attributed to Von Molke (the Elder)Broadly there are only three legitimateassumptions that can be made about anenemy, especially when dealing with futurescenarios. The first is that the enemy will studyour methods of fighting, seek weaknesses andtry to exploit them, the second is that they areintelligent and will learn from experience, andfinally they will attempt to deceive us. Basedon these assumptions, assessing what theenemy is likely to do becomes a game of“Catch 22”, subject to significant uncertainty.A means of reducing this uncertainty is toconduct a rigorous analysis of our owncapabilities to establish our strengths andtherefore determine what courses we canrealistically deny the enemy (and which aretherefore the enemy’s least likely courses). Forexample, with a defence force based on air andmaritime superiority (through the possession offighters, strike aircraft, submarines and ships)Australia claims the ability to close the air-seagap in the Timor and Arafura Seas. 7Therefore, an enemy may conclude that, if theyare to strike at Australia, they should avoidconventional approaches and may attempt“asymmetric crossings” to minimise combatlosses. 8 When likely scenarios are viewed fromthis enemy perspective, possible threatsbecome less ambiguous and risks can beproperly assessed (for probability andimportance) and mitigated. The assessments ofthe enemy courses of action then becomematters for risk evaluation and management.It is reasonable to conclude that in defenceof the Australian mainland, the currentprogram of investment in air and maritimeplatforms and C4ISR systems may force anenemy into an asymmetric approach forattacks on the Australian mainland andAustralia’s vital interests. This means that theArmy may fight campaigns anywhere withinAustralia against coercive threats by terrorists(a prospect not considered further in thisarticle) or, against threats of insurgency orraider operations by enemy special forces innorthern Australia.In the defence of Australia’s regionalinterest, that is operations in the littoral ormaritime approaches, Australia is likely tohave to project her influence offshore and theland component is a key element in thisstrategy. The land force must seize theinitiative in order to achieve national goalswithin the constraints of time and limitedresources. The ADF may be required to allocateforces to physically protect assets whilesimultaneously seeking out the enemy. Theenemy may have the initial advantage of alocal knowledge of the physical environment.The likely enemy can be bounded; bymassed conventional forces with some hightechnology inserts at the upper end, and bydispersed infantry forces (again with hightechnology inserts) at the lower. 9 Massedconventional forces are optimised for relativelyopen country and are susceptible to longrangedetection and fires, particularly whenmoving. Leading edge technologies in sensors,information management and transportationare making this type of battlefield more andmore lethal. However ground forcescontinually seek to shroud themselves interrain or civilian populations to minimise theeffectiveness of long-range precisionengagements. Probably more difficult isdispersed infantry concentrating for specificactions and dispersing again. They may be

8AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001equipped with shoulder launched anti–aircraftmissile such as the SA-7 or even SA-16/18,which presented a significant threat in Kosovobecause they are small, hard to detect and relyon passive guidance. 10 Other equipment mayinclude shoulder launched anti-tank weapons,which proved effective against helicopters inMogadishu and against armour in Grozny. 11Our assumptions about the enemy in theopening of this section lead us to theconclusion that likely operations will beagainst dispersed infantry-based forces becauseof our (especially US conventional forces)strengths in defeating conventional massedforces. It should be stressed that this is thelikely enemy course of action, not the definiteenemy course of action, and contingenciesmust be developed for other courses. If wewere to build a system designed for operationssolely against dispersed infantry-basedoperations we would be susceptible to massedconventional forces.Physical EnvironmentThe physical environment includes naturalelements such as weather, terrain andvegetation, the local electromagneticenvironment etc., man-made infrastructure andthe like. Terrain can be classified as either openor close, based on a simple definition. Terrainis considered open if the probable detectionrange is greater than the effective weaponrange, and close if the probable detectionrange is within effective weapon range. Openterrain is characterised by long fields of fireand observation, such as deserts, grasslands orfarmlands. Close terrain has short fields of fireand view, for example, forests, jungle andsavannah. Complex terrain is characterised byterrain in a mosaic of close and open withareas or lanes of open terrain and clusters ofclose terrain, for example urban, mixedagricultural and forest, and villages etc.This simple analysis of terrain leads to twoimportant classifications of range for combat;the range at which detection, identification andrecognition are “likely” and the “effective”engagement range of the major weaponsystems. An important characteristic ofcomplex and close terrain is that detection“envelope” (particularly recognition) often lieswithin the engagement envelope, when this isthe case these can be termed constrainedenvironments. 12Regional Characteristics (U)Australia’s approaches include thearchipelagos of South-East Asia and the SouthWest Pacific. These regions, depicted in Figure1, will remain strategically important toAustralia because, for the foreseeable future,any sustained and substantial threat toAustralia’s physical integrity must arise from ormove through this area.The curved line in Figure 1 depicts theinner arc, which is that area of the archipelagowhich, if controlled by a power with interestsinimical to Australia, could directly threatenAustralia. The shading in Figure 1 indicates therange of ship-based land attack missiles andland-based anti-shipping missiles anticipatedbeing commercially available by 2010. Theentire near region can therefore be characterisedas a littoral environment in which theoperational effects of sea, land and aerospacepower overlap. 13There are two major vegetation biomes ofSouth-East Asia: forest (mainly low latitudeevergreen rainforest, monsoon forest) andsavannah (mainly broadleaf tree savannah).There is some alpine tundra in New Guinea.Outside the normal biomes there are mangrovesin coastal regions and urban and cultivatedareas. The percentage of area covered by each ofthese biomes is listed in Table 1. TRAC WhiteSands Missile Range (WSMR) conducted a studyof world vegetation types to provide a betterunderstanding of line-of-sight in vegetatedareas; particularly with respect to dismountedinfantry combat. The results of this study arelisted in Table 2 as an indication of the impactof vegetation on the ability to detect infantry

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 9Figure 1 (U) Australia’s Near Region and Inner Arctargets. Combining the data in each table showsthat in over 60 per cent of South-East Asia,ground detection ranges are less than 100m andcanopy closure is over 65 per cent (over 50 percent with canopy closure of over 90 per cent).This indicates that achieving line-of-sight with atarget is extremely difficult for both air andground-based line-of-sight detection devices. Italso indicates that most of South-East Asia canbe classified as close, complex or constrainedterrain, because detection ranges are likely to bewithin engagement ranges, for all weapons fromsmall arms through to missiles. The complexityof South-East Asia is accentuated by weatherfactors. The impact of weather, and otherobscuration is shown in Table 3.Consequences of the Enemy and PhysicalEnvironmentThe future is not the son of Desert Storm,but the step child of Somalia and Chechnya.General Krulak, Former Commandant USMCThere are at least three key components oftechnology critical to realising knowledgesystems; communications, data processing andfusion, and sensors. It is not within the scope ofthis article to discuss the likelihood that futurecommunication technologies will provide thenecessary bandwidth, or that data processingalgorithms will provide the compression andfusion required. It could be assumed theywould, without invalidating the subsequentanalysis. Aside from enemy action to interdictthe wide bandwidth communication network,it is only the physical environment, in thebroadest sense, which impacts oncommunications and data processing.Importantly, the C4ISR system depends on theSurveillance and Reconnaissance elements forits usefulness in determining the enemy’sintentions. Thus, it can be argued that it issensor performance (both electronic andhuman) that has primacy in the utility of theC4ISR system and it is the sensors (again bothelectronic and human) that are most affectedby the physical and enemy environment.In the timeframe of the Enhanced CombatForce (ECF) and possibly for the Army AfterNext (AAN), it is unlikely that technologiesthat enable the detection, monitoring andidentification of dismounted infantry targetswill be available (certainly not without

10AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001Table 1 (U) Vegetation Types in South-East AsiaClassification Biome Percentage of Area CoveredAlpine vegetation Alpine Tundra 0.6%Cultivated land N/A 36.8%Savannah Savannah 1.6%Sub-Tropical and temperate forest Forest 6.5%Tropical evergreen forest Forest 44.6%Tropical deciduous forest Forest 9.9%Table 2 (U) Vegetation DataClassification TRAC WSMRData 27 CanopyClosureUnder GrowthDensityMaximumRangeAlpine vegetationNo dataCultivated land No data 29Savannah No data 30 15-30% Medium

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 11guided weapons meant target acquisition anddamage assessment was extremely difficult.To be able to target a guerrilla force … itmust be found, fixed, targeted, and engaged… before he breaks and flees. To do thesethings when an elusive enemy can be seenand engaged with direct fire is very difficult.It is extraordinarily difficult when he isdistant and unseen… 16Australian forces in Vietnam (1945-54 and1962-75) and Malaya (1948-61) fought anenemy whose tactics were based on dispersedguerrilla action supported by largerconventional infantry forces. They were anelusive and fleeting enemy operating inextremely difficult terrain, using dispersionand infiltration to avoid contact andconcentrate at the time and place of theirchoosing. The single biggest tactical problemof finding and then fixing the enemy inextremely difficult terrain was partially solvedby the use of long-range patrols to identifydeep targets for air and artillery strikes. Patrolsoperated out from the base area for weekscovering large areas on foot and consequentlybeing able to surprise the enemy and preventthem establishing safe base areas. However theallied forces used more conventional tacticswhen the terrain and enemy demanded.We were no longer in jungle warfare,where small patrols could wander throughand meet small enemy patrols. We tendedto keep battalions concentrated in defensivepositions and patrol in strength. We stillhad to patrol …and this was done bycompany patrols. 17Brigadier R. HughesThis mode of operation was an adaptationof the successful techniques employed byCommonwealth forces in Malaya. TheCommonwealth forces conducted constantpatrolling, searching and ambushing by livingin the field for weeks on end, which disruptedand eventually defeated the communists. Thesetactics were combined with policies thatremoved popular support for the communists.The Government succeeded in winning the“hearts and minds” whilst disrupting theguerrilla campaign. The tactical consequenceof the political campaign was to establish avast human intelligence network thateffectively drove the guerrillas into the jungleand cut them off from support.The desert operations of the Gulf War werepredominantly in open terrain with optical,thermal and radar devices all being able todetect forces well outside engagement ranges.Operations in Vietnam were generally incomplex terrain, the enemy being nearlyinvisible except at very close ranges (infantryoften having to withdraw before usingartillery). The war in Vietnam wasconsequently characterised by decentralisedcommand, with platoons and companiesfighting a hidden and well-dispersed enemywith centrally controlled indirect fire support.Even in the Gulf the US Army’s philosophy ofcommand was decentralised (directive control);however the fire support elements, air andartillery were centrally controlled.All of these examples demonstrate how theenvironment dramatically reduces theeffectiveness of “knowledge edge” systemsbased on line-of-sight detection devices andprecision weapons. The more dispersed theenemy, and the closer the terrain, the more thereliance is on human intelligence to provideinformation. It can be in the form of a HumanIntelligence (HUMINT) network, NORFORCEstyle local force patrolling and observationposts, 18 or light infantry conducting long-rangepatrolling and ambushing. The systems thatsucceeded in defeating a dispersed infantryenemy were based on decentralised commandof infantry patrols supported by powerful andresponsive suppressive firepower. The emphasisis on a dispersed searching system andsuppressive fire because of the very shortdetection and engagement ranges and the veryshort exposure times. This military system wassupported by a political removal of the

12AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001guerrilla’s popular support. Both aspects arepre-requisites for success.(U) In summary the combination of ahostile environment and a cunning adaptiveenemy conducting dispersed dismountedinfantry operations is a likely scenario forAustralia for two reasons: our own investmentin aircraft, ships and the knowledge edgepushes any thinking adversary into this modeof warfare, and secondly, the likely locationsand operations we will be required to conductare conducive to this style of warfare.Observations from RTA Phase 1 1998 19…the effect of terrain still requires that theland force be able to fight and win close combatand that this continues to require a mix ofinfantry, armour and artillery.RTA Final Report to the AustralianMinister of DefenceThe key analytical insights from RTA Phase1 concerned close combat and the impact ofthe physical environment on military systems.In summary the analysis reinforced that closecombat was likely and combined arms effectswere important. The results also highlightedwhat has been termed “The Tyranny ofTerrain”, meaning that the effect of terrain isunlikely to be nullified by sensor technologiesin the medium term. There remains significanttechnical challenges in detecting andidentifying infantry armed with missiles inforest and urban areas. The following is asummary of the key insights from the trials.Complex terrain restricts line-of-sight (LOS)to the extent that either the enemy or friendlyforces may achieve first detection. In very closecountry, detection may be coincident and anencounter battle is likely to result. Therefore,protection, firepower and mobility remainimportant conditions for success in closecombat. In addition, artillery fired without thebenefit of forward observers was found to becompletely ineffective in suppressing theenemy. When ground forces closed with theenemy, indirect fires became extremelyimportant for suppression. Ideally targetswould have been destroyed by precisionguided munitions (PGM), however, theidentification and designation of targets in theterrain of northern Australia was almostimpossible.Close country poses intricatesynchronisation problems when attempting toachieve detection, identification andmonitoring then dislocation or defeat of theenemy. Where monitoring cannot be achievedafter an initial cue, friendly forces must searchto re-establish contact with a target. The reacquisitionof the enemy is difficult and islikely to involve mobile sensors (either infantryor cavalry patrols). In these circumstances, it isimportant that the command and controlprocedures for the coordination of fire supportare responsive to the needs of the patrolcommanders. The fire support system must bedesigned to ensure rapid concentrated supportto dispersed searching (and then fighting)elements.Monitoring the enemy after detection isvital to provide the time needed to decide andthen act. This is extremely difficult to achievein practice, especially in close country, andbecomes dangerous for the monitoring forceshould the enemy become aware of theirpresence. A theory tested in RTA Phase 1 wasthat sensors could support the detection andmonitoring functions and that informationtechnology could quickly process and distributeinformation. It was thought that this wouldincrease the tempo of decision-making andfocus the main effort. Therefore, less combatpower would be required in reserve to providefor contingencies.Unfortunately, the trial results indicated thatthe technological capabilities to achieve suchsituational awareness in complex terrain arenot available. The Regional Force SurveillanceUnit’s (RFSU) and HUMINT network provided agood rate of cueing but the inability to monitorand confirm enemy locations meant that

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 13detection led to a focussed search not a decisiveresponse. In dispersed operations, where thereare few troops in a large area of operations,combat power must be increased to permit thefriendly forces that detect the enemy to initiatecombat action. The realisation that thedetection force is also likely to be the forcetasked to monitor and respond to the enemyleads to deductions about the capabilities itrequires. Tasks for the force include mountedand dismounted patrols by day and night tosearch for the enemy in close country. Ondetection, tasks may be to cordon the enemylocation or demonstrate to force the enemy tomove.There are four elements normally requiredfor close combat, all of which contributesignificantly to the outcome. These elementsare: indirect fire support, direct fire support,intimate support and the assault group. If allfour elements are employed and their effectscoordinated then the probability of success ismaximised. Artillery and mortars normallyprovide the indirect fire support for groundforces. When the battlefield is constrained,indirect fire assets are more likely to conductsuppression and neutralisation missions ofmajor enemy systems such as artillery, antiarmourweapons or other crew served weaponsto enable the assault forces to close with anddestroy the enemy. In close country the assaultforce normally includes infantry and combatengineers. Armoured vehicles, especially tanks,when used in intimate support, greatly decreasefriendly casualties in the assault. 20To defeat the enemy, fire and fire supportassets may be tasked to assault, ambush, orprovide cut off. Observations from RTA Phase 1noted that Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV)equipped with night vision goggles (NVG),protection and firepower could overmatchenemy patrols but were vulnerable to antiarmourweapons fired at short range in closecountry. The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter(ARH) was a great asset with the key attributesof speed, flexibility (in-flight briefing), targetacquisition systems and firepower, but therealities of line-of-sight meant that helicoptershad to expose themselves to make designations.Direct fire support and intimate fire supportsystems require greater physical protection asthe terrain tends to close, or complex. Thechoice of ARH or Armoured Gun System (AGS)is primarily driven by this factor. There is clearevidence from war-gaming that the best choiceis to use a balance between them so the enemyhas a number of different threats to defeat.A Proposed Broad Concept of Operations (U)The force package of a combinedarms team, bound by intent andinformed/supported by situational awareness isa more robust, enduring and rigorousphilosophy.Major R. M. Noble, A Squadron 2nd CavalryRegiment 1997-98 21Major Noble’s quote is included because itsuccinctly captures the essence of the conceptdeveloped through the analysis during RTAPhase 1. The essential components arecombined arms teams (combat and manoeuvre),intent (command and control) and situationalawareness (information acquisition). 22 These arebroadly in agreement with the Australianwarfighting philosophy, that is, the key tenetsof manoeuvre warfare, the indirect approachand attempting to achieve asymmetry are allpart of the concept proposed.Combat and ManoeuvreThe important insight from the RTA TaskForce Trial results is that the combined armsteam is likely to be conducting the searchingand the fighting. There is unlikely to be a splitbetween the sensor and the shooter. Thegreatest effectiveness is achieved through acombined arms combat and search team. Aforce with many complementary capabilitiesconfronts the enemy with a “multi-horneddilemma.” 23 By deploying to meet one threatthe enemy may well expose themselves to

14AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001defeat by another. They are forced to combata wide variety of threats. Additionally, theweaknesses of one system in a given situationcan be compensated for by the strength ofanother system. For example, groundreconnaissance may find surface-to-airmissile (SAM) systems that can be suppressedby artillery so as to allow ARH to operateagainst enemy armour. There is the potentialfor significant increases in effectiveness byusing combined arms teams in allenvironments because of the complementarynature of each weapon system. The basis ofthe team is likely to be infantry in closeenvironments and cavalry in the open.For operations in the constrainedbattlefield, the likely tactical building block isthe company, and in urban areas the platoon.These blocks are networked vertically andhorizontally by the commander’s intent.These forces must be self-sufficient incombat (with external fire support) until thenext echelon can reinforce them. The level ofoperation is as much a factor of theenvironment as of the enemy. This conceptrequires highly trained soldiers capable offighting at troop, platoon and section level.The parallel of this for commanders is thatrelatively junior commanders will be requiredto possess high levels of skill to coordinatehelicopter, air and gun fire support with theintimate support and direct fire support usedin the assault. Their initiative must beencouraged and risk taking institutionalised.These are significant challenges for thetraining system, especially in a peacetimeArmy, and is a method of gaining a“knowledge” advantage.The impact of precision weapons will bereduced on the constrained battlefieldbecause of the uncertainty associated withthe enemy location and short exposure times.Precision fires are likely to only be availablefrom intimate support direct fire assetswhereas indirect fires will at best beemployed for “precision suppression”. 24 Inopen country precision indirect fire systemsare effective, but vegetation and terrainreduce their impact as exposure times arereduced. Therefore, indirect fire supportassets must be able to provide precision strikeand suppression to give the commanderflexible response across a range of physicalenvironments.Command and ControlCentralisation versus decentralisation is notan issue of technology, it is an issue ofuncertainty. 25Centralised command and control andinformation technologies appear to offer thegreatest increase in effectiveness in the openbattlefield (that is under conditions ofcertainty). The more constrained the battlefieldthe more emphasis must be placed on directivecontrol (directive command?) of manoeuvreelements while retaining centralised control ofsupport assets. The level of uncertainty willremain high on the constrained battlefielddespite advanced sensors. Tempo needs to beachieved through concurrent planning, with theunit and formation HQ planning for the nextone to seven days, and immediate operationsconducted at company level. The role of the unitand formation HQ within the next 24-48 hoursis to synchronise the sub-units and provideadditional assets if required. Knowledge-basedtechnologies should be developed to supportthese concepts of command and control and notto try and change the concepts to fit thetechnologies unless clear enhancements ineffectiveness to the combat performance can bedemonstrated.Information Acquisition (U)The force used to obtain information isdependent primarily on the physicalenvironment, then on the target characteristicsand finally on the sensor technology. In closecountry, the backbone of the detection system islikely to be dismounted infantry conducting awide patrol program with the flexibility to

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 15concentrate quickly. There should be a wideHuman Intelligence network amongst thecivilian population providing support for thepatrols. Aviation, cavalry observation posts andother remote sensors complement these twosystems. Technology may eventually providereliable non-line-of-sight sensors to supplementthis surveillance and reconnaissance web. Inopen country, satellites, aviation, SAR and otherstand-off detection systems provide highprobabilities of detection, are able to support thecavalry-based patrols and can cue precision firesor mounted responses.Conclusion (U)Knowledge warfare, information operations,the knowledge edge and any other term for theuse of information and sensor technologies isseen as an essential aspect of gaining a decisiveadvantage in future operations. It is prudent toassume that the enemy knows this as well as wedo, that they are intelligent and will determineweaknesses in these concepts and will adapt,deceive and exploit these weaknesses. Theenemy is aided in these aims through thepassive compliance and complexity of thephysical environment in Australia and ourregion. They are further assisted if Australiadecides to “project our influence” into theregion. The overall effect of these conclusions isthat land forces, more so than air or naval, mustbe prepared to operate in an environment ofgreat uncertainty against an adaptable enemy.This requires an ability to construct a deployableforce of many complementary capabilities thatcover each other’s weaknesses, and provides theenemy with a “multi-horned dilemma” todefeat. The key tenets of force structuringshould be flexibility and the by-word ofoperational planning should be synchronisation.The real benefits of the knowledge edge in theland environment may be an enhanced abilityfor the commander to coordinate many differentcapabilities into a single cohesive team that canpre-empt and dislocate the enemy.The first aim of the knowledge edge shouldbe to reduce friction through friendly situationalawareness and increase the synchronisation ofdifferent force elements while supporting thephilosophy of directive control (or morecorrectly directive command). The second aim isto train our soldiers and commanders to usetheir initiative, take risks and to be able toflexibly employ a multitude of different systemsin a synchronised force. Our force developmentshould not be based on the hope that RMAtechnologies will reduce uncertainty(particularly in respect to the enemy) in the nearterm.Acknowledgements (U)The authors wish to acknowledge theofficers and soldiers of 1st Brigade whoprovided the inspiration and material for thisarticle through their efforts during RTA Phase1. Many observations and ideas weredeveloped through lengthy conversations withmany people in many different locations; thediscussions with Brigadier Jim Wallace andMajor Tony Devine were particularlyimportant.This article is a modified version of aPlenary Session Paper presented by LieutenantColonel Dean Bowley to a Military SensingSymposium.NOTES1. Network enabled warfare is anacknowledgement that we are unlikely to beable to afford the technologies of a full networkcentric operational architecture.2. Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals ofLand Warfare, is a current capstone documentfor Army Doctrine.3. P. Dibb, “The Relevance of the KnowledgeEdge”, Australian Defence Force Journal,No. 134 January/February 1999 p. 39. See alsoM. Evans, “Conventional Deterrence in theAustralian Strategic Context”, Land WarfareStudies Centre Working Paper No. 103 p. 24.4. Manoeuvre seeks to shatter the enemy’scohesion through a series of orchestratedactions that create a turbulent and rapidlydeteriorating situation with which the enemycannot cope. Australia’s warfighting tenetstherefore describe a mindset that emphasisesboldness and decisive action.

16AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 20015. The authors’ synopsis based on Land WarfareDoctrine 1 and their previous training andexperience.6. The characteristics of the Australian Army’swarfighting philosophy listed are predicated onextremely high levels of individual andcollective training and skills from individualinfantry to operational commanders.7. Closed to conventional force projectionplatforms and techniques such as amphibiousforces, air, land etc.8. The enemy may utilise commercial vessels oraircraft and enter through civilian ports andairports.9. As an example, it is estimated that fourlauncher vehicles and 10 theatre ballisticmissiles are available on the world market foraround US$35m. Hypersonic missiles will becommercially available in 2010 for about$200k each.10. The Evolving SAM Threat: Kosovo and Beyond,S.J. Zaloga, JED, May 2000.11. “Grozny: Lessons Learned”, 1-27 Infantry(Marine Corps Intelligence Activity- ArthurSpeyer) Unclassified Presentation to MCCDC.12. Open environments – long detection andengagement ranges.Close environments – short detection andengagement ranges.Complex - mixtures or mosaics of terrain types.Constrained – detection ranges within enemydetection and engagement ranges.13. Manoeuvre Operations in the LittoralEnvironment, Director Future Land Warfare.14. Aviation Week and Space Technology,August 2 1999.15. European terrain has been described as “close”with detection and engagement ranges of threekilometres.16. Firepower in Limited War p. 114.17. Brigadier R. Hughes, Commander 1 TF inVietnam 1968 as quoted in The Battle of Coral.18. NORFORCE is an Australian regional basedsurveillance force.19. The observations and analysis that this articledraws from were conducted by DSTO (primarilyLand Operations Division) in conjunction with1st Brigade during RTA Phase 1 in 1998. Theactivities included wargames, seminars, fieldtrials, historical analysis and modelling.20. This is supported by CAEN, CASTFOREM andJanus results.21. Personal communication with the authorsOctober 1998.22. The RTA reports emphasise the differencebetween situational awareness (a tool for thecommander) and situational understanding, acognitive process.23. General Sheridan is quoted as saying that theenemy should be kept on the horns of adilemma through deception and indirectmarches to the true objective. B.H. Liddel Hart,Strategy, 2nd Revised Edition Meridian 1991,p. 134.24. Systems with a high probability of the firstround being in the target area, with smalldispersion to support the assault as it closeswith the enemy will remain essential.25. Command in War, Van Creveld.26. Effects of Vegetation on Line of Sight forDismounted Infantry Operations, TRAC-WSMR-TR-99-001.27. Less than five per cent of an infantry targetexposed from an observer at ground level.28. Line-of-sight in this environment is determinedby the size of fields and infrastructure and hasnot been determined for this article. It isreasonable to estimate detection ranges asbelow 1 000 m for infantry targets.29. Data for savannah is inferred from experiencein northern Australia.30. Restructuring of the Army Task Force TrialsScientific Framework Paper, Mr D Bowley,DSTO-GD-0169.REFERENCESBowley, D.K., Restructuring of the Army Task ForceTrials Scientific Framework Paper,DSTO-GD-0169.Bowley, D.K., RTA TF Trial – Summary of DSTOAnalysis 1998, Presentation to the 1st BdeOptimisation Seminar October 1998.Brewer, S.R and Bowley, D.K., RTA Combat InsightsLOD Client Report, LOD-98-15-CR, 1998.Dibb, P., “The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge”,Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 134January/February 1999.Evans, “Conventional Deterrence in the AustralianStrategic Context”, Land Warfare StudiesCentre Working Paper No. 103.Gaertner, P., Characteristics, Requirements,Measures of Effectiveness and Methods ofAnalysis for the A21 TF Tactical Command andControl System.Gaertner, P., Command and Control Evaluation andAnalysis: Summary Report 1998, Presentationto the 1st Brigade Optimisation Seminar.Land Warfare Doctrine 1:Fundamentals of LandWarfare Commonwealth of Australia(Australian Army) 1998.Liddel Hart B.H., Strategy, 2nd Revised Edition,Meridian 1991.

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 17Lovasy, S., Tailby, D., Stanford, C., Brewer, S.,CASTFOREM Modelling of the RTA MotorisedCompany, LOD-98-14-CR.Lovaszy, S., Brewer, S., Bowley, D.K., ExercisePhoenix 98, Janus Wargaming Study, 6 –19September 1998, LOD-98-13-CR.McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral, Century,Hutchinson, Australia, 1989.Millikan, J., Castles, T., Modelling the Tennant CreekScenario Using CAEN, (draft) LOD-98-16-CR.Nicholson, R., RTA Logistics Modelling Report,Presentation to the 1st Brigade OptimisationSeminar.Press, D.G., “Lessons from Ground Combat in theGulf: The impact of Training and Technology”,International Security, Fall 1997,Volume 22 No. 2.Scales, R.J Jr., Firepower in Limited War, RevisedEdition, Presidio Press, 1994.Van Creveld, M., Command in War, HarvardUniversity Press, 1985.Wallace, J.J., Restructuring of the Army Task ForceTrial Phase 1 Trial Report, Commonwealth ofAustralia 1998.

Australian Perspectives on Network CentricWarfare: Pragmatic Approaches withLimited Resources19Ed Kruzins and Jason ScholzThe term Network Centric Warfare (NCW) describes the concept proposed by the US Navy todescribe the paradigm shift central to the revolution in US naval affairs. 1 It is defined as a conceptof operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers andshooters to achieve shared awareness and synchronised activity. The emergent properties of sharingresults in increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality and increasedsurvivability.Australia is determining its own response to NCW, which it terms “network enabled warfare”(NEW). NEW necessarily seeks jointness with our three Services and is also being seen as amechanism for seeking a Joint capability focus. The development of a joint C4ISREW environmentis an important staging point for NEW.In this article we describe the current activities and mechanisms being undertaken to seek NEWwithin the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) and suggest some new perspectives forrepresenting NEW and the acquisition process for supporting it.IntroductionAdmiral W. Owens while serving as VC ofthe US Joint Chiefs of Staff noted thatsuperior technologies were emerging in threeareas: Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance systems (ISR), Command,Control, Communications and Computingsystems (C4) and systems involving Targetingand Weaponry. 2,3 Networking these is enablingthe creation of new types of information-basedrelationships. The shift to an information basisto warfighting also heralds the shift fromplatform enabled to network enabledoperations.The ADO has recognised that a NEWapproach will raise organisational, training anddoctrinal issues that will need to be effectivelyanalysed and overcome to maximise thepotential inherent in the network enabledparadigm. This raises a resource allocationproblem for NEW investment decisions whichmust be analysed.An approach is to weigh upon themeasures of effectiveness for the warfightingadvantages promised by NEW to compare costeffectiveness, however this only makes sense ifwe balance advantage with potentialsusceptibility as a result of networkingpreviously un-networked systems.Potential Advantages to:• Battlespace Awareness;• Agility/Manoeuvre;• Lethality;• Synchronisation;• Engagement Diversity;• Operational Tempo; and• Decision Speed.Potential Susceptibilities:• Emergent unforeseen network and nodeinteractions;• Multiple enemy attack points;• Increased enemy stand off range;• Selectable precision of enemy attack; and• Difficulty in identifying attacker andresponding proportionally.It is obvious that we could reduce foreseensusceptibilities by the adequate engineering of

20AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001contingencies and protection methods. It isimportant that the cost of protection andcontingency does not out-weigh the warfightingadvantage gained, so any study of NEW mustbe followed by an equally rigorous study ofmetrics and measurables to be employed inorder to make meaningful comparisons.Measures of advantage are likely to becomposed of foundation elements and subelementsin coupled, federated and/or integratednetworks. These measures, alongside theanticipated cost of acquisition enable theresource allocation question to be approached.It is unclear whether the advantages of NEWwill be able to be met in a manner, cost effectiveto the ADO. However we suggest it is also notclear that the current migration path tocomplex, expensive platforms offers the bestapproach to forming a future force.We can suggest that as new technologiesenter the battlespace it would appear thatplatforms are becoming more visible and costly,while the munitions required to destroy themare becoming comparatively more costeffective. 4 At the same time networking andintegration of C4ISREW elements is becomingmore flexible, capable, accessible and costeffective.Network Enabled Warfare and the ADO: AStrategic OutlookAustralia's current strategic policyrecognises potential military roles for the ADFspanning a spectrum of conflict wide in scale,intensity and geographic diversity. 5 Currentlythis guidance broadly includes:• Defending of Australia (DA);• Contribution to the Security of theImmediate Neighbourhood (CSIN)• Strategic Wider Interests (SWI)• Peacetime National Interests (PNI)Although defeating attacks againstAustralia's territory (DA) remains the core forcestructure priority, decisions may be influencedby the ability of Australia's military forces toalso contribute to the task of defending regional(CSIN, SWI) and even global peacetimeinterests.Figure 1. Australia's area of regional strategic interest has a rich and extensivegeo-political diversity of a scale similar to Europe. 6

Regional InterestsAustralia's regional interests stem from oursupport to stabilising the local strategicenvironment and taking our positions with UNpeacekeeping operations. The size of our localregion and geo-political diversity can beconceptualised in Figure 1. This shows anoverlay of regional interests over a map ofEurope indicating that the area of immediatesecurity is extensive, volatile and will challengeAustralia's diplomatic skills and defensivecapabilities. Australia is currently serving inseveral UN-brokered peacekeeping zones, firstamong which is our role in East Timor.Joint OperationsThe concept of joint operations involvingcomponents of sea, air and land forces is wellestablished and is a key consideration in ourdefence capability development. Jointoperations form the cornerstone of ADF forcestructure and doctrine. Indeed many believethat a central tenet for NCW or NEW is therequirement of a much greater role for jointoperation. 7Self-Reliance and Coalition OperationsAustralia is dedicated to defend its territorywithout relying on the combat forces of othercountries. With self-reliance comes selfsufficiencywhere Australia can undertakeindependent military action with capabilitiesthat can be sourced from overseas butsupported through local industry involvementand a network of allies. Our need for a NEWthat supports coalition operations is thereforecritical.AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 21The sea-air gap to our north provides anatural impediment but also the main gatewayto the Australian mainland. The employment ofa range of capabilities within and across thesea, air and land environments in protection ofAustralia (DA) is a key focus for NEW.Spectrum of Future ConflictThe ADF may be called upon to undertakeboth operational and non-operational rolesassociated with the application of militarypower across a wide spectrum of conflict. Anindication of the range of potential operationsis given in Table 1.The ADF has been called upon tosupplement the civil emergency services intimes of exceptional demand, however it doesnot normally provide these services to the civilcommunity. Two exceptions to this principleinclude the provision of specialist support tocounter-terrorist operations, and support tocustoms, immigration, fisheries and other civilauthorities. It does this by providingsurveillance and response forces in Australia'scoastal waters.The ADO's civil and regional roles under theUN flag sit within the spectrum of conflict thatNEW is being designed to meet.Steps Toward NEWTo meet its military objectives, the ADO hasrecognised that its network structures are notoptimal for its purposes. This recognition wasfurther catalysed in 1996 by the Command andControl Support Study (C2SS), whichhighlighted the scope and extent of barriers toPEACE OOTW WAREmergency ReliefPeace EnforcementSupport to Civil Authorities Peacekeeping Local ConflictsCounter Terrorism Sanctions Regional WarsEvacuation Humanitarian Aid General WarTable 1: Possible future roles for the ADF which will influence an ADO based NEW. 8

22AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001achieving an integrated joint NEW systemwithin the ADO. 9Some of these barriers include the currentheterogeneous network infrastructure thatinhibits efficient information interchange fromlegacy software-intensive systems. Many ofthese have been separately specified andacquired, and difficulties arise for legacysystems to automatically and quickly interpretthe meaning of information from other legacysystems without human assistance.Many of the systems that the ADF acquireshas found origins from various overseas COTSsources and such systems have been shown tohave difficulties interoperating effectivelybetween other systems acquired fromalternative sources. 10Several initiatives to support NEW withinthe ADO have been followed over the last fewyears. These have centred upon developmentsoriginating from future warfare, militarystrategy and research and development.Network enabled warfare related initiativeswithin the ADO include:• The Defence Information Environment;• Future Concepts- Project Sphinx; and• Research and Development- Takari Program (including ProjectEXC3ITE).Defence Information EnvironmentThe Defence Information Environment(DIE) concept was endorsed in 1998 as aninitiative to coordinate and scope allinformation that supports the command andcontrol of operations and Defence business.The elements of DIE include:• C4ISREW;• Information Policy and StrategicCoordination;• Information Management andInteroperability;• Information Security and Operations; and• Research and development, includingliaison with industry.The elements of DIE are co-coordinated bythe DIEB, which meets on a biannual basis andis attended by senior representatives fromvarious areas of Defence. This forum is thehighest authority for co-coordinating NEWwithin the ADO and its many programs formthe foundations to the structure of an ADONEW approach.An Architecture Based Analysisof NEW under the DIEAn architectural approach to representingbusiness enterprises has in recent years foundits way into commercial and Defencerepresentation. 11 Architectural practices suchas the C4ISR AF and others are examples thathave enabled a formal representation of theentities and their relationships within theDefence enterprise. 12In 1999 the DIEB endorsed the formation ofthe Architecture Office and ArchitectureReview Board (ARB) to support the adoption ofan architectural approach to understanding itsdefence activities. This has progressed severalinitiatives using architectural representations. 13Research for improvements in Architecturepractices suited to ADO requirements hasprogressed. 14 Extensions to informationarchitecture approaches include the addeddimensions of mission tasks and resources(assets and people) to supplement the defencerepresentation. Information, task and resourcesperspectives are shown in synergy in Figure 2and we suggest this could form one of therepresentation methods for NEW.The synergy of tasks, information andresources is shown in Figure 2. The horizontalflow of information can be shown by the linesleft of centre (dark blue) and right of centre(pink), this indicates information input andoutput. Vertical lines top of centre (light blue)and bottom of centre (brown) indicate tasksand resources respectively. Figure 2 representsa capability view of one node within an OV-2product, itself being within a suite of products(OV 1 to N, SV 1-N and TV 1 -N) that details

AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE23ControlUSOTF StructureControlControlATOOpOrderISRSAIntSumATT3.3.2.1ConductAssults in AOATT3.3.5.4Conduct RaidATTBExercise C2ControlFuel RequestATOAdminAmmunitionRequestISRSAStatusReconnaissanceReports4RAR(Commando Coy)IntSumISRSASit RepISRSADMCSNavstarGPSParakeet DMCSStatus BCSS Navstar GPSSurveillance TrunkPortableReportsStatusSit RepSurveillanceReportsBinocularsGP 6x30Radio SetsHF, ManpackLowNight VisionSightMonocularPistols 9 mmAutoLauncherGrenade40mmRifles 5.6mmAusteyr F88Boat LandingInflatableFigure 2. A capability view of one node within an architectural representation for the ADO Armyunit (4RAR) during a hypothetical mission. The C4ISREW AF has a suite of products and thissingle product representation is enriched using the combined dimensions of mission task, resources(assets and people) and information. 15all aspects of this particular enterprise andwhich formalise the representation.Future Concepts - Project SphinxConducted by the ADO's Military StrategyBranch, Project Sphinx is examining thenature of future warfare (in the period to 2025)and the implications for Australia's strategicplanning. 16 The project identified five keyfuture warfare concepts:• Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance;• Command, Control and AdaptiveInteroperability;• Tailored Effects (Precision Firepower);• Force Projection and Protection; and• Force Sustainment.These are being examined by the seminarwar-games series termed KRAIT. Sphinx hasidentified that by inference any NEW systemshould strongly support the following warfareconcept. 17,18Intelligence, Surveillance and ReconnaissanceThe objective of ISR within NEW is toensure that commanders have a tailored, morecomplete, battlespace awareness. Given theincreasing availability of accuratecommercially sourced information to whoevercan afford it, superiority over futureadversaries is not guaranteed. With apredicted shift to urban warfare theintegration of commercial and military ISRresources, including those of allies, will

24AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001remain a critical determinant of the success ofNetwork Enabled warfare.Command and ControlThe objectives of C2 within NEW will beto provide effective decision-making atstrategic, operational and tactical levels thatsynchronises planning and intent of forceelements in a multi-dimensional campaign.The major challenge will be to balancehierarchical command responsibilities withdispersed, networked control in joint,combined and coalition situations.Tailored EffectsThe use of Tailored Effects support byNEW will be to apply selective, accurate andsufficient force to dislocate, disorient anddefeat an adversary. The force effects will beachieved through a combination of bothlethal and non-lethal means delivered eitherdirectly or indirectly. The effects are tailoredto meet the desired outcome in terms ofaccuracy, proportionality and costeffectiveness.Force Projection and ProtectionThe objective for NEW will be to projectthe appropriate level of force to achieve thedesired impact on the adversary. The capacityshall exist to either project sufficient effects atlong range or rapidly deploy the assignedforces to the area of operations, or acombination of both. Synchronisation ofjoint, combined and coalition force elementswill generate an appropriate presence,consistent with the military objectives.Force SustainmentThe ADF seeks NEW enabled logisticalsupport to effectively sustain joint, combinedand coalition forces throughout the executionof the campaign plan with no impediment tooperational tempo. This shall be supported bythe efficient integration of available national,commercial and military logistic support.Research and Development - TAKARI ProgramThe TAKARI program frames the researchand development activities from which a NEWis being conceptualised. It has established anumber of CTDs and facilities that have beenFigure 3. Example military experiment for surface ship air warfare, based on the use ofEXC3ITE information and simulation services overlays on a broadband network.

important in providing both interim capabilityas well as guidance for further refinement ofacquisition requirements for C4ISREW andNEW.Examples under the TAKARI program aredescribed but specific examples related to NEWdevelopment and conceptualisation include amix of virtual laboratories, network technologydemonstrators and virtual platforms. 19Virtual Laboratories and TechnologyDemonstrators• TDRAP - Technology Demonstrator forthe Recognised Air Picture.• CCISIL - Command and ControlInformation System InteroperabilityLaboratory.• EXC3ITE - Experimental C3I technologyenvironment.• ECC - Experimental Command Centre.• FOCAL - Future Operations CentreAnalysis Laboratory.• CFBLnet Combined Federated BattlelabNetwork.• SERF - Synthetic Environments ResearchFacility.Virtual Platforms• Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.• Virtual Ship and Submarine.Many of these are focused upon refinementof C4I elements using research concepts basedin both real and virtual environments. (furtherdetails see note 19). These are also coupled toongoing support to terrestrial and satellitebased communications activities such as TBS -the Theatre Broadcast System and theintroduction of tactical data systems within theADF such as TDL's link 16 where considerableinvestment is being made to achieve alliedinteroperability.Project EXC3ITEThe Experimental C3I TechnologyEnvironment (EXC3ITE) is a joint Defenceproject. 20 EXC3ITE is an enabling informationnetwork infrastructure and supportingAUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 25organisation for research and developmentpermitting the definition and demonstration ofarchitectures to support decisions in thedevelopment of the DIE.EXC3ITE contributes to improvement ofexisting systems, and supports doctrinal andorganisational experimentation. A centralfeature of EXC3ITE is the exploitation ofmiddleware concepts in the construction,functioning and re-use of softwarecomponents for flexible military applications.These concepts are echoed in the developmentof modern component-based software systems(including for example Microsoft Officeapplications) and at an enterprise level, arereflected in the Next Generation Internet (NGI),and Internet 2 initiatives.The EXC3ITE network consists of six fixedand three mobile nodes providing widebandconnectivity and access to information servicesat secret and restricted security levels.The EXC3ITE vision encompasses theability to construct an application in an hour.To achieve this requires the ability to locateand assemble an application on an ad hocbasis from a multitude of component parts.Component parts are military specific softwareentities including for example, user interfaces,services for visualisation, simulation, imageryprocessing, geospatial repositories,collaboration, etc.In addition to information services,EXC3ITE is developing a suite of simulationservices based on the use of HLA middlewareto support the integration of distributedsynthetic environments and simulationcomponents in DSTO (including the virtualship, synthetic environment research facility,virtual submarine, and virtual air platforms)and in industry.Experimentation and InteroperabilityThe development of simulation services forEXC3ITE in conjunction with informationactivities is to facilitate military experimentationor “military innovation”. Military innovation

26AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001Figure 4. Network Enabled Warfare supported by simulation servicesthroughout the life cycle of a capability.may be applied throughout the life cycle of acapability, as illustrated in Figure 4. Fromsupporting the development of operationalconcepts in wargaming through to missionrehearsal, the applicability of such a servicemay be ubiquitously applied.Other examples of simulation includewargaming under the Army's “Headline” series,which has been shown to be an importantprocess for restructuring the Australian Army. 21Distributed Virtual Environments: A CoalitionPerspectiveThe ADO is involved with the CombinedFederated Battlelab Network (CFBLnet). This isa network involving Western allied nationsand NATO countries. Based on the success ofannual Joint Warrior InteroperabilityDemonstrations (JWID), the CFBLnet intends tosupport demonstrations and experimentationthroughout the year. CFBL management teamsare in the process of seeking, selecting andsupporting demonstrations based onsponsored, common requirements, which havean exploitation strategy for development ofcapabilities.Specific areas of interest to DSTO that may besupported by CFBL include:• Situation Awareness in CoalitionOperations;• Information Operations;• CINC21. For the development of advancedtheatre-level headquarters;• Synthetic Environments. Syntheticenvironments (e.g. virtual platforms) maybe interconnected to facilitateinternational experimentation for conceptprototyping, doctrine development,mission rehearsal, tactical development,training and requirements capture. Thismay be supported by the use ofdistributed simulation based on use ofHigh Level Architecture (HLA)middleware; and• Interoperability of Theatre BroadcastSystem (TBS) and Global BroadcastSystem (GBS).Australian experience in coalitionoperations has identified the need for improvedlogistics information management systems asdescribed earlier. Australian involvement in the

AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 27Coalition Theatre Logistics-AdvancedTechnology Concept Demonstrator (CTL-ACTD)will support development in these areas. CTL isa US Pacific Command (PACOM) proposal toenhance combat support to coalition forces byproviding operational and logistic staff withaccess to timely, integrated and relevantlogistic information and decision support tools.Australian involvement in the PACOMCINC21-ACTD is expected to aid in thedevelopment of advanced theatre-levelheadquarters. Some key areas of interest toAustralia include:• Visualisation. The Australian FutureOperations Command Centre AnalysisLaboratory (FOCAL) is developing anadvanced visualisation environment tounderpin situation awareness andplanning;• Virtual Presence. FOCAL will employ theuse of avatars and advanced agenttechnology;• Information-Enterprise.The ExperimentalC3I Technology Environment (EXC3ITE) isa key DSTO capability in this area; and• Knowledge Management.Network Enabled Warfare and its Support toLogisticsIn 1999, Australia led a peacekeeping forceinto East Timor as part of its UNresponsibilities. In nearly all aspects this was avery successful mission but inevitablyimprovements in various areas could always bemade.An important enabler for the ADO'sactivities within the region was forcesustainment and in particular, logistics whereimprovements could be made possibly by theuse of better networking between HQ's,transport assets and personnel.Areas where potential improvement couldbe identified included:• Concurrency of Logistics Support;• Logistics Command and Control;• Asset VI visibility; and• Logistic Management InformationSystems.Concurrency of LogisticsFurther improvements of logistics relatedcommunications within the regional arena isrequired. Networked communications systemsboth for mobile and fixed communications formateriel centres and transport assets couldsupport improved concurrency of logistics withNEW.Asset VisibilityLack of visibility of materiel and equipmentresults in unnecessary bottlenecks in thedistribution pipeline, and leads to the overcommitmentof limited transport resources.NEW offers a means to support efficientinventory collation of delivered assets. Thiswould enable a fast delivery of materials tousers as well as efficient unloading and animproved turnaround of transport assets andstorage space.Logistics Command and ControlThe harmonisation of cultures and processacross the force is an emergent property ofNEW which offers a means to synchroniselogistics planning across distributed commandcentres thereby allowing a commonunderstanding of intent. The need forconsultation and approval at multiple levels ofthe organisation, which may be tolerable fornon-operational conditions, typically results inunacceptable delays under operationalconditions.Logistic Management Information SystemsMany problems experienced were related toadapting ADO activities during peacetime tooperational conditions. The problems undercoalition-based logistics support arguablywould be orders of magnitude worse. AlliedNEW for force sustainment and logisticsremains a problem to be solved. However NEWseeks an ability to provide compatible andinteroperable information systems.

28AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001Incompatibility of information standards and alack of information distribution capabilitiesstill provide difficulties for logisticmanagement.An Integrated NEW Acquisition Process:Linked PortfoliosThe current acquisition processes within theADO are not well suited to a network enabledwarfare approach. They are also not wellintegrated with capability analysis, conceptdevelopment, force structure development andthe planning processes. The current capabilityanalysis, force structure and planningprocesses are also disconnected from futurewarfare studies. There is therefore currently nomechanism to inform and tune acquisitions toachieving a network enabled synergy norrespond to rapidly evolving strategic and fiscalenvironments.The current process could be patched toachieving a network enable fix but we suggestthat if the ADO wholly embraces NEW then anacquisition process, which could be bettertailored to NEW, could be based upon militaryportfolios. The portfolio concept wasintroduced in reference for C4ISREW systemsof systems but we suggest it can be generalisedfor overall military force development. 22,23 Theprinciples of portfolio-based force development(PBFD) include:• Continual assessment of current andfuture strategic, economic, political andsocietal environments;• Development of processes to acquireappropriate capabilities and tailor forcestructure to meet a wide range of currentand future contingencies;• Establishment of guidelines for ensuringadequate interoperability and managingevolution of capabilities; and• Optimal use of funds to meetpreparedness and capability development.A portfolio-based approach to forcedevelopment has the potential to provide NEWthe flexibility and feedback needed to meldannual budgeting with five-year developmentplans, long-term planning (ADO purple bookand future studies), major capital equipmentproposals (ADO pink book), approvedacquisitions (ADO white book) and existingcapabilities. Applying this concept to theacquisition part of the process we arrive at thenotion of portfolio-based acquisition (PBA).PBA is composed of acquisition strategies,techniques and tools for developing, exploringand assessing interoperability, competingoptions and the processes, which facilitateeffective and efficient acquisition and entryinto service. Thus the acquisition portfolioshould provide:• A more effective military capability asPBA can tune the NEW acquisitionprocess to the strategic environment;• A more efficient and faster acquisitionprocess for NEW because PBA adapts tothe scale and type of acquisition;• Processes and mechanisms for ongoingforce development and a close couplingbetween military capability, forcestructure and the supporting acquisition;and• A heuristic approach that facilitatesongoing development of new acquisitionstrategies and processes for NEW relatedacquisition.A central tenet of PBA and PBFD isinteroperability of systems, its analysis andrelevance to achieving strategic policy andenhancing military response options. Methodsof achieving this underpin the above points.The Migration of Network Enabled Warfare withinADO Policy SpaceThe strategic environment in the geopoliticalneighbourhood of Australia is currentlydynamic and will continue to be so, for theforeseeable future. This will demand militarysystems that are not only adaptable andtuneable but can be easily migrated to embracethe rapid pace of technology. Any acquisitionprocess for NEW requires a migration path that

may be dimensioned against the ADO's policyspace to determine its extent and complexity.NEW occupies all space within the threedimensions of epoch, policy and military level,conceptualised in Figure 5 but is punctuated bysub spaces which includes the LittoralInformation Environment (LIE), Joint TacticalInformation Environment (JTIE) and C4ISREWInformation Environment (C4ISREW-IE). If weexamine any single bubble within this policyspace such as the JTIE, we observe anothermulti-dimensional space scoping the spectrumof theatre variations and activity. This suggestsa significant complexity to any NEW-basedsystem and its acquisition migration path, evenfor relatively small forces such as the ADF.A means of scoping the exploration of NEWis to choose focal areas within policy space thatallow the generation of immediate “deliverables”to the ADO, enlighten a prioritised migrationpath for acquisitions and inform us of an aspectof the larger picture. One such bubble is theDAA centred JTIE and within that, the LIE.AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 29A Joint Tactical Information EnvironmentCurrent research at the DSTO is analysingNetwork Enabled Warfare. 24 One aspect of thisresearch includes the exploration of jointinformation flows between combatants, acrossServices and allies within a JTIE. A focuswithin JTIE has been upon the exploration ofnetwork enabled warfare within the littoraldomain . 25The objective of JTIE research is to providea scientific basis to ADO policy for jointinformation (richness) and command/control toidentify the options for achieving informationexchange and interoperability across theServices (reach). 26 Combatants underconsideration within JTIE represent a mix ofnew and current platform systems wheretactical information interoperability policy isstill under development or refinement:• AIR 87 (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter);• Land 117 (Ground Based Air Defence);• FA-18 Upgrade;Figure 5 Research space for NEW indicating migration along the epoch axis through ADO policyspace. Policy space is likely to vary with the dynamic strategic environment.

30AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001• AEWC; and• LPA.To scope the necessary breadth of NEW theresearch is examining the ability to achieveimproved situation awareness, synchronisationof command and planning, logistics andinteroperability between several operating anddeveloping command support systems.They are:• Joint Command Support System (JCSS)-Joint HQ;• Battlefield Command Support System(BCSS)-Army; and• Tactical Data Link System (Link 16)-Navy,Air Force.A methodology has been to examine JTIEwithin a selection of relevant scenarios and torecord the variability of informationrequirement sensitivity to the dynamics of thescenario under a C4ISR ArchitectureFramework . 27 A conceptualisation is shown inFigure 6 which additionally highlights theobjectives determining network effects on:• Options for Information Architectures;• Tactical decision density;• Information criticality and missionsensitivity; and• Tactical decision C2 - who is best placed.Determining information flows betweencombatants in the tactical theatre is the initialstep to enabling a capability-focused approachto determining the value of NEW to the jointoperation.In contrast, a platform centric view of thisproblem may well have considered the worthof the network to the performance of the assetwithin its environment, thus losing theperspective of the assets joint capability value.A Way Forward for the ADOBuilding on the technologies, systems,services, applications, simulations, andnetworked synthetic environments described inthis article is the opportunity for the ADF, ADOand DSTO to build new tiers of capability usingnetwork enabling concepts. The logical growthof capabilities and the balance betweenpragmatic Research and Development andADO leverage is shown in Figure 7.We see that network enabled warfare andthe component elements within experimentaland operational networks facilitates training,Figure 6. Exploring a users perspective of NEW under a Joint TacticalInformation Environment (JTIE).

Operational Concept (OPCON) development,capability development, smart acquisition,OPCON experimentation and force structureoptions.Without the military specialisations presentin larger nations, we must capitalise on ourlimited range of military capabilities throughmutual interoperability to flexibly perform awide range of tasks. This flexibility impacts onsystems integration of capability developmentand may be an important factor in realisingthe potential of NEW.A Network Enabled force constitutes anorganising principle for future warfare, adirection for acquisition, and a concept fortraining.ConclusionsAustralia is determining its own responseto network centric warfare (NCW), which itterms “network enabled warfare” (NEW). NEWdiffers from NCW because the network isperceived to enable enhancements to warfighting.The ADO has taken this pragmaticperspective observing that NEW may enable apractical jointness with our three Services andAUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 31offer a mechanism for seeking a jointcapability focus.The emergent “warfighting deliverables”(increased tempo, enhanced synchronisationetc.) under NEW represent emergent properties,which arise as suitable components ofC4ISREW are networked and arranged within ajoint concept of operations. Furthermore, wesee that the development of a joint C4ISREWenvironment is an important staging point forNEW.NEW offers an inherent jointness, which isaligned to supporting the ADO's strategicpolicies. Our policies share a regional focuswith allied interoperability being a key focus.Operations other than war (OOTW) are likely tohave a strong place in a NEW tailored for theADO.The ADO's steps toward a NEW includeinitiatives within research, future concepts andthe overall Defence enterprise under theDefence Information Environment (DIE). Thepredicted areas of NEW will provide enhancedcapability for ISR, C2, Tailored effects, forceprotection, projection and sustainment.NEW must span many dimensions withinthe ADO scoping defence policy, epoch andFigure 7. The steps within a Network Enabled Warfare developmentpath for the ADO and its relationship to R&D. 28

32AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001theatre level. We suggest that initially, NEWshould focus on the Joint Tactical InformationEnvironment (JTIE) to inform the ADO of thepotential advantages to selected areas such asenhanced battlespace awareness, synchronisedplanning and logistics. With a single firstfocus, we could assess whether a single NEWsystem of systems could meet the anticipatedADO spectrum of potential usage.The importance and value of coalitioninteroperability is being considered in variousresearch initiatives within the ADO. Theseinclude the development of simulation servicesto facilitate military innovation such as underthe EXC3ITE project.The ADO is actively responding to coalitioninteroperability research with the CombinedFederated Battlelab Network. CFBLnet intendsto support demonstrations andexperimentation between allies. CFBLnet couldoffer a means to investigate the allied jointtactical information environment by seekinginformation interoperability between aselection of virtual combatants within the samevirtual theatre or scenario. Combatant playersor simulators may be physically distributedacross various Western command centres.Australian experience in coalitionoperations has identified the need for improvedlogistics information management systems.Australian involvement in the CoalitionTheatre Logistics-Advanced TechnologyConcept Demonstrator (CTL-ACTD) willsupport development in these areas.If we carefully scope the potentialadvantages (deliverables) and adequatelybecome cognisant of the susceptibilities, thenNEW offers the ADO the logical next step inthe development of the ADO's CombatCapability.AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to acknowledge thevaluable contributions of Mr. Phil Collier, DrDavid Matthews, Dr Greg Calbert and Mr LesVencel for their work and discussion of JointC4ISREW systems within the ADO upon whichthis article was based. Thanks also to Ms MoiraChin and Dr Gina Kingston for theircontributions to discussions on operationalarchitecture representations. We would alsolike to acknowledge the useful discussions withthe participants of the workshop on NetworkEnabled Warfare held at DSTO. We note thevaluable comments by Commander DavidJohnston and also Dr Jennie Clothier and DrTerry Moon for valuable discussions on thedevelopment of the linked portfolio process.NOTES1. D.Alberts, J. Garstka, and F. Stein, NetworkCentric Warfare: Developing and LeveragingInformation Superiority, CCRP Publications,1999.2. W.A. Owens, The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge,1996, (Eds, S. Johnson and M. Libicki,)National Defense University Press, WashingtonDC.3. R. Laird and H. Mey, The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs: Allied Perspectives, National DefenseUniversity Press, Washington DC. 1999.4. M. Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow's War,National Defense University PressWashington DC. 1999.5. Defence 2000, Defence White Paper, AustralianDefence Headquarters, Department of Defence(2000), Canberra.6. “Defence Information Environment” GenericPresentation Brigadier T. McKenna, ADFHQCanberra ACT, August 2000.7. op.cit., R. Laird and H. Mey.8. T. Moon and M. O’Brien. “Underlying Principlesfor Joint Systems of a New Aerospace CombatCapability” DSTO General Document GD0241, June 2000.9. J.E. Clothier, “Command and Control SupportStudy”, DSTO Report, Canberra 1996.10. J.S. Allison and S.C. Cook, “The New Era inMilitary Systems Thinking and Practice”, InProceedings of Systems Engineering 98,Canberra 1998.11. E. Rechtin and M. Maier, The Art of SystemsArchitecting, CRC Press, 1997.12. “The C4ISR Architectural Framework”, C4ISRArchitecture Working Group. CCRPPublications, 1996.13. “Workshop for a Mobile Communications

AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 33Architecture based upon a Meta GroupApproach” discussions with A. El Saka, G.Bullus, and Lieutenant Colonel D. Burns,DSTO and ADHQ, July 2000.14. M. Chin, “Operational Architecture”,Presentation at the Defence ArchitecturesWorkshop, ADFHQ, August 2000.15. ibid.16. M. Ramage, “Project Sphinx: The TwentyfiveConcept Groupings and Technology in2025”, Office of the RMA, ADHQ, Canberra,1999.17. R. Martinage, “Wargame Structure, Scenario,and Force Overview KRAIT Wargame I”CSBA Presentation at Royal Military College,Duntroon, Canberra, October 1999.18. E. Kruzins and J. Rigter, “Outcomes from theKRAIT Wargame Series 00/01”, Presented tothe Office of the RMA, ADHQ, May 2000.19. Project TAKARI DSTO Website EXC3ITE Website Headline description html22. D. Matthews and P. Collier, “Assessing theValue of C4ISREW Systems of SystemsCapability”, Proceedings of the InternationalCommand and Control Research andTechnology Symposium October 2000.23. J. Clothier, “Approaching Systems ofSystems: A Strategic View”, Draft 1, DSTOJoint Systems Branch, August 2000.24. “Network Enabled Warfare” Proceedings ofthe 1st DSTO workshop on NEW August2000.25. G. Calbert, “A Systems Perspective onAustralian Littoral Operations: Issues andObjectives” Accepted for the Proceedings ofthe International Command and ControlResearch and Technology Symposium,October 2000.26. P.B. Evans and T.S. Wurster, “Strategy andthe New Economics of Information”, HarvardBusiness Review, September-October 1997.27. E. Kruzins, “The Joint Tactical InformationEnvironment” Activity Plan, DSTO June2000.28. “An Australian R&D Approach to NetworkEnabled Warfare” Scholz Presentation at theconference for Revolutionising MilitaryAffairs in the Pacific Region, Canberra 17-19May 2000.

Mortar platoon, 2RAR, loading onto HMAS Tarakan during Exercise Tandem Thrust 01Photographer: Sergeant M. Dowling

A Force for All Seasons ...and all the right reasons35By Lieutenant Commander John P. Robinson, RANR“ …The fleet and the army acting in concert seem to be the natural bulwark of these Kingdoms.”Thomas More Molyneux, Conjunct Expeditions (1759)“ …Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses.”Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Deterrence or Defence (1960)IntroductionThe Defence White Paper, Defence 2000provides the ADF with the firstcomprehensive and detailed blueprint forDefence in 25 years. It enunciates Australia’sstrategic policy for the next decade andprovides details for the further development ofthe ADF, in the form of the Defence CapabilityPlan. Whilst Defence 2000 provides the ADFwith clear strategic guidance on the wayahead, it is timely to review the capabilitiesrequired of the ADF and to critically examinewhether the current ADF structure issufficiently optimised to meet theserequirements. The current structure reflectsestablished and proven capabilities, but thesecapabilities and their relevance to Australia’sfuture Defence strategy must now be reevaluatedto ensure that they meet therequirements enunciated in Defence 2000.The development of future capabilities is avexed issue, where threat assessments and theretention of embedded core capabilities havecombined to forge the current structure andcomposition of the ADF.The end of the Cold War with the prospectof greater stability in Central Europe hasparadoxically seen the proliferation of greaterinstability in many other parts of the world.The proliferation of new conflicts and thecontinuation of many old ones providesurgency to the efforts being made by the UN toresolve a number of conflicts and provide UNpeacekeeping forces wherever possible.Within our own region, the recent events inEast Timor, Bougainville, the Solomon Islandsand Fiji are a timely reminder that Australia ispart of a region that is undergoing radicalchange, where limited regional conflict mayerupt with little or no warning. Political,racial and religious unrest continues to pose athreat to Australian interests and stabilitythroughout the region. In addition, theoccurrence of natural disasters will continue toplace an onus of responsibility upon suchcountries as Australia and New Zealand toprovide humanitarian aid within the region.Australia’s rapid and robust response to thesituation in East Timor in September 1999, andthe deployment of the INTERFET Force,highlights the prominence being givenworldwide to “out of theatre” operations orexpeditionary warfare and the need to havehighly mobile forces available to respondadequately to a variety of contingencies. It isnow opportune to consider whether theimportance being given to “out of theatre” orExpeditionary operations by such countries asthe US and UK is relevant to Australia in the21st century. In re-evaluating the ADF’sability to implement the requirements ofDefence 2000, it will be critical to Australia’ssecurity that all aspects of Defence areexamined and their relevance to Australia’s

36AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001overall security reviewed. The pre-eminencegiven to the adoption of a Maritime Strategy inrecognition of Australia’s geo-strategicposition within the region would indicate thatan ability to quickly deploy highly mobileforces by sea and/or by air throughout theregion would be a key capability. These tasksmight cover a variety of contingencies,including humanitarian and peacekeeping.Such a capability will however require a moreholistic approach be adopted by the ADF forthe development and acquisition of Defenceequipment, in order that Defence capabilitiesmeet the total force requirement and not justthose of a particular Service. Indeed, thedevelopment and acquisition of new andemerging capabilities must be predicated uponan “effects” strategy, where a particularcapability is derived from determining theoptimum result to achieve the required “effect”.This approach is consistent with the “futures”methodology now being adopted by a numberof our allies who are looking to develop futurecapabilities predicated specifically upon the“effects” required.An Historical PerspectiveThe need to maintain a large standingArmy and strong Navy to primarily supportoverseas campaigns has been a major defencecharacteristic of the 20th century.Involvement in the Boer War, two World Warsas well as other regional conflicts since, haveborne testament to the need to maintain suchforces, which have in the main, beenconventionally structured, and organised alongtraditional British military lines. Whilst themaintenance of such forces were appropriate tomeet the requirements of the time, it is worthremembering that such organisations had theirgenesis in the 18th and 19th centuries, andreflected the requirements of that period, wherethe Fleet and large standing armies weremaintained to protect national interests athome and abroad.The realisation by a number of our alliesthat the requirement to use military force inthe future has changed has brought about afundamental change to their organisation and“modus operandi”. In the US and UK, forcestructures and the modus operandi, haveradically changed to reflect the need to havehighly mobile forces available to react to awide variety of “out of theatre” contingencies,including peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.Indeed the focus has moved away from theneed to conduct warfare in a deliberate andset-piece manner, with large formations, towarfare conducted quickly by lightly equippedbut highly mobile forces of all arms, able toreact quickly and effectively to changingdemands. This was effectively demonstratedrecently by the UK in Sierra Leone with theinsertion of Airborne and Amphibious Forcesto help restore law and order in that country.Such forces, by their mobility are able to retainthe element of surprise and are generally ableto create the impression of having greaternumbers deployed than is actually the case.Whilst the ADF today has contracted fromits former size, it nevertheless continues toreflect the structure and organisation of amuch larger force. This is particularly sowithin Army where there still remains muchhollowness, and whilst Army 21 andRestructuring the Army (RTA) have gone along way in redefining Army’s future structureand role, they do not reflect the wider ADFmodus operandi of the future. In similar vein,the RAN since the end of World War II hascontinued to develop and acquire capabilitiesconsistent with perceived conventional navalrequirements. The RAN has however nowdeveloped a modest amphibious capabilitywith the bringing into service of the LPA’s(amphibious transports) HMAS Kanimbla andManoora to augment the Amphibious HeavyLift Ship, HMAS Tobruk and the LCH’s(landing craft heavy). The employment of thehigh speed Catamaran, HMAS Jervis Bay, also

proved to be an invaluable asset in providingrapid logistic support by sea.In this evolutionary process, the RAAF hasevolved from a fledgling force in World War IIto becoming a technologically advanced andmulti-skilled Air Force within the Air World.The current range of roles undertaken by theRAAF is extensive but as we look ahead it willbe vital that the future acquisition of highvalue aircraft takes account of all ADFrequirements. The wider air supportrequirements to meet all maritime and landtasks must be clearly identified andincorporated into the ADF modus operandi ofthe 21st century. The development thereforeof all ADF capabilities for land, sea and airneed to be so orchestrated that the capabilitiesare fully integrated to meet all anticipated ADFrequirements.Strategic PolicyThis article suggests that the time has nowcome to reassess the way in which the ADFwill go about its business in the future andexamine what capabilities the force willrequire.Australia is faced with the challenge of coexistingand being a responsible neighbour ina large, diverse and rapidly growing region,which is however becoming increasinglyunstable. A significant difficulty forAustralian Defence planners in recent yearshas been attempting to identify the threat(s) toAustralia. This continues to be the case andwhilst there continues to be no immediatedirect threat to Australia or its interests, thereremains a plethora of potential indirect ordirect threats that could quickly emerge withinor beyond the region. In a region that isgrowing rapidly, the potential sources ofconflict are many and such threats could arisequickly and pose a significant challenge to ourDefence resources. The ADF must therefore beprepared to undertake a wide range of roles,react quickly to emerging threats and be ableto adapt to changing requirements.A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasons 37The publication of Australia’s StrategicPolicy (ASP97) in December 1997 determineda more forward looking defence posture forAustralia and provided a template for thedevelopment of the ADF into the 21st century.In introducing the new strategic policy thethen Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlanstated:Australia’s Strategic Policy covers thoseaspects of the Government’s securitypolicy which relate to the use of armedforce in international affairs. Thejudgements in it reflect theGovernment’s conviction that to prosperin the very demanding environment nowemerging in the Asia Pacific, Australianeeds a strategic approach which takesfull account of the new challenges weface. Moreover, Australia needs anapproach which explicitly reflects thefull breadth of our security interests.Australia’s strategic interests do notbegin and end at our shoreline. Theinterests of future generations ofAustralians will not be served byencouraging an isolationist mentality ata time when international interdependenciesare increasing.The security of Australia is, and shouldalways remain, the paramount concernof our national strategic policy.Maintaining confidence in our ability todefeat an attack on Australia is, in asense, the focus of all our defenceactivities. But obviously, developmentsin our region determine the possibility ofAustralia coming under military threat.It would be a serious miscalculation tothink we could remain unconcernedbehind some illusory “FortressAustralia” if the strategic environmentin the Asia Pacific were to deteriorate.Our aim must be a secure country in asecure region.

38AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001What is the region? The region is definedin ASP 97, as “the countries of East Asia,Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, the UnitedStates, and, perhaps increasingly in the future,South Asia.” This littoral region is vast andcomprises an enormous diversity of culturesand nationalities and is spread across severaltime zones and climates. It is the fastestgrowing region in the world and is theinterface between burgeoning industrial andcommercial development and old establishedcultures. Clearly, as the region continues toexpand and economies grow, there will beincreasing pressure on diminishing resources,which will increase the risk of friction betweencompetitors, at either the national or locallevel. Other pressures within the regioninclude the establishment of democracy andindependence in a number of countries.According to ASP 97:The dynamism of the Asia Pacificregion makes our task more complexthan it has been in the past. The paceof economic growth in our regionpresents a combination of opportunitiesand challenges. Our national approachto the region must therefore have anumber of elements which allow us bothto exploit the opportunities and managethe risks presented to us.An indication of the rate of growth that hasoccurred in the region in recent years isreflected in the modernisation of a number ofregional military forces into well-equipped andbalanced conventional forces, able to “monitorand protect offshore resources and interests”(ibid). The purchase of an Aircraft Carrier(Chakri Naruebet) by Thailand and the currentbuilding of three Amphibious Ships (LPD) bySingapore also represent a significant increaseto capability.ASP 97 noted that this strong rate ofgrowth in defence spending was expected tocontinue over the coming decades whichwould “increase the capability of regionaldefence forces.” Whilst both ASP 97 and theprevious ADO strategic policy acknowledgedthat there was no obvious or immediate threatto Australia or its dependencies, clearly there isconsiderable potential for a conflict to arisewithin the region and at relatively short notice.National sovereignty issues, racial andreligious disharmony, increased wealth and theemergence of democracy are all catalysts forconflict. Indonesia, Malaysia and PNG are butthree of a number of countries within theregion where such catalysts exist. Furtherafield, Burma, Cambodia, Korea, Taiwan andthe South China Sea are all areas of potentialconcern.As General Krulak, previous CommandantUSMC noted:In the future, the United States is likelyto face a number of very differentthreats to its security interests. Manyof these will be associated with thelittorals, those areas where land and seameet. The great coastal cities, wellpopulatedcoasts, and the intersection oftrade routes represent a relatively smallportion of the worlds surface, yetprovide homes to over three-quarters ofthe world’s population, locations forover 80 per cent of the worlds politicalcapitals, and nearly all of the primarymarketplaces for international trade.Because of this, the littorals are also theplace where most of the world’simportant conflicts are likely to occur.Geographic proximity with the littoralsis one of the few things that futureconflicts are likely to have in common.In all other respects - goals,organisations, armaments and tactics -the warfare of the next 20 years will bedistinguished by its great variety. Forthat reason, it is imperative that theCorps resist the temptation to preparefor only one type of conflict.

(Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea:Building a Marine Corps for the 21stCentury by General Charles C. Krulak).This message is equally applicable to theADF. In preparing to respond adequately toany one or more of the broad range ofpotential scenarios within the region, the ADFshould now re-assess how it is configured andorganised. The great imponderable in thiscritical self-assessment of defence capabilityare the judgements based on intelligence andother factors that identify the threat or threatsto Australia and its interests. A greatdifficulty for the ADF, in the post-VietnamWar era, has been to identify such threats anddevelop capabilities to counter them.Consequently, the ADF has continued togenerally develop capabilities that reflect singleService perceptions of what is important to thedefence of Australia. The result has been thedevelopment of a broad range of disparateplatform centric capabilities, not necessarilyintegrated to meet future ADF requirementsand not reflecting a Total Force concept.The Way AheadAs we begin to implement the guidancecontained in Defence 2000, it is opportune toconsider a better way of doing business andadopt a more holistic approach to thedevelopment of defence capabilities. A keyfactor in this process is to acknowledge thatwhilst Australia does not currently face anobvious threat, Defence 2000 demands that weare prepared to deal effectively with any one ormore of a range of potential threats emergingwithin the region, or beyond. This requires ahigh order of flexibility throughout the ADF inboth the organisation, the command chain andin the planning process in order that anappropriate force can be assembled quicklyand prepared for deployment to meet anygiven situation. The second key factorconcerns Australia’s unique geo-strategicsituation within the region and its vasthinterland, with limited infrastructure.A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasons 39Equally vast is the regional littoral area intowhich the ADF may be required to operate.The tyranny of distance between and withinthese vast areas requires a high level ofmobility at both the strategic and tactical levelacross the ADF.A key factor in this development is thatDefence 2000 recognises Australia’s geostrategicsituation as an island continent, set ina predominantly maritime environment, andthat the development of future ADFcapabilities will be very much centred upon aMaritime Strategy. This is a significantchange from the Continental Defence posturethat has dominated Australian defencedevelopment in the 20th century. The adoptionof a Maritime Strategy does not place Navy ina pre-eminent position over the other twoServices but does recognise the extensivemaritime nature of our surroundings and theneed to develop a Total Force capability.Stewart Fraser, in an article on Littoral Warfareand Joint Maritime Operations, noted that:Maritime Strategy flows directly from astate’s geo-strategic environment, and isformulated at national and grandstrategic levels. At its broadest, it maybe defined as the utilisation of nationalmaritime-based power – military andcivil – to meet political and economicobjectives:Maritime strategy is specificallyconcerned with the exercise ofmaritime power, as opposed tonaval power. The difference issignificant. Maritime power isinherently joint in nature. Itemanates from forces drawn fromall three Services, both land andsea-based, supported by nationaland commercial resources,exercising influence over sea, landand air environments. 1The reality of deploying and operating inthis environment, in a flexible and mobilemanner, needs to be fully examined and all

40AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001Defence capabilities need to be assessed fortheir utility in meeting these requirements.The adoption of a maritime strategy as acornerstone of Australian Defence Policy andthe development of integrated capabilities willensure that the ADF is able to respond in anappropriate manner to a wide range of threats.This is not dissimilar to the function of civilianemergency services, which are equipped,trained and prepared for a wide variety ofpotential tasks. The nature of the task at thetime will determine what resources will bedeployed. The secret to success being theability to quickly judge what resources arerequired to meet the task and the speed ofresponse. It will be vital for Australia’sstanding within the region in the future thatany military response is seen to be effective.This requires the establishment and preparationof a force that is well trained and prepared tobe able to act quickly and robustly to anygiven situation and to have the inherentflexibility to adjust to a changing situation.The establishment of a Maritime Strategyas a cornerstone of Defence policyconsiderably enhances the ADF’s ability todeploy within the region and confers upon theADF an ability to maximise the land, sea andair space for manoeuvres. When the principlesof Mobility and Flexibility are applied, theADF will acquire a significant capability toremain responsive to changing circumstancesand requirements within the region, includingmainland Australia and the offshore territories.To this end Army have now developed aconcept for warfighting in the littoral entitled –Manoeuvre Operations in the LittoralEnvironment (MOLE), 2 which is likely toremain relevant until at least 2020.Manoeuvre Operations in the LittoralEnvironment allow land forces as part of anADF deployed joint force or regional coalitionto achieve the strategic outcomes of deterrence,coercion or denial through the creation ofoperational shock. 3 Operational shock literallymeans paralysing the enemy to the point ofcollapse. Operational shock is achieved bycombining advanced technologies, tacticalproficiency and creative patterns of manoeuvrein order to generate a series of events againstwhich an enemy is unable to respond.The rational dislocation and emotionaldisorientation that results provide anumerically smaller force with the bestopportunity to discourage a rational enemyfrom further offensive action. 4Retaining the initiative and freedom ofaction, especially when the enemy is militarilymore powerful than Australia, will be essentialboth to achieve operational shock and to avoidpiecemeal destruction. Tying down forces tohold ground may reduce the options forsubsequent manoeuvre, thereby threateningthe deployed task force’s capacity to retain theinitiative. In some circumstances, however, thedeployed task force may need to seize and holdground in conjunction with manoeuvre. Ingeneral the operational requirement may bebest met by a number of actions of limitedduration to achieve limited objectives.Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral seeksto concentrate overwhelming effects atparticular places and times. This may beachieved by conducting simultaneousoperations at a tempo the enemy cannot matchincluding simultaneous forced entry from boththe sea and air. The forces that conduct theseentry operations may then conduct manoeuvreoperations, or seize and hold points of entryfor larger or more capable follow-on forces.Following successful manoeuvre operationsthere will usually be the requirement totransition to stability operations. Stabilityoperations are likely to involve at the outset,manoeuvre forces prior to handover to forcesmore appropriately configured for the conductof these operations.To acquire such a capability the ADF wouldneed to critically examine its force structureand levels of readiness. The development ofsuch a force would require that its key modusoperandi be established upon the concepts of

Manoeuvre Warfare, conducted by lightlyequipped, highly mobile forces able to besupported over long distances. These forceswould be both airborne and amphibiouscapable, and would have the necessary integralmobility, firepower and logistic supportnecessary to sustain them. Equally, thedevelopment of such a force would require thatall future ADF capability development bepredicated upon the warfighting requirementsof this force, as part of a Total Forcerequirement.The role of the RAAF as part of a “TotalForce” would not only require a review ofcurrent airlift capability but also a considerableincrease in the ability to support naval andArmy units in the maritime environment. Thismight require the acquisition of additional oralternative combat aircraft capable ofproviding air defence to naval unitsthroughout the region as well as close airsupport (CAIRS) to troops on the ground. Thiswould be in addition to the two squadrons ofArmed Reconnaissance Helicopters planned toenter service from 2004.Whilst Defence 2000 allows for theplanned replacement of HMAS Tobruk in 2010and HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla in 2015, aswell as the replacement of the LCH’S andLCM’s, there remains a need to review Navycapability requirements from a broader ADFperspective. This might translate intoenhancing the current amphibious and supportcapability as well as providing enhanced afloatC3I and fire support for the Joint Force. Thiswould be particularly applicable in the conductof Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea(OMFTS) and MOLE operations, where theforce might well be deployed for a protractedperiod in the region or beyond. The inherentability of this force is that it has the mobilityand flexibility to undertake a wide variety oftasks simultaneously. As Hewish, Janssen andScott, in their article Power Projection getsAmphibious Boost, noted :A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasons 41Amphibious forces have manyadvantages: they can be positioned overthe horizon from a danger spot; theycan be held concentrated, ready forrapid reaction; “(Poise)” and they canbe dispersed, ready to reassemblerapidly when required. Amphibiousforces also enjoy greater flexibility as, atsea, they are not constrained by theproblems of sovereignty, which besetland and air forces. 5The concept of Manoeuvre Warfare is notnew but has been firmly embraced in recentyears by a number of Western nations asoffering the best capability to respond to awide range of potential tasks. Stewart Fraser(Bailrigg Memorandum 32) stated that“manoeuvre warfare is generally associatedwith images of land and combat, 6 such asmassed armour and blitzkrieg tactics.However, it is a Joint Warfare concept equallyapplicable – and perhaps more so in somerespects – to maritime forces. In this context,manoeuvre warfare has two elements:manoeuvre at sea; and manoeuvre from thesea. Manoeuvre at sea centres on navaloperations, and is chiefly concerned withestablishing sea control over critical SLOCs,and precursor operations in the littoral area, tomeet the requirements of the overall jointcampaign on land, while manoeuvre from thesea applies the techniques of manoeuvrewarfare to power projection. The USMCconcept, as defined in Operational Maneuverfrom the Sea, outlines the idea of the littoraland adjacent SLOCs as a manoeuvre space:What distinguishes (OMFTS) from allother species of operational maneuver isthe extensive use of the sea as a meansof gaining advantage, an avenue forfriendly movement that issimultaneously a barrier to the enemyand a means of avoidingdisadvantageous engagements.This aspect of (OMFTS) may make useof, but is not limited to, such techniques

Australian armoured personnel carriers swim ashore from HMAS Tarakan during Exercise Tandem Thrust 01.Photographer: Corporal J. Weeding

as sea-based logistics, sea-based firesupport and the use of the sea as amedium for tactical and operationalmovement. 7This capability confers upon commandersenormous flexibility whereby they are able toapply the necessary level and mix of force toany particular task/mission. In theemergency services analogy, the commander,in conjunction with principal advisers, istherefore able to make an appreciation of thesituation, determine the requirements andassign the necessary resources to achieve thetask. Once completed the force is availablefor new tasking, either by relocating within theAO or be withdrawn to its base afloat. Thefact that the force is able to range overconsiderable distances whilst at sea furtherincreases the mobility and flexibility of theforce in being able to respond adequately to awide range of tasks.Force StructureWhilst the ADF clearly does not have thesame force levels and resources as the USMC,Defence 2000 provides for the realignment andenhancement to its force structure andresources. This will allow for increasedflexibility in the provision of combat forcesthrough their organisation into three brigadesand the Special Operations Group. The abilityto form Task Forces from within these Groupswill enable it to achieve a significant capabilityin the conduct of manoeuvre warfare within amaritime strategy.For maritime purposes, both JRDF coreunits can be reinforced with armoured orarmoured reconnaissance elements, probablyin no more than squadron strength (around 12Challenger tanks or Scimitar reconnaissancevehicles, respectively) on account of thesizeable support tail required by such units. Ina medium- to large-scale conflict, deploymentof the JRDF may only be a precursor to adivisional-sized build-up. 8 As Dr MichaelEvans noted in his paper:A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasonsThis is a concept of maritime strategy inwhich doctrinal refinements and newtechnology seem to give amphibious andairmobile operations greater strategicpotential than ever before in the historyof arms. 9Decision TimeThe ADF has arrived at a critical point in itsdevelopment with some fundamental choicesto be made as to how to do business in the21st century. The reality of Australia’s geostrategicsituation in a region that is bothmaritime and littoral by nature dictates theadoption of a strategy that reflects thedemands of this environment. This requiresthe development of Joint Warfare FightingCapabilities that cater for a broad range ofcontingencies that could arise in the sea-airlandgap.Whilst the ADF remains small in size,compared to a number of larger allies, there isenormous potential to maximise the effects ofa relatively small defence force by adopting theconcepts of manoeuvre warfare, wherebyforces are concentrated at key points to applyleverage. The effectiveness of manoeuvrewarfare calls for high levels of mobility andflexibility, as well as high levels of trainingand readiness.The ADF is fortunate that many of thecomponent parts required to develop a highlymobile and responsive force already existwithin the ADF force structure and the planned3 Brigade and SOG organisation will providethe nucleus for the development of a highlymobile force. The LAV and Bushrangerdevelopment programmes will confer increasedmobility to the force.Artillery, Engineer, Armour, Signals andLogistic support units are already wellembedded into the Army orbit. In additionhelicopter support, to be augmented in 2007 byan additional squadron of troop lift helicopters,is available through 5 Aviation Regiment, andthe RAN and RAAF. A modest level of43

44AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001strategic and tactical air and sea mobility isavailable with the upgraded C130(J) Fleet andthe newly redesigned LPA’s HMAS Kanimblaand HMAS Manoora in conjunction withHMAS Tobruk and the LCH’s.However, the effectiveness of these forcesdepends upon the adoption of a clearwarfighting capability established on theintegration of the capabilities to the commonpurpose of being able to provide a highlymobile and responsive force, able to operate inthe maritime environment. This not onlyrequires reorganisation to the current forcestructure but the replacement of some heavyequipment with lighter, more mobile and airseatransportable equipment. The provision ofair defence for those naval and Army unitsoperating as a joint force in the maritimeenvironment will be of paramount importance.The subsequent development of futurecapabilities across the ADF must continue toreflect the underlying requirement to develop ahighly mobile and responsive force that is ableto operate effectively throughout the region.It is possible that some significant savings incost and manpower may be achieved throughthe rationalisation of the developmentalprocess, thus offsetting some costs relating torestructuring changes.ConclusionThe ADF is confronted with the need tomake some significant decisions concerning itsstructure and modus operandi into the 21stcentury. The world has changed, and whilst anumber of countries have dramaticallyrealigned their defence forces to reflect thesechanges, the ADF has yet to change from itslong established structures. The CoalitionGovernment’s stated increased involvementwithin a region, that is both predominantlymaritime and growing in importance but alsobecoming increasingly unstable, demands thatthe ADF develop Joint Warfighting conceptsbased upon the MOLE warfighting concept.To be effective, the ADF must not onlyadapt to operating within a maritime strategybut also change its structure and modusoperandi to undertake manoeuvre warfare.Whilst the ADF has a broad range of existingcapabilities, these need to be reviewed, so thathollowness within the structure is removed andthe ADF acquires a lighter, compact and moremobile capability so that it can adapt and reactquickly to changing situations, particularlywithin the region. Force elements must becapable of coming together as part of a jointforce to meet any given task. The developmentof such a capability, demands that singleService developments reflect the requirementsof the Total Force. In addition, emphasisshould be placed on high levels of training andcross-training with other Force Elements toensure that a high level of familiarity andinteroperability is achieved across the ADF.The ability of this force to be effectivethroughout the region into the 21st centurydemands that the ADF re-evaluate its modusoperandi and adopt the concepts of manoeuvrewarfare. The development of future singleService capabilities must reflect the needs ofthe Total Force requirement, so that the ADFcan indeed become A Force For All Seasons.NOTES1. S. Fraser, (1995) “Littoral Warfare and JointMaritime Operations, UK Approaches andCapabilities”, Bailrigg Memorandum 32, CDISSLancaster University, Lancaster.2. Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in theLittoral Environment (4th Draft 04/06/01).3. Operational shock is a term derived from deepoperations theory drawn from the formerSoviet Union’s analysis of the determinants ofsuccessful manoeuvre and war termination.4. Rational dislocation is an inability to applyrational decision-making processes in a timelyand relevant manner to positively influencecircumstances in the battlespace. Emotionaldisorientation is an inability to come to termswith an unexpected loss of initiative andbattlespace control. The inability of the Frenchhigh command to respond effectively to theGerman blitzkrieg in 1940, despite the Frenchpreponderance of man, materiel and advanced

A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasons 45technology, is an example of the effects ofemotional disorientation combined withrational dislocation. Most French seniorcommanders were emotionally disoriented bythe collapse of the key assumptionsunderpinning their pre-war planning and mostof the rationally conceived orders prepared bytheir staff were dislocated in time from eventson the ground.5. M. Hewish, J. Janssen, R. Scott, (March 1997)Janes’ International Defense Review, Coulsdon,Surrey, UK.6. op. cit.7. S. Fraser, Bailrigg Memorandum 32 quoting“Operational Maneuver from the Sea,Headquarters Marine Corps” (Washington D.C.).8. S. Fraser, Bailrigg Memorandum 32.9. Dr Michael Evans LWSC Working Paper No.101, “The Role of the Army in a MaritimeConcept of Strategy.”

Coalition members of INTERFET

UNTAC and INTERFET -A Comparative AnalysisBy Brigadier Steve Ayling and Ms Sarah Guise47There has been a trend towards an increase in the number of coalition operations undertakensince the end of the Cold War. Whatever the reasons for this, it is clear that multi-nationalcoalitions will continue to be required to restore international peace and security on behalf of theinternational community in the future. It is likely that in many cases this requirement will be metby the creation of ad hoc coalitions that are formed on a temporary basis to undertake a specificoperation, and at short notice. These ad hoc coalitions will invariably include military contingentsfrom nations who only have membership of the United Nations (UN) in common, and do not havethe benefit of permanent security relationships. The question is, what is the best model for formingthese ad hoc coalitions and conducting successful coalition operations?This article examines the UN model forconducting coalition operations bycomparing and contrasting UNTAC (UnitedNations Transitional Authority in Cambodia)and INTERFET (International Force East Timor,concluding that this model appears to be themost appropriate for future low intensitypeacekeeping and peace enforcementrequirements in the Asia Pacific region. Theexamination takes a strategic level view of theways and means that can guide future ad hoccoalitions, and is based on the fact that bothUNTAC and INTERFET military coalitions wererelatively successful and involved manyparticipants from nations from both within, andexternal to, the Asia Pacific region. It is alsoimportant to recognise that experience in adhoc coalitions is increasing and consequentlyexpertise continues to evolve and improve overtime. This article argues that action can betaken in a manner consistent with the uniquestrategic context of the Asia Pacific to enhancethe readiness of regional nations to participatein coalitions together in the future.The analysis is structured to evaluate theachievement of the desired outcome of aneffective military ad hoc coalition, able tooperate in an integrated military, diplomatic,political and economic environment with arobust media presence. Firstly, an appreciationof the Asia Pacific strategic context that willinfluence ad hoc coalitions is given, secondlyan assessment of the UNTAC and INTERFETcoalitions from a strategic viewpoint and lastlyto reflect these considerations in lessons thatcan apply to the components of a coalitioncampaign. These considerations support aSWOT type approach to strategic planningwhere strengths and weaknesses are reflectedin the achievements and lessons learned fromthese operations, and the opportunities andthreats are reflected in the evolving strategiccontext.The comparative analysis reflects thepersonal experience of both authors (Seebiographical details on page 56).The Strategic Context- Constants, Trends andShiftsThe similarities and differences in thestrategic context that influenced both UNTACand INTERFET can be expressed in terms ofconstants, trends and shifts. Constants are thosefeatures that endure over time, were common toboth operations and are likely to remaincharacteristic of the Asia Pacific region forfuture operations. Trends are those aspects thatchange continuously over time and demonstrateevolution and improvement in national

48AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001expertise from UNTAC to INTERFET and intothe future. Shifts are those influences that canvary according to the particular circumstances.ConstantsThe major constant that influenced bothUNTAC and INTERFET is the diversity of theAsia Pacific region. This region encompasses alarge number of countries, all different to eachother in terms of economic development, socialstructures, political systems, religion and culture.Despite the globalisation influences of theinformation revolution and increasinglyliberalised international trade, the region willremain diverse. This diversity is characterised bya wide range of national goals and aspirations,and a determination for national independence.While countries of the region have a sharedinterest in regional security, our approaches toachieving it are as diverse as our nations. TheAsia Pacific region stands in stark contrast toWestern Europe, where historical, economic,social and political influences and directionshave converged to be compatible enough tohave allowed the formation of the EuropeanUnion and the deployment of NATO-basedcoalitions within that region.Another constant is the importance of theUN as a unifying influence in the region and theequal respect that is afforded to all nationsthrough membership of the General Assembly.The extent of participation in both UNTAC andINTERFET by regional countries highlights theirpreference to act with the authority of the UNthrough the means of a UN Security CouncilResolution. As members of the UN, each hasagreed to abide by the UN Charter and acceptthe UN as a legitimate authority for use ofmilitary force in international affairs. Support ofthe UN allows each country to safeguard theirown security but places desirable constraints onthe use of force in the internal affairs of otherstates. As a result, the common interest ofregional nations in security can co-exist withthe diversity of other interests and politicalmotivations.A third constant is the difficulty of formingan effective ad hoc coalition that balancesnational characteristics and requirements withthe demands of the campaign plan prepared bythe nominated force commander. Coalitionbuilding is a demanding task and conductingcoalition operations requires patience,negotiation, trust and confidence together witha guaranteed source of finance and specialisedmilitary resources. This constant provides boththe strength of an ad hoc coalition in terms ofthe national diversity that underpins its creation,and a weakness in terms of vulnerability in theforce structure and inherent capabilities. As willbe discussed under lessons learnt, a lot can bedone to facilitate this process, but it neverthelessremains complex and challenging.TrendsThere has been an important trend towardsan increased willingness to participate in UNoperations. Nations are becoming more willingto get involved in international efforts to restorepeace and security, and given the evidence ofUNTAC and INTERFET are prepared toparticipate either within or outside the region.There are several factors influencing this,including awareness that there is diplomatic andpolitical kudos to be gained by participating ininternational coalitions, particularly to assist insituations with a humanitarian slant. Theincreasing prevalence of the media, makingdomestic audiences increasingly aware of theworld problems and who is doing what toaddress them aid this. Participation willhowever necessarily include strict caveats onthe type and tasks that can be undertaken bythe respective national contingents.Secondly, there is a trend towards anincreased maturity in the conduct of UNoperations. This includes the consideration ofnational reasons behind the decision toparticipate and subsequently the capacity tooperate effectively within an ad hoc coalition.As more UN operations are conducted andnations continue to contribute to them, they are

gaining more experience at the strategic,operational and tactical levels of command. Thecountries of the Asia Pacific region have gainedsignificant experience in coalition operations,and in particular in operating with each other.Thirdly, another trend is an increasedwillingness on the part of the UN SecurityCouncil to authorise peace enforcementoperations that include the use of force bymilitary coalitions under Chapter VII of the UNCharter. This is largely due to adverseexperiences in operations such as Rwanda, andthe acceptance that the more restrictivepeacekeeping operations under Chapter VI havelimited opportunities to achieve mission goals.It is understandable that the credibility andviability of the coalition depends on the safetyof contingent personnel and their ability torestore adequate security for the othercomponents of the mission to succeed. Themember states of the UN have recognised thisand generally support and encourage theUnited Nation Security Council in theirincreased willingness to authorise the use offorce. This aspect was evident in the willingnessto participate in INTERFET under a Chapter VIIbased rules of engagement.ShiftsThe shifts in the strategic context presentthe greatest threats to the achievement of aneffective ad hoc coalition. It must be acceptedthat circumstances in which operations occurwill vary continuously and will tend to beunique for each situation. Examples includethe reasons for conflict erupting, the intensityand scope of the conflict, the likelihood of asuccessful outcome within a reasonabletimeframe and the longer-term consequencesof participation.The level of danger is a good example ofthe different circumstances surroundingUNTAC and INTERFET. In Cambodia, despite aChapter VI based resolution, the risks tocontingent personnel were high in anenvironment characterised by a fragile balanceUNTAC AND INTERFET - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSISof power between equally heavily armedfactions, a history of violence, and a highprevalence of landmines. In East Timor, with aChapter VII based resolution the danger levelswere lower, characterised by poorly armed andtrained militias who were happy to targethelpless civilians but were easily countered bythe professional military forces in theINTERFET coalition.Another example of shifts in a strategiccontext is the difference in the speed at whichthe situations in Cambodia and East Timordeteriorated into violence; resulting in adifference in how rapidly military forces wererequired to respond. In Cambodia, the situationwas more protracted and allowed thenegotiation of a peace agreement over time. InEast Timor, the safety of the local populationwas being seriously threatened requiringimmediate action.Although there is a trend towards anincreased willingness to participate in coalitionoperations, the shifts in diplomatic andpolitical opinion will influence decisions as towhether to participate in a coalition.Participation cannot be taken for granted andnations will assess their involvement inoperations on a case-by-case basis. Australiafor example has a set of criteria against whichit will assess participation in peacekeepingoperations in the new Defence White Paper.The conditions that influence the decisioninclude:• the nature and extent of Australia'sinterests, including strategic, political,humanitarian and alliance issues;• whether the mission has a clear mandate,goals and end-point;• whether the mission's goals are achievablein all the circumstances and with theresources available;• the extent of international support for themission;• the cost of participation, including theeffect on the ADF's capacity to performother tasks;49

50AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001• training and other benefits to the ADF;• the risks to personnel involved; and• consequences for Australia's widerinterests and international relationships.Lastly, an effective coalition will depend onthe availability of financial support for the costof the operation. Ad hoc coalitions do not haveguaranteed UN funding, and will depend onthe contribution of funding from other nationsfor the mission. However this is assisted byconducting the mission under UN auspiceswith the authority of a UN mandate and by theparticipation of a wide range of countriesrepresenting the international community.Nations are prepared in some cases to make aself-funded contribution (such as Australia didfor UNAMIC and INTERFET), but will requirefunding from the UN in other circumstances(such as Australia did for UNTAC and iscurrently placed in UNTAET). A source offunding is required to meet the significantcosts of deployment, logistic and medicalsupport and compensation for death andinjury. It is probable that reliance on selffundedcontributions will not be enough tocreate a viable coalition that is diplomaticallyacceptable.Analysis of UNTAC and INTERFETThe major success of both operations wasthat an effective coalition was created for boththe UNTAC and INTERFET missions, albeit overdifferent timelines. It is worth noting thedifference in the time taken to build thecoalition up to full effectiveness. INTERFETwas highly successful in rapidly forming aneffective coalition. The UN authorised aninternational force three days after theagreement by the Indonesian Government toallow an international force into East Timor,and INTERFET commenced deployment fivedays after the approval of UN Resolution 1264.However it was largely possible because anation - Australia - was willing and able toorganise and lead a coalition immediately andother nations, from both within the region andoutside, were willing and able to join inrelatively quick time. Although considerablenegotiation was still required to encouragenations to join INTERFET, confidence in theAustralian leadership, commitment to earlyresolution of an unacceptable situation in EastTimor and availability of both self-funded andRelief Trust Fund supported nations proved tobe the keys to success.UNTAC unfolded over a much longerperiod, and was preceded by extensivenegotiation with the Cambodian factions andthe deployment of the UNAMIC advancemission to confirm that the circumstancesremained stable. This robust UN process forpeacekeeping was successful, and clearly suitedthe coalition participants by allowing a longperiod to consider whether to deploy or not,and if so, what would the contribution be.While an effective coalition was achieved,there was a time lag in building the coalitionup to full effectiveness. This reflects the relativeinexperience in large-scale peacekeepingoperations at the time of UNTAC.A second success of both operations wasthe extensive regional and global participationin both coalitions. This demonstrates that theinvolvement of a wide range of nations inaddressing international security issues issuccessful and desirable. Such broad globalparticipation is particularly important in theAsia Pacific region, as regional nations maynot have the full range of capabilities requiredto mount a successful coalition operation.• Participants in the UNTAC military andcivilian police components were: Algeria,Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,Belgium, Brunei, Darussalam, Bulgaria,Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany,Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia,Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation,Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,

United Kingdom, United States andUruguay.• Participants in the INTERFET militarycoalition were: Australia, Brazil, Canada,Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany,Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia,Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway,Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore,Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom andthe United States.It is worthy to note the nations whoparticipate in both coalitions, and those whoused these operations to make their first evercontribution.Both coalitions were successful in securingadequate funding. The source of funding isdifferent - UNTAC was a UN funded missionand INTERFET was a mixture of self-fundednations and those supported by the UN ReliefTrust Fund. The Relief Trust Fund, funded withextremely generous contributions from Japan,was a major factor in the decision of manynations to participate in the coalition. Fundingavailability was a major consideration in thestrategic level negotiations completed withnations who were considering participation inINTERFET. The Australian Governmentundertook to meet in-country logistic costs forthose nations who were to be funded by theTrust Fund and seek separate reimbursementafter the fund was functioning in order toencourage early deployment. The AustralianGovernment also agreed to underwrite thedeath and disability compensation provisionsfor these nations as the aspect had not beenincluded in the terms of reference for the TrustFund.Both coalitions succeeded in providing asecure environment for the further restorationand development of Cambodia and East Timor.UNTAC included other components responsiblefor rehabilitation and reconstruction of thehost nations in terms of infrastructuredevelopment, humanitarian assistance and theconduct of elections, formation of newUNTAC AND INTERFET - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSISadministrations and so forth. INTERFET wasreplaced by UNTAET that had these widerresponsibilities. The “nation building”responsibilities that include the criticalrestoration of the rule of law of militarycoalitions is a significant point that canconfound a purely military planning approachto operations, and leads to fear of “missioncreep” and excessive risk minimisation tactics.Both military coalitions were less successfulin the rate of transition from military securityto police security for law and order. It wasevident in UNTAC that it was far more difficultto create an effective international policecoalition than it was for a military coalition.This resulted in a major change in role for themilitary component from one of disarming anddemobilising the armed Cambodian factions, toproviding security for the conduct of theelections. INTERFET did not have a civilianpolice component, and had to undertakeresponsibilities to sustain law and order afterthe threat from the militia had been contained.The capacity to transition effectively frommilitary to civilian control of the situation is amajor aspect for the future. The UnitedKingdom concept of “pushing from the rear” tocreate the circumstances in which the militarycomponent of a UN mission can be replaced bycivilian means (such as communications,logistics and medical support) is of criticalimportance in the strategic level managementof ad hoc coalitions. Measures are required tomanage the trend towards increasinginvolvement of the UN in international affairsextending well beyond military coalitions toinclude many other economic, political andhumanitarian initiatives. With the increase inintra-state conflict leading to the collapse ofeffective government, the UN is increasinglyinvolved in transitional governingarrangements.A final success worth mentioning is themomentum created with the success of eachmission. Success is cumulative and theexperience flows into contributing to the51

52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001success of subsequent missions. Hence thesuccess of UNTAC contributed to the success ofINTERFET, which in turn is contributing to thesuccess of UNTAET. The experience gainedover time had made each successive operationbetter than those before it. Many Asia Pacificnations have participated in these operations,increasing their own national experience ofoperations in a multi-national context.The analysis in this section demonstratesthat while UNTAC was a UN-sponsoredcoalition, run and led by the UN, andINTERFET was a UN-sanctioned coalition, runand led by Australia under UN authority, bothwere very successful. This indicates that bothforms of coalition possible under the UN modelcan be successful in the Asia Pacific region. Asdiscussed in the first paragraph of this section,the main distinction between the two types ofcoalition was the speed at which they wereable to build up to the force structure of a fullyeffective coalition. This distinction mayinfluence which type of coalition is moreappropriate in any given future situation.Future Ad Hoc CoalitionsThere have been a large number of lessonslearned from UNTAC and INTERFET that canbe better incorporated in planning. The desiredoutcome is a situation where a robust coalitionforce can be created that can reach fullcapacity in minimum timeframe, and withsufficient capability to achieve the missionobjective. Unlike the NATO situation, the AsiaPacific region includes a number of individualmilitary forces without a common doctrinalframework or mandated training andinteroperability standards. The UNTAC andINTERFET operations demonstrated that this isnot a major impediment to the conduct ofrelatively successful operations. The challengeis to create an acceptable means to addressselected strategic level lessons in peacetime,and provide an awareness of the operationaland tactical level lessons that can only beeffectively resolved in a specific coalitionsituation.The approach used within the AustralianDefence Force to consider the strategic levelcoalition building lessons learned fromINTERFET may be suitable for this purpose. Itcan provide the means to sort the variouslessons of the past and to identify those thatcan be addressed now, and those that are bestleft to those planning future ad hoc coalitions.The model was developed to address therequirements of future warfare by the Office ofthe RMA within the Defence Headquarters andintroduces seven components of warfareconcepts that integrate to define a campaignstrategy. Using these categories it is possible toidentify where major deficiencies exist that canbe addressed either by individual regionalnations or in a corporate way by those nationswho have cooperated together in previousoperations and may do so in the future.The warfare concept categories are:• command and control;• intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance;• tailored effects;• force projection;• force protection;• force sustainment; and• force generation.The approach provides a way in which theconstants, trends and shifts of the uniquestrategic context in the Asia Pacific region canbe merged with the components of future adhoc coalition campaigns. It can identify theways of achieving the objective of an effectivecoalition and the means through training,doctrine and policy to improve the ability tooperate in coalition in these areas. The key isfor regional nations that can anticipateoperating in coalition together in the future toprepare them for this eventuality. The basicpremise is that the more negotiating that isdone in advance and the more understandings

eached beforehand; the easier it will be toconduct a coalition operation. Those thingsthat take time, things that are common to allcoalition operations or can be identified asnecessary sufficiently far in advance can beaddressed. This will leave those things thatvary or that are not easily predicted to be dealtwith on a case-by-case basis. The web ofbilateral relationships that exists in the AsiaPacific region provides an effective means forachieving this goal.Command and ControlImportance of an efficient commandstructure. Coalition participants will only joina coalition if they respect and have confidencein command structure. Command and controlcan be based on the widely accepted UN modelthat has proven successful, but it requires theappointment of a capable and crediblecoalition commander agreeable to all. Potentialcoalition participants need to be convincedthat the most direct and efficient chain ofcommand has been established and mostimportantly that it will be responsive to theirnational requirements.Importance of the national commander /force commander relationship. Theassignment of national force elements to thecoalition commander under operational controlis a key factor. This allows the coalitioncommander to use national contingents withinlimits agreed by each nation for the purpose ofthe mission, but allows each nation to retainultimate command of their own forces. In aregion such as the Asia Pacific where thediversity of interest and motivation issignificant, the use of operational control asopposed to the NATO model of forces beingunder NATO command is much moreappropriate. The use of operational controlunder the UN model allows the coalitioncommander to negotiate individually withnational component commanders regardingthe employment of their forces. This assistsnations in achieving their varying politicalUNTAC AND INTERFET - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSISobjectives in joining the coalition and allowsthe coalition commander to address constraintssuch as varying willingness to acceptcasualties.Managing national media requirements. Astrategic plan for the management of coalition,national, host nation, UN and NGO agencyaspects is a key requirement. Internationalrecognition and national prestige are primaryconsiderations for nations planning toparticipate in a coalition. Appropriate mediacoverage of all activities, including access tothe arrival/ training/ deployment/ operations isrequired. This can be provided by nationalmedia agencies, but must be supported by thecoalition leader. National requirements can bemet through a flexible approach to theprocedures for the accreditation and support tomedia representatives.Intelligence, Surveillance and ReconnaissanceInformation sharing is required.Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissancecan be facilitated by the formulation ofinformation sharing agreements betweennations. This includes the use of generalinformation to inform the decision toparticipate in the coalition and during theoperation to inform changes in the missionand the circumstances for leaving the coalition.This is a sensitive issue, but will provideparticular benefits at the strategic level ofcommand.Policies for the release of classifiedmaterial. Interaction in a coalition setting isgreatly facilitated between nations that havealready negotiated the boundaries on whatclassified information they are prepared torelease to each. In addition, the more countriesshare information on regional developments asthey arise, the better prepared they will be todeal with them should military action becomenecessary.Force ProjectionStrategic lift for deployment and redeployment.Few nations have the means to53

54AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001INTERFET commander Major General Cosgrove inspecting Jordanian troops withUNTAET counterpart Lieutenant General Jaime de Los SantosPhotographer: Corporal A. Hallself-deploy on operations and the availabilityof strategic lift is a major consideration in thetimely deployment to join the coalition.Planning and arrangements for strategic liftcan be made in advance, with nationsconsidering the circumstances in which theywould need assistance with strategic lift.Training and exercising together can assist inthe development of common procedures forplanning and conduct of deployments. Therealso needs to be a willingness to make nationalcontingent transport assets available at thetactical level for coalition use.Staged deployment assists in coalitionmanagement. The ability during INTERFET tostage contingent deployments throughAustralia prior to deployment to East Timorallowed forces to concentrate and deploy intothe theatre of operations in accordance withthe campaign plan. This was more efficientthan the direct deployment into Cambodia atthe start of the UNTAC operation, where theavailability of support directly impacted on theperception of the efficiency of the operation.Tailored EffectsAcceptance of the Chapter VII UN CharterForce Rules of Engagement (ROE). Establishingacceptance and understanding of the UN rulesof engagement for Chapter VI and VIIoperations among nations and importantlyunderstanding the difference between themcan be done in advance. Nations can considerhow their national ROE fit with the UN ROEand make sure they are consistent. In particularnational policy towards the use of force toprotect designated persons and missionessential equipment can be specified inadvance.Force ProtectionThe likelihood of casualties is a majordeterminant in participation. Nations are vitallyconcerned with the risks associated with aChapter VII peace enforcement operation. It isa key planning factor and must be negotiatedduring coalition building planning. Nationalprerogatives need to be respected andaccommodated. Risk assessment will influence

many aspects of campaign planning includingpreferences for tactical areas of operation, thescope of national commitments and caveats onthe use of forces.Management of risks with tropical diseaseand availability of medical inoculations arekey determinants. Nations are not necessarilyfamiliar with the risks of disease in theparticular area of deployment. This particularlyapplies to deployments into tropical areaswhere knowledge of preventative measuresincluding the availability of immunisationstocks for large contingents is critical.Force SustainmentCoalition logistic support shortfalls mustbe satisfied. Most nations will not be able todeploy logistically self-contained and willexpect that support will be provided. Thecoalition leader must accept the responsibilityto meet any shortfalls in order to ensure thattimely deployment and readiness foroperations is possible. The demands on thecoalition leader will be particularly high inlocations where either the local infrastructureor commercial contractors are unable to beused.Logistic, movements and personnelplanning guidelines must be negotiated early.Logistic support can benefit significantly fromthe prior negotiation of implementingarrangements between nations. These canprovide general direction on the level ofsupport required by one nation that is agreedto be provided by another nations, should theyoperate in coalition together. Amendments willbe required for the particular circumstances ofan operation. The experience of UNTAC andINTERFET demonstrates that it is timeconsuming to negotiate these agreements, andcan impact on deployment and the build up ofthe coalition.Force GenerationNegotiation is required before nations willjoin a coalition. While some nations will jointhe coalition and deploy immediately,UNTAC AND INTERFET - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSISnegotiation is required with most nations. Theyneed to be convinced that planning andexecution are of standards acceptable to theirnational requirements. Detailed planning canbe achieved with the early deployment ofnational planning teams who can addresspolitical, military and financial aspects of theproposed operation.Trust and understanding is the key tocoalition building. Trust and understanding isa critical dimension to the success of an ad hoccoalition. The conduct of common training anddevelopment of strategic level doctrine canfacilitate this. The value of military personalrelationships developed through previoustraining and operational activities isemphasised. The identification of mutualacquaintances and recognition of militaryreputation supported the development of trustand understanding. Liaison officers withlanguage skills are important to assist inovercoming language and cultural barriers,particularly important in a region as diverse asthe Asia Pacific.A successful coalition has manyparticipants providing both large and smallcontingents. An equal approach needs to betaken to coalition building regardless of anation's reasons for participation or the size orcharacteristics of contingents. All nations cometo answer the call of the UN Security Counciland the coalition leader merely exercises“stewardship” of the coalition on behalf of theUN. It should be noted that the same staffplanning effort is generally required regardlessof the contingent size.Force reparation pays dividends.Contingent training in rules of engagement,customs and culture aspects together withlimited language skills are a very positivecoalition building activity. During INTERFETthis was managed under Australianarrangements in Australia, while in UNTAC itwas left to the individual nations to considerthe extent that it was required.55

56AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001ConclusionGiven the constants, trends and shiftsidentified and the analysis of both the ad hoccoalitions created for UNTAC and INTERFET, itis clear that the UN model is successful inachieving the outcome - the formation of aneffective military coalition - in the Asia Pacificregion. The two types of coalition allow the UNto choose which type will be more appropriatefor the situation. Acknowledgement of thelessons learned outlined in the seven warfareconcept categories highlight areas where theUN model can be strengthened by both earlyaction, and made more efficient and effectivein the future.It is important to recognise the role that theUN played in the efforts to resolve the crises inCambodia and East Timor within the strategiccontext of the Asia Pacific region. There waswide acceptance of the UN Security CouncilResolution as the basis for a commitment tothe ad hoc military coalitions by many nations,and particularly the value of allowing regionalcountries to be involved to resolve regionalissues of concern. The importance of allowinga wide variety of countries from outside theregion to act where their interests orconscience direct is of key importance to thediplomatic legitimacy and military strength ofthe coalition. It is particularly important toallow military capabilities not found within theregion to be incorporated in the coalition.The UN model also allows nations toremain flexible with regard to the participationin coalitions. Up to a certain point, nations arehappy to provide assistance with minimaldiscussion. But there comes a point beyondwhich nations will refuse to act without thechance to negotiate the nature of theirparticipation. The UN model allows nations tomake decisions on a case-by-case basis anddoes not require them to commit to aguaranteed response under any particularcircumstances.The achievements of the UNTAC andINTERFET military coalitions were significantin regional terms. The capacity to respond tofuture crisis of similar magnitude within theregion certainly exists. Consideration of thelessons learned not only leads to an enhancedability to conduct future ad hoc coalitionoperations under the UN model, but alsoprovides a sound basis from which to developa more permanent regional securityarrangement in the future.

Overcoming Learned Helplessness 157By James WarnThe Four Questions Asked by Effective Executives in Making People Decisions: 2• What has he or she done well?• What therefore, is he or she likely to be able to do well?• What does he or she have to learn or acquire to be able to get full benefitsfrom his or her strength?• If I had a son or daughter, would I be willing to have him or her work under this person?Dr Alan Hawke diagnosed a severe case oflearned helplessness in the Department ofDefence:There are certainly elements of whatI would call a culture of learnedhelplessness among some Defencesenior managers - both military andcivilian. Their perspective is one ofdisempowerment. 3The pattern of attributing failure to lack ofability, task difficulty, or bad luck, andbelieving that successes do not reflect effort orability has been called learned helplessness.Seligman and Associates first defined theconcept in a series of laboratory experimentswith dogs in the mid 1960s. They placed dogsin a restraining harness and then exposed themto a series of painful though not physicallyharmful electric shocks. No matter what thedogs did, the shocks would occur. Next, thedogs were put in a shuttle box, a chamberdesigned so that a dog can jump over a barrierand escape the shock. Dogs that had not beenpreviously exposed to the inescapable shockwould run frantically around the box untilthey accidentally scrambled over the barrierand escaped the shock. The dogs quicklybecame very adept at recognising the signalwarning of the shock and jumping the barrierbefore they were shocked. In contrast, thegroup of dogs, which had been subjected to theinescapable shocks, would at first run aroundfrantically for about 30 seconds. But they thenstopped moving, and lay down inside the boxand quietly whined.Since these early experiments, which inhindsight seem very cruel, learned helplessnesshas crossed the species barrier. Learnedhelplessness has been detected in human workgroups. Work groups afflicted with learnedhelplessness are unlikely to increase theirefforts and apply new strategies in the face ofdifficult problems because they believe that thecauses for their failure (and success) arebeyond their control.Learned helplessness is an outcome of aseries of disabling and unpleasant experiences.The causal factor is easily identified in anexperimental setting. However, thecontributing factors are less apparent inorganisation settings. The manager may nothave experienced a single traumatic shock.Instead, the manager’s behaviour is likely to bethe result of an incremental series ofexperiences that degrade one’s sense of beingin control of events. The manager may noteven have directly experienced some of theseevents. Managers observe the behaviour ofothers and evaluate the consequences of thisbehaviour. In general, people learn to adapttheir behaviour based on vicarious experience,that is, what they see happening to othersaround them.Underlying learned helplessness is a set ofbehaviours in the organisation that ChrisArgyris has called organisational defensiveroutines. 4 Argyris identified amongst a group

58AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001of senior executives, sets of actions, that overprotectindividuals or groups. These actions areroutines because they occur continually andare independent of an individual actor'spersonality. The routines are highly skilled -which means they are executed immediatelyand automatically, without conscious thought.These routines enable the individual to survivethe organisational politics, if not engage in it,and to progress one’s career. These routinesmight be better described as survival routines.Indicators of these routines are blaming,low encouragement of enquiry, decreasedconfidence in each other, prevalence of bitinghumour, low internal commitment to decisions,horse trading, covert empire building, politicalcoalition building, badmouthing, and secretmanoeuvring amongst the senior executives.Survival routines can occur in anyorganisation, not just Defence.Survival routines stop one from learningnew actions. These routines inhibit opendiscussion, stifle learning, and prevent change.Argyris says that these routines result in skilledincompetence, and in Defence, these routinesresult in a culture of learned helplessness.Argyris believes that the motivation toengage in a survival routine stems from theimplicit beliefs group members hold about howto achieve outcomes in their organisation. Thisset of beliefs is called the theory-in-use. Theprevalent theory-in-use enables individualsand groups in the organisation to:• achieve one’s own intended purpose;• maximise one’s own wins and minimiselosses;• avoid embarrassment (saving face is thename of the game); and• behave according to what you think isrational (not what others might think issensible).The most prevalent action strategies thatarise are to advocate your position, evaluatethe thoughts and actions of others (and yourown), and attribute causes for whatever youare trying to understand. These actions mustbe performed in such a way as to satisfy yourgoverning values - achieve minimumacceptable level of being in control, winning,or bringing about any other result. Thetheory-in-use says to craft your positions inways that inhibit inquiry into them and avoidtests of them with others’ logic. The theory-inuseinvolves expending your energy to protectand advance your position. The consequencesare defensiveness, misunderstanding, and selffulfillingprocesses within the organisation.How to ChangeSuccessful change rarely results in achange of deep-seated values. Rathersuccessful change recognises the predominantvalues of the organisation’s workforce andredefines the work outcomes that should beassociated with those outcomes. This insight isparticularly pertinent to defence organisationsthat depend on values such as loyalty andcourage. These are important values to keepintact. However, many of the existing workpractices are a matter of habit rather than anenactment of core values.Changing survival routines is difficult butcan be achieved with strong direction from thetop. Change is possible and there are plenty ofexamples where leaders have turned around anorganisation.LeadershipThe leader provides a metaphor thatdefines the culture of the workgroup. The CEOof Continental Airlines sees the work team asanalogous to a football team. Everyone has adifferent assignment, but that is the game. Hehas formed a top management team ofapproximately five people - president, chiefoperating officer, chief finance officer, head oflegal and PR and head of operations. “Wecollectively agree on things.” 5 Each one ofthese people sees things in terms of theirknothole, from their functional perspective.Each of these people brings individual smartsto the table, and collectively we reach a better

decision. This team culture at the toppermeates its way throughout the lower levelsof the organisation.The CEO of Continental Airlines, a formerNavy mechanic, first developed his managerialstyle when he was in charge of aircraftmaintenance for a squadron aboard a carrier,and later, a submarine hunting squadron. Hisformer commanding officer commented, “…was superb at motivating people”. AtContinental, the CEO replaced survival routineswith a culture of team learning.Three important factors are important tounderstanding team learning 6 :• Communication. For a team to achievehigh levels of performance, its membersmust actively ask questions, discusserrors, engage in experimentation, andreflection, and seek external feedback.Quality of communication within theteam and among teams stronglyinfluences work processes, theenvironment, team design, and teammember characteristics. Highestperforming self-managing work teamshave communication described as“honest, frank, and regular”. 7 Because ofintense information sharing, membersachieve high levels of clarity about eachother’s motivations and intents.Communication enables the team to learn.In high learning teams, mistakes areanalysed for how improvementsmight be made, and feedback, bothpositive and negative, is consideredhelpful rather than critical. These teamsactively seek out information fromoutside the group when they haveproblems. “If we have a quality issue -we’re not sure about something we’ve justdone - we’ll bring others in withouttelling them what the issue is to ask themif they see a problem with this part.” 8• Support. The shared belief that the teamwill not embarrass, reject or punishsomeone for speaking up is essential forOVERCOMING LEARNED HELPLESSNESSlearning to occur in teams. This sharedsense of supportiveness, respect and trustamong team members is calledpsychological safety. The climate ofsupportiveness allows team members totake more risks, make errors or ask forhelp, and consequently made learningpossible. Members of high performingteams typically make comments like:“We take responsibility for helping eachother.” 9Whereas members of low performingteams will note:“People are put down for beingdifferent...there is a lack of trust.” 10• Capacity. Performance depends on teammembers confidence in the capacity of theteam to perform, clear and compellinggoals adequate resources, information andrewards, and supportive leadership.However, high learning teams werecapable of overcoming situationalobstacles and limitations, whereas lowlearning teams were unable to transformtheir situation without externalintervention. Teams in which membershave high levels of comfort in voicingopinions are more successful sincedivergent opinions can be voiced, ideascan be challenged, and communicationstrategies exist for evolving better ideas.Leadership style is an importantcontributing factor to organisational outcomessince it maintains the supportive psychologicalclimate needed for groups to learn fromexperience and innovate and change. Teamleader coaching appears to facilitate thedevelopment of psychological safety withinteams. For most high learning teams, theleaders were proactive and committed to theteam. Leaders of low learning teams tended tobe more distant, and acted in a supervisoryrather than coaching capacity. Importantly asupportive team leadership style creates thegroup climate in which high performanceoutcomes can be achieved.59

60AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001Team leadership depends on leadersbehaving consistently on the basis of a set ofclearly articulated values. The incrementaleffect of this leadership behaviour is to createmutual trust and respect. Value-basedleadership should be clearly differentiatedfrom ethics training, which typically includessuch initiatives as a code of conduct, trainingin relevant areas of law, such as antidiscriminationlegislation, and mechanismsfor reporting and investigating misconduct.These initiatives tend to encouragecompliance rather than a values-basedapproach to workplace behaviours. Anintegrity-oriented strategy is needed if selfgovernanceis important to the organisation.HR System - Friend or FoeSurvival routines continue to exist in anorganisation because they continue to berewarded. Any attempt to shift a workforcefrom survival routines to high levels ofperformance needs first of all to examine theimpact of the HR system. Does the HR systemprovide the right performance indicators?Does it provide a metric? Is the metric alignedwith the incentive structure? Are people paidto perform or for just staying on? Is the HRsystem friend or foe?Unravelling a culture of learnedhelplessness requires the HR system to shiftits emphasis away from golden handcuffs thatsimply attempt to lock people into stayingrather than performing. Survival routinesmanifest in a culture of complaint andblaming, and a skilled incompetence indealing with the root causes of the problem.Blame the quality of new recruits, blame thelack of money, blame the contractor, andblame everyone you can, but avoid the rootcauses. For example, turnover is addressedby raising the entry barrier or the exit barrier.When authority is under threat, HR isregarded as a means to manipulate employeebehaviour. Mission statements - people areour greatest asset - are used to curry favourfrom amongst employees. The success of suchstatements is dubious. It is useful to considerPeter Drucker’s critique of HR. He argues thatHR can easily degenerate into a device to“sell” whatever management is doing. “It isno accident that there is so much talk inhuman relations about ‘giving workers asense of responsibility’ and so little abouttheir responsibility, so much emphasis ontheir ‘feeling of importance’, and so little onmaking their work important.” 11Companies with the best human assetmanagement practices have an “enduringcommitment to a set of drivers: basic beliefs,traits and operating stratagems”. 12 Survivalroutines that act as barriers to achieving thiscommitment are:• Obsession with action. Managers arerewarded for activity, implementingchange and moving on, rather thananalysis. “Most companies encourageaction. Some even support risk taking.But only a few demand that people graspthe implications of a problem before theyblast off in a quest for the holy grail ofsolutions. Instead, the unspoken butclearly accepted cultural mandate is ‘Dosomething’.” 13• Process fixation. Lots of attention toimproving process at the local levelwithout clarifying how the processcontributes to the organisational-wideoutcomes.These survival routines are further abettedby the inability to analyse cause and effectrelationships. Often managers lack the skillsfor measuring the connection betweeninternal activity and organisational-wideoutcomes (e.g. quality, productivity). Goalsare not analysed in terms of the impact theyhave on the organisation. Instead, achievinggoals is seen as the end in itself.The metrics provide a way for employeesto link their behaviours to importantorganisational outcomes. These relationshipscan be tightly defined by the use of tools,

such as a balanced scorecard. 14 The role of thereward system is to keep people focused on theimportant behaviours.Linking the incentive system to importantwork behaviours may sound deceptivelysimple. Rewarding team performance mayrequire pay for skills, team performance pay, orprofit sharing (or gain sharing). Typically,these approaches will put some proportion ofemployee earnings at risk. Research indicatesthat hidden pitfalls may be encountered in theimplementation phase. Moving to an earningsat risk pay plan may enhance targetedbehaviours (e.g. productivity) but can reduceother work attitudes and behaviours (i.e. lowerorganisational support, lower job performanceand increased absenteeism). 15 Progress inimproving the HR system requires clearadherence to basic values as well as rigorousanalysis. Clearly, improvements will not occurif change is guided by the prevailing logic ofsurvival routines.Leadership and a performance oriented HRsystem are vital ingredients for overcominglearned helplessness. Together they can createa collective sense of self-efficacy - a realisticbelief that the group can achieve the requiredoutcomes. 16NOTES1. This article is based on a paper delivered by theauthor to the Defence-Industry IntegratedTeams Conference, Canberra, 8 November2000.OVERCOMING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 612. Peter Drucker, The Effective Executive, 1967,Heinemann, London.3. Dr Allan Hawke, “What’s the Matter - A DueDiligence Report”, Address to the DefenceWatch Seminar, National Press Club, Canberra,17 February 2000, and reprinted in theAustralian Defence Force Journal, March/April2000.4. Chris Argyris, Knowledge for Action, 1993,Jossey Bass, San Francisco.5. The material on Continental was drawn fromarticles by Sheila Puffer, “Continental airlines’CEO Gordon Bethune on teams and newproduct development”, Academy ofManagement Executive, 1999, 13, 28-35, andBrian O’Reilly, “The Mechanic Who FixedContinental”, Fortune, 20 December 1999.6. A. Edmondson, “Psychological safety andlearning behaviour in work teams”,Administrative Science Quarterly, 1999, 44,350-383.7. D.E. Yeatts and C. Hyten, High performing selfmanagedwork teams, 1998, Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage.8. ibid., Edmondson.9. ibid., Edmondson.10. ibid., Edmondson.11. J. Beatty, The World According to Drucker,1998, , Orion, London, p. 117.12. Jac Fitz-Enz, The Eight Practices of ExceptionalCompanies, 1997, New York, AMACOM, p. 13.13. ibid., p. 45.14. R.S. Kaplan and D.P. Norton, The BalancedScorecard, 1996, Harvard , Boston.15. ibid., Yeatts and Hyten.16. A. Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy, 1997,Freeman, New York.

62ReviewsBooksTHERE TO THE BITTER END, Ted Serong inVietnam by Anne Blair, Allen & Unwin,Sydney, 2001.Reviewed by Major Jim TruscottIt is surprising that ithas taken 25 years for abook to be written aboutan inspirational figure.This is possibly because itis a book aboutconfronting militaryfailure. Although Serongheld influential positionsthroughout the entire course of the VietnamWar, most of his recommendations wereignored or his initiatives discontinued. Theauthor states that these setbacks did notconstitute failure to Serong as he viewedVietnam as just one of the dominos in theglobal fight against communism. From Serong'sperspective he achieved his mission of fightingcommunism for ten years. In many ways he justconsidered himself to be part of the Great Gamesimilar to that played out between competingworld powers in the Himalayas a centurybefore. However unlike that period, the bookdescribes the refusal by the US to treat Vietnamas a one-war Theatre.The reasons for political and military failurein Vietnam are now well understood, none theleast the author's description of the culturaldifficulty that the US had in discerning betweenimpressive briefings to superiors and the facts.The protagonists at the time would have donebetter to heed Serong's advice. As early as 1964he concluded that the war was lost, and hebegan planning for stay behind operations. Bymid 1965 Serong had finished commanding thehighly successful Australian Army TrainingTeam Vietnam and he was seconded to the CIAto establish the Police Field Force; one of thefew effective pacification operations in theentire war. When he retired from the Army in1968, he served his remaining time in Vietnamin multiple politico-military appointmentsemployed by the RAND Corporation. Even asthe war was almost over in February 1975, hedared the US to treat Indo-China as one fightingregion, and to use Thai forces to help hold backthe North Vietnamese Army. The book describesa defining moment for Serong when on 28April only days before the end, such was hisinfluence that 12 South Vietnamese Generalscome to his office and asked him to becomeCommander-in-Chief. Sadly, it was all too late.I have one major criticism. The author usesSerong as a one-dimensional vehicle to producean interesting perspective of the Vietnam Warand its ultimate failure, however it still does notanswer many questions about Serong. Theauthor intended that Serong be the windowthrough which she examined the Vietnam War,but for this approach to be successful, we haveto know more about Serong. For example, theaccount does not fully describe the priorpersonal experiences that really framed his rolein Vietnam. The connection between Serong,ASIS and the CIA remains ill defined, and theAustralian Prime Minister's desire for him tobecome Chief of the General Staff is withoutsupporting explanation of his career. The storylacks the human element that is crucial tocoming to terms with Serong and the role heplayed. None the less it is compelling readingfor war-fighters who must understand thefundamental linkage between effective strategyand tactical actions on the ground. It describeshow the lack of clear definition of whatconstitutes winning daunted commanders andfield soldiers alike. Fundamentally, Serong's

methods were too revolutionary for the US, astheir high technology Army persisted in tryingto fight a low technology war.SOUTHERN TRIDENT: STRATEGY, HISTORYAND THE RISE OF AUSTRALIAN NAVALPOWER. Edited by David Stevens and JohnReeve. Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allenand Unwin, 2001.Reviewed by Dr Hank PrunckunSince Federation, thedevelopment ofAustralia’s Navy hasclearly been a significantfactor in the nation’soverall development. Asan island continentAustralia is stronglyinfluenced by itsmaritime environmentand as such, Australia’s national interestsstretch far beyond its coastline. Recent casesthat spring to mind include the crises inIndonesia, the Fijian coups d’etat, the rebellionon Bougainville, and the interception offoreign fishing vessels in the Southern Oceanto mention but a few.In Southern Trident, Stevens and Reevehave brought together 19 contributors who areexpert in the field of Naval power.Collectively, they have written a series ofextremely informative and thought provokingessays that examine the influences leading tothe rise of Australian naval power. They haveset these issues in their historical context,showing that the creation of the AustralianNavy was more than a display of nationalism— it was rather a culmination of numerous andcomplex developments in the areas ofdiplomacy, international and economicrelations, politics, and technology.The book leads with a Forward by ViceAdmiral David Shackleton, RAN, followed byan Introduction from the two editors. Thebook in chief comprises 19 chapters arrangedREVIEWSinto two Parts – the first addressing “Conceptsand Approaches to Maritime Strategy” and theother “Perspectives on Imperial and AustralianNaval Defence.”Dr John Reeves, Senior Lecturer at theAustralian Defence Force Academy, sets thescene with an essay on “The Rise of ModernNaval Strategy c. 1580–1880.” He summonsup what is best described as “early modernbackground naval strategy,” a strategy whichnaval commanders inherited in the 20thcentury. He does so as a way of showing thatthis history can act as a source of experience(i.e. lessons learned) to be used in the currentstrategic debate. The discussion in Reeves’chapter is thematic rather than chronologicaland covers a wide sweep of history. Althoughselective in its content, this initial chapter setsthe standard for the high quality of writing andanalysis found throughout the book.Other chapters particularly worthy of noteinclude: “Strategic Culture and the AustralianWay of Warfare: Perspectives” (Dr MichaelEvans, Australian Army’s Land WarfareStudies Centre, Duntroon); “‘A VigorousOffensive’: Core Aspects of AustralianMaritime Defence Concerns Before 1914” (DrPeter Overlack, St Edmond’s College); “‘Defendthe North’: Commander Thring, CaptainHuges-Onslow and the Beginnings ofAustralian Naval Strategic Thought” (Dr DavidStevens, Director of the Naval HistoricalStudies, RAN); and “A Fleet not a Navy: SomeThoughts on the Themes” (Captain JamesGoldrick, Director General, Maritime StudiesProgram, RAN).Southern Trident is nicely presented in ahardbound format with dust jacket suitable forany library collection. It is profuse withillustrations, maps and statistical lists. Thereare look-up tables for contents, abbreviations,and illustrations in addition to the book’scomprehensive endnotes and subject index.This book will not only be of great interest tostudents of naval history but will be attractiveto professionals concerned with international63

64AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001and strategic issues. It is a book that will findan audience with the general reader as well asacademics and policy makers interested inAustralian defence issues. Recommended.RUNNING THE GAUNTLET,by Alister SatchellReviewed by Major J.E CottonI found this afascinating book.Alister Satchell tellsthe story of hisexperiences as aRoyal AustralianNavy Cipher officeraboard the Cunardliner Aquitaniaduring her service asa troop-ship during World War II. WhileSatchell’s appointment to the ship appeared tohave been lost by senior naval HQ, resulting inSatchell serving without any extended leave,his was not the most onerous service of WorldWar II. The ship sailed between wartime Britainand the United States of America, so not onlydid Satchell spend considerable time enjoyingthe pleasures of wartime New York, he wasaccommodated in one of the Aquitania’s plushstaterooms while at sea. There is no doubtthough, that while Satchell’s service was attimes enjoyable, it was also most dangerousand highly important.The Aquitania sailed mostly betweenScotland and New York, along with fellowCunard liners Queen Mary and QueenElizabeth. These ships were sent through themiddle of the Battle of the Atlantic beingwaged between any number of German UBoats, the Allied warships and aircraft seekingthem out and the merchant ships trying toavoid being sunk. That this was a brutal andcostly battle is evidenced by the Britishmerchant marine having much the highest lossrate of any other British service during WorldWar II, approximately 35,000 men died out of150,000 who served, a chance of death ofalmost one in four. Into this the Aquitania, andour author, sailed repeatedly and invariablyunescorted.The service provided by these and othertroop ships was vital to the war effort. WinstonChurchill said their contribution “shortened thewar in Europe by twelve months”. The threeCunard ships are estimated to have carried1,443, 538 troops to the war effort with theQueens carrying up to 16,000 on each trip andthe smaller Aquitania carrying up to8,000. The sinking of any of these ships wouldhave been a major victory by the German UBoat Service, a huge blow to the Allies and oneof the most significant military disasters inhistory.The intelligence war waged against theU Boat threat continued throughout the conflict.Planners assessed the best chance for thesetroopships was not in slower moving convoys –despite the statistic that 70 per cent of all shipslost to U Boats were outside convoy protection -but travelling at high speed and being veeredaway from Uboat concentrations by intelligenceexperts in Britain. That these experts were usinginformation gathered from highly securesources, such as decoding the German Ultradevices, meant that messages to change coursewere invariably encoded. Satchell’s job was todecode these messages to ensure the Aquitaniaavoided disaster. Satchell performed his dutiesfrom his appointment in March 1943 (at theheight of Allied shipping loses to U Boats) to theend of the war, without missing a single sailingof his ship.This book is very well written and supportedby a significant photographic record. It accountsfor the vital element of the war effort providedby the Cunard ships, it provides significantdetail of the Battle of the Atlantic and afascinating portrayal of the unusual but vitaland dangerous war service of an AustralianMariner.

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