COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

the French, a point which would not be lost on the Americans since they werevery concerned about British attempts to dominate any command and controlrelationships that might be established whenever the military forces of the twocountries would operate together. Additionally, the report outlined Great Britain’ssituation and provided general intelligence concerning shipping losses and effectivetactics against German bombers. 256After the tours were concluded, the Committee reconvened on 29 August andthe British laid out their view of the strategic situation in a frank and wide-rangingbrief. The British identified their two strategic priorities as defense of theHome Islands and Egypt, noting that there was little they could do to improvetheir situation in the Far East. They were sanguine about their prospects, believingthat the war would be won by the country that could make the most effectiveuse of superior resources and noting that their control of the seas gave themaccess to all the world’s resources and American productive capacity while theGermans could only draw on the resources of Europe. During the presentation,the British candidly answered questions about their procurement programs, scopeof U.S. assistance desired, and the effectiveness of their own blockade efforts. 257Once again, the candor of the British, along with their optimism and confidence,even in the face of the London Blitz, which was then beginning, appeared to havea positive effect on the U.S. delegation.From the perspective of intelligence cooperation between the two countries,the subsequent meeting held on 31 August was a watershed event. This meetingbegan with the British outlining their general strategy for winning the war andreiterating the position they had taken during the 1939 talks between the CNOand CDR Hampton: that they would need to rely heavily on the U.S. in the FarEast if Japan initiated hostilities there. Ghormley asked the British a number oftough questions concerning their expectations of the U.S., all of which the Britishanswered with candor. 258 BGEN Strong made an offer that would eventually helpto forge the SIGINT relationship between the two countries. He told the Britishthat256 Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, USN, Chief ofNaval Operations, 23 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-11. Ghormley forwarded the report on theconduct of the war, which the British had prepared on 16 August 1940, to Stark as an enclosure tothis memo.257Standardization of Arms Committee, “Minutes of the Anglo-American Standardization ofArms Committee,” 29 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-11.258 Standardization of Arms Committee, “Minutes of the Anglo-American Standardization ofArms Committee,” 31 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-12. Cited hereafter as SOA CommitteeMinutes, 31 August 1940.72