FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

More documents

Recommendations

Info

PrefaceFMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 establishes doctrine (fundamental principals and TTP) for the defeat of adversaryIED operations. It is based on existing doctrine and lessons learned from recent combat operations.This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/the Army National Guard ofthe United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). The primary audience for thisFMI is commanders, leaders, and staffs at corps-level and below.To make this manual useful to leaders involved in IED defeat operations regardless of where these operationsmay occur, the doctrine contained herein is broad in scope and involves principles applicable to varioustheaters. This FMI is not focused on any region or country. IED operations have some common characteristics,but their methods of implementation may vary widely.FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is not a stand-alone document. Readers must be familiar with the fundamentals ofassured mobility found in Field Manual (FM) 3-34. This manual uses assured mobility as a framework to assistleaders with planning and executing IED defeat operations. Additionally, this FMI incorporates lessons learnedand major studies from sources across the Army and joint community. It focuses on the asymmetric threats andestablishes doctrine to defeat those threats.Note. An FMI is a DA publication that provides expedited delivery of urgently needed doctrinethat the proponent has approved for use without placing it through the standard developmentprocess. Unless an FMI is rescinded, the information it disseminates is incorporated into a newor revised FM. An FMI expires after two years, unless superseded or rescinded.This manual―• Provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and staffs for planning, preparing for, andexecuting and assessing IED defeat operations.• Serves as an authoritative reference for emerging doctrine, TTP, materiel and force structure,institutional and unit training, and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for IED defeatoperations.• Outlines the critical roles and responsibilities of staff cells for IED defeat operations.Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. Glossary references:The glossary lists most terms used in FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 that have joint or Army definitions. Termsfor which FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is the proponent FMI (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk inthe glossary. Text references: Definitions for which FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is the proponent FMI areprinted in boldface in the text. These terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next revision ofFM 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent FM followsthe definition.The proponent for this publication is United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparingagency is the Doctrine Development Division, United States Army Engineer School. Send comments andrecommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly toCommandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATSE-DD, Suite 336, 320 MANSCEN Loop, FortLeonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929.Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.iv FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2005
Introduction“This is not a new war. Our enemies have been waging it for some time, and it willcontinue for the foreseeable future. As President Bush has stated, ‘This is a different kindof war against a different kind of enemy.’ It is a war we must win, a war for our very wayof life.”General Peter J. Schoomaker,Chief of Staff of the ArmyArrival Message, 1 August 2003The proliferation of IEDs on the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan has posed the most pervasivethreat facing coalition forces in those theaters. The persistent effectiveness of this threat has influenced unitoperations, U.S. policy, and public perception. IEDs are a weapon of choice and are likely to remain amajor component of the Global War on Terrorism for the foreseeable future.The definitive history of IEDs has not been extensively documented. However, many specific incidents inthe last 100 years have been well documented. Recently there has been a trend of increasing terrorist actsagainst the United States. These attacks have increased in their frequency, in their level of sophistication,and in their lethality. For example, the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was attacked with a truck bombthat killed 241 U.S. Marines in 1983. This was followed by the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 overLockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. (The plane carried passengers from 21 countries, but 189 of the 259 on boardwere Americans; the crash also killed 11 people on the ground.) In the first terrorist attack on the WorldTrade Center in New York City in 1993, a truck bomb failed to cause the desired number of casualties butnevertheless demonstrated the ability to attack the U.S. homeland. In 1996, another truck bomb killed 19U.S. Soldiers and injured 372 at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Theviolence continued with the bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 andthe United States Ship (USS) Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, in 2000.With the development of sufficiently powerful, stable, and accessible explosives, a preferred weapon of aterrorist is a bomb or IED. As a weapon, bombs are efficient as they allow a person or group to strike withgreat destructive effect. The sophistication of the device depends on the maker. They can range from beingvery simple to very complex with booby traps, antihandling devices, and sophisticated electronic initiationdevices to prevent disarming. Generally, bombs can be triggered in a variety of ways. A timer is commonand can be set hours in advance. Remote-controlled detonators with a limited range allow the timing of thedetonation exactly. Bombs can be manufactured out of many household products (including fertilizer andbatteries), but most sophisticated bombs use a small amount of explosive to trigger a larger quantity ofpoorer grade explosive material. Bombs do not have to be large to be effective. Most bombs are small andare directed at individual targets, such as military personnel or politicians. Often these are planted along aroadside and detonated as a vehicle passes. Larger devices can be placed in vehicles parked along theroadway or driven into the target by suicide bombers willing to give up their lives for the cause.This manual provides commanders, leaders, and staffs with fundamental principals and TTP for the defeatof adversary IED operations. Based on current doctrine, this manual also incorporates the lessons learnedfrom recent combat operations. The following briefly describes the chapters and appendixes:• Chapter 1 defines IED defeat operations. It describes how commanders and their staff use the IEDdefeat framework to assist with planning, preparing, executing, and assessing IED operations.• Chapter 2 provides a description of the COE in which IEDs are employed. It explains how andwhy the enemy uses IEDs to disrupt friendly operations from a strategic to a tactical perspective.• Chapter 3 defines how threat forces operate and how they use IEDs.21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 v
Page 2: ForewordAttacks from improvised exp
Page 9 and 10: Chapter 1FundamentalsWith the proli
Page 11 and 12: Fundamentals• Avoid activities. T
Page 13 and 14: Fundamentals• Explosive hazard. A
Page 15 and 16: Chapter 2Contemporary Operational E
Page 17 and 18: Contemporary Operational Environmen
Page 25 and 26: Chapter 3Improvised Explosive Devic
Page 27 and 28: Improvised Explosive Device ThreatF
Page 31 and 32: Improvised Explosive Device Charact
Page 33 and 34: Improvised Explosive Device Charact
Page 35 and 36: Chapter 5Organizations Involved in
Page 37 and 38: Organizations Involved in Improvise
Page 47: Improvised Explosive Device Respons
Page 51 and 52: Improvised Explosive Device Respons
Page 53 and 54:
Improvised Explosive Device Respons
Page 55 and 56:
Chapter 7Improvised Explosive Devic
Page 57 and 58:
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Chapter 8Training RequirementsUnits
Page 71 and 72:
Training RequirementsENEMY TACTICS8
Page 73 and 74:
Training RequirementsCompany Level
Page 75 and 76:
Training RequirementsTable 8-2. Cri
Page 77 and 78:
Appendix AMetric Conversion ChartTh
Page 79 and 80:
Appendix BIntelligenceThe process o
Page 81 and 82:
IntelligenceB-10. As with standard
Page 83 and 84:
IntelligenceB-16. HUMINT provides t
Page 85 and 86:
Intelligenceturn, broadcast video v
Page 87 and 88:
IntelligenceSECTION III - PROCESS C
Page 89 and 90:
Appendix COrganization Contact Info
Page 91 and 92:
Organization Contact Information an
Page 93 and 94:
Organization Contact Information an
Page 95 and 96:
Appendix DRecording and Tracking Im
Page 97 and 98:
Recording and Tracking Improvised E
Page 99 and 100:
Recording and Tracking Improvised E
Page 101 and 102:
Appendix ETactics, Techniques, and
Page 103 and 104:
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Page 105 and 106:
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Page 107 and 108:
Appendix FMilitary SearchMilitary s
Page 109 and 110:
Military SearchPRINCIPLES• Ambush
Page 111 and 112:
Military Search• Potential VBIED
Page 113 and 114:
Appendix GSpecialized EquipmentIn g
Page 115 and 116:
Specialized EquipmentCASSPIRG-3. Th
Page 117 and 118:
Specialized EquipmentROBOTSFigure G
Page 119 and 120:
Specialized EquipmentFigure G-12. A
Page 121 and 122:
Specialized Equipment• Two shock
Page 123 and 124:
Appendix HTraining ResourcesTASKSTh
Page 125 and 126:
Training ResourcesH-9. A video avai
Page 127 and 128:
GlossarySECTION I - ACRONYMS AND AB
Page 129 and 130:
GlossaryDOTLDDOTMLPFDirectorate of
Page 131 and 132:
GlossaryIVMMDIWJCMECJDIGSJIEDDJIMJI
Page 133 and 134:
GlossaryOPORD operation orderops op
Page 135 and 136:
GlossaryWITWMDwwwweapons intelligen
Page 137 and 138:
ReferencesSOURCES USEDThese are the
Page 139 and 140:
References*FMI 4-30.5. Modular EOD
Page 141 and 142:
FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.0121 Septemb
show all

FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?