ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 15concentrate quickly. There should be a wideHuman Intelligence network amongst thecivilian population providing support for thepatrols. Aviation, cavalry observation posts andother remote sensors complement these twosystems. Technology may eventually providereliable non-line-of-sight sensors to supplementthis surveillance and reconnaissance web. Inopen country, satellites, aviation, SAR and otherstand-off detection systems provide highprobabilities of detection, are able to support thecavalry-based patrols and can cue precision firesor mounted responses.Conclusion (U)Knowledge warfare, information operations,the knowledge edge and any other term for theuse of information and sensor technologies isseen as an essential aspect of gaining a decisiveadvantage in future operations. It is prudent toassume that the enemy knows this as well as wedo, that they are intelligent and will determineweaknesses in these concepts and will adapt,deceive and exploit these weaknesses. Theenemy is aided in these aims through thepassive compliance and complexity of thephysical environment in Australia and ourregion. They are further assisted if Australiadecides to “project our influence” into theregion. The overall effect of these conclusions isthat land forces, more so than air or naval, mustbe prepared to operate in an environment ofgreat uncertainty against an adaptable enemy.This requires an ability to construct a deployableforce of many complementary capabilities thatcover each other’s weaknesses, and provides theenemy with a “multi-horned dilemma” todefeat. The key tenets of force structuringshould be flexibility and the by-word ofoperational planning should be synchronisation.The real benefits of the knowledge edge in theland environment may be an enhanced abilityfor the commander to coordinate many differentcapabilities into a single cohesive team that canpre-empt and dislocate the enemy.The first aim of the knowledge edge shouldbe to reduce friction through friendly situationalawareness and increase the synchronisation ofdifferent force elements while supporting thephilosophy of directive control (or morecorrectly directive command). The second aim isto train our soldiers and commanders to usetheir initiative, take risks and to be able toflexibly employ a multitude of different systemsin a synchronised force. Our force developmentshould not be based on the hope that RMAtechnologies will reduce uncertainty(particularly in respect to the enemy) in the nearterm.Acknowledgements (U)The authors wish to acknowledge theofficers and soldiers of 1st Brigade whoprovided the inspiration and material for thisarticle through their efforts during RTA Phase1. Many observations and ideas weredeveloped through lengthy conversations withmany people in many different locations; thediscussions with Brigadier Jim Wallace andMajor Tony Devine were particularlyimportant.This article is a modified version of aPlenary Session Paper presented by LieutenantColonel Dean Bowley to a Military SensingSymposium.NOTES1. Network enabled warfare is anacknowledgement that we are unlikely to beable to afford the technologies of a full networkcentric operational architecture.2. Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals ofLand Warfare, is a current capstone documentfor Army Doctrine.3. P. Dibb, “The Relevance of the KnowledgeEdge”, Australian Defence Force Journal,No. 134 January/February 1999 p. 39. See alsoM. Evans, “Conventional Deterrence in theAustralian Strategic Context”, Land WarfareStudies Centre Working Paper No. 103 p. 24.4. Manoeuvre seeks to shatter the enemy’scohesion through a series of orchestratedactions that create a turbulent and rapidlydeteriorating situation with which the enemycannot cope. Australia’s warfighting tenetstherefore describe a mindset that emphasisesboldness and decisive action.