FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

Appendix BIntelligenceThe process of IPB is the same for counterinsurgency operations as for any other typeof operation; however, the important considerations are unique. Special Text (ST) 2-01.301 contains useful guidance on IPB considerations for stability andreconstruction operations that bear directly on counterinsurgency. Someconsiderations specific to the IED fight are discussed below.SECTION I – INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELDDEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENTB-1. A thorough knowledge of the roads in the unit AO is a critical step in the IPB to deal with the IEDthreat. It supports not only analysis of likely attack points, but development of as many alternate routes forfriendly use as possible, thus depriving the enemy of easy patterns to plan attacks against.B-2. The demographics of the AO and area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR), along with the likelylearnings of each ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic group towards friendly forces and the insurgentsshould be understood. This knowledge will support the analysis of likely attack locations, as well as theability to successfully use nonlethal engagements, such as psychological operations, CA, and shows offorce to interdict insurgent capabilities in the AO.B-3. A thorough knowledge of the culture and history of the AO and AOIR should be gained. This willprovide an understanding of both the insurgents and the local population and help prevent handing theenemy costly IO victories.B-4. The key leaders in the AO and AOIR should be identified as thoroughly as possible and the powerstructures they use both official and informal (priests, crime bosses, influential and prominent people, orfamilies).DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTSB-5. Terrain analysis, specifically along the roads in the AO, is an important consideration whenconducting IPB with the IED threat in mind. While IED attacks are feasible virtually anywhere and at anytime, certain features provide particularly suitable situations. They are―• Overpasses, for both hanging and hand-thrown IEDs. (It is important to develop convoy TTP forsecurity at overpasses. Often persistent surveillance and even security is necessary at theselocations).• Places that force slowdowns and closer intervals on convoys, such as winding turns, unpavedsurfaces, steep or sharp turns, narrow roadways, and choke points.• Areas of dense civilian traffic that provide determined insurgents with concealed approachpossibilities as well as slow-moving targets.• Culverts and unpaved roadways that provide opportunities to bury large IEDs directly in thepath of a convoy.• Terrain features that provide overwatch positions that can support use of command-detonatedIEDs and combined IED and direct-fire ambushes.• Metal guardrails that provide hiding places for elevated IEDs.21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 B-1