COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

More documents

Recommendations

Info

his immediate superior, the DNI, Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, who honoredthis and future requests. By December 1940 the attaché office had expanded to 30officers, in addition to numerous “naval observers” who would be assigned toEngland temporarily on specific fact-finding missions. 150 This significantincrease in personnel was needed to handle the ever-increasing flow of informationand intelligence provided by the British as the war progressed. The path toestablishing the U.S. naval observers with the British military and scientificestablishments was not an easy one as mutual distrust hampered the flow of informationbetween the two countries well into 1940.The Boom Defense-Arresting Gear DealDespite direction from his superior to engage in greater information exchangewith the British, CAPT Willson had been stymied in his efforts to obtain moreinformation. The main problem was the fact that neither the British nor the Americanswere willing to give up the technical secrets that the other side wanted.Prior to Willson’s departure, agreement was reached that the U.S. and the UKwould explore the possibility of exchanging information on the British harborboom defenses for details of the arresting gear used aboard U.S. naval carriers. Atleast one author has characterized this exchange as minor. 151 While it may appearso, it was, in fact, significant to both countries at the time and this event clearlyshows the limits of the possible, with regard to information exchange, in theperiod prior to the start of the war.While Willson and Godfrey had laid the ground work for this exchange prior toWillson’s departure in February 1939, it was June of that year before Kirk couldprovide Godfrey with a timeline in which the exchange would take place. Kirkinformed Godfrey that he should look to send his observer to the U.S. sometimein July or August of 1939, which disappointed Godfrey, given that this was nearlyeight months after the exchange had been agreed to. 152 The contrast between thetwo countries’ approaches to these exchanges is interesting, as they began justtwo weeks before the war started. In the matter of the exchange of boom defenseinformation, Captain H. E. Fischer and Commander G. W. Nelson were cordially150Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 15 September 1939, Kirk Papers; Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN,Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk, USN, 20 September 1939,Kirk Papers, n.p; “ALUSNA London Command History,” Stark Papers, 2.151 Zimmerman, 32-33.152Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers. Then-CNO ADM Leahy actually approved theexchange on 27 July 1939. For additional information see William Leahy, ADM, USN, Chief ofNaval Operations, Memorandum to the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Ordnance, Construction andRepair, and Yards and Docks, 27 July 1939, DNI Correspondence.45
eceived by the British and from the start of their visit Kirk was able to report thatthey were receiving full cooperation from their hosts and were even allowed toinspect the British anchorage at Scapa Flow to see the boom defenses in operation.In all, Fischer and Nelson were in England for well over a month and theywere able to say with confidence that they had “gotten just about everythingworthwhile on the subject of boom defenses” from their British hosts. 153The British sent Royal Navy Captain R. M. Ellis to the USS Saratoga to learnwhat he could about the American arresting gear. Officers aboard the Saratogawere given clear instructions that they were not to provide any details of aircraftcharacteristics to the Royal Navy officer, but they could discuss other matters of anon-sensitive nature. Ellis impressed the U.S. officers he came in contact with,especially the Commander of Carrier Division ONE, Rear Admiral William“Bull” Halsey, who admired Ellis’ confidence in the Royal Air Force and his willingnessto discuss British aviation. 154 Even though the exchange went well andAmerican officers were impressed with British openness, there was still tremendousreticence on the part of the Navy hierarchy to share anything beyond whathad been so arduously agreed to. For example, Ellis had asked questions aboutnight carrier landings and barrier crash rates, but he had been rebuffed onboardthe Saratoga. Efforts by the British Assistant Naval Attaché to obtain this informationwere also denied. 155 Even Kirk tried to capitalize on the momentum hehad hoped this exchange would generate by trying to convince Anderson that theBritish should, at the very least, be given details on the Navy’s aircraft cast recoverysystem since, now that they were exposed to it from Ellis’ visit, they wouldquickly figure out how to replicate it on their own. 156 As with the informationrequested by the British, Anderson was forced to tell Kirk that the details of thesystem would need to remain confidential. 157153Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 14 August 1939, Kirk Papers; H. E. Fischer, CAPT, USN, Letter to U.S.Naval Attaché, London (Captain Alan G. Kirk), 23 September 1939, DNI Correspondence.154Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics (Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, USN), Letter to the Chief ofNaval Operations, 15 July 1939, DNI Correspondence; Commander Carrier Division ONE (RearAdmiral W. H. Halsey), Letter to Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson),14 August 1939.155 Commanding Officer, U.S. Fleet, Aircraft Battle Force, Letter to Director of Naval Intelligence(Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson), 12 August 1939, DNI Correspondence; F. J. A. Coleby,CDR, Royal Navy, Letter to Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson), 22August 1939, DNI Correspondence.156 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 19 August 1939, DNI Correspondence.157 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Captain AlanGoodrich Kirk, USN, 5 September 1939, DNI Correspondence.46
Page 1 and 2:
COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
Page 4:
The Joint Military Intelligence Col
Page 8 and 9: FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
Page 10 and 11: PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
Page 14 and 15: action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
Page 16 and 17: officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
Page 18 and 19: ships in violation of treaty limits
Page 20 and 21: assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
Page 22 and 23: might bear on their work.” 39 As
Page 24 and 25: ility over time, its operational in
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
Page 28 and 29: told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
Page 30 and 31: ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
Page 34: ecame one of the primary sources of
Page 37 and 38: of shoring up their strategic weakn
Page 39 and 40: mon framework for negotiation with
Page 43 and 44: assuaged British concerns about the
Page 45 and 46: In the area of intelligence exchang
Page 47 and 48: clear to the Americans that if they
Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
Page 51 and 52: praised the fighting spirit of the
Page 53 and 54: through November of 1940 persuaded
Page 55: and Great Britain. His principalcon
Page 59 and 60: gear designed by the British. Altho
Page 61 and 62: American Attitudes On Intelligence
Page 63 and 64: information did have an impact on K
Page 65 and 66: the affair. 183 This lack of resent
Page 67 and 68: tion exchanges. Even more significa
Page 69 and 70: nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
Page 75 and 76: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
Page 79 and 80: Since the Tizard Mission had only a
Page 81 and 82: appropriating large increases to th
Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
Page 101 and 102: Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
Page 103 and 104: Godfrey’s main concern was most l
Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
Page 107 and 108:
2. Be prepared to give something of
Page 109 and 110:
had in forming its own Joint Intell
Page 112 and 113:
GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
Page 114 and 115:
APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
Page 116:
APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120:
________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122:
________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 123 and 124:
Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
Page 126 and 127:
INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
Page 128 and 129:
IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 130 and 131:
Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
Page 132:
PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
show all

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?