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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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gave Kirk information on six German U-boats operating in the Atlantic. 180 FromKirk’s comments to Anderson, it was obvious that Kirk had formed a favorableimpression of British naval intelligence efforts.While British reluctanceto share intelligenceonce war broke out inSeptember 1939 can beattributed to the factorscited above, there weremore mundane problemsthat militated against theexchange of informationin the first few months ofthe war. Kirk reported Figure 3. German Propaganda on Kirk’s Visit.that factors such as logistics,lack of social opportunities,and themovement of some Admiraltyoffices during thefirst few months of the war significantly hindered the flow of information. 181Despite the restrictions, Kirk was able to gather some information and hissmall staff began 24-hour operations in the first few weeks of the war. In October1939, Godfrey told Kirk that he had permission to visit the Home Fleet, atThurso in Northern Scotland, leaving Kirk with the impression he could staythere a few days to observe fleet defenses. Kirk only stayed one night, however,when he learned that the Commander of the British Fleet, ADM Forbes,while receiving him cordially, had not been informed of the purpose of hisvisit. In actuality, Winston Churchill had directed Godfrey to send Kirk toThurso as part of a plan by the British to counter German propaganda. TheGermans claimed they had sunk the Ark Royal and Kirk was able to verify thatthe British aircraft carrier was in excellent condition on his return to London.182 Kirk’s visit became fodder for the Nazi propagandists (see cartoon). Inhis letter forwarding this graphic to Anderson, Kirk displays no rancor at havingbeen used by the British, in fact, he seemed to relish the role he played in180Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-3. This was the second letter to Anderson dated28 June 1939.181“ALUSNA London Command History,” Stark Papers, 3.182Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, 10 October 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2.53

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