gave Kirk information on six German U-boats operating in the Atlantic. 180 FromKirk’s comments to Anderson, it was obvious that Kirk had formed a favorableimpression of British naval intelligence efforts.While British reluctanceto share intelligenceonce war broke out inSeptember 1939 can beattributed to the factorscited above, there weremore mundane problemsthat militated against theexchange of informationin the first few months ofthe war. Kirk reported Figure 3. German Propaganda on Kirk’s Visit.that factors such as logistics,lack of social opportunities,and themovement of some Admiraltyoffices during thefirst few months of the war significantly hindered the flow of information. 181Despite the restrictions, Kirk was able to gather some information and hissmall staff began 24-hour operations in the first few weeks of the war. In October1939, Godfrey told Kirk that he had permission to visit the Home Fleet, atThurso in Northern Scotland, leaving Kirk with the impression he could staythere a few days to observe fleet defenses. Kirk only stayed one night, however,when he learned that the Commander of the British Fleet, ADM Forbes,while receiving him cordially, had not been informed of the purpose of hisvisit. In actuality, Winston Churchill had directed Godfrey to send Kirk toThurso as part of a plan by the British to counter German propaganda. TheGermans claimed they had sunk the Ark Royal and Kirk was able to verify thatthe British aircraft carrier was in excellent condition on his return to London.182 Kirk’s visit became fodder for the Nazi propagandists (see cartoon). Inhis letter forwarding this graphic to Anderson, Kirk displays no rancor at havingbeen used by the British, in fact, he seemed to relish the role he played in180Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-3. This was the second letter to Anderson dated28 June 1939.181“ALUSNA London Command History,” Stark Papers, 3.182Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, 10 October 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2.53
the affair. 183 This lack of resentment likely had more to do with Kirk’s anti-Nazi feelings than his pro-British tendencies. Like most officers of his generation,Kirk remained wary of the British, as evidenced when he forwarded adetailed intelligence report on Mexico to Anderson that Godfrey had providedhim in November 1939. Kirk asked Anderson to have ONI’s analysts take ahard look at it and to let him know if the information in it could be confirmed.As he told Anderson, “[i]t would help me to know whether or not I am beingmade a ‘stooge.’” 184 Kirk’s concerns demonstrate that, although he was receptiveto Godfrey’s overtures, he was not blindly trustful of what the DNI providedhim.The two most significant items of information the British gave Kirk duringthis period, items given without any reciprocal exchange from the U.S., asGodfrey pointed out, were intelligence on the German magnetic mine and theopportunity to examine vessels damaged in enemy action. The decision togive the Americans the information on the mine was very significant, givenBritish security concerns, but the Admiralty reasoned that one day the AmericanNavy would join their fight, and if the U.S. fleet was vulnerable to thistype of mine it would be an ineffective force until such time as they couldinstall the proper countermeasures. 185 In early November 1939, Kirk wasinvited to the Admiralty to speak to the Director of the Minesweeping Division,CAPT Morse, who told Kirk the information he was going to give himneeded to “be treated with the utmost secrecy” as the British government wasvery concerned the Germans would find out just how effective the mine hadbeen. 186 While the British had not recovered a mine intact at this point, theyshared every bit of data they had with Kirk, to include their theories on theactuation method, size of the explosive payload, the method of delivery, themost effective deployment depth of the mine, its destructive effect, and howthe British were attempting to counter it using an experimental degaussingmethod. 187 Kirk was also given information about the German 21-inch torpedo,the British asdic system (sonar), and he was notified by the British183 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, 20 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1.184Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, 9 November 1939, Kirk Papers.185 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 56.186 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, Enclosure (B) to letter dated 6 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. Cited hereafteras Kirk, Enclosure (B) to Letter to Anderson, 6 November 1939.187 Kirk, Enclosure (B) to Letter to Anderson, 6 November 1939, 1-4.54
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
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________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
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Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1