Séminaire d'Économie Publique - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne

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Séminaire d'Économie Publique - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne

These solutions seem unrealistic, they appear to be a back in the past. While dual technologyuse is a way to release defence budget constraint, it is not possible to increase defence publicfunds or to stop the financing of the research which is an important contribution to theeconomic growth. The two following ideas are more plausible: to strengthen exportationcontrols and/or to keep watch on edge-cutting technology through the entire world, even tospy.The control of the production and the trade of weapons and edge-cutting technology arewarranted by administrative structures: the Arms Export Control Act and the ExportAdministration Act in USA, and this task is devolved upon the Prime Minister by the WarMaterials Export Study Inter-ministerial Commission in France. A problem underlined byHagelin (1998) is that these controls don’t worry about dual product exportation, as it’s thecase in France, or are biased in favour of economic interests, as it’s the case in USA.Another way to focus economic interests and military sovereignty is to keep watch onedge-cutting technology. All the ministries of defence have a technological watch office.These offices are in charge to watch edge-cutting technology to allow an understanding topermit a technology oriented investment strategy to be put in place and to allow a more indepthappreciation of what the civil world is doing in certain areas of technology (Robets2001). We understand that this strategy is called technological watch in the case of civilsector, and can be called spying in the case of military technology. 1We add another way of reconciliation of this dilemma: defence secret label has to bemade incentive to innovate.3/ The IP rights in defence sector.Since public military sector faced to an important decrease of theirs budgets, intellectualproperty rights matter. Also, both private research publicly financed and dual-technology useforce defence administration to re-think the management of innovations and intellectualproperty rights. In other words, at the end of the cold war, public defence administration hasto incite private firms to collaborate. For this, new agreements of contractual incentives had tobe found because commercial contractors often have a variety of reasons for not wanting tocontract with the government given its IP rights management (USGAO 2002).1 Bruneau (2001) asks if the intelligence production has to be a civilian or a military task.6

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