FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

Appendix Fso as not to give the enemy a time and place; unpredictability makes it harder for the enemy totarget IED search teams.• Considering anything suspect that looks out of place (for example, a rock pile or brush, wire,detonating cord, an abandoned vehicle, symmetrical trash bags).• Maintaining a visible presence and aggressive posture.• Conducting mounted and dismounted surveillance between checkpoints.WARNINGDo not attempt to do EODs job of neutralizing IEDs; what appearsto be simple may indeed be complex.ENTRY CONTROL POINTF-8. ECPs are a likely target for VBIEDs. Before constructing an ECP, conduct an IPB identifying thespecific threats to the installation. Identified threats are ECP design drivers.DESIGN CHARACTERISTICSF-9. ECP design characteristics include―• Deterrence. The overall ECP design, security posture, and procedures should convey to apotential aggressor a hardened access point not likely to be penetrated―it will fail.• Detection. Detection is the multiple measures that sense, validate, and communicate thepresence of an aggressor to the response force (cameras, vehicle passes, searches, questioning,bomb dogs, and so forth).• Defense. Defense is the active and passive measures employed to prevent an aggressor fromgaining entry or to minimize the effects of an attack (drop barriers, blast walls, stand off,serpentines, guards, and so forth).• Defeat. Defeat is the active and escalating measure of force design to defeat an aggressor (heavymachine guns (MGs), AT weapons, or QRF).DESIGN ELEMENTSF-10. ECP design elements include―• Traffic control. The flow of vehicles and personnel must be effectively controlled in order toefficiently segregate and process legitimate movement through the ECP. Traffic control shouldbe maintained by―• Segregating and conducting identification checks, HN police searches, and vehicle andpersonnel passes.• Using speed control (speed bumps or serpentines).• Using positive stops (wire rope barriers or vehicle drop barriers).• Channelizing and funneling traffic through the ECP provides clear engagement zones forMGs.• Allowing unauthorized vehicles to exit.• Threat mitigation. Threat mitigation involves features (such as blast walls to protect from theeffects of overpressure) to reduce identified threats and increased standoff distances to protectagainst fragmentation. Threat mitigation includes―• Hesco® barriers for blast protection (VBIED, suicide bomber, or direct and in-direct fire).• Predetonation screen (rocket-propelled grenade [RPG] attack).• Heavy MG and AT weapons (engage enemy vehicles or personnel).• Standoff to reduce effects from blast overpressure and fragmentation.F-4 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2005