China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69* Chen Jian

More documents

Recommendations

Info

358 The China Quarterly1956.6 In the summer of 1958 the Vietnamese Politburo formally askedBeijing's advice about the strategies of the "Southern revolution." In awritten response, the Beijing leadership emphasized that "the most fundamental,most important and most urgent task" facing the Vietnameserevolution was "how to promote socialist revolution and reconstruction inthe North." "The realization of revolutionary transformation in theSouth," according to Beijing, "was impossible at the current stage."Beijing therefore suggested that Hanoi should adopt in the South astrategy of "not exposing our own forces for a long period, accumulatingour own strength, establishing connections with the masses, and waitingfor the coming of proper opportunities."' The nation-wide famine followingthe failure of the Great Leap Forward forced the Beijing leadership tofocus on dealing with domestic issues. During Zhou Enlai's meetingswith Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam's Prime Minister,in Hanoi in May 1960, he advised the Vietnamese that they shouldadopt a flexible approach in the South by combining political and militarystruggles. He emphasized that even when military struggle seemed inevitable,it was still necessary for political struggle to take an importantposition.8 All this indicates that Beijing's leaders were not enthusiasticabout their Vietnamese comrades starting military struggles in the Southin 1959-60, and that "to resume the resistance" in the South was basicallyan initiative by the Vietnamese themselves.However, Beijing took no active steps to oppose a revolution in SouthVietnam. The relationship between Communist China and Vietnam wasvery close in the late 1950s and early 1960s.9 The close connection withHanoi, as well as Beijing's revolutionary ideology, would not allow theChinese to go so far as to become an obstacle to the Vietnamese causeof revolution and reunification. The late 1950s and early 1960s also witnessedin China the continuous propaganda that Beijing was a natural allyof the oppressed peoples of the world in their struggles for national liberation.It would be inconceivable, in such a circumstance, for Beijing toplay too negative a role toward the Vietnamese revolution. Further, froma strategic point of view, as Sino-American relations experienced severalcrises during this period, especially in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, theChinese leaders would not ignore the fact that intensifying revolutionaryinsurgence in South Vietnam could extend America's commitment, thus6. The Editorial Group for the History of Chinese Military Advisers in Vietnam (ed.),Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi (A Factual Account of theParticipation of Chinese Military Advisory Group in the Struggle of Assisting Vietnam andResisting France) (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1990), pp. 142-43.7. Guo Ming et al., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 66; for a Vietnamese versionof the story, see The Truth about Vietnamo-Chinese Relations over the Past Thirty Years(Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979), pp. 29-33.8. Guo Ming et al., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 67; and the Institute ofDiplomatic History under Chinese Foreign Ministry (eds.), Zhou Enlai waijiao huodongdashiji, 1949-1975 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai's Important Diplomatic Activities) (Beijing:World Affairs Press, 1993), pp. 279-280.9. See Huang Zheng, Hu Zhiming yu Zhongguo (Ho Chi Minh and China) (Beijing:People's Liberation Army Press, 1987), ch. 6.
China in the Vietnam War, 1964-69 359improving China's position in its confrontation with the United States inEast Asia.'"Under these circumstances and in response to Hanoi's requests, Chinaoffered substantial military aid to Vietnam before 1963. According to onehighly reliable Chinese source, during the 1956-63 period, China'smilitary aid to Vietnam totalled 320 million yuan. China's arms shipmentsto Vietnam included 270,000 guns, over 10,000 piece of artillery,200 million bullets of different types, 2.02 million artillery shells, 15,000wire transmitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000 trucks, 15 planes,28 naval vessels, and 1.18 million sets of military uniforms." Without adirect military presence in Vietnam, Beijing's leaders used these supportsto show to their comrades in Hanoi their solidarity.Beijing's Decision to Increase Aid to Hanoi, 1963-64Beijing's policy towards Vietnam began to turn more radical in late1962 and early 1963. In the summer of 1962, a Vietnamese delegation ledby Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh visited Beijing. The Vietnamesesummarized the situation in South Vietnam, emphasizing the possibilitythat with the escalation of military conflicts in the South, the UnitedStates might use air and/or land forces to attack the North. The Chinesewere very much alarmed by this assessment and offered to equip anadditional 230 battalions for the Vietnamese.'2Beijing made general security commitments to Hanoi throughout 1963.In March, a Chinese military delegation headed by Luo Ruiqing, China'schief of staff, visited Hanoi. Luo said that if the Americans were to attackNorth Vietnam, China would come to its defence. The two sides alsodiscussed how they should co-ordinate their operations in the event of anAmerican invasion of North Vietnam. In May, Liu Shaoqi, the secondmost important leader in China, visited Vietnam. In his meetings with Ho10. In late 1958, during the Taiwan Straits crisis, Mao Zedong introduced the concept of"noose strategy." According to this concept, overseas American military presence served ashangman's nooses for the United States. Every military commitment abroad would add onemore noose to the Americans, and finally strangle the "U.S. imperialism." Mao thereforebelieved that the overextension of America's strength would lead to the final failure ofthe U.S. foreign policy in general and its policy toward China in particular. See MaoZedong's speech to the Supreme State Council, 8 September 1958, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedongwengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic, 8 vols.)(Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987-93), Vol. 7, pp. 391-92. Fordetailed discussions of the "noose strategy," see Zhang Shuguang Deterrence and StrategicCulture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1992), ch. 8.11. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (ThePeople's Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: CCP Historical MaterialsPress, 1989), pp. 408-409. This work offers one of the best accounts of China's militarydevelopment from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. As the authors were alleged to havereleased confidential information without proper authorization, the book was withdrawn fromcirculation shortly after its publication.12. Guo Ming et al., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 69; Wang Xiangen, Kang Meiyuanyue shilu (A Factual Account of Resisting America and Assisting Vietnam) (Beijing:International Cultural Development Press, 1990), pp. 25-26; see also Beijing Review, 23November 1979.
Page 1 and 2: China's Involvement in the Vietnam
Page 3: China in the Vietnam War, 1964-69 3
Page 7 and 8: China in the Vietnam War, 1964-69 3
Page 25 and 26: Table 1: China's Military Supply to
Page 33: China in the Vietnam War, 1964-69 3

China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69* Chen Jian

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?