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ong>CONSOLIDATINGong> ong>DEMOCRACYong>report on the undp technical assistance programmefor the 2004 indonesia elections>CONSOLIDATINGong>ong>DEMOCRACYong>report on the undp technical assistance programmefor the 2004 indonesia elections

AcknowledgementsPrincipal AuthorKendra CollinsPrincipal ContributorsKarla DalimunthePaul GuerinMieke KooistraLu’lu MuhammadFida NasrallahMenil PoerwatmaRudiarto SumarwonoAndrew ThornleyThis report would not have been possible without the support and valuable contributionsof the UNDP Election Programme Team.ReviewersGwi-Yeop SonIwan GunawanEditorJohn McBethDesign Concept and ProductionDesignLabPublished byUnited Nations Development Programme, IndonesiaKav. 3, Jl. M.H. Thamrin, P.O. Box 2338Jakarta 10250, Indonesia

AbbreviationsAECANFRELAPCAusAIDCAPCCEIACETROCIDACGICSOCTADPDDPRDPRD IDPRD IIEMOEUEUEOMGoIIFESINSIDEIORCITJAMPPIJICAJPPRKIPPKPPSKPULP3ESKPUDMOUMPRNDINGOAustralian Election CommissionAsian Network for Free ElectionsAdvisory Committee on ProcurementAustralian Agency for International DevelopmentContracts, Assets and Procurement CommitteeCenter for East Indonesian AffairsCentre for Electoral ReformCanadian International Development AgencyConsultative Group on IndonesiaCivil Society OrganizationChief Technical AdviserRegional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah)National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)Provincial Level National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tk.I)Regency/city Level Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tk. II)Election Monitoring OrganizationEuropean UnionEuropean Union Election Observation MissionGovernment of IndonesiaInternational Foundation for Electoral SystemsIndonesian Society for Democracy and People’s EmpowermentInternational Observer Resource CentreInformation TechnologyIndonesian People’s Network of Election Observers(Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia)Japan International Cooperation AgencyPeople’s Observers and Voter Education Network (Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Rakyat)Independent Election Observer Committee (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu)Voting Station Officials (Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara)National Election Commission of Indonesia (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information(Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial)Local Elections CommissionMemorandum of UnderstandingPeople’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)National Democratic InstituteNon Governmental Organization

PACPANWASPERFIKIPPKPPSPSAPVTTAFTITNPTPSUNEADUNDPUNDPAUNVUSAIDProject Appraisal CommitteeElection Supervisory Committee (Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan)Indonesian Mobile Film Cinema Company(Persatuan Perusahan Pertunjukan Film Keliling Indonesia)Sub-District polling staff (Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan)Kelurahan/Village polling staff (Panitia Pemungutan Suara)Public Service AnnouncementParallel Vote TabulationThe Asia FoundationTransparency InternationalNational Tally Centre (Tabulasi Nasional Pemilu)Polling Station (Tempat Pemungutan Suara)United Nations Electoral Assistance DivisionUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Department of Political AffairsUnited Nations VolunteerUnited States Agency for International Development

FOREWORDIn the year 2004, five years after the successful democratic elections in 1999, Indonesia held both legislative andpresidential elections. The legislative elections on 05 April, in which the Indonesian people elected representatives tothe DPD for the first time in addition to the DPR and provincial and district DPRDs, using a new open candidate listsystem, was considered to be the most complex set of elections ever conducted on a single day in one of the world’smost populous countries. The first and second round of the presidential elections were held respectively on 05 July and20 September, when Indonesians voted directly for a president and vice-president for the first time in their history.The holding of peaceful multiparty and presidential elections was an impressive achievement, accomplished in theface of immense logistical challenges. In the span of six months, more than 150 million people voted in three electionsin over 550,000 polling stations across the archipelago. UNDP with donor assistance provided direct support to theelectoral process in a number of areas: a training programme reaching more than 5 million pollworkers; an extensivevoter information campaign and support to civil society organizations for a more grass roots approach informing votersof the new changes to the electoral system and the process of punching the ballot correctly. Support was also givento Panwas and local monitoring groups which resulted in more complaints being recorded and a more transparentprocess. The IORC provided a forum for different monitoring groups to discuss issues and coordinate observationactivities. This report not only reflects the activities implemented through the UNDP-coordinated electoral assistanceprogramme, but the cooperation with national and international partners which was critical to ensuring a smooth andsustainable process.On behalf of UNDP, I would like to thank everyone who participated in this significant year of elections and whohelped make this programme’s contributions to the process a success: the election programme team, UNDP colleagues,our partners in the international community, and our Indonesian colleagues in government, the General ElectionsCommission, and civil society. However, the real value of these elections was the participation of the citizensthemselves, whose commitment and enthusiasm made the events truly historic.Bo AsplundResident RepresentativeUnited Nations Development ProgrammeJakarta, Indonesia

Content5 Context17 Programme Development andImplementation31 Election Management47 Voter Information Campaign59 Voter Education69 Election Monitoring andObservation83 Lessons Learned andRecommendations95 Annexes


1ContextThe 2004 elections in Indonesia were nationally and internationally recognized as a remarkable success. Three nationalelections held over a period of six months helped to institutionalise a political system in which the will of the peopleis now accepted as both a necessary and desirable prerequisite for political leadership. In doing so, the electionsrepresented a further step in the country’s convincing process of democratic consolidation, thereby providing acompelling model of how countries with an authoritarian past can make a peaceful transition to democracy.A significant first step in the transition process took place in June 1999 when 86% of Indonesians voters turned outto participate in the first truly democratic elections since 1955. The 1999 elections, which followed the resignationof President Soeharto in May 1998, set in place a process of change that went beyond the elections themselves.The national parliament began to play an active role in questioning the executive branch, which no longer was

Figure One: Political History of Indonesia at a Glance1945194919551959196019661997199819991999-200220015 April 20045 July 200420 Sept. 200420 Oct. 2004Indonesia declares independence.The Dutch recognize Indonesian independence after four years of guerrilla and other warfare.First Parliamentary Elections for House of Representatives and Constituent Assembly.President disbands Constituent Assembly as part of the return to the 1945 Constitution. Thischange marks the beginning of the period of “Guided Democracy”.President dissolves House of Representatives and then appoints people to fill both a new Houseof Representatives and the People’s Consultative Assembly.Sukarno hands over emergency powers to General Soeharto, who becomes acting president inMarch 1967 and is then appointed as president in 1968. This period marks the beginning of the“New Order”.Asian economic crisis begins; Indonesian rupiah plummets in value.Widespread protests and rioting lead to fall of President Soeharto. Former Vice-president B.J.Habibie becomes president.Free national level elections are held in Indonesia for the first time since 1955. AbdurrahmanWahid is elected by the duly inaugurated People’s Consultative Assembly.Legislators pass constitutional changes seen as a key step towards democracy, includingprovisions for Indonesian voters to be able to elect their president and vice presidentand establishing a second chamber to the national parliament, the House of RegionalRepresentatives (DPD).Parliament dismisses President Wahid over allegations of corruption and incompetence. Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri is sworn in as his replacement.Parliamentary and local elections: Golkar wins greatest share of vote, with PDI-P coming second.First-ever direct presidential elections; first round narrows field to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoand incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri.Former general Yudhoyono wins second round of presidential elections, unseating incumbentMegawati Soekarnoputri.Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla sworn in as president and vice-president respectively.

all-powerful. Television and other media becameincreasingly open and brought information as neverbefore to millions of homes. NGOs expanded theirnetworks. The police and military were separated. Aprocess of decentralization resulted in the devolvementof power to the regions. All these reforms wereemerging evidence of a new pluralism and resolve formore transparency in Indonesia.Electoral FrameworkThe 2004 elections were staged in the context ofconstitutional amendments and new electorallaws. These resulted in a greater balance of powerbetween the legislature, the executive branch andan independent judiciary.During its August 2002 session, the People’sConsultative Assembly (Majelis PermusyawaratanRakyat or MPR) approved an amendment providingfor the popular election of the president and vicepresidentbeginning in 2004. Amendments also ledto the establishment of a regional representativescouncil (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) as a secondchamber with limited oversight powers. And finallythe amendments terminated the representation of thearmed forces in parliament as of 2004. That mean the2004 elections, for the first time in Indonesian history,produced parliaments with no appointed members.With this phase of constitutional review completed inAugust 2002, consideration of the new political andelectoral laws by the legislature started in September2002. There were four core pieces of draft legislation:• the law on general elections• the law on political parties• the law on the structure and composition of staterepresentative institutions, and• the law on presidential elections.In addition, a new Constitutional Court with the powerto adjudicate disputes relating to election results wasa critical constitutional reform achieved during thisperiod. This also required implementing legislation. Thelaws were all passed between March and August 2003.Among important reforms manifested in the new lawsincluded the use of a restricted open list proportionalsystem for the National Parliament (Dewan PerwakilanRakyat or DPR) and for regional parliaments atthe provincial and kabupaten/kota levels. Moreimportantly, the laws also provided for much smaller

electoral districts than in 1999 with multi-memberdistricts of between three and 12 seats. Withindistricts, voters were able to vote for one party and,if they wanted, also one candidate from that sameparty. The participants in elections for the DPR wererequired to be from political parties, while for the newDPD candidates were required to run as individuals.The latter were elected on the basis of a “first past thepost” system, with four members being elected fromeach province. The law also sought to get more womenelected through a quota system established as a nonbindingmoral imperative for the parties.chairman and vice-chairman) replaced the previous53-member Commission, which included 48representatives from each of the political partiesstanding for election and five representatives fromthe Government. Its independence is clearly statedin the amended Constitution, while its appointmentprocess is regulated in Presidential Decree 70/2001.The KPU and the newly-created permanentprovincial and regency/city election commissions(Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah or KPUD) havemembers with terms of office of five years from thetime of their inauguration.General Elections CommissionThe General Election Commission (Komisi PemilihanUmum or KPU) was responsible for conducting the2004 elections. The new independent, permanentand non-partisan KPU of 11 members (includingIn addition to the permanent bodies, temporary subdistrictelection committees (with five members) wereappointed by the regency/city election commissionand they in turn appointed village election committees(with three members). The term of office of the subdistrictelection committees ended three months aftervoting day. The term of office of the village electioncommittees ended one month after that day.Figure Two: Number of KPU PersonnelEntityLevelElectionsApril July SeptemberPersonnelKPUNational111+ 500KPUD ProvinsiProvincial323232+ 1,500KPUD Kabupaten/KotaDistrict/City440440440+ 8,800Panitia Pemilihan KecamatanSub-district5,1105,1095,108+ 15,000(PPK)Panitia Pemungutan SuaraVillage-71,05770,669+ 210,000(PPS)Kelompok Panitia PemungutanCommunity579,901567,511565,515+ 5,000,000Suara (KPPS)

The Election Law describes the following duties andpowers to the KPU:• Planning the election;• Determining the organization of and procedures forthe election;• Coordinating, conducting and controlling all stagesof the election;• Determining which parties/candidates are eligible tocontest the election;• Determining the election date;• Determining the boundaries for the electoraldistricts and the number of MPs to be elected atnational, provincial and regency/city levels;• Determining the time period and the procedures forelection campaigns;• Determining the results of the elections andannouncing the successful election candidates atnational, provincial and regency/city levels;• Conducting an evaluation of the election andreporting on the conduct of the election; and• Having other duties and powers as stipulated by law.Dispute resolution relating to the elections, in thefirst instance, was conducted through the ElectionSupervisory Committee (Panitia Pengawas PemilihanUmum - Panwaslu), formed by the KPU.This national committee appointed provincialsupervisory committees, which in turn chosekabupaten/kota supervisory committees. Those bodiesthen appointed kecamatan supervisory committees.The national supervisory body was responsible to theKPU and lower levels were responsible to the levelof supervisory body above them, in a strict hierarchy.Supervisory committee members were drawn frompolice, prosecutors, media, higher education institutesand public figures. The national committee has ninemembers, province and regency/city committees haveseven members, and sub-district committees have fivemembers.The role of the supervisory committee is to acceptcomplaints, resolve disputes of a non-criminalnature, and pass unresolved issues to the appropriateauthorities for investigation. Citizens, accreditedobservers, contesting political parties and DPDcandidates can lodge complaints to the supervisorycommittee. The District Court is the first and finalcourt for criminal offences (as defined in the ElectionLaw) punishable by less than 18 months imprisonment.For offences punishable by more than 18 monthsimprisonment, decisions of the District Court can be10

appealed to the Supreme Court. The ConstitutionalCourt is the first and final court for disputes aboutelection result.A total of 24 political parties participated in theelections, having satisfied the following mainrequirements:The 2004 Elections• A recognized existence under Law 31/2002 onPolitical Parties;Indonesia held its 2004 legislative elections onMonday, 5 April and the first and second rounds of itsdirect presidential elections on Monday, 5 July andMonday, 20 September respectively.••A complete board of administrators in at least 2/3(two thirds) of the provinces;A complete board of administrators in at least 2/3(two thirds) of the regencies/cities in each of theprovinces.Legislative Election• A minimum of 1000 (one thousand) persons or atleast 1/1000 (one thousandth) of the total numberof residents as members in each administrativeThe parliamentary elections were hailed as the singlebiggest and most complex ever conducted on one day.area, substantiated by party membership cards;On 5 April, close to 82% of eligible voters, from anThe elections were affected by administrativeelectorate of about 150 million, cast their ballots atsetbacks in some locations, largely caused by the579,901 polling stations. They could choose betweenlogistical challenges that faced the KPU. There wasnearly 350,000 candidates competing for more thanwidespread concern that the difficulty in delivering15,000 legislative seats. The elections required thematerials would lead to delays in the conduct ofprinting and distribution of close to 650 millionseveral elections. The final result was that electionsnewspaper-sized ballots, in over 2,000 separatewere delayed in less than 2,000 polling stationselections.across the country or around 0.3% of the total.Figure Three: Number of Polling Stations, Electorate and Actual VotersLegislative ElectionNumber of Polling Stations (SK KPU 23/2004)Number of Actual Voters (No. 44/SK/KPU/2004)579.901124.449.038First Round of Presidential ElectionNumber of Polling Stations (SK KPU 39/2004)Number of Actual Voter (No. 79/SK/KPU/2004)574.945121.292.844Second Round of Presidential ElectionNumber of Polling Stations (actual, 98/SK/KPU/2004)Number of Actual Voter (No. 79/SK/KPU/2004)565.515116.662.70511

Figure Four: Results of Legislative ElectionsNoParty Votes %Seats2004%Seats1999%1Marhaenisme Indonesian National906,7390.8010.180.00Party (Partai Nasional IndonesiaMarhaenisme)2Social Democratic Labor Party634,5150.5600.000.00(Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat)3Crescent Star Party2,965,0402.62112.00132.84(Partai Bulan Bintang)4Freedom Party (Partai Merdeka)839,7050.7400.000.005United Development Party9,226,4448.165810.555812.66(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)6United Democratic Nationhood1,310,2071.1640.730.00Party (Partai Persatuan DemokrasiKebangsaan)7New Indonesia Alliance Party669,8350.5900.000.00(Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru)8Freedom Bull National Party (Partai1,228,4971.0900.000.00Nasional Banteng Kemeerdekaan)9Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)8,437,8687.465510.000.0010Indonesian Justice and Unity Party1,420,0851.2610.1840.87(Partai Keadilan dan PersatuanIndonesia)11Indonesian Democratic Vanguard844,4800.7510.1820.44Party (Partai Penegak DemokrasiIndonesia)12Indonesian Nahdlatul Community890,9800.7900.0051.09Party (Partai Persatuan NahdlatulUmmah)12

NoParty Votes %Seats2004%Seats1999%13National Mandate Party7,255,3316.41539.64347.42(Partai Amanat Nasional)14Concern for the Nation Functional2,394,6512.1220.360.00Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa)15National Awakening Party12,002,88510.61529.455111.14(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)16Prosperous Justice Party8,149,4577.20458.1871.53(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera )17Reform Star Party2,944,5292.60142.550.00(Partai Bintang Reformasi – PBR)18Indonesian Democratic Party of20,710,00618.3110919.8215132.97Struggle (Partai Demokrasi IndonesiaPerjuangan)19Prosperous Peace Party2,424,3192.14132.360.00(Partai Damai Sejahtera)20Golkar Party24,461,10421.6212823.2711825.76(Partai Golongan Karya)21Pancasila Patriot’s Party1,178,7381.0400.000.00(Partai Patriot Pancasila)22Indonesian Unity Party677,2590.6000.0030.66(Partai Serikat Indonesia)23Regional United Party656,4730.5800.000.00(Partai Persatuan Daerah)24Pioneer’s Party (Partai Pelopor)896,6030.7930.550.000.00122.62Total113,125,750100.00550100.00458100.00KPU Decree N0/44/SK/KPU/200413

Presidential ElectionsThe results determined which parties, or coalitions ofparties, could nominate candidates for the presidentialelection in July. Under Law 23/2003 on Presidential/Vice Presidential Elections, parties or coalitions ofparties, can only nominate candidates if they obtain15% of seats in the DPR or 20% of the national votesfor the DPR. However, there was a specific clauseapplying only to the 2004 presidential election whichlowered the threshold for party nominations to 3% ofthe seats in the DPR or 5% of the national votes forthe DPR.Based on that provision, five pairs of candidates wereparticipated in the first round of the first-ever directpresidential election in Indonesia. The candidates were:1. Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid (nominated by theGolkar Party)2. Megawati Soekarnoputri and Ahmad HasyimMuzadi (nominated by the Indonesian DemocraticParty of Struggle - PDI-P)3. Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo (nominatedby the National Mandate Party - PAN)4. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad JusufKalla (nominated by the Democrat Party)5. Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar (nominated bythe United Development Party - PPP)There were two additional parties that attainedthe threshold for fielding candidates: the NationalAwakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous JusticeParty (PKS). The PKB candidate, Abdurrahman Wahid,was declared medically unfit to contest the presidentialelection, based on the requirement in the law thatcandidates must be “physically and mentally able toperform their duties and obligations as the presidentand vice-president”. PKS stated that it wanted toremain a significant opposition party in Parliament andtherefore did not field a candidate.The first round of election took place on 5 July, 2004,with 121,292,844 of the 155,048,803 registered voterscasting their ballots in 574,945 polling stations acrossthe country. The elections were peaceful and many ofthe logistical problems faced in the legislative electionshad been largely overcome. The only issue to mar onthe elections was the estimated 40 million voters whorendered their votes invalid by mistakenly punching the14

allot paper twice. The Elections Commission quicklyrectified this oversight, issuing a decree that declaredthe double-punched ballots valid.As no candidate received more than 50% of the votesin the first round of the presidential election, the twocandidate pairs who received the highest and thesecond highest number of votes contested a seconddirect election for president and vice-president. Thetwo pairs of candidates were:1. Megawati Soekarnoputri and Ahmad HasyimMuzadi2. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad JusufKallaThe second round of the presidential election was heldon 20 September, 2004. Of a total of 153,312,436eligible voters, 116,662,705 (76%) cast ballots in oneof the 567,511 polling stations. The election was onceagain peaceful with no significant incidents beingreported.Figure Five: Results of First Round of Presidential ElectionNo Candidate PairVotes Obtained % of Votes1Wiranto and Solahuddin ‘Gus Solah’ Wahid26,286,78822.152Megawati Sukarnoputri and31,569,10426.61Hasyim Muzadi3Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo17,392,93114.664Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and39,838,18433.57Jusuf Kalla5Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar3,569,8613.00Total Valid Votes118,656,868Total Invalid Votes2,636,976Total Votes Cast121,293,844KPU Decree No. 79/SK/KPU/200415

Figure Six: Results of Second Round of Presidential ElectionNo Candidate PairVotes Obtained % of Votes1Megawati Sukarnoputri and44,990,70439.38Hasyim Muzadi2Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and69,266,35060.62Jusuf KallaTotal Valid Votes114,257,054Total Votes Cast116,662,705KPU Decree No. 98/SK/KPU/2004On 20 October, 2004, retired general Susilo BambangYudhoyono was sworn in as Indonesia’s sixth president,together with his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, who wassworn in as the vice-president. As vast and compli-cated as the 2004 elections were, they were a remarkablesuccess and represented an historic victory forIndonesian democracy.16

2Programme Developmentand Implementation17

2Programme Developmentand ImplementationProgramme DevelopmentFor the 1999 General Elections, the UNDP was responsible for mobilizing and coordinating foreign financial andtechnical assistance amounting to close to US$90 million, of which US$60 million was channeled directly through theUNDP, representing the largest-ever support programme to a nationally-run election.In September 2002, the Government of Indonesia (GoI), through the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs,again formally requested the UNDP to coordinate international assistance for the 2004 Elections 1 . In accordancewith the standard pre-requisite to the United Nations (UN) providing electoral assistance to any member state, the1 See Annex One18

UN Elections Assistance Division of the Departmentof Political Affairs undertook a Needs AssessmentMission to Indonesia in December 2002. The missionrecommended a positive response, noting (1) theappropriateness of UN assistance, based on thesupport of the main stakeholders to UN involvementand potentially positive impact and (2) the necessityfor international support given the current capacitiesof the main stakeholders and the importance ofthe upcoming elections. This recommendation wasapproved by the UN Focal Point for Elections in NewYork and was formally communicated to the GoI.A memorandum of understanding reflecting thisagreement was subsequently signed between theGoI and UNDP on 25 April 2003 2 . The memorandumoutlined the following:1. That the UNDP will assist the IndonesianGovernment in organizing the 2004 elections.2. That external assistance will be based on theconsent, request, priorities and relevant laws of theRepublic of Indonesia.3. That all foreign technical assistance for theelectoral process will be coordinated through,and/or channeled by the UNDP.Based on this, the UNDP, working in close cooperationwith the KPU and the GoI, drafted a programmedocument “Support to the elections”. A key principleof the programme strategy was the recognition thatthe conduct of the elections was within the domainof the internal affairs of Indonesia: the 2004 Electionswere to be run by newly-established independentelectoral commissions at the national and sub-nationallevels. Core activities of the KPU were expected to beprimarily funded by the state budget and assistancethrough this programme, largely focused on strategictechnical inputs. Funding was also to be channeledto civil society organisations (CSOs) who would beactively involved in the electoral processes.Accordingly, the programme activities not onlyrelated to the short-term objective of conductingsuccessful legislative and presidential elections,but also to the longer-term objective of building asustainable institutional capacity within relevantinstitutions to ensure successful future elections.Activities were grouped into four main categories:1. Providing technical support to the KPU and KPUDsto assist in the management and implementationof the elections. This included supporting theKPU in providing training to staff within the KPUand KPUDs to help build long-term institutionalcapacity.2. Supporting the KPU in conducting voterinformation campaigns and supporting votereducation activities in close collaboration with theCSOs to ensure not only the availability of factualorientation regarding voting procedures, but alsoto convey to the public the value of voting and theright of individuals to vote according to their ownconvictions.3. Supporting KPU-accredited CSOs in monitoringthe election process and the elections themselvesto establish an integrity safeguard, discouragefraud, intimidation and violence and reinforce thelegitimacy of the final result.4. Providing support for the coordination andmanagement of international resources to theelection process, including the facilitation ofinternational observers.Although the programme provided support tonational election monitors and facilitated support tointernational observers, the UNDP was not engagedin the substantive task of passing judgment on theconduct of the elections.The programme was approved on 17 June, 2003 andwas given the number INS/03/A11. UNDP funding for1 See Annex One19

the programme was channeled through INS/03/011 andSwedish funding was channeled through INS/03/U11.ministers and ambassadors. These would be chairedand convened by KPU and/or the GoI.Donor CoordinationThe MOU and the approved programme document gavethe UNDP the mandate to coordinate all internationalassistance to the election process. The documentincluded activities related to “supporting meetingsbetween the KPU, the Government and donors atvarious levels for effective and timely coordinationof activities”. The overall aim of the coordination wasto establish mechanisms to help ensure that donorassistance was consistent in meeting the prioritiesof the Election Commission in administering theelections. This unity of priorities was important for thefollowing reasons:• to optimize the efficient use of resources• to reduce or eliminate double allocations of fundsto projects and initiatives• to minimize potential conflicts of interest amongdonors and other electoral stakeholdersAt the first meeting of donors on 17 January, 2003, theparticipants agreed on three different mechanisms fordonor coordination.1. KPU/GoI/donor subject working groups focusingon specific areas of assistance. These meetingswould be convened and chaired by the KPU and/orGoI (with UNDP assistance as required);2. Donor coordination group meetings that wouldbe chaired by the UNDP and to which the GoI,the KPU and all donors, regardless of their levelof involvement, would be invited. These would beconvened on a bi-monthly or quarterly basis toensure a broad level of information sharing on theelection; and3. High-level policy consultations, as needed,which would involve participation at the level ofNo high level policy consultations were convenedduring the implementation period of the programme,due to the fact that no critical issues arose among thedonors which required the involvement or interventionof high-level actors.The donor coordination meetings were held regularly,on 17 January, 16 April, 30 July, and 20 October in2003 and on 28 January, 14 May, and 13 Octoberin 2004. The meetings were chaired jointly by theCoordinating Ministry of Economy and the UNDP.The main purpose of the meetings was to shareinformation on a broad level. The principal agendaitem for each of the sessions was a briefing by thechairmain of the Election Commission, giving donorsan update on the progress of election preparations.Also featured as a regular agenda item was an updateon the UNDP Elections Programme by the nationalprogramme director, who also concurrently the deputysecretary general of the KPU, as well as updatesfrom other donors implementing funds on a bilateralbasis. Finally, the meetings provided a forum forpresentations from invited guests on a range of issuesrelating to the election process.The subject working group meetings were themost useful means of ensuring a harmonization ofdonor-supported activities and minimizing conflictsof interest. These meetings brought together theKPU with those donors directly providing supportfor specific activities. While the UNDP representedthose donors contributing funds through the UNDPTrust Fund, other participating donors included thePartnership for Governance Reform, USAID (togetherwith its implementing partners), JICA and AusAID. Thefollowing are some of the working groups established:20

• Training: A committee on training was established,chaired by a member of the KPU and involvingUNDP, AEC, JICA, and IFES. One overall trainingstrategy was developed and approved by thiscommittee into which each donor, as well as theKPU, provided specific and coordinated inputs.This greatly contributed to the effectiveness of thefunds available for training and eased the pressureon the KPU in trying to manage the various donorinputs.• Voter Information and Education: This meetinginvolved the key donors working in the voterinformation and education field, specifically USAID,JICA, UNDP and the Partnership for GovernanceReform. While the KPU did not participate in themeetings on a regular basis, the outputs of themeeting were continuously shared with the KPU.The main objective of the meetings was to ensurecoordination on priority information messages,as well as coordination on CSO approaches andgeographic coverage. A common database ofCSOs was established, including informationon the proposals they had submitted, to whichdonor agency they had been submitted, the timeat which they were submitted, and the budget.This mechanism helped to prevent double ormultiple funding of the same programmes and toensure that no geographic area in Indonesia wasneglected and marginalized.• Monitoring: The purpose of these meetingswas to encourage sharing of deployment plansand the development of common reportingformats. Participants included those donorsproviding support to monitoring activities (TheAsia Foundation, Partnership for GovernanceReform, UNDP), as well as the recipients of thesupport (JAMPPI, JPPR, CETRO and Forum Rektor).Collaboration with the Election Supervisory Body(Panwaslu) was encouraged by inviting Panwaslumembers to join the meetings at regular intervals.This resulted in the signing of a memorandum ofunderstanding between the monitoring agenciesand the Panwaslu, to clarify mutually supportingroles and responsibilities.In addition to this, and to ensure that donors andother partners were continually kept informed aboutprogrammes activities, a regular newsletter wasproduced electronically, and shared with all donors,as well as being posted on the UNDP Website ( These newsletters,together with the donor meetings, helped toensure transparency and accountability of donorfunding, making donors aware at all stages of theprogramme implementation of ongoing activities anddevelopments.Finally, donor coordination also took place in relationto a number of specific activities. Examples includedcollaboration between the KPU, UNDP and IFESon the establishment of the National Tally Centre,collaboration between UNDP, NDI and local civilsociety organisations on the post-election “quickcount” and collaboration between the UNDP, IFES, NDI,and TAF on the establishment of the IORC to assistinternational observer.Programme FundingAt the first Donor Meeting on 17 January, 2003, UNDPpresented a number of options for programme fundingto interested donors. These included (a) cost-sharingfor projected assistance, (b) in-kind assistance, or (c) adedicated trust fund for contributions.Following consultations with the main donors, it wasagreed that the most appropriate funding mechanismfor the programme would be the establishment of atrust fund. The reasons for this were the confidenceand acceptance that donors had gained in the useof the UNDP trust fund mechanism. The trust fund21

allowed for the easy pooling of resources in an openand transparent manner for all donors, while alsoallowing the possibility of earmarking funds forspecific activities. It also ensured that administrativecosts were kept at a minimum for donors, while alsoincorporating established accounting and auditingprocedures, making it fully transparent to both donorsand beneficiaries. The trust fund was established byUNDP New York on 7 July, 2003 3.strategy. Also as a result, two additional projectdocuments had to be developed to incorporateEU activities: INS/03/A14 (Support to the PANWAS)and INS/03/A15 (Support to the Voters’ InformationCampaign in Indonesia: C-VICI). It also resulted in anumber of implementation difficulties, particularlyconcerning INS/03/A15.The programme document presented an indicativebudget requirement of US$32 million. This was basedon the estimated cost of activities as presented inthe programme document and agreed on by the KPUand GoI. Discussions with donors concerning resourcemobilization had been initiated in a first donor meetingin January 2003. Once completed, donors were all senta copy of the draft programme document with thedetailed budget in April 2003. The document was alsopresented to the donor coordination group meetingheld on 16 April, 2003.Figure Seven: List of ContributionsA number of donors pledged funding to the programmefollowing this initial call for funds. The first donoragreement to be signed was from the UnitedKingdom on 21 August, 2003. This was followed beagreements signed with Australia and Sweden. The firstcontributions entered the trust fund in October 2003The funding received from the European Unionfollowed a different mechanism. Prior to finalizingits contribution to the programme, the EuropeanUnion conducted its own programme developmentmission, which resulted in the drafting of acontribution agreement. The activities as outlinedin the agreement were not fully consistent withthe activities and management set-up as indicatedin the UNDP programme document and requireda number of amendments to the programmeDonorAustraliaCanadaEuropean UnionFinlandNetherlandsNew ZealandNorwaySwedenSwitzerlandUnited KingdomUNDPRepublic of KoreaContributionsAUD 9,000,000CAD 5,000,000EUR 7,000,000EUR 100,000USD 8,184 ,352NZD 650,000NOK 3,500,000SEK 16,000,000USD 50,000GBP 1,500,000USD 1,51 7,000USD 50,000 (in kind)3 See Annex Three22

Figure Eight: Breakdown of Funds Committed/ReceivedDonorIn originalcurrencyCommitmentsUS DollarequivalentAmountreceivedFundsreceivedAustraliaAUD 8,000,000USD 5,532,000USD 5,532,00020-Oct-03AUD 1,000,000USD 702,800USD 702,80018-May-04USD 6,234,800CanadaCAD 5,000,000USD 3,888,775USD 3,888,77523-Dec-03European UnionEUR 5,500,000USD 6,707,317USD 6,707,31718-Mar-04EUR 1,500,000USD 1,829,268USD 8,536,585FinlandEUR 100,000USD 124,720USD 124,7202-Jan-04NetherlandsUSD 2,074,420USD 2,074,375USD 1,340,00012-Dec-03USD 734,42021-Jul-04USD 3,330,000USD 3,329,955USD 3,329,9556-May-04USD 1,113,355USD 1,113,355EUR 1,500,000USD 1,666,667USD 2,779,9777-Oct-04USD 8,184,352New ZealandNZD 150,000USD 100,853USD 100,8534-Feb-04NZD 500,000USD 314,200USD 314,20027-Apr-04USD 415,053NorwayNOK 500,000USD 74,621USD 74,6219-Dec-03NOK 3,000,000USD 442,089USD 297,58122-Dec-03USD 516,710USD 144,50826-Apr-04SwedenSEK 8,000,000USD 942,285USD 942,2851-Oct-03SEK 8,000,000USD 1,085,482USD 1,085,4821-Feb-04USD 2,027,767SwitzerlandUSD 50,000USD 49,980USD 49,98021-May-04United KingdomGBP 1,000,000USD 1,776,199USD 829,1877-Oct-03GBP 500,000USD 829,187USD 1,776,19914-May-04USD 2,605,386UNDPUSD 1,517,000USD 1,217,000USD 1,217,00018-Nov-03USD 300,000USD 300,00021-Jun-04Total AmountUSD 34,101,128USD 32,271,85923

Figure Nine: Breakdown of Use of FundsBudget($)Expenditure / Commitment($)Personnel1,099,8871,055,473Office cost475,241345,084Media Centre1,023,0631,022,964KPU Information Campaign6,980,0026,995,659KPU Training Material3,676,4463,721,694KPU Training Activities2,246,4462,269,596Vote Tally Centre971,397979,228Voter Education6,833,9886,805,155C-VICI3,577,2932,993,237Election Monitoring4,132,7014,059,879Evaluation & Audit450,511296,033PANWAS Training2,181,9591,983,408EU Visibility Campaign452,195415,280Total34,101,12832,942,689A total of US$26.6 million was mobilized by the UNDPfor the legislative elections held on 5 April, 2004.A further US$7.5 million was set aside for the tworounds of the presidential election, following a secondformal request for funds issued by the IndonesianGovernment and the UNDP on 8 December, 2003. Thefinal funding for the programme therefore totaledUS$34.1 million. Of this, almost US$33 million or 97%was expended and/or committed as of 31 December,2004.24

A number of donors earmarked funds for theprogramme, based on their own country priorities andwork plans, as follows:• Australia: committed, under the first contributionagreement, a total of A$8 million, of which A$2million was enmarked for training programmes,A$3 million for voter information and educationand A$3 million for election monitoring. Thesecond contribution of A$1 million was nonearmarked.• Canada: committed a total of C$5 million, all ofwhich was earmarked for voter education, witha focus on women, first-time voters and conflictareas.• Netherlands: committed US$2,074,420 under thefirst contribution agreement, which was earmarkedfor personnel, audit, and international contracts.However, following the submission of the midtermreport to the Netherlands Embassy, a total ofUSD 809,534 of previously earmarked funding waschanged to non-earmarked funding, at the requestof the UNDP. The Netherlands made two furthercontributions for the first and second rounds of thepresidential election totaling US$6,109,977, bothof which were non-earmarked.• European Union: Committed a total of Euros7million, which was earmarked for KPU trainingmaterials, PANWAS training, support to C-VICI, EUvisibility activities and operational costs.• Switzerland: committed US$50,000, all of whichwas earmarked for voter education activities.The United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Finland, andNew Zealand did not earmark funds. While all of thelisted contributions were in cash, South Korea madea contribution in kind of 93 fax machines, valued at$50,0000, which were provided to the KPU for theelection preparations.Figure Ten: Breakdown of ExpendituresPersonel (3%)Office Cost (1%)Media Centre (3%)KPU Information Campaign(21%)KPU Training Materials(11%)KPU Training Activities (7%)Vote Tally Centre (3%)Voter Education (21%)C-VICI (9%)Election Monitoring (12%)Evaluation and Audit (1%)Panwas Training (6%)EU Visibility Campaign (1%)25

Programme ManagementThe programme was nationally executed throughthe Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs. Allactivities under INS/03/A11 were implemented bythe General Elections Commission, as stated in theprogramme document. The Government establishedan inter-departmental working group, chaired by thecoordinating ministry and members from Ministry ofForeign Affairs, State Secretariat, Ministry of Finance,the National Planning Board (Bappenas) and the KPU.The working group acted as an advisory body to thecoordinating ministry in the conduct of its duties asexecuting agency of this programme.A letter of Aagreement between the UNDP and the KPUwas signed in May 2003. 4 The agreement specifiedthat the UNDP was willing to provide support servicesfor assistance, based on a request from the KPU, forthe following activities of the programme:1. Identification and/or recruitment of projectpersonnel and technical expertise2. Procurement of services of contractors toundertake agreed activities3. Procurement of goods related to agreed activities4. Disbursement of other expenditures associatedwith project-related activitiesThe project documents supporting EU-funded activitieswere also executed by the economic coordinatingministry, but were assigned different implementingpartners. INS/03/A14 - Support to the PANWAS wasimplemented directly by the PANWAS and INS/03/A15 - support to the Voter Information Campaignin Indonesia was implemented by the Consortiumfor Voters’ Information Campaign in Indonesia. TheGovernment established a committee, consisting ofthe Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,State Secretariat, and the National Planning Boardand chaired by the Coordinating Ministry for EconomicAffairs. This committee was tasked with feeding inputsto the executing agency on the reports and proposalssubmitted by the implementing agencies. The KPUwas also frequently asked to provide technical inputs,especially for activities relating to the KPU bodies.Under the overall direction of the national programmedirector and the management of the programmeadviser/manager, the programme opened a numberof different offices to ensure the most responsiveand practical mechanism possible. While the idealsituation would have been to have the majority of stafflocated at the KPU, this was not possible due to thelimited space available. As a result, only those staffrelated to the training component of the programmewere based permanently at the KPU, in an office thataccommodated a total of four persons.The main programme office was established at theSurya Building, in close proximity to the main UNDPoffice. This was deemed necessary due to the factthat the letter of agreement signed with the KPUmeant that UNDP had the main implementing role.This therefore required very close and regular contactbetween the programme administration and theUNDP’s administration, to ensure a fast and efficientimplementation of KPU decisions. A total of 22 staffmembers were stationed at the main programmeoffice, including the programme adviser/manager.In addition, an office was established at Panwasheadquarter, located in the Aspac Building. ThePanwas team consisted of five full-time staff as wellas a number of shorter-term consultants, and wasresponsible for supporting the implementation of thePanwas training component, for which the Panwasitself acted as implementing agent. Finally, one3 See Annex Four26

staff member was also posted in the offices of theCoordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs to assist inits function as executing agency.Forty staffers were employed throughout the durationof the programme. Of these, 10 were internationalstaff who were recruited under ALD (Appointment forActivities of Limited Duration), SSA (Special ServiceAgreement) and UNV (United Nations Volunteer)contracts for the following position: programmeadviser, training advisers, voter education adviser,communication advisers, evaluation adviser, monitoringofficers, and information officer.The other 30 were national staff members (12 personsat professional level and 18 persons at administrativelevel). They were contracted under Service Contractsand SSA contracts for the following positions:programme officer, media advisers, poll worker trainingofficer, manager for International Observer ResourcesCenter, website manager, finance officer, graphicdesign officer, procurement expert, grant assistants,finance assistants, translator, contract assistant,secretary, and driver.All recruitments, at the request of the KPU, followedUNDP rules and regulations concerning personnel andall contracts were based on UNDP standard termsand conditions. Selection of staff followed opencompetitive processes, and involved the KPU in theselection process of all senior staff. For the recruitmentof administrative staff, the KPU generally requested theUNDP conduct the selection process, while forwardingthe decision to the KPU for endorsement.Figure Eleven: List of Staff PositionsProgramme AdviserVoter Education AdviserCommunication AdviserVoter Education &Information AdviserMonitoring Officersfor Programme GranteesFinance AssistantsGrant AssistantsElectoral AdviserSecretariesTraining AdvisersMedia AdvisersPoll Worker Training OfficerProgramme OfficerContract / PersonnelAssistantIT Programme StaffDriversOffice BoysCommunication Adviserfor IORCManager for IORCTranslatorWebsite ManagerFinance OfficerAdmin. AssistantsEditorong>Reportong>ers27

As with staffing matters, the majority of otherwork implementation was also managed by theprogramme directly, based on discussions andapprovals from the KPU. This included the contractingof all private suppliers and service providers, as wellas the contracting of all grantees conducting bothvoter education and election monitoring activities.All contracting processes were conducted in closecoordination with the UNDP administration and weresubject to UNDP rules and procedures. Notably, suchprocedures require the review of all contracts valued atover US$30,000 by an internal contracts, procurementand assets committee (CAPC), and the subsequentreview of all contracts valued at over US$1 million bythe Advisory Committee on Procurement (ACP) basedin New York. In the majority of cases, this processworked smoothly and efficiently, responding well to thetight deadlines imposed by the impending elections.However, there were some notable exceptions.The first was the contracting of all grantees under theUNDP programme, which represented a substantialportion of the programme’s resources. Whileproposals were formally solicited through a “requestfor proposals”, posted on the website and widelydistributed, the activities called for were varied inscope and general in terms of geographic location. Thiswas a specific strategy of the KPU and the programmeto ensure space for local ideas and initiatives arisingfrom to the direct needs of communities. It resulted inproposals varying from nationwide media activities tomuch more localised face-to-face education activities.All were evaluated according to the criteria laid out inthe “request for proposals” and their coherence withthe KPU’s own needs and priorities. Proposal budgetswere evaluated based on standard cost scales preparedby the programme and approved by the contracts determined by a waiver of competitivebidding. Spesific UNDP regulations on waivers meantthat any grant over US$30,000 had to be sent toNew York for approval. Since New York cannot acceptdocuments in bahasa Indonesia, this also meant thatlarge amounts of documentation -including legalpapers- had to be translated from bahasa Indonesiato English prior to being sent to New York. WhileUNDP headquarters made much-appreciated efforts toapprove these contracts on a fast-track process, thevarious additional steps involved led to many delaysin the contracting of grantees and disruptions to theirapproved work plans.The second notable exception to the generally smoothimplementation process was the methods involvedin extending and amending contracts. Due to theslow and sometimes uncertain commitment andreceipt of donor funds, contracts had to be awardedto larger service providers on a piecemeal basis,based on available funds at the time of contracting.Despite the fact that it had been foreseen thatcontracts would be increased as more funds werereceived, each subsequent amendment was treatedby UNDP headquarters as a waiver of competitivebidding and therefore had to be sent to New York forclearance. Again, while every effort was made by NewYork to review submissions as soon as possible, theadditional steps often meant significant delays in theresponsiveness of the programme to the priorities andneeds of the election process.At the request of the KPU, all financial managementand reporting was managed by the programme,together with the UNDP administrative and financedivisions. This required that financial managementfollowed UNDP standard rules and regulations.However, given that proposals could not be evaluateddirectly in comparison to one another, UNDPheadquarters decided that they had to be treatedFor the management of grantee finances, theprogramme was required to establish its ownaccountability mechanisms, given that such28

mechanisms are not available within the UNDP. Theprogramme therefore drafted the Guidelines forGrantees which acted as the main reference for bothelection monitoring and voter education grantees fortheir financial reporting. The guidelines containedstandard operating procedures, financial reportingformats and other formats for monitoring bothactivities and finances.The grantee financial reporting formats weredesigned to ensure three key principles: (1) internalcontrol (completeness of financial administrationdocuments pursuant to standard stipulation of theUNDP Election Programme), (2) compliance to withthe programme’s finansial administration procedures,and (3) accountability (financial responsibility to theUNDP programme). The grantee financial reportingprocedures included providing proof of payments,disbursement vouchers, cash disbursement vouchers,bank reconciliations, detailed financial reports,percentage expended reports and advance requests ifrelevant.With the election monitoring and voter educationgrantees spread through most of Indonesia’s provinces,it made sense for the UNDP Election Programme togive financial report training to all grantees by bringingthem to Jakarta for two-day training sessions. All newgrantees received training. Grantees having problemsin reporting were invited to repeat sessions. Thetraining gave the grantees an understanding on thefinancial reporting process, answered questions andproblems associated with the preparation of financialreports, and ensured financial report standardizationfor all grantees, without exception. During the projectimplementation, four training sessions were organised.Final Evaluation and AuditAs was stated in the programme document, anindependent and external evaluation and audit wasrequired.Based on agreements with the Dutch Government, inaddition to an end-of-programme audit, a mid-termaudit was conducted in May 2004. The audit wasundertaken by the independent auditor, KAP GrantThornton. The full audit report is available from theUNDP. An end-of-programme audit was conductedin December 2004. This was conducted by theindependent auditor, KAP Paul Hadiwinata, Hidajat,Arsono & Rekan. Again the full audit report is availablefrom the UNDP.In October 2004, an independent team of four personsconducted the final evaluation, with two focusingspecifically on the EU component, according torequirements laid down in the EU agreement. Theevaluation found that “the programme was welldesigned, managed and implemented and met most ofits immediate objectives in areas where assistance wasprovided”. The full text of the evaluation is availablefrom the UNDP or alternatively can be obtainedfrom the UNDP Website (

3Election Management31

3Election ManagementThe existence of effective, transparent, adequately funded, and accountable election management bodies are criticalto ensuring elections are credible and fair. Successful elections cannot happen without appropriate preparationand planning. Electoral management essentially refers to the administrative infrastructure required to support thedemocratic process of elections which, in Indonesia, comes under the responsibility of the KPU.The UNDP programme document identified the need for technical support for the KPU as a priority objective.Specifically, the document outlined support for the national and sub-national election bodies to assist in themanagement and implementation of the elections, as well as to help the in the establishment of internal processesand procedures that were sustainable, effective and efficient. This included supporting the KPU in providing training32

to staff within the national and sub-national electioncommissions to help build long-term institutionalcapacity and establish of a training unit in the KPU toensure the sustainability of training initiatives. Otheractivities included support for the KPU’s institutionalefforts to uphold the integrity of the electoralprocess through a transparent organization of the2004 legislative and presidential elections and tomaintain a professional relationship with national andinternational media, political parties and the generalpublic.KPU Training ActivitiesThe legislative elections were considered to be thelargest, most complex set of elections ever conductedon a single day in the world. Four elections withnumerous parties and candidates were held on thatday, followed three months later by the country’s firstdirect presidential election and a further two monthsafter that by a second round of the presidentialelection. New voting procedures and forms weredeveloped in Decrees 1 and 2 (legislative), 37 and38 (presidential first round) and 45, 46 and 47(presidential second round). The challenge of thetraining programme was to ensure that more thanfive million poll workers could conduct three credibleelections in six months, based on new laws andprocedures.The UNDP training team included an internationaltraining adviser, a national poll worker training officer,a finance officer and an administrative assistant. Itsoffice was established at the KPU for the day-todayrunning of the training programme. Technicalassistance was aimed at:ultimately implementing a training programmeover three elections in six months, improving oneach one through monitoring and evaluation.Underpinning technical assistance was the ethosto work in collaboration with the KPU and increasetraining as a priority through positive results,evaluation and ownership as part of the institutionbuilding objective.UNDP training activities were conducted in closecoordination with the KPU, as well as other donoragencies, specifically IFES, AEC and JICA. Though allagencies had different levels of funding and varyingprogramme objectives, it was thought best practice tocoordinate activities, dividing tasks where necessaryand designing a single training work plan leading upto each election. In order to facilitate collaborationwith the KPU, the election commission establisheda training committee chaired by Hamid Awaludin, amember of the KPU, as a forum for donor agencies todiscuss all training issues.The training committee had representatives fromeach bureau in the KPU, as well as representativesfrom AEC, IFES, UNDP and JICA. Coordination savedthe KPU valuable time in dealing with training issueswith separate agencies. In addition to the trainingcommittee, a new training sub-division was createdin the KPU’s human resources department. These twobodies -one ad hoc and the other permanent- provideda mechanism for UNDP, IFES, AEC and JICA to providetraining assistance to the KPU and seek approval for alltraining activities.Training Work Plan• developing training strategies for managerial andoperational levels,• producing and distributing materials andA training work plan was approved by the trainingcommittee and endorsed by a plenary session of theKPU. It included the following stages:33

1. Election management training for KPU provincialand district secretariat staff.2. Operational training for sub-district and villagelevelKPU staff.3. Poll worker training.The KPU stressed that the latter two of these traininglevels should be prioritized and urged the team toconduct face-to-face training whenever possible,given the complexity of the new election system.The available budget from the donors specificallyfor training was less than US$5 million. This wouldnot have been sufficient for a fully realized cascadetraining programme reaching all five million pollworkers in the time available. However, with additionallocal government funding, in most provinces thecascade worked at least down to district level.The first two stages of the training plan were organizedcentrally, but as part of the capacity-buildingobjective, the funding and organization of trainingwere gradually decentralized and led to the formationin January 2004 of KPUD provincial training hostcommitees. The responsibility of these committees wasto organize training events, inform participants of theschedule and venue, provide refreshments, equipmentand administration, reimburse transportation costs andprepare a financial report with receipts and attendancelists. An agreement was made between the UNDP andthe KPU that funds would be sent to the KPUDs, withthe UNDP providing assistance in financial reporting.As was clearly indicated when the work plan was beingdeveloped, participants expected to be paid to attenda training session. It was agreed up front that theUNDP would not make such a payment and would onlyfund items such as transportation costs, refreshments,accommodation, materials and the venue. To paythe trainees, the KPU requested funds from thestate budget and the KPUDs sought funds from localgovernments. These incentives contributed greatly tothe attendance at the training sessions, which probablyexplains the nearly 100% turnout of trainees noted inthe survey conducted by the UNDP at the end of theprocess.Training StrategyAll KPU training activities from October 2003 to April2004 were funded and conducted jointly by the UNDP,IFES and AEC. The strategy consisted of developingtraining materials, conducting a “training of trainers”,then cascading the training from provincial tosub-district level depending on the programme.From May to September 2004, for the two roundsof the presidential election, a different approachwas adopted. The UNDP funded a national trainingprogramme, conducted by the KPU in 27 provinces.AEC and IFES targeted specific provinces which hadbeen identified by KPU as needing a more intensivetraining.The training budget and the available time and humanresources (trainers/presenters) dictated the strategy.Four implementation methods were used, ranging fromsmall workshops to public information sessions:1. Cascade workshops for provincial and districtlevels for professional development in electionmanagement or planning and logistics (preelection)2. Cascade training-PPK to train PPS to train KPPS(legislative election)3. Mass briefings at district level for PPK, PPS andKPPS chiefs (presidential rounds one and two)4. Self-instruction by reading the manual orwatching the training video on TV (all elections)Small workshops of less than 30 participants werepossible when running courses for provincial anddistrict staff, but they costly due to transportation34

and accommodation costs. As the cascade moveddown to PPK, PPS and KPPS level, the sheer number ofstaff made it difficult and unrealistic to hold smallerworkshops. As a result, the objective became totrain as many people as possible in as short a time aspossible.Training ActivitiesAn election management programme was run fromNovember to December 2003 for 32 provincial KPUmembers and 440 district KPU members. The topicsThe topics included dealing with local media, pressconferences and making statements to the Press andthe main, clear messages for socialization through themedia.For the legislative elections, UNDP, AEC and IFESjointly supported the cascade training of PPK andPPS personnelfrom March 16–28, 2004. They thenproceeded to train KPPS workers. For the first roundof the presidential elections, the UNDP supportedtraining en masse (PPK, PPS and KPPS chiefs) in 27provinces from June 24-July 2. It also produced andincluded the legal framework and the use of the lawto solve disputes, verify party candidate nominations,campaign management and deal with stakeholders.A planning and logistical training programme was runfrom December 2003 to January 2004 for 32 provincialKPU secretariat staff and 440 district KPU secretariatstaff. The topics included election planning, riskanalysis and logistical planning and tracking.A public relations training workshop was run inDecember 2003 for 32 provincial secretariat staff.distributed training materials to all provinces. AECfunded assistance in five provinces-Papua, West IrianJaya, North Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Aceh.IFES assisted training in South Sulawesi, Gorontalo,Central Kalimantan, Central Java, Lampung and NorthSumatra, with funding from the UNDP.For the second round of the presidential election, usinga similar strategy to previous elections, the UNDPsupported training en masse in 27 provinces fromSeptember 4-15, and distributed training materialsto all provinces. Two poll workers (KPPS) from each35

polling station (one million trainees), two PPS workersfrom each village (140,000 trainees) and two PPKpersonnel from each sub-district all attended atraining session held at the district level (kabupaten/kota) by the KPU. AEC funded and assisted training insix provinces-Papua, West Irian Jaya, Nusa TenggaraTimur, North Maluku, Maluku, and South East Sulawesi.IFES assisted training in Gorontalo, West Java, WestSumatra, North Sumatra, and Central Kalimantan, withfunding provided by the UNDP.Training MaterialsTraining materials were based on the KPU decrees. Inaddition, all election forms had to be designed by theKPU, based on these decrees. Decrees 1 and 2 for thelegislative elections were only approved on 23 January,2004, with the legislative elections scheduled to beheld on 5 April. Decrees 37 and 38 for the first roundof the presidential election were approved on 26 May,2004, and the additional Decrees 45, 46 and 47 forthe second round of the presidential election wereapproved on 20 August, 2004. The lead-in time wasvery short to conceptualize the training manual andvideo, as well as to draft, design, film, edit, approve,reproduce and distribute the materials.For the legislative elections, the aim was to producea training manual which would provide a legal baseand reference point for all poll workers to carry outtheir tasks. This election required different proceduresand forms from those used in 1999, reflecting thecomplexity of running four elections at the same timeand using a new system that involved an open list ofcandidates. The decree was published at the end ofJanuary, leaving only 10 weeks before election dayto create the manual, the video and other trainingmaterials. The approach adopted was to summarizerelevant aspects of the poll workers’ tasks and makethe formal language more accessible without losingthe legal meaning. Additional procedural steps,not outlined in the decree, had to be formulated tofacilitate their work. Graphics, including the layout ofthe polling station and samples of voters card, voterscards and voters list, were necessary to enhance thecomprehension and familiarity of procedures.A manual for the first round of the presidentialelection was considered important, not only todisseminate the new information and differentforms but also to correct procedures lapses from thelegislative election and improve the performance ofpoll workers. Based on assessments of observer teamsand internal feedback and evaluation, a list of issueswas drawn up which could be improved upon in thenext election. Poll workers were generally commendedon their commitment and neutrality and for running asmooth election day without any major incidents. Allobservers were impressed with the transparency of thecounting process.Some procedures which needed improvement, however,included closer checks of ink-stained fingers to preventdouble voting, the wider spacing of voting screensto ensure more secrecy, ang greater care in fillingout forms and making copies available to witnessesor for posting on result boards. As poll workers hadalready the experience of the legislative election,considerable attention was paid in the manual andvideo to improving performance and achieving moreconsistency and accuracy in implementing procedures.As a result there were more instructions on filling informs and more graphics depicting the steps to befollowed in voting and counting.Because it was not known if there would be a secondround of the presidential election until after July 5,no plans had been made for a third manual. Whena second round was announced, additional fundingprovided an opportunity to focus again on improvingperformance and consolidating the knowledge and36

experience of the poll workers. During de-briefingswith provincial trainers, it was suggested that moregraphics, more colour and a simpler text should beused. The concept was to provide a “refresher” bookletwhich, rather than simply repeating information fromthe first round, would remind poll workers of theimportance of following procedures consistently. Thebooklet had pullout task cards for each poll worker anda separate sheet to be given to witnesses explainingtheir rights.Three videos were produced, one for each election. AKPU editing committee was established to approvethe script, particularly the technical aspects and thetone. For the legislative election video, the script tooktwo weeks to develop and the production and postproductiontook a further two weeks. The stars of thefirst video were from two popular television shows-Rano Karno and Maudy from “Si Doel” and Mats Solarand Nany Wijaya from “Bajaj Bajuri”. Deddy Mizwar isanother film and TV star who presented instructionswith an air of authority on the second and third videos,and Cici Tegal, a well-known comedian, joined for theIn addition to the manual, it was agreed that a trainingvideo would be produced to broadcast on televisionas well as to use in training sessions. A 30-minutevideo was considered long enough to explain thepreparations, voting and counting procedures andforms. To achieve maximum impact, the video wasstyled on the popular sinetron, or “infotainment”format, using television celebrities. The focus of thevideo was directed as much at the voters, informingthem of what documents to bring and how to vote, asthe poll workers.last of the three videos to add a humourous touch. KPUChairman, Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin opened each videowith a speech offering encouragement to poll workersto conduct a smooth election and finally thankingthem for their commitment.Copies of the VCD were distributed to all districts withone copy per PPS/village. The video was used in manytraining sessions where equipment and electricitywere available. The video was broadcast 21 timeson 7 TV stations in the week before the legislativeelection, 14 times on seven TV stations for first round37

of the presidential and 12 times on five TV stationsfor the second round. The airing dates and times wereprovided to monitoring organizations, political parties,election committees, polling station officials.The video had the additional function of informingvoters about the process of the elections, therebyincreasing transparency. It also helped witnesses andlocal observers their tasks of assessing the voting andcounting.A complex distribution plan had to be devised to getthe training materials to all districts and sub-districts.Distribution companies were used to deliver thematerials in time for each election. For the legislativeelections, materials were delivered to provincial,district/city and sub-district levels. The idea wasfor each polling station to receive two manuals andeach village-level authority to receive a VCD. Remoteareas and areas with security issues such as Papua,Aceh and Maluku, were given priority for distribution.The training materials were also distributed to CSOsconducting both voter education and party witnesstraining and to national observer groups. Englishversions of the manual and video script were alsoprovided to international observer groups and donors.As part of its strategy, the KPU launched the trainingmaterials at the media centre a few weeks before eachelection. KPU members presented the training planand the materials. They were joined by the celebritieswhile segments of the video were shown and materialshanded out to the Press. The strategy of using thecelebrities to advertise the training materials andthe broadcast times worked well in promoting theKPU’s national training programme and resulted inpositive press reports. It was very difficult to secureprimetime slots on the popular TV stations, whichwere either booked months in advance or overpriced.Private stations tended not to give discounts, even ifthe programme was considered to be national service.According to the survey, 49% of respondents said theywatched TV in the afternoon and 35% in the eveningSCTV, RCTI, and TVRI were the most popular stations.Monitoring and EvaluationFollowing the two presidential elections, UNDP carriedout an independent evaluation of the KPU trainingprogrammes covering all three elections. This wasdone by the KPU Polling Center and involved in-depthinterviews, focus groups and a quantitative survey.38

The survey offered insights into what materials andstrategies proved to be most effective and to providerecommendations to the KPU for future programmes.Results from the survey showed that 100% of pollingstaff reported getting some form of training. Of these,68% received what they considered to be a briefing onvoting, counting of ballots and the filling in of forms.The other 32% considered what they had received tobe in-depth training. Generally the evaluation waspositive. The training was considered well-organizedand effective enough to educate polling staff in theirroles and responsibilities.The trainers were considered to have been clearenough in their instruction, supported by simulationand examples of problems. The training materialswere seen to be easy to understand. Suggestionsfor improvements from participants included: moresimulation exercises; fewer participants in eachtraining session; prioritization of administrative andtransportation issues, either first or separately, so theydon’t distract from the training; earlier announcementof training schedules; and the use of more interactivetraining techniques. However, 50% of participants saidthere was nothing to improve in the training they hadreceived.The manuals were considered a successful tool in thesmooth running of the elections, with 97% of thosesurveyed describing them as useful and 73% sayingthey didn’t need improvement. Based on feedbackand the evaluation, there were some suggestions forimprovement such as to use local printers, print morecopies, and ensure that distribution is made well aheadof training. Other ideas were to increase the font size,check that the graphics clearly represent the tasks,provide a better explanation on how to fill out theforms and to be careful not to try to cover too muchbecause it discourages poll workers from reading.Predictably, poll workers passing judgement onthe video particularly liked the famous actors,the humour, the systematic explanations abouterrors, and the animation. They also suggestedmore frequent broadcasts of the video with a clearschedule that should be better advertised, and withmore focus on troubleshooting and solving problems,briefer explanations, and an emphasis on positiveachievements rather than just the mistakes.After every election, the UNDP, IFES and AECparticipated in a debriefing of the trainers who assistedin conducting the training programme in the provinces.The trainers, as well as national and internationalobserver groups, raised several issues, regarding theperformance of poll-workers:• The need to check inked fingers more closelyand to apply ink to the voter’s finger in a moreconsistent manner;• The need to respect the secrecy of the voter’sballot, including not having poll-workers or anyoneelse behind the voting screens unless assisting adisabled voter;• The need to avoid the late opening and earlyclosing of polling stations;• The need to ensure that no political propaganda isleft near or around the polling station;• The need to count ballots according to proceduresand to fill in forms accurately; while providingcopies for witnesses and posting the electionresults.• The need to speed up the recapitulation of resultsby ensuring fewer errors in the filling out of forms.All comments relating to the performance of pollworkers were noted by the KPU and the UNDP andhelped shape each video and manual, with theintention of improving on shortcomings.39

UNDP staff also visited polling stations and completedstandard checklists related to the effectiveness ofthe training and materials for each, as well as togather information related to voter informationand education. The majority of all polling stationsmonitored by UNDP staff in each of the elections hadreceived the manual and found it useful. Almost allpoll-workers had seen the training video on television.Training Programme of the SupervisoryCommittee for General Electionsand in identifying and understanding violations andother fraudulent acts. This was therefore the focus ofthe training that was provided by the UNDP in supportof the Panwaslu. The training was funded from anearmarked contribution from the European Union, andwas implemented through a sub-project (INS/03/A14)executed by the Coordinating Ministry of Economyand implemented directly by the Panwaslu. The roleof the UNDP included offering technical expertise forthe training sessions, providing training materials andbooks, as well as administrative support.While all were striving to make sure the 2004 electionswere held in an effective, non-partisan and timelymanner, it was assumed these elections would beunder much closer scrutiny. The public, the mediaand outside observers had been rather accepting ofshortcomings in 1999, mainly because of the noveltyand the restricted time frame under which theytook place. The 2004 elections would not have thisadvantage. It was therefore important the wholeelection process would be submitted to a form ofeffective and independent supervision to guarantee itsoverall quality.Law 12/2003 on Elections, Article 122, prescribes theformation of an Election Supervisory Body (PanitiaPengawas Pemilihan or Panwaslu) at the national,provincial, regency/city and sub-district levels. ThePanwaslu, while established by the KPU, was taskedwith supervising every stage of the election, includingreceiving reports on violations of election laws, settlingdisputes where possible and forwarding findingsand reports which could not be resolved to relevantinstitutions. To do this successfully the Panwasluhad to be able to manage its own affairs withdemonstrable autonomy from the KPU.Critical to the success of Panwaslu was the capabilityand skills of Panwaslu members in managing disputes,Training ActivitiesTraining started in November 2003 and by the endof January 2004, the Panwas, with UNDP support,had completed the training of all Panwas staff at theprovincial, district, and sub-district level. The UNDPteam and Panwas decided to limit the number ofparticipants to all trainings to 30-35 people, whichtranslated into about 760 training sessions. Theparticipatory approach required a team of skilledtrainers, who were then teamed up with Panwas staffat the local level. Each participant was presentedwith a package of key materials. In developing thetraining materials, UNDP advisers looked into therecommendations from the 1999 elections. Criticismat that time included a lack of clear guidelines forthe handling of complaints and a lack of standards bywhich to evaluate complaints.The training team opted against using complex visualaides because the bulk of the training was held atsub-district level where electricity can be unreliable.The primary visual aide produced was a high-quality(thick stock) flipchart, given to each facilitator. Theseflipcharts proved popular, but at the provincial levelparticipants argued for the use of power-point. Inaddition to these materials, the Panwas produced atraining video and a manual on dispute resolution, with40

UNDP support. About 6000 copies of the video weredistributed to all provincial and district offices after itwas completed in February 2004. While the VCD wasconsidered useful at the provincial and district level,to be effective at the village level, it needed to beincorporated into the training programme, rather thanas a stand-alone training material.internet. The lack of a comprehensive public awarenessprogramme about the Panwas also restricted theability of the organization to advertise its website tothe general public. Advertisements were placed to great effect – as witnessed by the spike inhits following placement of these advertisements. Butthe cost involved was relatively high.WebsiteCase ong>Reportong>ingDeveloped with UNDP programme support, thePanwas launched its website www.panwaspemilu.orgin January 2004 and received about two million hits– an average of 70.000 a day - during the period ofthe legislative elections. The website offered a rangeof information on Panwas and the electoral complaintprocess. By allowing users to report violations on line,the general public was invited to actively participate insupervising and monitoring the elections.The website received hundreds of readers’ comments.Surveys showed 89% of respondents thought Panwaswas effective in supervising the elections and82% thought it effectively handled disputes. Moreimportantly, the website received several hundred casereports of possible violations, providing an alternativemeans for reporting possible electoral abuse.The website is the clearest example of an aspect ofthe programme that exceeded its originally-intendedoutput. The website developed a readership that wasfar in excess of original expectations and was a usefultool for provincial PANWAS offices to submit reportsand information quickly to the national office.Use of the website, however, varied widely amongPanwas offices – some provincial staff checked itseveral times a day and made regular submissions,others used it infrequently, often because there wasonly one office telephone line, limiting access to theA team of reporting staff, supported by UNDP, assistedPanwas members in compiling data on reportedviolations during the presidential election. From 15-16April, the training programme supported a workshop inJakarta for all of Panwas national members to reviewand discuss interpretations of regulations relating tothe election process, evaluate their own performance,discuss reports received during the polling andcounting process, and determine formats for finalreporting for this period. At a second workshop someweeks later, representatives from all Panwas provincialoffices completed their reporting and discussedimprovements to the reporting mechanism for thepresidential election period.UNDP considered support for case reporting to be apriority, because the time and resources invested toexplain the case reporting mechanisms at all levelsduring the national training programme depended onefficient case management in Jakarta. The staff – whoremained at the Panwas office around the clock duringthe election periods – performed an invaluable task inproviding timely and comprehensive case information.As a result, Panwas was able to provide valuableinformation at press conferences on the day of and theday following the national elections.41

National Election MonitorsAs it is impossible for the staff of Panwas to be presenteverywhere and at any given time, it had to rely onvolunteers, the general public and national electionobservers to submit reports on election violations.With the Panwas training programme was takingshape in October 2004, there were several discussionsabout promoting and intensifying cooperation withnational monitoring groups, That led to the signingof a memorandum of agreement at the nationallevel between the Panwas and several of the groups.Relations between national monitors and the Panwaswere strong at the national level, but unfortunatelythis did not translate to effective relations at theprovincial and district levels. Regrettably electionmonitors filed very few case reports with the Panwas.Monitoring and EvaluationThe UNDP programme undertook ongoing monitoringand evaluation of training courses and visited nearlyall provinces at least once during election preparations.This included attending training events, conductingin-depth interviews with Panwas members andwith other election stakeholders, poll observers inparticular. In addition, the UNDP programme financeofficer and finance assistant visited all provinces thatwere considered negligent in transmitting financialreporting and helped them complete financial reports.Trip reports were written following each field visitand results were discussed with the Panwas wheneverissues of concern arose.One of the success indicators for the Panwas was thenumber of cases of election violations reported andprocessed, which was significant. More than 900 caseswere sent to district courts, with more than 600 ofthese already decided by November 2004 (comparedto only four in the 1999 elections). Panwas alsosuccessfully mediated over 1,000 cases, but saw fewresults from the more than 12,000 administrativeviolation cases referred to the KPU for resolution. Oneof the main problems that faced Panwas was its lackof enforcement authority. It compensated for thatsomewhat by effectively using its good relations withthe Press to publicize problems, but if the Panwasmechanism is used for future elections, this is an areathat needs to be addressed.KPU Media CentreThe programme’s objectives included providingsupport to the KPU in its efforts to ensure atransparent organization of the elections and tomaintain a professional relationship with nationaland international media, political parties and thegeneral public. Programme support therefore includedthe establishment of a full-service KPU Media Centremanaged by a public relations company calledBamboedoea Communications, which won the contractin a competitive bidding process.The KPU chairman officially opened the media centreand media-monitoring unit on 29 September 2003.The centre was used by more than 100 journalistson a daily basis and had more than 500 registeredjournalists overall. Its aim was to (1) provide quick,convenient and accurate information on 2004elections to the media and public and (2) establishgood relations between the KPU and the mass media.To meet these objectives, the centre organized twosub-programmes:1. Media Monitoring and Analysis: includedmonitoring all election coverage, particularlywhere it related to the KPU. From this, the centreassisted the KPU in formulating an informationstrategy to respond to various issues as they arose.2. Press and Information: included providing42

information to the Press and public on all mattersrelated to the elections.Specific activities undertaken under each of these subprogrammesare summarized below:Media Monitoring and AnalysisKPUDs and other interested parties.f) An election information database including acompilation of all data, old and new, on the2004 elections, was made available to journaliststhrough an intranet in the KPU Media Centre.g) An election information database was copied anddistributed on CD-Rom. All regional KPUDs wereamong teh recipients.a) Daily summaries of news coverage, focusing on keyissues relating to the elections and the KPU. Thesewere distributed to all KPU Members.b) Minutes of meetings, including all KPU plenarysessions and other important gathering. Thesewere also distributed to all KPU Members.c) Analyst recommendations centered on issuesrequiring priority attention, and were providedby the media centre to KPU Members. Therecommendations included strategies on how todeal with upcoming issues.d) Daily press releases on KPU activities and electionrelatedissues were prepared and distributed to themass media. All releases were pre-approved by theKPU before distribution.e) A bi-weekly newsletter, Suara KPU, covering thework of the KPU, was distributed to the media,Press and Information Centrea) Provision of media centre services, including17 computers, one scanner, one printer, twophotocopiers, six telephones, one fax machine andfour television sets.b) SMS services, including SMSs sent to about 250recipients on a daily basis containing urgent newsabout the elections and/or the KPU.c) Fax services, including faxes sent to 137institutions also containing urgent news about theelections and/or the KPU.d) A call centre responded to calls received through afree-phone number related to the elections and/orthe KPU.e) Press conferences were organised in the media43

centre as often as required by the KPU.f) Press backgrounders were organized to provide thePress with detailed information on various events.g) Editors’ forums were organized to provide anopportunity for the KPU Members to meet withthe editors of major media concerns to build up abetter understanding about the work of the KPU.h) Press tours were frequently organized so journalistscould accompany KPU members on visits to theregions to observe election preparations.i) Journalist workshops were organized to coverdetailed issues related to election technicalities.j) Print and photo competitions were held toencourage excellence in reporting on the electionsprocess.k) Regular coffee mornings were organized andhosted by the KPU chairman. These were attendedby different groups at different times, includinguniversity deans, religious leaders, youth leaders,and political observers.l) Balloting simulation was conducted, at the requestof the KPU, to brief international and nationalobservers on the balloting process.m) Representatives of all political parties signeda “peaceful campaign” declaration prior to thelegislative elections.n) Presidential candidates signed a similar declarationprior to the first round of the presidential election.The media centre also worked with 40 civil societyorganizations to assist the KPU in distributingsocialization materials and organizing events insupport of the elections. These organizations consistedof professional institutions, such as teachers’ anddoctors’ associations, artists and celebrities, womens’organizations, religious and minority groups. Othermedia centre activities included providing assistanceto the KPU in situations during the electoral process.This proved particularly valuable when a large numberof double-punched ballots were discovered duirng thefirst presidential election. The media centre assisted incontacting all KPUDs to inform them of the subsequentdecree which validated the ballots.Despite the seeming dominance of negative news, ananalysis of overall media coverage on the electionsfrom January to September 2004, shows that 76.2%was either positive or neutral. In addition, accordingto IFES tracking surveys, the public opinion of the KPUwas largely upbeat throughout the election process,rising from 60.2% positive in January 2004 to 82.2%positive in October 2004. Of all the election-related44

news in the Press, 71.72% is estimated to have resultedfrom information received by the media throughreleases or from events at the KPU Media Centre.One of the final activities of BamboedoeaCommunications, prior to the end of its contract on31 October 2004, was the handover of the mediacentre to the KPU public relations bureau, whosestaff had been continuously involved in its activitiesand decisions, but had not been responsible for theday-to-day implementation. The handover providedan opportunity for direct training and on-the-jobtraining of the KPU staff throughout September andOctober, while gradually reducing the staff presence ofBamboedoea. On 1 November, 2004, the bureau stafftook over the management of the media centre.Bamboedoea also assisted the KPU in establishingthe KPU Election Documentation Centre within themedia centre, which is open to the media and thepublic and provides access to a wide range of archivedinformation concerning the elections. This includeselection materials (ballot boxes, ballot booths andballot papers), socialization materials (posters, videosand recordings of PSAs, leaflets and flyers), trainingmaterials (manuals and videos), political partymaterials (posters, flyers, T-shirts and PSAs) and otherrelated election resources.National Vote Tabulation CentreAs a further way of assisting the KPU in ensuringtransparency in the organization of the elections, theUNDP Programme supported the KPU in setting-upa national tally centre, the Tabulasi Nasional Pemilu(TNP). The TNP was initially established on a temporarybasis for two weeks following the 5 April legislativeelections. The TNP was set up at the Borobodur Hoteland served as a focal point for the collection anddissemination of KPU election results and provideda venue for daily presentations and discussions onelection issues for the Press.The results displayed in the tally centre were gatheredfrom the KPU’s newly-established informationtechnology system, designed to enable results to bequickly communicated to the national level, whilethe slower process of manual counting was beingconducted. The IT-gathered results could not beconsidered as the formal count, but they provided avaluable source of early information for the mediaand the public at large. The data presented at the tallycentre could be accessed using a drill down approachall the way national to individual polling stationlevel for each of the four elections-DPR, DPD, DPRDProvinsi, and DPRD Kabupaten/Kota. This on-line votecount presentation provided a significant degree oftransparency in the vote-counting process and alsoproved to be a very accurate.The Tally Centre was established and managed byan external public relations company called AAJKomunika. The company was selected following acompetitive bidding process.The TNP was officially opened on April 4, 2004, with a45

press briefing attended by 220 domestic and foreignjournalists and 75 non-media visitors. Following theopening session, press conferences were organized ona daily basis, as well as daily discussion sessions onsubjects of topical interest. A media working room wasestablished, with computers, internet access and easydownloading of election results as they were received.Based on the success of the TNP for the legislativeelections, the KPU requested support for theestablishment of a similar centre for the first andsecond rounds of the presidential elections. Thisactivity was cost-shared between the UNDP and IFES,which proved to be an effective partnership. For thefirst round of the presidential elections, the event wasagain managed directly by AAJ Komunika. However,for the second round, the event was more directlymanaged and implemented by the KPU, with technicalinput from AAJ Komunika. This was intended as acapacity-building measure and as such was highlysuccessful.KPU Debates and DialoguesFor the first time in Indonesia’s history, the KPUorganized a series of debates and dialoguesbetween the presidential candidates. Prior tothe first round of the presidential elections, thepresidential and vice-presidential candidates wereinvited to a debate, with two pairs of candidatesfeatured on one evening and three pairs on thenext. The debates were broadcast live throughoutIndonesia. Prior to the second round of thepresidential elections, a series of three dialogueswere organized on consecutive evenings, withthe two remaining presidential candidates facingquestions covering a range of social, economic andpolitical issues.KPU was supported by IFES for the concept andorganization of the debates and dialogues. At therequest of the KPU and IFES, the UNDP providedsupport for the venue and set-up costs for the secondround presidential dialogues. The KPU Media Centrewas also fully involved in these activities, providingadvisory and administrative support.The debates and dialogues were popular, with justover 50% of the voters seeing or hearing them atleast once 1 . However, the concept of a debate wasnew to Indonesia and some commented that it wascontrary to the culture of Indonesia to enter into directconfrontation on issues. Only a quarter of Indonesiansthought that candidates should be allowed to criticizethe platforms or policies of other candidates, while amajority (51%) was opposed to the idea 2 .Figure Twelve: Satisfaction of Users with TNPPresidential Elections: Round OnePresidential Elections: Round TwoTotal% Total %Excellent3924.2%2219.3%Good8854.7%5649.1%Satisfactory2616.1%3026.3%Poor85.0%65.3%1 IFES Tracking Survey, 19 October 20042 Ibid46

Voter Information Campaign447

4Voter Information CampaignThe area of voter information was identified as a priority of the KPU in the early stages of the election processand during the development of the objectives for the UNDP election programme. While some state funds had beenallocated for this activity, the KPU was concerned that the significant changes in the election process would demand ahigher level of information dissemination than their resources would allow.An initial survey on voter knowledge and attitudes was conducted by The Asia Foundation between June and August2003. This showed that, while there was a high intention to vote in the upcoming elections, Indonesians had a poorunderstanding of the new electoral procedures and were unfamiliar with the role of elections and representatives, aswell as core democratic principles and values. Specifically, the survey showed that more than 90% of the electoratedid not know when the legislative elections would take place, that almost two thirds had not heard anything about48

the DPD or were unsure if they had heard anything,and almost half had not heard of the KPU. A further31% had heard of the KPU, but did not know what theorganization did, and 75% were confused about theprocedures for the legislative elections.In an effort to rectify the situation, the UNDPworked with the KPU on recruiting an experiencedadvertising agency to help with the development andimplementation of a voter information strategy andcampaign. The selection of the advertising agency wasdone through an open competitive tender involving anumber of different stages. Interested agencies werefirst asked to submit proposals to the UNDP basedon a detailed “terms of reference” which had beendeveloped by the KPU and the UNDP. Following aninitial short-listing process conducted by the UNDP atthe request of the KPU, a committee was established,comprising KPU, UNDP and external experts, to reviewthe remaining and responsive proposals in detail.The committee selected a final four companies topresent their concepts and proposals to the KPUplenary-meeting of all the KPU members. A final twocompanies were selected, both presenting conceptswhich were considered to meet the needs andrequirements of the KPU and the election process.Of these, the company with the lower price proposalwas selected. This company was PT Fortune Indonesia,an established communications agency in Indonesia,working in advertising, public relations and socialmarketing.The UNDP worked closely with the KPU in itsimplementation of a nationwide voter informationstrategy. It was agreed that the overall goal of theinformation campaign would be to ensure that theprocess and results of the elections were perceived asfair and honest and accepted by the Indonesian peopleas reflecting the true will of the people. To do this, thekey theme of the campaign was identified as: “SuaraAnda Menentukan Anda: Gunakan Hak Pilih AndaDengan Bijak” (Your Voice Counts: Use Your VotingRights Wisely). The strategy was divided into threephases:Phase One: Pre-election period (September-December2003) focused on registering voters, introducing thepublic to the new electoral process and ballotingprocedures, and promoting the KPU as an independentand non-partisan organization.49

Phase Two: Legislative election period (January-April2004) focused on making voters more knowledgableso they could actively and effectively participate inthe legislative election. This included an awareness ofthe electoral process, of participating political partiesand their candidates and of the need to exercise votingrights in a friendly, peaceful and safe environment.Phase Three: Presidential election period (April–October 2004) focused on encouraging voters toregister for the legislative elections and to participatein the presidential elections. Emphasis was also placedon the date and system of the elections and how tocast a valid vote.The KPU information campaign was formally launchedby the then President Megawati Soekarnoputri on27 October, 2003, introducing the “Milih Langsung”(“Vote Directly”) logo and mascot to the Indonesianpublic. The logo was used throughout the campaign.The campaign produced and distributed millions ofposters, flyers, booklets, stickers and print ads andaired radio and television PSAs throughout the country.A summary of the total products used in the campaignis included in figure thirteen.50

Figure Thirteen: Summary of Voter Information Materials Produced by FortuneActivity Message/Details QuantityPhase OneTV SpotsTelops and RunningTextsThree versions: Voter Registration, NewElection System, KPU ImageTwo versions: Voter Registration, ElectionSchedule699 insertions on 4 TVstationsRadio SpotsTwo versions: Voter Registration, ElectionSchedule9,176 insertions on 2network stations and 3Jakarta stationsPrint adsThree versions: Voter Registration, ElectionSchedule, KPU Image54 insertions in 5newspapers, 2 tabloids, 4magazinesBookletsQuestion and Answers on the Elections10,000 copiesPostersTwo versions: Voter Registration, ElectionSchedule10,000 of each versionLeafletsNine versions (each in both bahasa Indonesiaand English): Election Schedule, VoterRegistration, KPU Image, DPD, DPR, PartyVerification, Panwaslu, Election Districts, andWomen in Elections30,000 of each version inbahasa Indonesia and 2,000in EnglishGiant BannersVote Directly126 BannersVCDAll socialisation materials for the KPUDs500 copies51

Activity Message/Details QuantityPhase Two: Legislative ElectionsTV ProgrammesSix programmes, including talk shows andquiz shows61 episodes in total on 5different TV channelsTV SpotsThree versions: Election Schedule, DPD, Howto Punch the BallotTV FillerTV TelopTwo Versions: Use Your Right to Vote, SeekInformation on the PartiesValid and Invalid Votes1,359 insertions on 13different national and localTV stationsRunning TextFour versions: Election Schedule, Voters Card,Use Your Right to Vote, Election TimeRadio SpotsFour versions: Election Schedule, How toPunch the Ballot, Use Your Right to Vote, SeekInformation on the Parties23,560 insertionsPrint AdsFive versions: Election Schedule, How toPunch the Ballot, Valid and Invalid Votes,Peaceful Elections, Voter Card213 insertionsPostersFour versions: Election Schedule, How toPunch the Ballot, Political Parties, Layout ofthe Polling Station1,460,000 postersLeafletsTwo versions: Voters Guide, Political Parties400,000 leafletsFlyersVoters Guide2,000,000 flyersGiant BannersTwo versions: Election Schedule, How toPunch the Ballot5,004 bannersStickersTwo versions: Election Schedule, How toPunch the Ballot520,000 stickers52

Activity Message/Details QuantityPhase Three: Presidential Elections Round OneTV SpotsTwo Versions: Election Schedule and Use YourRight to VoteTV FillersTV TelopsHow to Punch to the BallotTwo versions: Voter Registration, How toPunch the Ballot2,709 insertions on 9different national and localTV stationsRadio SpotsFive Versions: Voter Registration, VoterRegistration Extended, Election Schedule, Howto Punch the Ballot, Use Your Right to Vote15,912 insertions on 92different radio stationsacross IndonesiaPrint AdsTwo versions: Voter Registration, ElectionSchedule + How to Punch69 insertions in nationaland local newspapers andmagazinesPostersThree versions: Election Schedule + How toPunch, Profile of Candidates, Layout of PollingStation552,000 PostersLeafletsVoters Guide200,000 LeafletsFlyersVoters Guide500,000 Flyers53

Activity Message/Details QuantityPhase Three: Presidential Elections Round TwoTV SpotsTV FillersUse Your Right to VoteHow to Punch to the Ballot1,721 insertions on 9different national and localTV stationsRadio SpotsTwo versions: How to Punch the Ballot+ Usethe Ink, Use Your Right to Vote24,930 insertions on 92different radio stationsacross IndonesiaPrint AdsTwo versions: How to Punch the Ballot+ Usethe Ink, Use Your Right to Vote17 insertions in nationalnewspapers and magazinesPostersTwo versions: Profile of Candidates, ElectionSchedule + How to Punch the Ballot400,000 postersFlyersVoter Guide500,000 flyersIn order to track both the effectiveness of thecampaign and the emerging information needs ofthe public, UNDP provided cost-sharing support for aseries of tracking surveys, which were managed andimplemented by IFES. The series of 20 tracking surveysfocused on key aspects of public knowledge of theelectoral environment as a means of assessing specificvoter information and election management needs,and to fine-tune resulting public information andeducation campaigns. Questions included in the surveyincluded those related to awareness of the dates ofthe elections, understanding of the election process,awareness of the voter registration process, andawareness of the Milih Langsung campaign messages.Langsung campaign messages directly correlated withthis increase. By January-February 2004, 52% said thatthey had seen, heard or read this message, and 57% byFebruary-March 2004 (see figure fourteen).Figure Fourteen:Exposure to ‘Milih Langsung’ Messages47% 52% 57%The knowledge and awareness of the elections datesDec 2003Jan-FebFeb-Marand processes increased steadily over time (See figure20032001*from IFES tracking survey). Exposure to the Milih*from IFES tracking survey54

The KPU identified first time and young voters asa particular target for their information campaign.While this was incorporated into the campaignmessages conducted by Fortune Indonesia, it wasalso supplemented by an activity conducted by MTVIndonesia. The MTV activity was contracted on a solesourcebasis, with both the KPU and UNDP consideringthat there was no comparable provider to beconsidered. MTV already had experience of producingsuccessful campaigns and advocacy of developmentrelatedmatters in collaboration with various UnitedNation agencies, such as the UNFPA, UNICEF danUNAIDS in the United State, India and the Philippinesamong others. MTV is also the only television station inIndonesia which specifically targets the youth market.The MTV “Rock-the-Vote” campaign was aimed atfirst-time voters as well as at encouraging a peacefulelection. There were initially many indications thatyoung voters were more likely to be disenchantedwith the election system and more likely therefore notto vote, with student groups initially being the mostvocal in calling for a boycott of the general electionsprocess. The target audience of MTV also representedthe largest demographic segment in Indonesia. Ofa voting population of 150 million people (out of atotal population of 220 million), 85 million voterswere between the ages of 15 and 34 years old. Thisrepresented close to 60% of the eligible voters.The campaign informed young voters on when and howto vote with a series of PSAs and “vox pops”, in whichyoung voters shared their views on why democracyand elections are important. The campaign covered thethree elections, with specific and different messagesbeing highlighted during the process. The highlight ofthe campaign was a live Rock-the-Vote concert heldin Senayan in Jakarta in June 2004, bringing togethersome of the biggest names in Indonesian pop music. Itwas attended by over 30,000 people and was aired anumber of times on MTV.55

Figure Fifteen: Summary of Voter Information Materials Produced by MTV IndonesiaActivity Message/Details QuantityLegislative Elections (March-April 2004)TV FillersTwo versions: Election System, ElectionScheduleEach shown 6 times a dayfor 72 daysTV FillerHitting the Heart: MTV interviewed people allover the country and some Indonesians livingabroad for their opinions and to gauge whatthey knew about the elections, especiallythe new electoral system (Jakarta, Bandung,Surabaya, Medan , Makassar, Yogyakarta,Balikpapan, Bali, London)Shown 12 times a day for17 daysTV Spots252 insertionsAd Libs5 times a day for 65 daysPresidential Elections (April-July 2004)TV FillersFour versions: Voter Registration, ElectionSystem, Election Schedule, GeneralInformationTwo shown 6 times a dayfor 72 days and two shown6 times a day for 121 daysTV Spots228 insertionsAd Libs5 times a day for 35 daysPresidential Elections (August-September 2004)TV FillersThree versions: Peaceful Campaign, Use YourRight to Vote, Election ScheduleEach shown 20 times a dayfor 20 daysTV Spots120 insertionsAd Libs5 times a day for 20 days56

In addition to the above, UNDP assisted the KPU in anumber of ad hoc information dissemination activities.This included the printing of 50,000 compilationsof the five election laws, which were distributedto KPUDs, political parties, CSOs, and the media. Italso included the printing of mock ballot papers forthe legislative elections (10,000 of each of the fourdifferent types of ballots: DPRD kabupaten/kota, DPRDprovinsi, DPD and DPR) that could be used by the KPUand KPUDs, as well as other interested partners, forballoting simulation activities.European Union Visibility CampaignAs part of its contribution to the Election Programme Trust Fund, the European Union allocated 360,000Euros to conduct a visibility campaign. The aim of the campaign was to inform the Indonesian public aboutthe role of the European Union, its relations with Indonesia and its commitment to the democratizationprocess. Since the money allocated was part of the EU contribution to the trust fund, the UNDP was taskedwith the implementation.This project was distinctly different from all the other activities and projects under the umbrella of theUNDP Elections Programme. Although it required the approval of the institutional Indonesian bodiesinvolved in the elections, it was implemented and developed independently. Moreover, the expected resultswere to reflect the interest of the single donor – the European Union - as this was a project aimed solelyat its promotion and greater visibility in Indonesia.The Specific ObjectivesTo provide more information about the European Union and issues related to democratization, stressthe links between the European Union and Indonesia and improve the understanding of European Unionamongst young people.The TargetUniversity students were chosen as the target group because first or second time voters typically form thedriving force behind any struggle towards democracy.The TimeFrameThe project, initially designed for a six-months period, was later extended to eight months.57

The Activities:The campaign focused on three major types of activities:• Media campaign• Public relations and cultural events• Seminars on democracy in Indonesian universitiesMedia CampaignThrough a bidding process, the advertising agency JWT was selected to conduct a media campaign. Theagency produced 2,000 posters, 3,000 diaries and a television commercial. The posters were distributedthrough the VICI Consortium, the KPU network, universities (distribution by the UNDP) and embassies(through the EU delegation), while the diaries were handed out to students at seminars. The diarycontained a message from the EU ambassador, a map of the European Union and general informationabout EU institutions. The 60-second TV commercial and the 30-second reminder were aired on nationaltelevision in May 2004.Public Relations and Cultural EventsThe UNDP contracted the agency One Comm to assist with this aspect of the project, which included:1. A pantomime play by the well-known theatre group Sena Didi Mime, who produced an hour-longperformance on aspects of democracy in Indonesia. The play was shown to the public on 23 and 24 ofApril, at Gedung Kesenian in Jakarta and received many positive reviews.2. A photo exhibition of work by non-professional photographers who were asked to combine the themesof democracy, Europe and the Indonesian society. The exhibition ran at the Goethe Institute, the galleryof Taman Ismael Marzuki, and the lobby of Wisma Dharmala.3. Public relations events, which included a radio programme and several advertorials and ads in selectednationwide newspapers written by Wimar Witoelar. His writings on democracy and Europe, in relationto the political momentum in Indonesia, were printed in the daily Kompass and the weekly Tempo.Press conferences and media releases on these activities assured a wider coverage of the campaign topicsin the Indonesia media.SeminarsA series of one-day seminars for university students and lecturers were held in Jakarta, Banjarmasin,Medan, Makasar and Jogyakarta. These seminars consisted of a series of presentations from local universitylecturers and European Union diplomats on themes related to democracy and European Union-Indonesiarelations. They offered an opportunity for open discussion, sharing of information and exchange ofknowledge, especially for the university students. Attendance as well as participation was overwhelming,with many questions and comments raised by the students.58

Voter Education559

5Voter EducationThe largest area of support under the Election Support Programme was assisting the KPU in voter education activities,in close collaboration with civil society organizations (CSOs) to ensure the availability of factual orientation regardingvoting procedures, to underscore the value of voting and the right of individuals to vote according to their ownconvictions.The Election Support Programme approved USD 6,950,000 to support voter education for the legislative elections aswell as both rounds of the presidential elections of which USD 6,805,293 was actually spent. The funds were disbursedto 40 civil society organisations, 19 of which were supported for both the legislative and presidential phases of theelections.60

Role of Project Appraisal CommitteeThe Project Appraisal Committee on Voter Educationwas established on 17 September, 2003. The PAC waschaired by the KPU (Ibu Valina Singka Subekti) andcomprised two voting KPU members, two members(one voting) of the Coordinating Ministry for EconomicAffairs and two voting members of the UNDP. Inexceptional circumstances, and at the discretion of theChair, observers were invited to attend the meetings.As the chair of the PAC, the KPU was concerned thatall the activities of selected CSOs were in accordancewith the prevailing regulations and technicalstipulations. The KPU was equally aware of theimportance of involving civil society organizations inthe dissemination of voter education down to the levelof the grassroots to a country as large and far flung asIndonesia.The PAC tried very hard to be as geographicallydiverse as possible, selecting CSOs spanning fromAceh to Papua. It did not encourage the disbursementof block grants; however, it tried to accommodatevarious techniques and methodologies used by CSOsin reaching a wide number of target beneficiaries.Indeed, programmatically, it felt more disposed tosupporting a participative methodology encouragingface-to-face field-work and maximum contact withthe people, rather than placing emphasis on workshopsand seminars.felt that such methods ought to take precedence overproposals that concentrated on holding seminars andworkshops, considering that such methods tend to‘preach to the converted’ and target society’s elite.Equally, the number of target beneficiaries that suchprogrammes can reach is very low. More importantly,however, they also rely on a limited number of nationalinstead of foresting the development of local andregional expertise.The UNDP Programme established a rigorousmechanism by which proposals were selected. Allproposals were given a first screening to determinewhether the organization actually existed and toascertain that all the requirements for the submissionof proposals were fulfilled. Proposals that lookedinteresting were set aside until the references ofthe CSO were investigated. This involved discussionswith local and international partner donor agencies,PANWASLU branch offices and KPUD offices in theregions the CSO proposed to work in. Efforts werealso made find out whether the CSO had worked withdonors or other relevant partners before, and whetherthey had encountered problems with this CSO. If theCSO was newly established, then the task was to findout whether it brought with it experienced people andwhether it had the capacity and human resources toundertake the prescribed work. Preference was givento bigger proposals with a large number of targetbeneficiaries and to CSOs working together as aconsortium or through joint collaboration.The PAC was in broad agreement that face-to-facemethodologies that go down to the grassroots are thebest way of spreading information and ensuring thatsuch information is understood and absorbed. Thisconviction was borne out despite the fact that suchmethods are labour intensive, time consuming andcostly. From this philosophy the PAC supported massorganizations of various religions that were capableof reaching a very wide audience. Moreover, the PACProposals that passed this initial test were then sentto the PAC for evaluation and decision. The assessmentwas made according to a matrix comprising severalcriteria – namely, the organization’s expertise, itsproposed work plan and approach, and its personnel. Inevaluating the proposals and making its deliberations,the PAC tried to determine whether there was aneed for the programme, what its objectives were,what is its impact and its inputs were, and whether61

the methodology was sound and feasible andappropriate for the target group. Attention was alsopaid to whether the activities were in line with thedesired outputs and finally, whether the budget wasrealistic. Based on the recommendations of the PAC,proposals were then submitted to the UNDP ContractsCommittee for final review. The entire contracting andfunding mechanism was managed by the UNDP.Once a CSO was accepted, a number of specificmeasures were put in place to ensure itsaccountability, effectiveness and transparency. Theseincluded standard operating procedures developed bythe UNDP, which required CSOs to abide by specificregulations for financial management, work planning,activity and financial reporting. They also demandedthe continuous monitoring of all activities through thesubmission of periodic financial and activity reports,and through evaluations and financial audits.Activities supported by the Election SupportProgramme were constrained to some extent by certainparameters set by its donors. This was especially thecase for the legislative elections where the majorityof funding available for voter education was tied tospecific target groups or areas. For example CIDAfunding, which formed the bulk of the funds availablefor the legislative elections, was tied to women,first-time voters, and conflict areas. The attentiondevoted to those parameters did result in some goodproposals being put aside because they did not meetthe necessary funding criteria.Voter Education Activities for Legislativeand Presidential Elections30 were accepted, 215 were rejected and 127 arrivedpast the deadline so they were not considered. Nomaximum limit was set for any one grant.A total of 221 proposals were submitted for activitiescovering the presidential elections: 27 were accepted,168 rejected and 26 arrived too late. Some of the CSOsthat had performed well during the legislative electionshad their contracts extended to cover the presidentialelections, bringing the total number of CSOs supportedfor two-round presidential election to 40.The methodologies of the programmes were mixedand the mix reflected the target audience at whichthese programmes were directed. Women were usuallytargeted through face-to-face meetings, communitydiscussions at grassroots level, interactive and focusgroup discussions using participatory approaches suchas role-plays and simulations. First-time voters weretargeted through peer education programmes held atparticipating schools, voting simulations in schools,poem reading contests, seminar discussions, radiodramas and the dissemination of information throughvarious print media. Some programmes targeted thegeneral public - regardless of gender, socio-economicclass or degree of literacy - using alternative methodsthat mixed information with entertainment. Thesemethods included mobile cinema, mobile theatreshows, and drama gong performances.Some NGOs were working in areas of conflict andas a result had to design programmes to suit theirparticular circumstances. For example, mass rallieswere not encouraged, and activities tended to focusmore on small-scale focus group discussions, candidatedebates, radio shows, and media distribution.A total of 593 proposals covering both the legislativeand presidential phases of the elections weresubmitted to the Elections Assistance Programme. Ofthese, 372 proposals targeted the legislative elections:In rural areas where infrastructure was lacking andentertainment was usually scarce, NGOs concentratedon mobile cinema to attract a very large audienceand then used the event to distribute materials and toshow voter education clips and hold an elections quiz.62

CSOs supported a variety of target audiences. Of theCSOs working on the legislative elections, some forexample focused exclusively on women (PATTIRO;Aisyiyah; PGI/KWI; PD Politik; Wanita Syarikat Islam),whereas others concentrated on students and firsttimevoters (LPAD Riau; YLBHK; Yayasan Kata Hati;POKJA Pedoman; UI; UK Ternate; Yabiku; YPK Aceh).Several targeted both (KP3 Bali; KPPIPP; PesutMahakam; YNWS Sorong). And still others had villagers(ELSAKA) or tribal settlement (Jembatan Pemilu)as their main target audience. Two CSOs paid mostof their attention to farmers, fishermen and smallentrepreneurs (KL2SS; PKBHB).In a number of cases, CSOs specialized in disseminatinginformation to their union membership (SBL Lampung),whereas others looked for a wider and more generalaudience (Bali Forum; IPCOS; PERFIKI; PBHR-ST;and JPPR). Finally, some CSOs specialized in conflictprevention programmes or worked in areas of potentialconflict (CGI; YABIMU; Pokja RKP Poso).Of the CSOs supported during the legislative phase ofthe elections, it is estimated that 16,350,000 peoplewere reached directly or indirectly through face-tofacemeetings. This is excluding the extensive use ofthe media, including national and private television,community radios on a national scale, tabloidnewspapers and leaflets as well as the large-scaleproduction and distribution of printed materials suchas posters, banners, and stickers.For the presidential elections, the approximate numberof target beneficiaries reached directly or indirectlythrough face-to-face meetings was 15,980,000. Again,this excluded programmes using national and privatetelevision, national and community radio and theproduction and distribution of printed media.As was the case for the legislative election, the CSOsselected a variety of audiences for the presidentialCSOs Supported duringThe Indonesian elections 2004Name of Institution Funds Committed (Rp)AISYIYAH3,258,840,200BALI FORUM1,069,625,000CEPDES1,335,985,000COMMON GROUND3,504,900,000ELSAKA4,636,775,000FAKTA399,305,000GMKI276,880,000GRAVITASI MATARAM657,400,000IPCOS751,594,400JEMBATAN PEMILU2,029,795,000JIL1,962,894,000JPPR2,687,500,000KL2SS1,962,225,000KP3BALI3,007,423,250KPPIPP929,488,250LAKPESDAM JOMBANG224,427,150LPAD - RIAU631,667,000PATTIRO401,085,000PBHR-ST398,808,000PD POLITIK1,572,916,000PERFIKI4,376,750,000PESUT MAHAKAM1,185,520,000PGI/KWI3,252,685,000PKBHB-BENGKULU920,005,000POKJA PEDOMAN362,410,000POKJA RKP- POSO176,177,500PSAPP1,810,480,000RADIO 68H3,112,000,000REMAPPALA465,757,500SBL LAMPUNG1,477,190,500SORAK ACEH1,192,849,000UNI INDONESIA3,758,352,500UNI KHAIRUN TERNATE1,453,225,000WANITA SYARIKAT ISLAM505,037,500YABIKU533,135,000YABIMU360,862,000YAYASAN KATA HATI314,475,000YLBHK269,525,000YNWS SORONG1,412,658,800YPK ACEH BARAT710,597,50063

election. Some focused on women (CEPDES; Aisyiyah;ELSAKA; PD Politik; YABIKU), some on first-time voters(GMKI; Pokja Pedoman; LPAD Riau; Pesut Mahakam)and others targeted both (Bali Forum; GravitasiMataram; KL2SS). Tribal settlements (Jembatan Pemilu;Yayasan Remappala) and labourers and farmers (SBLLampung) also came in for special attention, but mostof the CSOs went for the wider general public (JIL;FAKTA; KP3 Bali; Lakpesdam Jombang; PBHR-Sulteng;SORAK Aceh; PERFIKI; Radio 68H; PSAPP; UI; UKTernate; YNWS Sorong; YPK Aceh; and CGI).Some of the most interesting types of activitiesundertaken in the voter education programme for boththe legislative and presidential elections were thosethat adopted alternative methods of voter education,mixing information with entertainment. These methodswere successful because of their wide appeal to abroad audience. They attract the literate and theilliterate and various socio-economic classes, andappeal to rural and urban audiences and the old andyoung alike.Bali Forum, for example, used an approach that wasvery culture-centric to Bali. It employed drama gongperformances to spread voter education messages tothe public, then ended with an election simulationby the KPUD Bali. Each performance attracted up to8,000 people. PERFIKI’s approach was to use mobilecinema – an excellent approach for the disseminationof information in rural areas. Mobile cinema was usedin 12 provinces for this programme.In addition to other more conventional approaches,CEPDES staged wayang performances, as well asketoprak and ludruk to spread voter educationmessages; YABIKU organized a music and artperformance and Pesut Mahakam a theatreperformance – all having democracy and the electionscentral themes.Monitoring and EvaluationThe UNDP Programme set in place several mechanismsby which to monitor the activities of the CSOs.In addition to the submission of regular financialand activity reports, full-time monitoring officers(MO) were deployed. MOs were responsible forensuring that the organizations met their financialand programmatic commitments – both in termsof implementation and reporting. They conductedspot checks and field trips to ensure that the workproposed by the CSOs was actually being implemented.MOs regularly submitted monitoring reports andassessments, offering recommendations and makingfollow-up visits when required.In addition, two evaluation workshops were heldin order to assess the work of the CSOs. The firstworkshop covered the CSOs working on the legislativeelections. It resulted in recommendations for allparties concerned to ensure that the process wasstreamlined and smoother in the following phase.The second workshop, covering the period of thepresidential election, looked at the extent to whichsuch recommendations had been taken into account,discussed the experiences of the new CSOs, anddeliberated on the future of on-going, sustainable andlonger-term voter and civic education.An internal evaluation of the voter educationprogramme was also conducted through the conductof a national survey and focus group discussions, bythe Indonesian research organization, The PollingCentre. The survey was undertaken in order to obtainquantitative results regarding voter education activitiesin general, whereas focus groups were more intensiveand therefore more qualitative in nature, yielding morein-depth insights into specific programmes in targetedareas.64

Preliminary feedback from the survey and focus groupdiscussions was positive. It showed that in all the areaswhere the NGOs had been deployed, people had eitherreceived training directly, or were aware of trainingprogrammes being conducted. Participants confirmedthat face-to-face methodologies proved to be mosteffective, especially amongst women and semi-literatepeople because it enabled them to ask questions.Indeed, the timing of face-face sessions was obviouslyvery important. Sessions were held in the afternoon orevening at times that were most suitable in order toincrease attendance rates. Although some respondentsstill had to leave their jobs to attend, their respons wasmost encouraging. Said one North Sumatran voter: “Interms of business, I lost, but in terms of knowledge, Ibenefited.”Face-to-face activities were crucial in explaining thenew election system, but although respondents weregenerally satisfied, some expressed a desire for moretime given the novelty and complexity of the electoralexercise. They considered the facilitators or trainers asboth competent and neutral. Results also confirmedthe cascading potential of face-to-face methodologies.Indeed respondents felt the need to share informationwith relatives, friends or neighbours because theyconsidered it to be important in ensuring that theyexercised their voting rights free from errors.Posters and brochures received a mixed assessment.In Bali many believed that the printed media wereineffective in rural areas where literacy rates are lowand where reading habits are not established. Somequestioned the design of posters and stickers, claimingthat they seemed too busy and contained too muchinformation which could not be properly seen by theelderly and which could not be understood at a glance.The assessment from North Maluku, however, wasdifferent. Respondents said that stickers and postersserved to increase their awareness and understandingof election proceedings and the technicalities ofvoting. Moreover, the stickers were properly displayed.‘I saw them every day because they were posted alongroads over which I pass by every day’ note one NorthMaluku voter.Radio programmes received equally mixed reviews.Respondents had either not heard any voter educationmessages (South Sulawesi), had heard them onlybriefly (Bali) or rarely listened to the radio at all(North Sumatra). In North Sumatra and North Maluku,respondents suggested a greater usage of locallanguage in future.The unpopularity of radio was in stark contrast towhat respondents said about television. All had heardelection information programmes either on nationalTV or on private television channels. Respondentsconsidered that the information-disseminationprogrammes on TV were quite effective because ofthe extensive coverage and visual appeal. Those inBuleleng, Bali, considered TV more effective becausemost people own a television set and prefer to watchTV rather than to listen to the radio. However, somerespondents stressed the importance of face-to-faceencounters, given the fact that not all members of acommunity can watch television. ‘In remote areas, noteverybody has a television set, so for the next election,training or direct meetings will be more appropriate’(North Sumatra).Programmes targeted at women were well receivedin some areas. In North Sumatra, for example,attendance was very high and respondents felt proudto present the females perspective. In Bali they wereless successful, mainly because the men usually faroutnumbered the women. This situation was overcomeby holding face-to-face activities for housewivesthrough PKK meetings. In Bone, South Sulawesi, alot more men were present at the education sessionsbecause the women were too busy either attending totheir household duites or working in the platations.65

Respondents in various research areas saidthat their understanding of the meaning andimportance of democracy was increased afterparticipating in the voter education programmes.In Ternate, North Maluku, respondents understooddemocracy as an important principle within thecommunity. ‘For me, after participating in theprogramme, [I feel that] democracy is the mostimportant principle in communal life because itteaches us that sovereignty is in the hands of thepeople, so let the people decide who will representand lead them’ (North Maluku).Consortium for Voters Information Campaign in Indonesia (VICI)The EU approved a Euro 3 million grant to support a one-year voter education and information programmerun by the Consortium for Voters Information Campaign in Indonesia (C-VICI). C-VICI consisted of fourlocal NGOs including CEIA (Centre for East Indonesian Affairs), Solidaritas Perempuan (Women’s Solidarityfor Human Rights), KIPP (Independent Committee for Electoral Monitoring), and INSIDE (IndonesianSociety for Democracy and People’s Empowerment). The consortium was assisted by an international NGO,the Friedrich Neumann Foundation (FNF), for financial management and monitoring. This activity was anearmarked requirement of the grant provided by the EU and specified in the contribution agreement signedbetween the EU and the UNDP.In the early phase of project implementation, Stamstag Café, a television talkshow broadcast live everySaturday morning on Metro TV, took the centre stage of C-VICI activities. Featuring political analysts, NGOactivists, and party executives as guest speakers, it touched on various issues regarding the elections andwas implemented collectively by the consortium.Within the overall project, CEIA’s role was to ensure the widest possible dissemination of election-relatedinformation in three eastern provinces of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Maluku and Papua through workshops,seminars and public discussions, television and radio talk shows, at regional, sub-regional and village level.CEIA also produced and distributed posters, stickers and banners, as well as information through pressreleases, articles, and radio jingles broadcast on local radio stations. By March 2004, CEIA had producedand distributed a total of 45,000 posters, 117,000 stickers and 113,400 leaflets in the three provinces. CEIAalso organized 100 village discussions, in addition to 26 sub-regional seminars and public discussions in 29districts. For the presidential election, CEIA produced to produce and broadcast five episodes of televisiontalk shows entitled “Kafe Presiden”, which featured four of the five vice-presidential candidates. Theprogrammes were produced in collaboration with Trans TV and TVRI.Solidaritas Perempuan’s (SP) activities focused on women voters. Starting with a national consultativemeeting in November 2003, SP organised a series of workshops and training courses to support voter66

information in 23 regions. SP also produced three booklets in five local languages on female politicaleducation, posters and stickers, and other print materials. By January 2004, SP had completed training in16 regions-Kendari, Mataram, Ambon, Padang and Bukit Tinggi, Palembang, Lampung, Makassar, Manado,Palu, Yogyakarta, Kalet-Solo, Jakarta, West Java, Deli Serdang, East Java and Salatiga. As of the end ofMarch 2004, SP had initiated 1,147 village discussions, 25 public discussions and 56 radio talkshowsin 25 provinces across Indonesia. Prior to the presidential elections, SP selected eight regions-Jakarta,Karawang, Kendari, Pekanbaru, Bojonegoro, Makassar, Klaten, and Aceh- in which to implement radio,village and public discussions. In each region, four village discussions, two radio discussions and twopublic discussions were conducted. SP also organised television talk shows in Jakarta and Makassar whichfocused on the theme “Choose a President with an Agenda for Women’.Prior to the legislative elections, KIPP conducted regional training workshops for the local branches of KIPPin Lampung, Semarang, Makassar, Pontianak, and Surabaya. The workshops featured public discussions,involving the members of KPUD, Panwas and the media. Following these workshops, local KIPP staffinitiated village discussions on 25 March in most regions. The goal of the KIPP village discussions was togive the electorate at the village level adequate information regarding election procedures so that voterswould be able to self-monitor the election process. About 400 village discussions were held by KIPP beforethe 5 April elections.INSIDE mainly focused on media activities, and produced a series of PSAs, of which only two wereapproved to be broadcast: “valid-invalid votes” and “peaceful campaign”. INSIDE also prepared adocumentary film, which, though never approved by the necessary authorities, was aired on SCTV, MetroTV and TVRI on 4 July, 2004.Based on an independent evaluation that was conducted at the request of the EU, it was notedthat while the C-VICI planned activities were generally implemented, the process itself was difficultand some activities, mainly relating to the media component implemented by INSIDE, remainedquestionable. One of the key problems encountered was the relationship between C for VICI,government institutions and the KPU, which seriously impacted upon the effectiveness of the overallproject. Another issue raised in the evaluation report was that C-VICI was created merely as a vehicleto receive the grant. The creation of the consortium appeared to have been driven more from theknowledge that funds were available than a genuine willingness to work together. This was evidentfrom the continual difficulties among the four organizations, which severely hampered the abilityof the Consortium to meet programme demands, particularly in the area of financial and activityreporting.67

Election Monitoring and Observation669

6Election Monitoring and ObservationOne of the main objectives of the UNDP programme was to reinforce the transparency of the election processesin Indonesia through the introduction of good practices. Election monitoring is seen as a means of establishing anintegrity safeguards and discouraging fraud, intimidation and violence on election day, as well as increasing thelegitimacy of the final result. The presence of election observers reassures voters they can safely and secretly casttheir ballots and that vote counting and tabulation will be conducted transparently. Monitors note the successes andachievements of elections and identify issues, circumstances or practices that are contrary to accepted national andinternational standards.70

Programme activities involved providing support forthe training and mobilization of national electionmonitors. They also included the establishment of anInternational Observer Support Unit with facilities tosupport the work of international election observers.As stated clearly in the programme document, whileUNDP supported monitoring-related activities, it wasnot in any way engaged in the substantive task ofpassing judgment on the conduct of the elections.National Election MonitoringBased on these stated objectives, the programmeaimed at training and mobilizing national electionmonitors. As with voter education, a project appraisalcommittee (PAC) was established to review CSOsproposal. The call for proposals was issued prior toboth the general and presidential elections. The PACwas chaired by the Partnership for Governance Reform,with members from both the UNDP and the IndonesianGovernment. The KPU did not have a presence on thePAC to ensure an appropriate ethical relationshipbetween the KPU and agencies selected to monitor theelection.At its first meeting, the PAC decided to select oneorganization, which could effectively implementelection monitoring activities on a nationwide scale. Inorder to do this, a total of six proposals were reviewedwith particular attention paid to the experience ofeach organization, its track record, organizational andnetworking capacity and credibility.After careful deliberations, the PAC finally choseForum Rektor to carry out the monitoring activities.The reasons for this decision included the fact thatForum Rektor has an extensive network in Indonesiaand could provide clear evidence of a source fromwhere monitors will be recruited. It also helped thatthe UNDP had prior and positive experience of workingwith the organization in 1999.Forum Rektor was responsible for deploying about160,000 short-term monitors on the day of thelegislative elections, and 2,000 long-term monitorstwo months prior to election day. In addition, ForumRektor, in collaboration with the National DemocraticInstitute, trained 20,000 of its volunteers to collectvote results directly from 10,000 polling stations. Theresults of the parallel vote tally were made publicjust after election day, in addition to Forum Rektor’s71

qualitative assessment of the elections and a reporton the long and short term electoral monitoringcampaigns. Forum Rektor’s final election statementwas presented to the media during a formal pressconference on 10 April, 2004.For the presidential elections, the PAC again reviewedfive proposals for monitor the voting and also to carryout research and survey tasks. One of these was afollow-up proposal submitted by Forum Rektor. ThePAC discussed the possibility of extending the contractwith Forum Rektor. However, in stark contrast to theexperience of UNDP with Forum Rektor in 1999, itwas agreed that Forum Rektor had not performed at ahigh enough standart during the legislative elections.The management at Forum Rektor’s headquarters wasconsidered weak, and also appeared to be weak linksbetween the centre and the regions. The quality oftraining monitored by the UNDP was rather low, witha lack of teaching aids and a focus on “lecture” stylepedagogy. In addition, one month after the legislativeelections, there were still concerns over the financialreporting because of poor accountability at theregional level.The proposal from FRI for the presidential electionsdid not address any of these concerns that had beenpreviously raised with it by the UNDP and the PAC andit was therefore decided not to consider its applicationany further. The two proposals finally selected by thePAC were those submitted by CETRO and JAMPPI.CETRO observed not only the counting process at thepolling station (TPS) level, but also at the PPS and atthe PPK levels. This was in line with the public’s vocalconcern regarding the counting in the last election.The electoral observation covered a total of 11provinces, and involved the deployment of 10,000observers to monitor the polling and counting processat the TPS level, 5,000 observers to monitor at thesub-district (PPS) level, and 2,000 observers to monitorat the district (PPK) level. CETRO is an organizationthat enjoys a good reputation in the advocacy andelectoral observation community, and has a proventrack record. it had also gained valuable experiencein tn the USAID-funded monitoring of the legislativeelections. Based on the successful implementationof poll watch activities for the first round of thepresidential election, CETRO was again contracted forthe second round, deploying 19,000 short and longertermmonitors.Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia(JAMPPI) was also selected by the PAC. JAMPPIobservered the election in 29 provinces, recruitingand fielding more than 12,000 monitors at the pollingstations, 725 at the sub-district counting centres and145 at the district level. JAMPPI is an experiencedorganizations that worked with the Partnership ina successful observation of the 1999 elections-anexperience the UNDP had shared in. As with CENTRO,JAMPPI’s performance in the first round of thepresidential election led to an invitation to mobilize16,500 monitors for the second round.Monitoring Related ActivitiesVoter Registration AuditIn addition to the activities of Forum Rektor duringthe legislative elections, the PAC also recommendedthe selection of Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan danPenerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES) to implementa voter registration audit, aimed at verifying theaccuracy of the voter registration list and evaluatingthe quality of the process. This was intended as ameans of building public confidence in the voterregistration process and in turn the KPU. It was alsointended that the results of the VRA could provide anopportunity for the KPU to make correction the voterslist if it was deemed necesssary. Finally, the VRA wasthere intended to provide valuable benchmark data forfuture voter registration programmes.72

The voter registration audit process required therecruitment of 400 observers, each of whom randomlyselected three voters from the list and went tothe registered address of each voter to verify theinformation provided on the list. Each observer alsorandomly interviewed three voting-age citizens in agiven locality and confirmed that their names andinformation were on the voter list. This was termeda “two-way audit”. The whole audit, covering nearly6,000 eligible voters and 400 randomly-selectedvillages, was conducted by LP3ES with the technicalsupport of NDI, an important partner in this process.Additional support on information dissemination wasprovided by the Japanese International CooperationAgency (JICA).performance, and in particular about claims that aninordinate number of persons eligible to vote had beenleft out of the list.The voter registration audit conducted in July 2004indicated an increase from 91% to 95.3% in thenumber of registered voters, when compared to thefirst audit. However, given that 4.7% translates intomore than seven million voters, this still demonstrateda need for a process to update the voter registrationlist prior to the second round of the presidentialelection. One key finding of the audit was thatabout half of all villages surveyed had not placedthe registration list in a place which could be easilyaccessed by the public.The voter registration audit, held in February 2004following the registration process, indicated that 91%of eligible voters were registered-although 27% didn’tactually realize they were. Researchers found thatgender, marital status, age and physical disability hadno particular influence on registration rates. Of the91% already registered, the audit showed that the datadid contain flaws, with inaccuracies noted in datesof birth (30%) and names (9%). These results weresubmitted to the General Elections Commission.For the presidential elections, the PAC approved afollow-up voter registration audit because as it wasbelieved that the comparison with the results yieldedby the first audit would provide valuable data on thesteps taken by the KPU to re-register voters priorto the presidential elections. While the first voterregistration audit was conducted by LP3ES, the auditfor the presidential election was conducted by JAMPPI,again with significant technical support from the NDI.At the time of conducting the audit, there continuedto be a lot of misinformation and confusion concerningthe accuracy and comprehensiveness of the voter list.The VRA for the legislative elections had proved to bea good tool to counter public concerns about the KPU’sParallel Vote TabulationFor the first presidential elections, the PAC alsoapproved a proposal submitted by LP3ES to conducta parallel vote tabulation (PVT). It was consideredthat LP3ES was in a good position to conduct the PVTbased on a similar, highly successful and publicizedexercise that it conducted at the time of the April 5elections, with technical support received from theNDI. The PVT had proved in the legislative elections tobe a valuable early prediction of the election outcome.This information helped to diffuse potential disputeswhich threatened to occur as a result of the KPU’sslower compilation of both the electronic and manualcounts. The PVT also provided a tool for comparisonwith the final results, thereby helping to ensuretheir acceptance by political parties and the generalpublic and offering an independent verification of theelection results.The PVT for the first round of the presidential electionwas jointly funded by the NDI and the FreedomInstitute. Funds from the Freedom Institute originatedfrom the private television station, Metro TV. Someconcerns were initially raised over this arrangement,73

given the fact that Metro TV had exhibited some biastowards specific political interests. This concern wasaddressed through the signing of a memorandumof understanding between all parties which clearlystated that the information originating from the PVTwould be made equally available to all media. Theonly concession given to Metro TV was that it couldreceive, although not broadcast, the data two hoursbefore the press release to allow it to prepare its ownprogramming accordingly. It was agreed that it couldonly go ahead with its broadcast after the data hadbeen made publicly available.Due to the efficient network system that LP3ES hadput in place, the PVT results were available on theevening of election day for the first round of thepresidential election on 5 July. Despite the agreementsestablished in the MoU, Metro TV went ahead andreleased the results prior to the official press release byLP3ES. This caused additional problems because it didnot allow sufficient time for LP3ES to formally submitthe results to the General Elections Commissionaspesific requirement of the election monitoringaccreditation process. While the involvement of theprivate sector was considered in a positive light, it washowever made clear from this incident that stricterprocedures concerning equal access to informationneeded to be put in place in the future.The PVT drew some criticism from political partiesand their candidates and even from the KPUinitially, mostly because of a lack of knowledge andunderstanding of the methodology. This however didchange as the accuracy of the “quick count” becameincreasingly evident following each election. Indeed,the media came to rely on it as primary indicatorof the election outcome and the public increasinglyaccepted it as a trusted source of information.Monitoring and EvaluationThe programme recruited a monitoring officer to checkon the activities of the election monitoring grantees.This included attending training sessions for trainers,financial officers and observers, observing the PVT andVRA courses and monitoring events on actual electionday. The officer also sat in on a number of meetingsheld by monitoring organizations to prepare finalstatements on the quality and conduct of the precampaign,campaign and polling day. Under UNDP’smandate, however, no attempt was made to participatein or shape in any way the final statements of themonitoring organizations. To ensure the UNDP wasnot seen to be passing judgement on the quality ofelections, monitoring organizations were not requiredto display a UNDP logo at any point in the course oftheir work.As in the legislative elections, the results of the PVTwere remarkably accurate, when compared to thefinal results of the KPU’s own electronic count andits official manual count. A final PVT was conductedfor the second round of the presidential election,with support from Metro TV directly, NDI and the TIFAFoundation. Again, the results proved to be extremelyaccurate. A Voter attitude survey was held at thesame time as the so-called “quick count” to gatherinformation on the election process.The UNDP programme worked in very closecollaboration with other donors in this area. USAID andthe Partnership both supported a limited number ofelection monitoring organizations. All donor-supportedelection monitoring groups, including CETRO, ForumRektor, JAMPPI and the JPPR Network, were asked towork together to ensure that there was no duplicationin the coverage of polling stations and that similarstandards were applied. For example, similar rates forexpenses were paid to volunteers and similar reportingformats were used.74

The election monitoring groups were also asked towork in collaboration with the Panwas. One of thelessons learned from the 1999 elections was thatreports received by the Panwas from the monitoringgroups were not in a practical format that allowedit to take effective action. Accordingly, Panwasrepresentatives were invited to coordination meetings,the monitoring organisations participated in Panwastraining activities at the kecamatan level, and Panwasreviewed the proposed reporting formats before theywere set as standard.While relationships at the central level between thePanwas and the monitoring groups were positive, thisunfortunately was not reflected at the lower levels ofboth organizations. As a result, the monitors were notconsidered to have effectively contributed to reportson election violations. While, there is little doubt thatthe monitoring groups did act as an important integritymechanism for the 2004 Elections through their broadpresence at the polling stations, there is a need fora systematic look at the monitoring and observationefforts within Indonesia.visit : “Indonesians have voiced a clear commitmentto the democratic process. When voters cast theirballots, they should do so with confidence that theinternational community is watching this process withinterest.” The Carter Center deployed over 60 longtermobservers across Indonesia.Other large missions included the European UnionElection Observation Mission, led by Europeanparliamentarian Glyn Ford. The EUEOM fieldedthe largest number of observers, followed by theUS Embassy Observation Team and the JapaneseElection Observation Mission. Many diversecountries took an active interest in the elections,including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Taiwan andSudan.International Election ObservationBuilding on the experience from the 1999 elections,when more than 600 international observers came toIndonesia, the Indonesian Government again invitedthe international community to send observersmissions to the 2004 elections. During the six-monthselection period, Indonesia welcomed a total of 16international missions, which together deployed anaverage of 550 observers in all of Indonesia’s 32provinces.In July, the former US President Jimmy Carter andhis wife, Rosalynn, led an international team toobserve Indonesia’s first direct presidential vote. The80-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner said about his75

IORC Briefing Kits and MaterialsThe IORC distributed a total of 749 briefing kits to international observers. The kits consisted of a custommadecotton bag with the IORC label and included background information on the laws and regulationsgoverning the election, the people and culture of Indonesia, maps and other geographical information on theregions, contact information for coordination and emergencies, and an election observation manual.The kits contained:• Indonesian Electoral Map, print and CD-Rom• Election Laws and Decrees, book and on CD-Rom• List of Political Parties• Health and Security Information• Election Acronym• List of International Observers, Contacts and Deployment,• Provincial contacts: national and international observers (JPPR, Yappika Forum Rektor, UN-staff and EU)• Media ong>Reportong>s on Aceh, Maluku, Papua, and on the 2004 Indonesian Elections• A guide for International Observers of the 2004 Indonesian National Election• The KPU manual on Polling Station, Voting and Counting Procedures• IORC notebookIn the final round presidential election, IORC compiled observer statements from both the legislativeelections and the presidential elections and distributed these together with an updated KPU electionmanual, updated KPU regulations and degrees, an updated contact and deployment list and a set ofIn February 2004, at the request of the donors, adecision was taken to set up a facility to assist theinternational observers arriving for the elections. Asa result, the UNDP, with technical support from IFES,NDI and TAF, established the International ObserverResource Centre (IORC). Less than three weeks beforethe legislative elections, the IORC was formallylaunched by the UNDP Resident Representative beforean audience of the partners, donors, observers and themedia. The first IORC observer meeting was held on 19March, 2004.The IORC’s principal role was to serve as aclearinghouse for all information related to electionobservation and to bring together the differentinternational observer groups and the nationalmonitoring groups to share experiences and toprevent a duplication of their efforts. During its sevenmonths of operation, the IORC provided support to 11governments that participated through their embassiesor aid missions, eight international organizations,several national monitoring groups, and local mediaand government representatives.The support included weekly meetings, production ofbriefing kits, briefing sessions with presentations by avariety of different informants, up-to-date informationon issues related to the elections, and essentialcontacts, tools and information, most of which wasmade available on IORC’s own website. IORC services76

to observers also included ensuring regular liaisonwith national monitoring groups to assist in thecoordination of observation coverage. In addition, theIORC set up an office, meeting room and newsroom,and provided computer and other facilities to observergroups.In this early period, the IORC made a concertedeffort to contact those embassies planning to sendobservers to inform them about available services andto invite their representatives to attend meetings.These missions included Russia, Thailand, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Mozambique, South Africa and Sudan,all of whom sent observers for the legislative electionsand actively participated in the IORC. The same effortwas made with the national monitoring groups, suchas Forum Rektor, JAMPPI, LP3ES, KIPP, JPPR, Yappikaand CETRO. In view of the increasing importanceof the role of domestic election monitoring, it wasexpected that by providing a forum for domestic andinternational observers to share information, the workof both would be enhanced.The elections in Indonesia were unique in more thanone way, and many superlatives have been heaped onthe process. Particular to the role of IORC was the factthat there were three consecutive rounds of electionsin six months. This meant that many internationalobservers did not parachute in for a couple of weeks,but remained throughout the six-month electionperiod. This gave the IORC the opportunity to define itsrole and adjust its services to meet the demands andexpectations of the various observer missions.The extended period in which the elections tookplace, coupled with the presence of a large number ofelection professionals, made it possible for the IORCto undertake a number of additional activities. Severalworkshops and presentations were held to shareelection expertise with national election monitoringgroups. Topics addressed were: election standards andprinciples, election observation, media monitoring andthe legal basis of election observation. The UNDP/KPUtraining team conducted the workshops. In addition,as it was clear that many Indonesian opinion makersand politicians were unfamiliar with the role played bysurveys and parallel vote tabulations in a democraticelection process, the IORC also arranged a paneldiscussion on the topic of opinion polls in whichnational and international experts took part.77

Legislative ElectionsOn the 5 April, 2004, 518 international observersjoined 400,000 domestic monitors in overseeingthe Indonesia’s legislative elections. The variousobservation missions together covered all of Indonesia’s32 provinces. Despite efforts at coordination,international monitoring was not evenly distributed,but this was balanced by the large number of nationalmonitors.Following election day, the IORC held 2 post-electionsessions to allow monitoring groups to compare noteson their polling day experiences. In these sessions,monitoring groups expressed overall satisfactionwith the smooth handling of the ballot. The firstpost-election session took place on 6 April and waschaired by Glyn Ford, the head of the EU ElectoralObserver Mission. Among the 37 participants were IFESPresident Mr. Richard Soudriette (Washington), TheAsia Foundation Head of Delegation Syed MohammedZakaria, of Bangladesh, and other prominent delegatesfrom embassies and organizations.Australian MP Margaret May, and senatorsNatasha Stott-Despoja and David Johnstonand ALP Senator Ruth Webber attended asecond debriefing, held on 8 April, wherea special invitee was Panwas ChairmanKomaruddin Hidayat. Representatives of theIRI, the Bosnian and Netherlands embassies,Interband, UNDP, NDI, IFES, JPPR and The AsiaFoundation attended the meeting.Subsequently, many observation missionsmade their findings known through anofficial statement or a press release. TheIORC collated the comments made during thetwo sessions and the public statements fromdomestic and international observer groupsthat were made public, in order to presenta synopsis of opinion on the elections. Thisoutcome was presented at the donor meetingin May 2004.78

Presidential elections, first roundIn the run up to the first presidential election, theIORC hosted seven meetings and nine briefings forinternational observer missions. On 5 July, a total of577 international observers joined about 160,000national monitors. During the legislative elections,the IORC’s deployment mapping had identified gapsin some areas and over-representation in other Usingthat as a guide, observer groups made an effort in thefirst and second rounds of the presidential electionto spread their resources more evenly. After votingday, two post-election sessions were held to allowobservers to compare notes before making theirfindings public.Presidential elections, second roundThree specialized pre-election meetings were heldat the IORC prior to the final round of the directpresidential vote. There was no fixed agenda, butrather a sharing of reports on all observation topics:secrecy of vote, issues of intimidation or electionviolation, TPS lay out and environment, preparednessof staff, respect for rules and regulations, the presenceof national monitoring groups, the counting processat PPS and PPK levels, and general observation on theprinciple of ‘free and fair.’ Two post-election briefingswere also called, with one of these also serving as theclosing meeting of the IORC.Monitoring and EvaluationIORC initiatives were met with mostly positiveresponses and comments from individual delegates.Questionnaire showed that all delegations had agreat appreciation for the centre and the way it hadserved observers’ interests. The IORC questionnairedistributed to all regular participants showed that92.8% of respondents considered the IORC forum forinformation sharing was useful, and 85.7% expressedsatisfaction with the frequency of the meetings.As one delegate put it: “The IORC provided a placefor an exchange of views and information betweendelegations small and large. The meetings became acomfortable habit for all of us.” When asked whetherthe IORC was a useful model for replication in othercountries, 92.9% responded positively.The IORC was considered to have fulfilled its roleas a clearing-house. The international observationdelegations quickly accepted it as their main forumfor the exchange of information, views and ideas. Theregular coordination meetings saw a high turnout.Out of 19 international organization/embassies, 14were active participants and attended every IORCmeeting. Because the format was adaptable to needsand circumstances, the attendance-rate of the regularmeetings remained high all through the elections.The IORC had the privilege of working with excellentelection observation teams from many differentcountries. The IORC partner organizations - IFES,NDI and TAF – brought extensive experience to theIORC, thereby greatly contributing to its success. Thepartners were consulted on major decisions and playedan active role in the meetings, in the presentations andbriefings, and in the dissemination of election-relatedmaterial for the briefing kits.From monitoring and observer statements, the overallimpression is that the monitoring and observationefforts went very well and, with the exception of Aceh,there were no places where election observation wasobstructed or interfered with. In most area, electionobservers were well received at the polling stations,by the KPPS staff as well as by voters. The concludingimpression of the observers was that the electionprocess was largely free and fair and that the resultsfrom the election process accurately reflected the79

will of the people. The problems observers noted atthe polling station were mainly procedural and manyexperts and analysts with lengthy election experienceexpressed appreciation for the process and called theelections ‘surprisingly well-run’.Election Observation ResultsFormer US President Carter praised the country’s transition to democracy and said he was “greatlyimpressed with the orderly and very well planned procedure.” His remarks were shared by many of theinternational observer missions, who were unanimous in calling the election “peaceful”, “historic” and “asignificant step in Indonesia’s democratic transition.”A new electoral framework made the whole process a challenging task. This was true in particular forthe legislative elections when voters had to deal with four different ballots, each the size of a doublespreadnewspaper. Despite experts’ suggestions that the elections would be among the most complex everattempted, observers agreed that they were conducted in line with international standards.An exception was Aceh – where violence and fraud was reported and where the presence of excessivesecurity/military personnel around polling stations intimidated voters. During the legislative elections theprovince was still under martial law. The movement of observers was restricted and no conclusions couldbe drawn. Observation only became possible during the presidential elections and the results are includedin this overview.In their statements, international observer teams have expressed gratitude to the KPU for allowing themto see this democratic process at work and for providing them with timely accreditation, welcoming theirparticipation as well as their recommendations.Legislative elections:• The legislative polls were lauded as fair and transparent with polling taking place in an orderly,peaceful and festive manner.• Early concerns that there would be major delays in various localities due to insufficient supplies ofmaterials did not come to pass. Only a few districts in remote or strife-torn areas had short delays.• A lack of uniformity at the polling station and minor technical problems were registered, but theelectoral process was not compromised as a result. Violations were often the result of administrativeflaws, such as the size of the ballot papers in relation to the size of the voting booth.• Observers were generally impressed by the dedication of polling staff and the high voter turnout butdid signal the need for additional voter registration.80

First Round Presidential:• While the elections were peaceful and took place without violent incidents, several irregularitiesseem to have dampened the success, such as the large number of invalid votes caused by theincorrect use of the ballot sheet. The last minute decision by the KPU to change the status of these‘double-punched’ ballots from ‘invalid’ to ‘valid’ was welcomed by observers as pragmatic andhelpful. Still, the issue managed to cast some cloud over an otherwise successful election.• The KPU regulation on a candidate’s health excluded one candidate from the presidential race. Thisdid not conform to international standards.• The Constitutional Court established its credibility in handling several cases, -including the petitionby the Wiranto-Wahid team - and gained significant public confidence.Final Round Presidential:• Observer groups praised the first direct presidential election in Indonesia as genuinely democraticand peaceful. The Jakarta Post quoted Douglas Peterson of the Carter Center as saying: “Thiselection has been a tremendous success and a huge accomplishment”.• Significant improvements were noted in electoral logistics and administration.• Irregularities in procedures by election authorities –such as late opening and early closing of pollingstations - did not affect the legality of the process or the outcome.• The media played a positive role, but the state television displayed a pronounced bias for theincumbent.OverallThe KPU generally managed its difficult task well and maintained the trust of all parties. Observershighlighted a number of points to be taken into consideration by the election authorities such as:• The limited campaign time for the last two candidates in the final round of the presidentialelection.• The risk of invalid voting associated with the use of the nail punch.• Granting election stakeholders the right to appeal KPU decisions.• Free TV slots for voter education purposes.Overseas observers expressed concern that domestic monitoring organizations were still neededstrengthening.81

7Lessons Learned andRecommendations83

7Lessons Learned andRecommendationsThe Indonesia Elections 2004 offered a very specific set of challenges for the General Elections Commission (KPU).Not only was the election schedule very tight, with three sets of national elections to be organized over a space of sixmonths, but each of the elections involved new or amended procedures, which had to be communicated to the staffworking to conduct the elections and to the voters themselves. In addition, the Election Commission faced tremendous84

logistical challenges, having to organize electionsover an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands,with the legislative elections involving more than2,000 individual elections, almost a billion ballots, fivemillion poll workers and more than 150 million voters.Despite these challenges, Indonesia held crediblelegislative elections in April and two presidentialrounds in July and September.The 2004 elections in Indonesia have furtherconsolidated the democratic electoral processthat started with the elections in 1999. They wereimplemented by a new, independent KPU that, despiteits inexperience and the complexities of the newelectoral system, was able to hold elections which96% of the population thought were well organizedand 90% regarded as free and fair. 1 The KPU alsoemerged with its credibility intact, with more than80% of the population seeing the institution ashonest, fair and transparent. 2 Given that this wasthe first ever successful transition of power from onedemocratically-elected administration to another,and given the peaceful atmosphere that prevailedthroughout the election process, these elections were ahistoric milestone for Indonesia.The UNDP Elections Programme was designed toassist the KPU in meeting some of the key challenges,through training, voter education and monitoring.The evaluation of the programme conducted byan independent team in October 2004 found thatit was “well designed, managed and implementedand met most of its immediate objectives in areaswhere assistance was provided” 3 . The evaluation didhowever note that the programme’s objectives relatingto capacity building were only partially achieved,indicating the need for longer-term and sustainedefforts by the international community.The following part of the report outlines a numberof lessons learned related to the implementationof the UNDP programme, which it is hoped cancontribute to the design and implementation ofefforts of international donors to continue electoralsupport, both in the elections field, both in Indonesiaand elsewhere. These lessons have been drawnfrom suggestions from the KPU, the UNDP ElectionProgramme staff, from the independent programmeevaluation and from other monitoring and evaluationexercises. For voter education, the evaluationworkshops held in May and October were extremelyuseful for gathering recommendations.KPU Training SupportTraining Strategy and MethodologyWhile cascade training is the most common strategy,it has the drawbacks of time, cost and difficulty inensuring consistency in quality. However, it doesprovide a forum for questions and answers anda chance to distribute materials and the latestinformation and updates. It is also motivational andcreates solidarity among trainees. In the case of thisprogramme, the cascade could not be fully completedbecause of a lack of time and money. What resultedwas a semi-cascade en masse training ,involvinghundreds of staffers gathered in huge halls. Alternativestrategies that could be implemented in the event oflimited funds or time in the future include targetingprovinces or areas for a more intensive approach.The programme strategy of utilizing a self-learningapproach through manuals and videos also provedsuccessful. Poll workers were able to read, watch andlearn the necessary information to run the pollingstations, even if they were not able to attend trainingsessions directly.1 IFES Survey for the first and second round presidential elections, August and October 2004 respectively.2 IFES Surveys. Of respondents who knew of the KPU.3 Programme Evaluation Final ong>Reportong>: October 200485

Concerning the methodology used for training,there was a tendency to rely on traditional passivetraining methods which involved long speecheswith a microphone. It is recommended that in thefuture a more interactive methodology be integratedwith assistance from professional trainers. It isrecommended that trainers be seconded from variouseducational institutions to enhance the trainingmethodology in the future. While the KPU shouldbe present at the courses as the election authority,professional trainers can make training more effective.The training programme benefited considerably fromthe establishment of the ad hoc training committee,which brought together experienced KPU personnelfrom relevant bureaus to check and approve trainingstrategies or material content. The committee alsoinvolved all international agencies working on trainingactivities with the KPU, including IFES, AEC, JICAand UNDP. This ensured the development of commonstrategies, and the use of common methodologiesand materials. As indicated in the evaluation report,the integrated nature of the training programme wasconsidered a best practice.Training ManagementThe elections programme succeeded in working withthe KPU in the setting up of a training sub-division.However, the sub-division remains small and without aspecific budget for future activities. Continued capacitybuilding of the KPU at the central and local levels,which will be necessary for future national and localelections, will require the training unit to be expandedin terms of organizational structure and staff capacity.It also needs to be less dependent on donor funding.Training MaterialsManuals: The manual proved to be a useful referencein explaining the KPU decrees. From feedback onthe first two manuals produced by the programme -legislative and first presidential- poll workers preferredthe use of graphics, concise information, samplesof the forms with examples of how to fill them in,and pullout task cards for each worker. The bookletproduced for the second round of the presidentialelections was preferred in style, being smaller, lighter,less daunting to read, and lighter to transport,86

although this was made possible by the fact it wasonly intended as a refresher to previous manuals.One of the challenges in producing the manuals wasthe need for all text to be approved at various levelsin the KPU. Last minute changes/decisions in policycaused confusion and could only be included up tothe point the manual went to print. The existence ofthe training committee helped significantly in theapproval process, although the tight timelines wouldhave benefited from a process for immediate approvals,particularly where last minutes changes wereconcerned. A related issue was the late completionof relevant decrees leaving very little time for thedevelopment and production of training materials. Insome cases, this meant that materials could not beused in training sessions, although they still remaineduseful as stand alone self-learning materials.Training MonitoringMonitoring of the training activities was weak,made difficult by the fact that personnel were notspecifically recruited by the UNDP for this purpose andthe fact the KPU staff at the central level were toobusy with election preparations to undertake this task.It is recommended in the future that the KPU TrainingDivision should train monitors on quality assessmentand how to report back both administratively(financial accountability and attendance) as well as onsubstance (accuracy and currency of information) andmethodology (effectiveness).Panwas Training SupportTraining Strategy and MethodologyVideos: While the manuals provided a valuablereference tool, it was not expected that poll workerswould go over them from cover to cover. The use ofvideo proved far more popular as a form of passivetraining/learning, particularly with the integration ofa sitcom style using celebrities. One major successproved to be the broadcasting the video on popularTV stations nationwide. This provided a cost-effectivemeans to reach poll workers, 80% of whom said theyhad seen the video and 65% of whom had seen itmore than once. 4 As more than 80% of Indonesiansreceive their news from television 5 it also served as anintegrity mechanism, informing the public on pollingday procedures and enabling citizen monitoring.The use of the video as a training tool would havebenefited from even greater dissemination. Fromairtime reports, the best time to broadcast was theafternoon and then the evening. The most popularchannels were SCTV, RCTI and TVRI.The Panwas training strategy followed a cascademethod, which proved to work effectively andefficiently in imparting much-needed information tolower levels of the Panwas structure. This was becausethe funds for the Panwas training were earmarkedby the European Union and were generous, therebyallowing a full-scale programme to be implemented.The programme was able to hire a core of 40 dedicatedand trained facilitators at the outset, which wasperhaps the single most important reason why thecascade training was conducted so successfully. Theprogramme was much helped by the commitment ofthe Panwas members, who saw the implementationof the training courses as integral to their overallmandate.While the Panwas training programme includedelements of how to interact with monitoringorganizations, it became clear that this dealt with4 Polling Center, Final ong>Reportong> on Training, p 1225 IFES, Waves I through IV Tracking Survey. March 200487

only one side of the coin. Insufficient attention wasgiven to the training for election monitors, resulting ina lack of knowledge of monitors on how to report toPanwas – or, indeed, why reporting to Panwas was intheir interests. Since Panwas has staff only to the subdistrictlevel, they had to rely on national monitors,as well as the public, to be their eyes and ears in thepolling stations. If they did not receive reports fromthe monitoring organizations, they missed out on apotentially key source of information.Training MaterialsThe Panwas training programme included acomponent for the production of training manualsand videos. However, the amount of money set asideby the contributing donor for video production wassubstantial and represented a mismatch betweenearmarking and actual needs, as identified by thePanwas members. As a result, while a video was made,it was not fully supported by the members and wastherefore not optimally effective. Funds which werenot used could have been diverted to other activities.Additional Support ActivitiesThe support provided for the development of thePanwas website went far beyond original expectations,as detailed in the Panwas project document. Theestablishment of an on-line reporting system provedto be popular and ensured that local Panwas officescould quickly submit reports to Panwas headquartersfor processing. It was also an inexpensive meansof encouraging the public to play an active role inmonitoring the election process. This could be furtherimproved by widely disseminating information aboutthe Panwas and the reporting process; no funds for aninformation campaign were available, either throughthe project or through the Panwas budget.KPU Media Centre andVote Tabulation CentreThe establishment of the KPU Media Centre and theVote Tabulation Centre contributed successfully to thetransparency of the activities of the General Electionscommission’s activities. The tally centre became thefocal point for obtaining credible election results andthe media centre was able to provide regular updateson the election process to the media and maintaineffective channels of information to the public,political parties and observers.One lesson learned from the implementation of thesetwo activities was the need to encourage nationalownership at all levels of the election administrationto ensure long-run sustainability. While both had thefull support of, and continuous direction from, KPUmembers and senior secretariat staff, this did notalways translate into support and inputs further downthe chain.Activities conducted by Bamboedoea, the companycontracted to establish and run the KPU MediaCentre, were intended to be managed directlyby the KPU’s Public Relations Bureau. It was alsointended that the staff of the PR bureau would beintegrated into the media centre, to learn from theexperts running the centre and also to be able tomonitor the company’s activities. There was a strongreluctance on the part of the bureau staff to workalongside the private contractors, despite the goodrelations that had been established between thetwo organizations. This stemmed in part from thedifference in salaries between the private sector staffand the civil servants, which caused tension. It wasonly at the end of the electoral process, and withBamboedoea’s contract near completion, that thebureau became motivated enough to learn more aboutthe media centre. Following the implementation of aspecifically designed training programme conducted by88

Bamboedoea, the staff began to assume managementof the centre in November 2004.The KPU Media Centre and the Vote Tabulation Centrewere established and run for the legislative electionsand the first round of the presidential elections byAAJ Komunika, a private company. While the KPUdirectly oversaw this activity, the involvement againwas mostly at the KPU member and senior secretariatstaff level. For the second round of the presidentialelections, it was decided that the vote tabulationshould be directly managed and run by the KPU itself,under the direction of a KPU member. As AAJ Komunikaprovided technical advice and logistical support duringthe second round, this strategy worked well in ensuringthat the KPU staff developed the knowledge andcapacities to run the centre and to deal directly withthe media.Voter InformationStrategy and Activitiesthe content and style of the campaign were approvedby the KPU Plenary and extensions to the contract ofFortune Indonesia, the private company responsiblefor implementing the campaign, were also subject toplenary approval. All materials produced by FortuneIndonesia required the prior approval of the KPU. Thisvery strong ownership of the campaign by the KPUsignificantly contributed to its success.ImplementationThe KPU and UNDP decided early on that it would bebest if the information campaign was implemented byone selected private sector service provider. The reasonfor this was to ensure continuity and consistency inmessages, as well as to make the management of thecampaign easier for the KPU. A further advantage ofthis implementation decision was that the selectedagency could bulk-buy airtime and lower overall costs.The professionalism of Fortune Indonesia, togetherwith its flexibility in meeting the changing priorities ofthe election environment, also proved to be invaluable.The KPU voter information strategy was shapedconsiderably by information on voter attitudes fromagencies such as The Asia Foundation and IFES.UNDP support to the voter attitude tracking surveysconducted by IFES throughout the election process wasimportant in ensuring that the KPU’s voter informationstrategy received continuous input and feedback. Thiswas helped by the fact that IFES included specificquestions on the “Milih Langsung” campaign and otherareas of KPU interest, and frequently discussed andanalysed the findings with all those involved in theimplementation of the information campaign.The KPU voter information activities funded throughthe programme were managed throughout bycommission members. The initial decisions concerningVoter EducationActivities and MethodologiesFrom the survey undertaken by the polling centre, itwas clear that face-to-face activities were the mosteffective in explaining the new election system. Notonly did participants learn the most through thesemethods, but it also resulted in a cascading effect withrespondents feeling the need to share informationthey received with relatives, friends or neighbours.Therefore, while considered expensive when valued ona cost-per-voter basis, particularly in comparison tomedia activities, these activities did prove to be costeffective.89

Alternative methods of voter education that mixedinformation with entertainment were as importantand as effective as face-to-face methods These weresuccessful because of their wide appeal to a broadaudience – the literate and the illiterate, all socioeconomicclasses, rural and urban audiences as well asthe old and the young and old timeframe for disbursement and the need toensure accountability for donor funds. However, localoutreach would be improved through a longer-termproject at a decentralized level to build relations withgrassroots organizations and to provide them with thenecessary technical and administrative capacities toimplement voter education programmes.While media activities, such as the use of televisionand radio, were successful in transmitting votereducation messages, the survey showed that printedmaterials (posters, brochures) were not so effective.That applied particularly in rural areas where literacyrates were low and reading habits not well established.In these areas, direct face-to-face training was moreeffective.Most CSOs programmes responded directly to thevoter information needs of the elections in terms ofthe materials, methods and media used. Due to timedemands, however, the broader demands of votereducation were not adequately covered. Longer termplanning would have allowed for voter educationactivities that were pedagogic, rather than beingexclusively informative in nature.In the course of the programme, there wasconsiderable difficulty in identifying CSOs that workedin remote areas, where people have arguably themost needs. Special attention, therefore, needs to bedevoted to inaccessible geographic locations, whichrequire specific budgetary allocations and longer termplanning.Voter Education GranteesSmaller and newer civil society organizations wereless likely to be selected due to their lack of previousexperience and the smaller size of their programmes.This strategy was considered necessary given theThe UNDP programme also tended to favour thoseCSOs that had come together as consortiums forthe implementation of activities over a broadergeographical area. In terms of implementation, thisstrategy worked well. However, experience showedthat these Consortiums tended to exist only for theterm of the activity, and they disbanded soon afterthe elections were completed. This caused significantdifficulties in trying to complete the final reporting,as many of the partners could no longer be contacted.The existence of legal documentation establishing theconsortium, which was required by UNDP in all cases,did not prove to hold a lot of weight.It was discovered some time into the implementationof the voter education activities that a number ofCSOs were being hindered by various authorities. Thiswas particularly the case in Aceh where freedom ofmovement was not possible. In the end, the KPU issuedan authorization letter (surat jalan) to all the UNDPvoter education grantees, which they were able toshow when required. This should be considered in theimplementation of any future voter or civic educationactivities.Technical Assistance to GranteesThe technical assistance provided to CSOs focusedmostly on reporting and financial accounting. Thisincreased the CSO’s familiarity with internationaldonor requirements and strengthened their abilityto produce necessary financial and administrative90

eports. However, the UNDP programme recommendsthat a component for technical assistance to CSOsshould be provided in the future. This need becameparticularly in taking their dealings with issues thatare inherently difficult, such as encouraging womento get more involved in politics and inter-acting wtihan illiterate audience. CSOs tended to be traditional intheir teaching approaches; a capacity building projectcould assist them in programme design and train themin adult learning methodologies.Monitoring and EvaluationThe number of monitoring officers put in place by theUNDP to monitor the activities of the CSOs should beincreased in the future. This will allow the officers toprovide better feedback to the CSOs after their visitsand for the CSOs to subsequently make improvementsand adjustments to their programmes, should there bea need to do so.CSOs were encouraged to work closely with localKPUDs in the implementation of their activities. Thisproved valuable in strengthening of KPUD/CSO voterinformation strategies at the local level and served asan ongoing monitor on CSO voter education activitiesand materialsThe UNDP programme put in place what proved to bean effective method of monitoring voter education.However, the monitoring served the purpose moreof informing the UNDP management of whetherthe activity was being implemented as planned andapproving instruction materials. There would have beenvalue in giving the CSOs funds to conduct their owninternal monitoring and evaluation, which would haveserved the purpose of promoting institutional learningand adapting activities to changing conditions.Election MonitoringMobilising MonitorsThere was a direct correlation between the numberof domestic monitors mobilized and the amount ofdonor funding available. As funding decreased foreach election, so did the number of monitors due tothe fact that, although observers are often labeledas “volunteers,” most are paid. While payment was91

deemed necessary in order to mobilize very largenumbers of monitors in a short timeframe, it cannotbe described as a sustainable practice. One monitoringorganization attributed this “bad habit” of relying onfunding to 1999 when large amounts of donor fundingwent in search of large numbers of observers.without it being directly involved in coordination ormobilization of observers, or in the reports presentedby the observer missions. One simple but effectivemeans of emphasizing the facilitation role was that asa rule, the UNDP did not chair the IORC meetings.Technical Assistance to GranteesThe organizations that were selected to conductelection monitoring activities were experiencedmonitoring organizations, which had all had a rolethe 1999 elections. Technical assistance, however,would have been valuable in introducing internationalmonitoring standards and procedures to these groups,to ensure that reporting was objective and bias-free.Links with PanwasAs noted previously, links between with nationalmonitoring groups and international observer groupswere limited. The reporting process would have beenstrengthened if the monitoring groups had beenencouraged to include more information on thePanwas and its role in their training activities, as wellas details on how and what to report.International ObservationUNDP’s Role in Facilitating ObserversThe IORC performed well in fulfilling its role as aclearing-house, with international observer delegationsaccepting the organization as their main forum for theexchange of information, views and ideas. One of theinitial concerns of the UNDP was to ensure that itsneutrality was maintained throughout. This was donethrough limiting the role of the IORC to facilitation,Involvement of PartnersThe IORC benefited considerably from its partnershipwith three other international organisations, IFES, TAFand NDI. Incorporating the technical expertise andexperience of these organizations contributed greatlyto the IORC’s success. The partners were consultedon major decisions and played an active role in themeetings (rotating chairmanship), in the presentationsand briefings and in the dissemination of electionrelatedmaterial for the briefing kits.National Monitors and InternationalObserversThe IORC was established specifically to helpinternational observers. There was broad agreement,however, that the international observers would benefitfrom greater interaction with national monitoringgroups, who could share their own expertise on thecountry and the results of their own monitoringexercises. While significant efforts were made by theIORC, the involvement of the national groups facedsome barriers, particularly relating to language.During the election process, some tensions arosebetween the national monitoring groups andinternational observers, which largery from amisunderstanding over the role of the observers. Whilemonitoring groups were mobilizing poll watchers intheir thousands, their reports did not receive the samekind of press attention as those of the significantlysmaller international observer teams. These tensions92

may have been alleviated through better interactionand information sharing between the two groups fromvery early on in the elections process.Programme Management andImplementationContracting ProceduresAs stated in the report, a number of difficulties wereencountered in the process of contracting civil societyorganizations to support the voter education andelection monitoring process. The method of solicitingproposals was considered by the KPU and UNDPprogramme to be the most effective in developinginnovative ideas and matching priority needs andwas therefore built into the programme document.However, this method did not appear to be compatiblewith UNDP procedures, which apparently do notinclude any privision for grant making. This howeverwas not communicated to the programme until fivemonths after the signing of the programme document,when the first of the grantee contracts was submittedto the local CAPC. This, together with the fact thatcontracts then had to be submitted to the New YorkACP for approval, caused significant delays in criticalactivities and hindered the proper implementation ofmany activities.success of the programme. However, it was hamperedby the many exceptions to this delegation, whichincluded any waiver of competitive bidding over$30,000. As both grants and contract extensions wereconsidered as waivers, a large part of the programmeimplementation was subject to direct approval byauthorities from New York. Despite significant supportand assistance from New York, these additional stepstook time and delayed the implementation, andtherefore the effectiveness of various programmes.Commitment and Disbursement ofDonor FundsDespite the fact that the initial donor meeting washeld in January 2003, the first commitment to theprogramme was made in August 2003, with the firstdisbursement of funds occurring in October 2003.This affected the ability for to plan and to commitcontractually to activities beyond the immediate term.It is recommended that donors be made more awareof the impact of late commitments and disbursementson the effectiveness of programme activities. Deadlinesshould be provided, beyond which UNDP would not feelit possible to disburse funds effectively and efficiently.Earmarking of Donor FundsSpeed of Contract ApprovalElections programmes are by nature strictly timebound.Any delays resulting from administrativeprocedures can have a direct and irreversibly negativeimpact on the support that is being provided by theUNDP. In recognition of this fact, UNDP New Yorkgranted a special US$1 million delegation-of-contractsigningauthority to the Resident Representativein Indonesia. This was an important element in theWhile donors were encouraged to earmark funds,this frequently occurred without reference to thecurrent status of programme funding. As a result, theprogramme strategy had to adapt to the availablefunds, rather than letting the funds work to support it.One example of this was the money provided by CIDAand earmarked for voter education. While significant insize, the funds were earmarked for activities related towomen, first-time voters and conflict areas. However,the size of the funds represented almost the entirevoter education budget for the legislative elections,93

esulting in the strategy having to be adaptedaccordingly.A further example was the money provided by theEuropean Union which was specifically based onthe needs assessment of the EU, rather than on thestrategy laid out in the UNDP programme documentand agreed on by both government and KPU partners.This meant a significant amendment in the programmestrategy, bringing in a focus on the Panwas which hadnot been specifically included in the original document.It also resulted in a total of Euros 3 million beingdirected at one specific consortium of CSOs, ratherthan being allocated through the project appraisalcommittee mechanism.of service providers for the vote tabulation centre(KPU, UNDP and IFES) and the signing of MoUs withpartners for specific activities (UNDP and NDI, UNDPand IFES).The evaluation report noted that the donormechanisms put in place ensured that “actors had acommon understanding and approach, knew what eachother was funding and obtained better geographiccoverage.” The evaluation also noted that the donorcoordination “was notable for the lack of turf battleswhich so often mar election assistance efforts,”with one bilateral donor stating that coordinationensured a “seamless mesh” of its bilateral aid with themultilateral UNDP programme.Bearing that in mind, attempts should be made toactively involve donors from the very start to ensurethat donor-specific requirements are built into theprogramme design and strategy. This would also ensurethat donors are fully in concurrence with the objectivesand activities of the programme at its onset. It wouldalso avoid the need for amendments to strategies andsubsequent planning, after agreement by all partners,and would therefore avoid any misunderstandings ordelays.Donor CoordinationOne significant lesson learned from the programmehas been the value and benefits of donor coordination.While the formal donor meetings provided forinformation sharing at high levels, the most valuablemechanisms for donor coordination were seen atthe working level. All programme activities involvedcoordination with donors to one extent or another.This worked in a range of different ways, including thedevelopment of a shared strategy and work plan forKPU training activities (KPU, IFES, AEC, JICA), the jointissuance of bidding documenta and the joint selection94


96Annex 1: Request from GoI to UNDP to coordinate elections assistance

Annex 2: MoU between GoI and UNDP97

100Annex 3: Trust Fund Approval from New York








108Annex 4: Letter of Agreement between KPU and UNDP




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