COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to the Foreign Office, where it was intenselydebated. Tizard, who worked for the Air Ministry and was essentially the creatorof Great Britain’s air defense early warning network, was adamant aboutthe need to engage in this exchange. While many, including Churchill, wereopposed to an exchange, particularly one offered with no expectation of reciprocation,Tizard was aided in his fight by other high-ranking individuals, suchas First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, who persuasively argued that concernsabout U.S. security were overblown. By late June, Churchill gave his permissionfor the mission to go forward, most likely in response to the worseningmilitary situation. 224 Tizard was placed in charge of the mission and given thego-ahead to begin planning for the exchanges. 225 On 8 July 1940, Lord Lothianpresented an aide-memoire to the State Department, requesting an immediateand general exchange of technical information between the two governments.Significantly, the proposal stated that[i]t is not the wish of His Majesty’s Government to make this proposalthe subject of a bargain of any description. Rather do they wish, in orderto show their readiness for the fullest cooperation, to be perfectly openwith you and to give you full details of any equipment or devices inwhich you are interested without in any way pressing you before hand togive specific undertakings on your side, although, of course, they wouldhope you could reciprocate. 226Further, Lothian made it clear that the British were offering to provide theAmericans with their most important technical secret, radar, as the proposalstated the British were willing to give the Americans techniques used to detectand target enemy aircraft. 227 Here the British made it clear that there would beno quid pro quo in this exchange, that the information they would providewould be gratis and that it would be as full and complete as the Americansdesired.Both the Navy and the War Departments accepted the British proposal. Theofficial U.S. acceptance was sent to the British on 29 July 1940, designating the224Zimmerman, 20-24, 62-64, 71, 117.225 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 57-58.226 Department of State, “The British Ambassador (Lothian) to President Roosevelt—AideMemoire,” 8 July 1940, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1940 3 (Washington, DC: GPO,1958): 78. Cited hereafter as “Aide Memoire, 8 July 1940,” FRUS 1940 vol. 3.227 “Aide Memoire, 8 July 1940,” FRUS 1940 vol. 3, 78.64