FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

Chapter 8Training RequirementsUnits must be prepared to perform IED defeat to serve in-theaters of operationsaround the world. Upon arrival to a theater, units are finding themselves performingoperations traditionally reserved for combat arms units. With a clear lack of visiblelines of contact, Soldiers and Marines are finding themselves constantly on guard andpotentially performing combat arms tasks. Training at home stations beforedeployment is critical to ensure that units traditionally designated as CS and combatservice support (CSS) can maneuver and survive on the battlefield. The informationin this chapter will provide some necessary skills and information to be consideredbefore deployment to a theater of operation.OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD8-1. There is a significant tactical performance gap between unit predeployment training tasks,conditions, standards, and the actual tactical environment and mission expectations in-theater. Theater,FORSCOM, and TRADOC predeployment training guidance list tasks, but do not describe requiredcapabilities. Units practice individual TTP, rather than execute a battle-focused wartime training strategy.Mandated certification of standardized tasks is driving a sequential, event-driven approach topredeployment training strategy, vice the battle-focused training strategies described in Army trainingdoctrine.8-2. Soldiers, Marines, and units transitioning for reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration(RSOI) report an expectation that they will be “trained” by someone before commitment to operations.This is particularly true for CS and CSS units. Some units with a high level of enemy attacks were found tohave limited relevant training and low confidence in their own ability to fight effectively. They tend to lookfor a “silver bullet,” such as SOPs, a text book TTP, or training from others outside their own leadership.Some units are assigned missions that are either different from their prewar mission (such as MultipleLaunch Rocket System [MLRS] battalions performing military police battalion missions) or are executingmissions under different conditions than prewar doctrinal assumptions (for example, there is no secure reararea).8-3. The theater expects individuals and units that are trained to be ready to fight on arrival. There isneither time nor the resources to make up for predeployment training shortfalls during RSOI. The conceptsof multiechelon training and the commander’s responsibilities are essential to effective predeploymenttraining. However, current operations have also shown that the conditions do not always match ourestablished prewar doctrinal assumptions, training procedures, and exercises. For some combat arms unitsthe difference is not great, requiring little adjustments. For many units, however, experiences in currentoperations have shown that prewar training techniques, resources, and assumptions have not preparedSoldiers, Marines, staffs, or leaders for the demands of combat. Training for current operations oftenmeans discarding or re-evaluating “the way we have always done it.”8-4. Basic expectations can be ascribed to any Army unit deployed to current operational theaters(combat, CS, CSS). Assessment of expectations and conditions in the current operational theaters havebeen synthesized down to this simple summary of tactical expectations, required techniques, requiredcapabilities, training conditions, and enemy tactics. While it is infeasible to put every unit in the field at thehighest collective levels or to recreate a combat training center (CTC)-like environment at everyinstallation, it is not infeasible to train effectively and realistically. An effective predeployment trainingstrategy to develop the right capabilities at the right levels is key. A commander (at any echelon) needs to21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 8-1