Immigration in Europe - HumanitarianNet - Universidad de Deusto

INTRODUCTION 15need to expand the immigration of unskilled as well as skilled labour (MaMung), while in Belgium the government is holding back on a moreliberal approach to immigration, presumably because of worries aboutpublic opinion, even though the business world is in favour of expandedimmigration to help meet shortages of high skilled labour (Martiniello).Second, there is a related but more fundamental and long termargument to be made in favour of expanding immigration flows,namely that this is necessary to meet Europe’s “demographic deficit”.Niessen would like to shift the debate about immigration in the EU froma preoccupation with the need to exclude third country nationals to theneed for increased immigration in the context of a declining population.The average number of children per woman of childbearing age in theEU in 2000 was 1.53, as against 2.1 needed to replace the population.Because of increased life expectancy, the proportion of those aged 65and over will reach 22 % in 2025, having risen from 16 % in 1998. Theresult is that the population of working age will have fallen by about 40million in 2050 and the ratio of workers to pensioners will have declinedfrom four to one, to two to one. Notwithstanding regional variations,this demographic arithmetic has stark implications for the future ofpensions and health care systems in European welfare states. While itseems obvious that the expansion of immigration could play a part(along with policies to increase fertility and encourage greaterparticipation in the labour force) in helping to turn this situation roundin the short term, the long term effects of increased immigration on thelabour market cannot be easily predicted because, as Niessen pointsout, immigrants are also subject to the ageing process!Both of the above arguments might be called Euro-centric, in thatthey are based upon the economic self-interest of European welfarestates. A third argument is based on the potential contribution of anincreased flow of labour migrants from less developed to moredeveloped countries (and an opposite flow of remittances) to raisingthe living standards and life chances of the world’s poor. Since thisargument is not presented in any detail by the contributors to thisbook, we give some space to it here because we believe it is potentiallythe most important and, therefore, one that deserves particularconsideration. Nor is it is without a significant, if indirect, element ofEuropean self interest, if we assume that global inequality is the greatestlong term threat to the security and well being of the inhabitants of therich industrialised countries.One of the most striking ways of representing the rich-poor dividein the world today is to note that farmers in the EU receive a subsidy ofUS$2 per day, for each of their cattle, while 1.3 billion of the world’s