COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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Chapter 8EVALUATION:SUCCESS OF THE BRITISH EFFORTThe British aggressively used a number of highly effective tactics to secure acloser intelligence relationship with the U.S. prior to the U.S.’s actually enteringthe war. These approaches took place on many levels and through many venues aspart of a comprehensive, although not necessarily well coordinated, plan on thepart of the British to draw the U.S. into World War II as their ally. Although theU.S. may have been predisposed to aid the British, given their common interests,it is unlikely the U.S. would have drawn as close to the British as they did in theperiod from 1938 to 1941 were it not for persistent British overtures.As the U.S. progressed toward supporting Britain in the war, intelligenceexchanges between the two countries became commonplace. Althoughincreased cooperation was consistently hampered by tensions and animosities,by the time the U.S. entered the war, cooperation in the area of intelligence,particularly naval intelligence, was well beyond anything anyone would haveimagined possible in 1939. Although U.S. decisionmakers in the Navy hierarchy—Roosevelt,Knox, and Stark—were predisposed to aid the British,because they clearly saw it was in the U.S. national interest to do so, they werealso very cautious. Even though they were receptive to British overtures, theinitiation of cooperative ventures was difficult given domestic political constraintsand the U.S. desire, especially among military officials, to be treated asequals by the British. Given this reluctance on the part of the American policymakersand senior military officials, it is highly unlikely that the level of intelligencecooperation attained between the two navies in the interwar period wouldhave been as extensive and wide-ranging as it became, were it not for repeatedBritish initiatives designed to advance that purpose. By gambling well with themost significant bargaining chips available to them—their technical advances,intelligence resources, and war experience—the British secured a “special relationship”with the United States in matters of intelligence, a relationship thatstill brings substantial benefits to both sides.Lessons for The U.S. Intelligence CommunityIf the rationale for intelligence sharing can be reduced to a cost-benefit calculationwhereby countries seek to mitigate weaknesses in their intelligence capabilityby seeking to arrange a limited partnership with a state or group that93
possesses complementary capabilities, 341 it is in practice a highly complex process.A state must determine its “potential partner’s reliability, stability, andpotential durability,” and must work out how the intelligence will be exchanged,the limits of that exchange, and what security protocols will be enacted to protectthe information provided. 342 A country cannot assume that another governmentoperates in the same way and must correctly ascertain the factors and individualswho truly influence policy before beginning the negotiations necessary to effectthe exchange. 343The most serious risk in intelligence sharing may be the exposure of sourcesand methods, but there are other potential dangers to sharing intelligence. Theseinclude the chance that intelligence given to one country will find its way to athird, potentially hostile, state; a propensity for circular reporting; increased pressureto share intelligence in other areas; and the risk that disclosure of the intelligencesharing could be politically harmful to the governments engaged in theexchanges. 344 The potential benefits of exchange are significant, however. Thelargest benefit is that intelligence cooperation can provide needed intelligencethat may be unobtainable otherwise. Cooperation may expand a country’s readilyavailable collection targets, or it may be a way to employ collection technologiesthat would otherwise be unavailable to one of the exchange partners. 345 Anothermajor benefit may be in the area of influence. A state may provide intelligence toanother country in the hope of influencing that country to act in a certain way.Cooperation may also be used as a way to engage another state diplomatically ina situation where no strong diplomatic ties exist. 346As in the post-Cold War period, the U.S., in the 20th century interwar timeframe,experienced a multiplicity of new threats at a time when the resourcesdevoted to intelligence were declining. This produced a situation whereby intelligenceexchange had to be considered by resource managers as the most efficientand effective means of addressing these requirements. 347 In one observer’sview, during periods of heightened crisis, the American public is much morewilling to tolerate associations that would be questionable during a more stable341Gideon Doron, “The Vagaries of Intelligence Sharing: The Political Imbalance,” InternationalJournal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 135.342 Doron, 135.343Doron, 141-142.344 Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 315-318.345 Richelson, 311-315.346 Richelson, 314-315.347 James J. Wirtz, “Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension,” InternationalJournal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 86.94
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
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officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
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ships in violation of treaty limits
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assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
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might bear on their work.” 39 As
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ility over time, its operational in
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Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
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told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
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ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
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firmly believed that British polici
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ecame one of the primary sources of
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of shoring up their strategic weakn
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mon framework for negotiation with
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assuaged British concerns about the
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In the area of intelligence exchang
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clear to the Americans that if they
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in his mind worked against closer c
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praised the fighting spirit of the
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Page 59 and 60: gear designed by the British. Altho
Page 61 and 62: American Attitudes On Intelligence
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Page 67 and 68: tion exchanges. Even more significa
Page 69 and 70: nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
Page 75 and 76: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
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Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
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Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
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Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
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Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
Page 112 and 113: GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
Page 116: APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120: ________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122: ________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 123 and 124: Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
Page 126 and 127: INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
Page 128 and 129: IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 130 and 131: Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
Page 132: PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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