Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-1935:FROM COOPERATION TO COMPETITIONThe basis of friendship between the two great English-speaking peoplesis rivalry and independence of each other, and these are the really trueand lasting bases of all friendships. The instant the condition of dependencearises between two equals the essence of friendship is lost....Thereis no necessity for an alliance between Great Britain and the UnitedStates, and there probably never will be one, but, in effect, it exists, ormust exist, through conditions which are arising in the world and whichwill hereafter necessitate that the two countries will stand together; otherwisethey may fall together.Captain Albert P. Niblack, USN, “Forms of governmentin relation to their efficiency for war,” ProceedingsThe Historical ContextThe quote above, written by the U.S. Director of Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong> followingWorld War I, was both descriptive and prescient. While the alliance thatwould form between the U.S. and the UK between 1935 and 1945 would be oneof the closest and most enduring the world has ever known, there were many inthe U.S. who were far more focused on the rivalry that existed between the twostates. Niblack’s main argument concerned the commonalites and superiority ofthe U.S. and British forms of government and, while the development of theFascist states of Europe and Asia was still years away, he correctly saw that itwas the common values shared by the American and British people that wouldeventually overcome the tensions between the two countries. 54 What were themain sources of tension and why were they so significant in the inter-warperiod, particularly to the naval officer corps in both countries? First, even withthe war experience behind them, many in the U.S. and the UK had little firsthandknowledge about each other and their perceptions of one another were rifewith stereotypes and misconceptions. Second, while the seeds of naval operationaland intelligence cooperation were planted during the period of the GreatWar, many U.S. naval officers saw the Royal Navy as their principal rival andthe British felt threatened by a U.S. policy committed to building a “Navy secondto none.” Third, Great Britain was seen by many in the U.S. as representingcolonialism, a practice most Americans despised, despite the fact that the U.S.54 Albert P. Niblack, CAPT, USN, “Forms of government in relation to their efficiency for war,”Proceedings 46 (September 1920): 1402-1430.15
had colonial possessions of its own. Fourth, the UK saw the U.S. as its maineconomic rival. This, coupled with a historic distrust of the ability of U.S. governmentofficials to keep secrets, made the British hesitant to cooperate withthe U.S. in the period after the Great War.Stereotypes and MisperceptionsStereotyping other peoples is always easy. For most Americans, the UK wasseen as a class-based society, where birth mattered more than merit for one’sadvancement, and many held that the UK was not truly a democracy becausetheir monarchial-parliamentary system did not resemble the republican form ofgovernment practiced in America. Additionally, America’s revolutionary heritage,its large Irish immigrant population, and resentment of colonialism wereall factors responsible for creating a feeling of distrust regarding British intentionsand actions on the part of many Americans. This distrust was not a universalfeeling, as many in the upper tier of American society idolized the Britishand there was significant respect for British cultural achievements at all levelsof U.S. society. 55 Misperceptions also abounded in the UK and many in the rulingcircles of that country were largely ignorant of how the U.S. functioned,both socially and politically, a condition that would persist throughout the interwarperiod and a factor that would later work against the British in theirattempts to influence U.S. policy. 56Naval Rivalry and The Impact of Naval Arms LimitationsNaval RivalryU.S. participation in the Great War was a watershed event in U.S.-UK relationsand, while the period under review in this chapter saw some easing of thetensions between the two countries, there were rough patches in the alliancewhich would serve as irritants in the future relations between the two navies.Despite the decision to enter the war on the U.S. side, Samuel Morison hasnoted that the leadership of the U.S. Navy was highly distrustful of the British.For example, before departing on his mission to England to coordinate theefforts of U.S. naval forces engaged in the war, Admiral William F. Sims was55 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in CompetitiveCo-operation (Chapel Hill, NC: The <strong>University</strong> of North Carolina Press, 1982), 23-24; Smith,Ultra-Magic Deals, 1-2; Stephen Budiansky, “The Difficult Beginnings of U.S. British CodebreakingCooperation,” in American-British-Canadian <strong>Intelligence</strong> Relations 1939-2000, ed. DavidStafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 50-51.56 Reynolds, 12; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), letter to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. AsiaticFleet, 12 November 1940, Papers of Harold R. Stark, Operational Archives Branch, Naval HistoricalCenter, Washington, D.C. Collection cited hereafter as Stark Papers.16
- Page 1 and 2: COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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still a powerful influence. While Z
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Since the Tizard Mission had only a
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appropriating large increases to th
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the French, a point which would not
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when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
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it was not official U.S. policy. St
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efforts that had begun with the Sta
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high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
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to successfully interpret the instr
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to little more than a nebulous stat
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to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
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Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
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Godfrey’s main concern was most l
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possesses complementary capabilitie
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2. Be prepared to give something of
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had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
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________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
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Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1