CRIMINAL APPEALS BULLETIN March Edition 刑事上訴案判例簡訊 ...

4proceedings the person being the subject of these proceedings shall not be examined or crossexaminedby the court or by any person as to the alleged offence with which he is charged and noinquiry shall be made of him as to that offence alleged” does not prohibit the use at trial of materialsin the related bail proceedings [54] and [56]. That such evidence which contravenes s 9N(b) isinadmissible in the subsequent trial will be sufficient protection for an accused in enabling him topresent his bail application fully without being exposed to the risk of giving oral evidence at suchapplication which may be used against him at trial.[58].(2) Prosecution counsel was entitled to cross-examine the Appellant to establish that she allowedherself to be presented in the bail application as a normal person with no psychiatric problems [66].However, a witness should not be asked to explain the reasons why another person contradicts thetestimony of the witness [75]: what the witness can say about the other person’s reasons isnecessarily a matter of conjecture or speculation; it is not a question which the witness can readilyanswer. It is an unfair means of endeavouring to persuade a witness to change his answer and it mayresult in the witness giving the impression that he is evasive. The technique is a variation of thequestion which invites a witness to comment on the truthfulness of another witness [76].(3) Dr Yuen, the psychiatrist who treated the Appellant at Siu Lam Psychiatric Centre opinedthat the Appellant was “mentally stable”. Dr Yuen was not called by the prosecution. The Appellantwas asked in cross-examination if that opinion was “accurate, true and correct”. If the prosecutionwanted to rely on the Psychiatrist’s views, he should have been called as a witness. It was notlegitimate to ask her whether she agreed with his medical opinion as distinct from any statements offact which he attributed to her. She could, however, be asked about non-disclosure to Dr Yuen ofmaterial facts and about her view of her own mental health [77]-[78].(4) The Appellant was cross-examined at length of her refusal to consent to Dr Yuen giving areport to the court relating to her mental condition in November 2003. The proposition that,generally speaking, a jury should not be invited to speculate about the reason for not calling awitness, subject to those cases in which an inference can be drawn, is well accepted. TheAppellant’s refusal of consent for Dr Yuen to make a report or give evidence on a relatively minoraspect of the case may well have induced the jury to think that she was standing in the way of thecourt obtaining the best available evidence [79]-[82].(5) The cumulative effect of the impermissible aspects of the cross-examination was prejudicialto the Appellant. They might well have contributed significantly to an adverse assessment by thejury of her credibility, thereby resulting in an unfair trial [88].(6) The hearsay evidence of the two witnesses that the deceased suspected the Appellant ofpoisoning his whisky and of trying to kill him was not relevant (as it was not logically probative) tothe issues of self-defence and provocation which were dependent on the Appellant’s (not thedeceased’s) mental state at the time [108]. Although the evidence was relevant in a broad sense “aspart of a continual background of history”, to characterize the relevance of the contested evidence assimply evidence of the deceased’s state of mind regarding the condition of his marriage is greatly tounderstate its impact. There was no need for the jury to receive the highly prejudicial evidence ofsuspected poisoning for that purpose. It added nothing of significance to the large corpus ofevidence available on that score [117]-[118]. Given that the balance struck by the trial judge wasfounded on an erroneous view as to the probative significance of the impugned evidence (i.e. treatingit as relevant to the issues of self-defence and provocation), the court exercised its discretion insubstitution in holding that the prejudicial effect of such evidence far outweighs its marginalrelevance towards establishing the deceased’s state of mind regarding the condition of the marriage[121].(7) The Court of Appeal’s attempt to rescue the position by propounding its own theory of

5relevance as the means to revolving a “conundrum” for any fact-finder as to why the Appellantwould have adopted the apparently clumsy and risky expedient of delivering a drugged milkshake totheir neighbour at the same time trespasses on functions which are the province of the jury [139] and[145]. This was not how the matter was left to the jury by the trial judge [144]. However, it is notsuggested that the Court of Appeal’s theory of relevance could never be cogently advanced or thatthe probative value of the impugned evidence, given such relevance, must necessarily be outweighedby its undoubted prejudicial effect [145].(8) The prosecution’s closing speech, inter alia, that the impugned evidence “demonstrates thatby September, Nancy Kissel had begun to employ drugs, it appears, against her husband”constituted a wholly impermissible invitation to the jury to treat the hearsay statements of thedeceased as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted by him [128]-[129]. Although it went beyondthe basis for adducing the evidence and the limited purpose for which it would be allowed it, the trialjudge did not intervene to counteract that submission but instead only confined himself to repeatinghis general injunction against treating the hearsay evidence of as evidence of the truth of thedeceased’s assertions. Such direction was insufficient [130].(9) The trial judge’s function in instructing juries in his summing-up is: (a) to identify the issuesfor the jury’s determination; (b) to explain to the jury how the law applies to the facts of theparticular case; and (c) to put the contentions of the respective parties clearly and fairly to the jury –which will involve relating the contentions to the evidence in the case [157]. It is not his function toengage in a discourse about the law. The only law the jury needs to know is so much as is necessaryto guide it to a decision on the issues for determination [158].(10) Trial judges should take great care before resorting to a direction that excludes from thescope of self-defence an aggressor, a person who acts out of revenge or retaliation or in spite oranger which may be too absolute. If a judge considers a direction of this kind to be appropriate, itmay well be advisable, depending on the circumstances, to frame it in terms which give emphasis to“aggressor throughout” or “acting solely out of” and the facts will usually, if not almost always,require a more sophisticated direction which is tailored to the facts. In the present case, theimpugned sentence appeared to be no more than an abstract proposition of law, unrelated to the facts[155]-[156] and [159].(11) There was no reason to think that the jury would have diverted from confining theirconsideration of self-defence to the specific questions so identified and explained to them. Thewritten directions which were handed to the jury by the judge omitted the impugned sentence [160]-[161]. Ground 3 was, by majority (Bokhary PJ dissenting), not made out.

B. CRIMINAL APPEALS / AGAINST CONVICTION香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 鄧 兆 峰 及 另 一 人上 訴 法 庭庭C A C C 4 1 8 / 2 0 0 8上 訴 法 庭庭 法 官 張 澤 祐 及 袁 家 寧 、 原 訟 法 庭庭 法 官 湯 寶 臣判 判 日 期 : 2 0 1 0 年 1 月 5 日答 辯 人 代 表 律 師 : 副 刑 事 檢 控 專 員員 李 紹 強 資 深 大 律 師 及 檢 控 官 張 民 焜第 一 申 請 人 代 表 律 師 : 郭 棟 明 資 深 大 律 師 及 何 慧 嫻 大 律 師第 二 申 請 人 代 表 律 師 : 黃 達 華 大 律 師刑 法 — 強 姦 — 受 害 人 自 願 飲 酒 而 受 到 酒 精 影 響 導 致 神 志 不 清 — 法 官 需 要 引引 導陪 審 團 的 事 項受 害 人 在 參 加 生 日 派 對 時 , 飲 了 酒 精 飲 品品 , 導 致 酒 醉 及 神 志 不 清 。 派 對完 畢 後 , 受 害 人 與 兩 名 申 請 人 及 另 一 被 告告 到 達 一 時 鐘 酒 店店 。 她 感 到 自 己 全 身赤 裸 , 並 與 人 發 生 性 行 為 。 受 害 人 指 她 當 時 神 志 模 糊 和和 沒 有 意 識 , 她 並 不 願意 與 人 發 生 性 行 為 , 但 當 時 無 法 表 達 她 的 意 願 。 陪 審 團 在 退 席席 商 議 期 間 , 曾以 書 面 形 式式 向 法 庭庭 提 出 問 題 : 「 一 個 人 在 醉 酒 或 不 完 全 清 醒 情 況 下 所 做 的 行為 , 在 法 律 上 是 否 接 受 ? 」 主 審 法 官 要 求 陪 審 團 澄 清 有 關 問 題 中 的 「 一 個人 」 是 指 誰 人 , 陪 審 團 在 退 席席 商 議 後 向 法 官 表 示 , 他 們 撤 回 有 關 的 問 題 。裁 決 , 上 訴 得 直 :( 1 ) 由 於 本 案 的 議 題 是 一 名 受 害 人 自 願 飲 酒 而 受 到 酒 精 影 響 , 導 致 神 志 不清 , 主 審 法 官 需 要 提 醒 陪 審 團 以 下 事 項 [ 4 4 ] 及 [ 4 5 ] :( a ) 一 名 成 年 人 是 有 權 選 擇 飲 用 大 量 的 酒 精 飲 品品 及 一 對 男 女 在自 願 飲 用 大 量 酒 精 飲 品品 後 進 行 性 交 並 非 不 尋 常常 的 行 為 。 若性 交 是 在 雙 方 同 意 的 情 況 下 進 行 , 是 不 會 構 成 強 姦 罪 的 。( b ) 若 案 件 涉 及 一 名 自 願 地 令 自 己 昏 醉 的 受 害 人 , 法 庭庭 必 須 提醒 陪 審 團 最 重 要 的 議 題 是 受 害 人 是 否 曾 同 意 性 交 。 若 果 受害 人 雖 然 受 酒 精 影 響 , 但 她 曾 同 意 性 交 , 有 關 的 同 意 是 不能 被 撤 銷 或 視 作 無 效 的 。( c ) 受 害 人 是 否 同 意 性 交 的 基 本 條 件 是 她 是 否 有 能 力 表 示 同 意性 交 , 即 若 果 受 害 人 是 因 為 昏 醉 而 暫 時 失 去 知 覺 , 她 就 是不 同 意 性 交 。 在 這 情 況 下 , 視 乎 被 告告 人 的 意 圖 , 有 關 性 交應 構 成 強 姦 罪 。( d ) 若 果 受 害 人 是 自 願 地 飲 酒 , 令 自 己 昏 醉 , 但 她 仍 有 能 力 選擇 願 意 或 不 願 意 性 交 及 表 示 同 意 性 交 的 話 , 這 情 況 就 不 會構 成 強 姦 罪 。6

7( 2 ) 本 案 的 其 中 一 個 可 能 性 是 , 雖 然 受 害 人 聲 稱 她 是 不 同 意 性 交 , 只 是 因 受到 酒 精 影 響 而 沒 法 表 示 不 同 意 性 交 , 但 她 的 供 詞 卻 多 次 說 到 她 在 飲 用 酒 精 飲品品 之 後 變 得 「 模 模 糊 糊 」 、 「 神 志 模 糊 」 等 , 這 些 供 詞 極 可 能 給 予 陪 審 團 一個 印 象 是 她 在 酒 店店 時 已 經 失 去 知 覺 , 並 已 失 去 同 意 性 交 的 能 力 。 這 與 控 方 所持 的 立 場 有 所 不 同 , 主 審 法 官 是 有 必 要 對 陪 審 團 作 出 進 一 步 針 對 性 的 指 引引[ 4 7 ] 。( 3 ) 另 一 個 可 能 會 引引 致 陪 審 團 得 到 上 述 印 象 的 情 況 是 主 審 法 官 沒 有 就 第 一 申請 人 作 供 時 對 主 控 官 提 出 受 害 人 是 否 清 醒 的 問 題 的 答 覆 給 予 他 們 一 個 較 清 晰的 指 引引 [ 4 8 ] 及 [ 4 9 ] 。(4) 陪 審 團 提 出 有 關 的 問 題 的 另 外 一 個 原 因 , 可 能 是 他 們 基 於 受 害 人 在 性 交前 及 性 交 時 的 行 為 、 動 作 及 表 現 認 為 她 有 可 能 是 同 意 性 交 的 , 但 困 擾 他 們 的是 如 何 理 解 她 在 酒 精 影 響 下 作 出 的 行 為 在 法 律 上 的 後 果 [ 5 1 ] 。( 5 ) 法 庭庭 認 為 基 於 案 件 有 上 述 這 些 可 能 性 , 主 審 法 官 更 應 該 在 陪 審 團 提 出 問題 後 對 有 關 的 議 題 作 出 進 一 步 的 指 引引 。 由 於 主 審 法 官 沒 有 因 應 案 情 的 需 要 而作 出 進 一 步 的 指 引引 , 特 別 是 陪 審 團 提 出 的 問 題 及 所 牽 涉 的 法 律 原 則 , 有 關 的定 罪 並 不 穩 妥 [5 0 ] 及 [ 5 4 ] 。[English digest of CACC 418/2008, above]HKSAR v. TANG SIU FUNG & ANORCOURT OF APPEALCACC 418/2008Cheung & Yuen JJA, Tong JDate of Judgment: 5 January 2010Counsel for the Respondent : Robert Lee SC SADPP & Bobby Cheung PPCounsel for A1: (1) Eric Kwok SC &Vivian HoCounsel for A2: (2) Richard WongCriminal law – Rape – Victim unconscious under the influence of alcohol due to voluntaryconsumption of drinks –Issues upon which the judge needed to direct the juryHaving taken some alcohol in a birthday party, the victim was drunk and unconscious. Atthe end of the party, the victim went to an hourly-rented hotel with the two Applicants and anotherdefendant. She felt she was naked and had sex with somebody. The victim claimed that she was ina drunken stupor and unconscious. She did not consent to having sexual intercourse with anyone butwas unable to express her wish. During deliberation, the jury submitted a question to the court inwritten form, “Whether the acts of a person who is drunk or not entirely conscious are acceptable tothe law?” The trial judge asked the jury to clarify to whom that “a person” referred. The jury retiredto discuss and came back to indicate that they would withdraw the question.

Held, appeal allowed:8(1) Since the issue in the present case related to a victim who was unconscious under theinfluence of alcohol due to voluntary consumption of drinks, the trial judge was required to direct thejury on the following matters [44]-[45]:(a)(b)(c)(d)An adult can choose to consume substantial quantities of alcohol and there is nothingunusual about a man and a woman having consensual intercourse after havingvoluntarily consumed substantial quantities of alcohol. Provided that both partiesconsent to sexual intercourse, there is no rape.In a case involving a victim whose intoxication was self-induced, the court mustremind the jury that the most important issue was whether the victim had consented tosexual intercourse. If the victim, though under the influence of alcohol, had earlierconsented to sexual intercourse, then such consent could not be vitiated.On the question of consent, the victim must at least be capable of expressing herconsent to sexual intercourse. A victim temporarily losing her consciousness due todrunkenness and was incapable of making the decision of whether to consent wouldnot be consenting. Depending on the state of mind of the defendant, sexualintercourse under these circumstances would be rape.When a victim who is intoxicated by voluntary consumption of alcohol is still capableof giving consent, and has expressed her consent, then there is no rape.(2) One of the possibilities in the present case was that the victim claimed that she did notconsent to sexual intercourse, but was incapable of indicating her wish due to the influence ofalcohol. Despite that, she repeatedly in her evidence described herself after taking the drinks asbeing “in a stupor”, “unconscious” etc. This could very likely give the jury an impression that shehad already lost her consciousness in the hotel, and hence the capacity to consent to intercourse.This was different from the prosecution’s case. The trial judge was therefore required to give furtherdirections to the jury on this matter [47].(3) The above impression would also possibly be created in the mind of the jury when the trialjudge failed to give the jury a clearer direction on A1’s reply in his testimony to the question askedby the prosecuting counsel about the consciousness of the victim [48]-[49].(4) Another reason as to why the jury raised the question it did might be, that although itconsidered that the victim might have consented to sexual intercourse in the light of the victim'sconduct, gesture and demeanour before and during the intercourse, it was concerned as to what acorrect understanding of the legal consequence of her conduct under the influence of alcohol shouldbe [51].(5) As there were such possibilities in this case, the court took the view that the trial judgeshould have given further directions on the relevant issues. Since the trial judge failed to givefurther directions on the question raised by the jury and the related legal principle, the convictionwas unsafe and unsatisfactory [50] and [54].

C. MAGISTRACY APPEALS/AGAINST CONVICTION香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 林 照 華 及 其 他 他 人原 訟 法 庭庭HCMA 397/2009原 訟 法 庭庭 法 官 湯 寶 臣判 決 日 期 : 2010 年 2 月 5 日答 辯 人 代 表 律 師 : 高 級 檢 控 官 郭 永 隆第 一 至 三 上 訢 人 代 表 律 師 : 鄺 展 鴻第 四 上 訴 人 代 表 律 師 : 無 律 師 代 表 , 親 自 出 庭庭定 罪 上 訴 -《 電 力 條 例 》-《 電 力 ( 路 線 ) 規 例 》- 備 置 及 保 存 紀 錄 -「 擁 有 人 」“ 的 定 義9四 名 上 訴 人 為 新 界 元 朗 一 大 廈廈 地 下 鋪 位 的 業 主 , 各 被 控 以 一 項 「 身 為 一 名 固 定 電 力 裝置 的 擁 有 人 , 未 能 將 該 裝 置 最 近 期 的 測 試 證 明 書 備 妥 , 以 便 有 關 機 電 工 程 署 署 長 提 出 要 求 時 ,呈呈 交 署 長 查 閱 」 罪 , 違 反 第 406 章 《 電 力 條 例 》 第 59 條 訂 立 之 《 電 力 ( 路 線 ) 規 例 》 第 22(2)及 24(1) 條 。裁 斷 , 上 訴 駁 回 :(1) 該 固 定 電 力 裝 置 是 低 壓 固 定 電 力 裝 置 。 大 廈廈 公 契 等 文 件 所 述 的 業 權 均 證 明 該 單 位 是 地下 鋪 , 樓 上 住 宅 的 大 廈廈 , 是 《 電 力 ( 路 線 ) 規 例 》 第 20(3) 條 的 處 所 [30]。(2) 如 果 有 關 的 電 力 裝 置 所 座 處 的 地 方 , 是 有 人 持 有 的 , 不 管 持 有 的 方 式式 如 何 , 該 持 有 人都 屬 於 是 「 擁 有 人 」。 針 對 安 裝 在 大 廈廈 公 共 地 方 的 電 力 裝 置 , 業 主 自 然 是 「 管 有 」 人 或 「 控制 」 人 。 縱 然 租 客 是 「 用 者 」, 但 業 主 共 同 擁 有 公 共 地 方 的 業 權 , 這 包 括 電 力 裝 置 。 當 然 ,由 於 法 例 訂 出 如 此 廣廣 闊 的 定 義 , 租 客 也 可 能 是 擁 有 人 , 但 要 視 乎 情 況 而 言 。 擁 有 人 的 定 義 是指 「 使 用 權 」, 就 算 物 業 租 出 , 除 非 有 特 別 的 安 排 , 否 則 , 業 主 仍 保 持 著 物 業 , 即 該 單 位 電力 裝 置 的 管 理 權 。「 擁 有 人 」 應 該 給 予 廣廣 泛 的 定 義 , 它 包 括 業 主 , 但 不 限 於 業 主 [39]-[41]。(3) 互 助 委 員員 會 的 成 員員 一 般 會 是 義 務 替 大 家 服 務 的 。 如 果 控 方 針 對 他 們 來 檢 控 , 將 更 為 不公 平 。 要 租 客 接 受 檢 控 也 不 一 定 是 公 平 的 , 因 為 租 約 有 長 有 短 。 另 一 方 面 , 政 府府 部 門 也 不 可能 每 家 每 戶 去 查 證 誰 是 有 關 時 期 的 租 客 , 然 後 再 去 追 蹤 檢 控 [47] 及 [55]。[English digest of HCMA 397/2009, above]HKSAR v LAM CHIU WAH & ORSCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCEHCMA 397/2009Tong J

10Date of Judgment: 5 February 2010Counsel for the Respondent: Kwok Wing Lung SPPCounsel for A1-A3: Vincent KwongCounsel for A4: In personAppeal against conviction – Electricity Ordinance – Electricity (Wiring) Regulations –Making and keeping of records – Definition of “owner”The four Appellants were the landlords of a ground floor shop of a building in Yuen Long,New Territories. Each of them was charged with an offence of being the owner of a fixed electricalinstallation, failing to make available, for inspection as and when required by the Director ofElectrical and Mechanical Services, the latest test certificates of the installation, contrary toregulations 22(2) and 24(1) of the Electricity (Wiring) Regulations made under s 59 of the ElectricityOrdinance (Cap 406).Held, appeal dismissed:(1) The fixed electrical installation was a low voltage fixed electrical installation. The titleshown in the documents such as the Deed of Mutual Covenants established that the place in questionwas a ground floor shop of a residential building. Thus, it was a premises within the ambit ofregulation 20(3) of the Electricity (Wiring) Regulations [30].(2) If a person held premises in which the electrical installation was located, that person was an“owner”, no matter in what way the premises were held. For electrical installations installed in thecommon parts of a building, the landlords would naturally be the persons in “possession” or“control” of the installations. Although the tenants were “users”, the landlords together owned thetitle of the common parts which included the electrical installations. Of course, since the net cast bythe legislation was so wide, tenants could also fall under the definition of owner. All depended uponindividual circumstances. An owner was defined as a person who “held premises”. Even if aproperty was leased and unless there were special arrangements, the landlord still held the property,namely the right to manage the electrical installation of his premises. The term “owner” should begiven a broad meaning so that it included, but was not limited to, the landlord [39]-[41].(3) The members of a mutual aid committee normally served on a voluntary basis. It would bevery unfair if the prosecution brought the case against them. Nor would it be fair to prosecute thetenants since the periods of tenancies varied. On the other hand, it was impractical for governmentdepartments to identify, track down and prosecute the tenants of each and every premises during therelevant period [47] and [55].HKSAR v NACUA HAZEL CABIGASCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCEHCMA 1019/2009Wright JDates of Hearing: 9, 18 & 25 February 2010Date of Judgment: 25 February 2010Counsel for the Respondent: Anna Lai SPP

Counsel for the Appellant: Philip Ross11Breach of condition of stay –Computation of time – Whether s 71(1) of the Interpretation &General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1) applies – Section 11 of Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115)renders s 71 of Cap 1 inapplicable – Appellant should leave Hong Kong on the stipulated dateThe Appellant was convicted after trial of one count of “Breach of condition to stay”,contrary to s 41 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115). Having been granted permission pursuantto s 11 of that Ordinance to remain in Hong Kong until 9 August 2009, she overstayed on 10 August2009. She was fined $500. She appealed against conviction.The facts were that the Appellant arrived in Hong Kong on 26 May 2009 and was permittedto remain as visitor for 14 days. On 9 June 2009, she applied for and was granted an extension until5 August 2009. On 5 August 2009, she applied for a further extension, which was refused. She wasnotified, in writing, of such refusal and of the fact that she was to leave Hong Kong on or before 7August 2009. She ignored that direction and on that day, applied for yet another extension. It wasagain refused. Again, she was notified of such refusal. She was served with a notice which read, inpart, “Please note that you are required to leave Hong Kong on or before 9 August 2009”. Onceagain, she ignored the notice served on her. On 10 August 2009, she yet again applied for anextension. For the third time, her application was refused. On 14 August 2009, she returned to theImmigration Department whereupon she was arrested.Held, appeal dismissed:(1) The contention advanced is that because 9 August 2009 was a Sunday, the Appellant was notobliged to leave until Monday 10 August 2009 by virtue of the operation of s 71(1) of theInterpretation & General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1). However, the effect of s 11 of the ImmigrationOrdinance which provides the express power to impose a limit of stay, renders the provisions of s 71of Cap 1 inapplicable to acts performed under the former section. A common sense reading of thatsection clearly indicates the “contrary intention” contemplated by s 2 of Cap 1. If s 71 of Cap 1 wasto apply to orders made under s 11 of Cap 115, it would render the powers created by that sectionnugatory [6] and [9].(2) Section 71 of Cap 1 expressly states its purpose is to provide for the computation of time.Whereas the notice given to the Appellant stipulated a fixed date on or before which she was todepart Hong Kong, there was no question of any period of time required to be computed. As aconsequence, the provisions of s 71 of Cap 1 were not triggered, even had they applied to a decisionmade under s 11 of Cap 115 [12].

12D. MAGISTRACY APPEALS / AGAINST SENTENCE香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 鍾 春 明原 訟 法 庭庭HCMA665/2009原 訟 法 庭庭 暫 委 法 官 李 瀚 良判 決 日 期 : 2010 年 1 月 8 日答 辯 人 代 表 律 師 :上 訢 人 代 表 律 師 :檢 控 官 倪 振 邦王 寶 榮判 刑 ─ 管 有 偽 造 商 標 的 藥 物 ─ 影 響 公 眾 健 康康 ─ 應 即 時 入 獄上 訴 人 被 控 一 項 「 為 售 賣 或 任 何 商 業 或 製 造 用 途 而 管 有 應 用 偽 造 商 標 的 貨 品品 」 罪 , 即20 支 有 偽 造 商 標 的 鈣 針 及 30 粒 有 偽 造 商 標 「Viagra」 的 藥 丸 , 違 反 《 商 品品 說 明 條 例 》 第9(2) 和和 18(1) 條 。 上 訴 人 為 涉 案 藥 房 的 董 事 。上 訴 人 承 認 控 罪 , 被 判 入 獄 12 個 星 期 , 上 訴 人 指 判 刑 過 重 , 提 出 上 訴 。裁 決 , 上 訴 駁 回 :(1) 違 反 《 商 品品 說 明 條 例 》 第 9(2) 條 的 罪 行 可 能 涉 及 一 般 商 品品 、 藥 物 以 及 生 活 必 須 品品 。 如罪 行 涉 及 售 賣 或 管 有 偽 造 商 標 的 藥 物 , 影 響 公 眾 健 康康 , 令 人 對 藥 物 檢 測 制 度 和和 零 售 藥 物 失 去信 心 , 則 後 果 嚴 重 , 不 只 是 影 響 商 標 持 有 人 的 經 濟 利 益 。 任 何 人 售 賣 偽 冒 藥 物 應 即 時 入 獄[12]。(2) 法 庭庭 一 貫 對 涉 偽 冒 藥 物 和和 生 活 必 須 品品 的 案 件 均 採 取 嚴 厲 態 度 , 因 此 等 行 為 影 響 公 眾 健康康 , 應 判 即 時 入 獄 。 若 偽 冒 藥 物 含 有 害 成 份 或 沒 有 正 版 藥 物 的 功 效 , 更 是 加 刑 的 理 由 , 判 刑一 定 要 讓 公 眾 和和 有 關 業 界 清 楚 知 道 , 法 庭庭 絕 不 姑 息 這 類 行 為 [14]。[English digest of HCMA 665/2009, above]HKSAR v CHUNG CHUN MINGCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCEHCMA 665/2009P Li DJDate of Judgment: 8 January 2010Counsel for the Respondent: Dominic Ngai PPCounsel for the Applicant: Wong Po WingSentencing – Possession of drugs to which forged trade marks were applied – Public health

13endangered – Immediate custodial sentence justifiedThe Appellant was charged with an offence of having in possession for sale or for anypurpose of trade or manufacture, goods to which a forged trade mark was applied, namely 20 vials ofcalcium injections and 30 tablets of ‘Viagra’, contrary to ss 9(2) and 18(1) of the Trade DescriptionsOrdinance (Cap 362). The Appellant was the director of the dispensary at which the offence wascommitted.The Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 12 weeks’ imprisonment.He appealed against sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.Held, appeal dismissed:(1) The offence under s 9(2) of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance might involve ordinarycommodities, medicines and daily necessities of life. When the offence was related to the sale orpossession of a medicine with a forged trade mark, public health would be endangered and the publicconfidence in the drug testing system and its retailing business undermined. The consequences wereso serious that the injury would not only be confined to the economic interest of trade mark owners.Anyone convicted of selling medicines with forged trade marks should face an immediate custodialsentence [12].(2) The courts have always taken a serious stance on cases involving medicines and dailynecessities of life to which forged trade marks were applied. As such conduct posed a risk to publichealth, an immediate custodial sentence was warranted. It would also be an aggravating featurewhen the medicines with forged marks contained toxic substances or failed to produce the effect thedrugs professed to have. The court must, through sentencing, make it clear to the public and thetrade that such conduct would not be tolerated [14].HKSAR v CHAU HUNG YINGCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCEHCMA 838/2009McMahon JDate of Judgment: 1 March 2010Counsel for the Respondent: Raymond Cheng SPPCounsel for the Appellant: Phillip RossTrade Descriptions Ordinance (Cap 362) – Possessing for sale goods to which a false trademark was applied – Whether 6 months’ starting point manifestly excessiveThe Appellant, a proprietress of a fashion shop in Central, was convicted on her own plea ofan offence of possessing, for sale, trade or manufacture, goods to which a forged trade mark wasapplied, contrary to ss 9(2) and 18(1) of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance (Cap 362). There were123 items and the value was about HK$45,700. The magistrate took a starting point of 6 months’imprisonment which, given the appellant’s plea, was discounted to a sentence of 4 months’imprisonment.

Held, appeal allowed, sentence reduced to 3 months’ imprisonment:14(1) The goods were being sold as genuine goods and that purchasers of the goods would haveundoubtedly accepted they were genuine and so have been deceived out of considerable sums ofmoney. A deterrent sentence should have been imposed, and a starting point of 6 months’imprisonment, given the quantity and value of goods involved and the damage to Hong Kong’s retailrepetition, was not excessive [6] and [7].(2) Nevertheless the appellant’s clear record did assist her in the circumstances of this offence,and after taking into account her plea of guilty, a further discount, perhaps over generously wasappropriate. Her sentence was reduced to one of 3 months’ imprisonment [8].HKSAR v CHEUNG KI ( 張 棋 )COURT OF FIRST INSTANCEHCMA 773/2009BEESON JDate of Hearing: 24 February 2010Date of Judgment: 4 March 2010Counsel for the Respondent: Lily Ho SPPCounsel for the Appellant: Simon NgAiding, abetting, counselling & procuring a breach of condition of stay – Whether themagistrate erred in applying the Ho Mei-wa guidelines – Whether the magistrate erred in“enhancing” Appellant’s sentence – Any sufficient justification for disparity in sentencebetween D1 and Appellant – Whether sentence wrong in principle and/or manifestly excessiveThe Appellant (D2) pleaded guilty to one count of “Aiding, abetting, counselling &procuring a breach of condition of stay” contrary to s 89 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance Cap221 and s41 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), and by virtue of regulation 2 of theImmigration Regulations. He was sentenced to 10 weeks’ imprisonment. He appealed againstsentence.The facts were that during a raid at a clothing company in Causeway Bay on 2 October 2008,a Labour Inspector saw a woman (D1) removing the label of a coat with a thread-removing knife.Upon identity check, D1 was found to be an Indonesian domestic helper employed by theAppellant’s wife. The Appellant was not present at the time of the raid. Later, under caution, theAppellant admitted that he had caused D1 to go to his company to demonstrate how to removeclothing labels about 6 or 7 times and also to demonstrate sewing techniques on two occasions.The magistrate took an initial starting point of 9 weeks, increased it to 15 weeks to takeaccount of the aggravating features and after discount for plea, imposed the 10 weeks’ sentence.Held, appeal allowed:

15(1) The magistrate did not err in using Ho Mei-wa as a comparable case. It is recognised that theHO Mei-wa guideline has particular specificity for offences under s 17I of the ImmigrationOrdinance, but in the absence of specific guidelines for s 89 offences (i.e. aiding, abetting,counselling & procuring breach of condition of stay) a sentencer is entitled to look at comparableoffences and sentencing principles [21].(2) What the magistrate did was to increase the starting point for sentence because of aggravatingfactors. Such an exercise is a very common part of the sentencing process carried out by judges andmagistrates on a daily basis. An appeal court must look to see what the basic starting point was andthen whether there existed factors which would justify an increase of the starting point. Thecomplaint that the magistrate had “enhanced” the starting point in a technical sense failed [25] and[28].(3) A starting point of 9 weeks could not be regarded as excessive given that their maximumsentences indicate that a s 89 offence might be regarded as less serious than an offence under s 17Iand thus warranted a slightly lesser sentence. The magistrate picked out correctly the aggravatingfeatures which would justify an increased starting point [37].(4) However, the magistrate erred in adding 6 weeks to the starting point making it 15 weeks.The aggravating features of the Appellant’s actions could be marked adequately by adopting the HOMei-wa starting point of 12 weeks, which with a full discount for plea makes a sentence of 8 weeks.Sentences for these offences must have a generally deterrent effect to be of any value, but they muststill be proportionate to the offence charged [38].香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 周周 必 強 及 其 他 人原 訟 法 庭庭HCMA 610/2009暫 委 法 官 陳 慶 偉聆 訊 日 期 : 2010 年 3 月 3 日判 決 日 期 : 2010 年 3 月 17 日答 辯 人 代 表 律 師 : 高 級 檢 控 官 李 鏡 鏞第 一 、 二 、 四 、 五 、 七 至 十 上 訴 人 代 表 律 師 : 麥 高 義 資 深 大 律 師 及 鍾 元 富第 三 上 訴 人 代 表 律 師 : 鍾 偉 強第 六 上 訴 人 代 表 律 師 : 潘 展 平判 刑 - 對 公 眾 造 成 妨 擾 - 完 全 堵 塞 來 往 機 場 的 唯 一 汽 車 通 道 - 三 個 月 為 量 刑 起 點 - 初犯 者 可 判 即 時 監 禁各 上 訴 人 承 認 一 項 對 公 眾 造 成 妨 擾 罪 , 當 中 五 名 上 訴 人 判 處 兩 個 月 即 時 監 禁 ,而 另 五 人 則 被 判 處 7 星 期 即 時 監 禁 。 他 們 各 把 自 己 的 的 士 完 全 堵 塞 來 回 機 場 的 北 大 嶼 山公 路 。裁 決 , 上 訴 得 直 :

16(1) 法 庭庭 尊 重 香 港 市 民 行 使 示 威 、 罷 工 的 權 利 , 但 這 必 須 在 遵 守 法 紀 及 和和 平 理 性 的 前 提 下作 出 。 法 庭庭 不 能 容 忍 具 惡 意 並 嚴 重 破 壞 社 會 秩 序序 的 示 威 行 動 [5]。(2) 當 天 眾 上 訴 人 的 舉 動 , 目 的 是 製 造 最 大 的 滋 擾 。 當 晚 眾 上 訴 人 的 非 法 行 為 對 其 他 市 民做 成 的 不 便 , 對 整 個 社 會 經 濟 上 做 成 的 損 失 是 難 以 估 量 的 [11]。(3) 就 當 天 所 干 犯 的 控 罪 , 一 短 時 間 兼 具 阻 嚇 性 的 刑 罰 是 合 適 的 。 裁 判 官 以 3 個 月 的 即 時監 禁 作 為 量 刑 起 點 , 雖 然 不 輕 , 但 也 未 至 於 過 重 [12]。 即 使 是 初 犯 , 也 並 非 不 能 被 判 處 即 時監 禁 , 每 宗 案 件 須 視 乎 案 情 而 論 [15]。(4) 畢 竟 , 事 件 起 因 是 源 自 不 滿 政 府府 的 交 通 政 策 而 作 出 的 抗 議 行 動 , 除 沒 有 申 請 外 , 抗 議本 身 基 本 上 是 沒 有 問 題 的 。 法 庭庭 接 納 當 天 只 是 眾 上 訴 人 的 做 法 過 於 激 進 , 超 出 了 法 律 所 容 許的 範 圍 [13]。(5) 在 考 慮 到 事 件 纏 擾 年 多 , 對 上 訴 人 自 身 、 家 人 , 無 論 在 精 神 及 財 政 上 均 構 成 沈 重 壓力 , 而 各 上 訴 人 已 嘗 過 兩 星 期 的 鐵 窗 生 涯 [14], 法 庭庭 決 定 各 上 訴 人 就 他 們 分 別 面 對 的 7 星 期至 2 個 月 的 即 時 監 禁 改 以 緩 刑 18 個 月 的 方 式式 執 行 , 另 外 每 一 名 上 訴 人 須 額 外 罰 款 $5,000元 ,30 天 內 繳 付 [16]。[English digest of HCMA 610/2009, above]HKSAR v CHOW PIT KEUNG SIDNEY & ORSCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCEHCMA 610/2009Deputy Judge Andrew ChanDate of Hearing: 3 March 2010Date of Judgment: 17 March 2010Counsel for the Respondent: Robert KY Lee SPPCounsel for A1, A2, A4, A5, A7 to A10: G McCoy SC & Hylas YF ChungCounsel for A3: Bernard ChungCounsel for A6: Jackson PoonSentence – Public nuisance – Complete block of the only vehicular access to and from theairport – Starting point of 3 months – Immediate custodial sentence may be imposed even forfirst offendersThe Appellants pleaded guilty to one count of public nuisance, five of whom were sentencedto 2 months’ imprisonment and the others to 7 weeks’. They placed their own taxis in such a way asto block entirely the North Lantau Highway, the only vehicular access to and from the airport.Held, appeal allowed:(1) The court respected the rights of the citizens of Hong Kong to demonstrate and go on strikebut such rights must be exercised in compliance with the law and in a peaceful and rational manner.The court did not tolerate acts of demonstration which were malicious and which seriously

interrupted social order [5].17(2) The Appellants’ conduct on the day in question was aimed at creating the greatest disruption.The inconvenience caused to other citizens and the economic loss suffered by the community werehard to assess [11].(3) For such an offence, a short sentence having deterrent effect would be appropriate. Astarting point of 3 months’ immediate custody adopted by the magistrate, albeit not light, was notexcessive either [12]. Depending on the facts of each case, even a first offender would notnecessarily be spared of an immediate custodial sentence [15].(4) After all, the demonstration, which arose out of discontent with the Government’s transportpolicy, would otherwise not be improper but for the lack of prior notification. The court acceptedthat the Appellants were only acting over the top in going beyond what was lawfully permitted [13].(5) Taking into account that the matter had been hanging over the Appellants’ heads, causingpressure on them and their family both psychologically and financially, and that the Appellants hadbeen remanded in custody for two weeks [14], the court decided that their respective sentences of 7weeks and 2 months be suspended for 18 months with the imposition of an additional fine of $5,000each, payable in 30 days [16].