evaluation of general food distribution in northern uganda: gulu ...

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camps 150 , but mainly moved to transit sites, bringing the number of transit sites in Acholi upto 1062. In Gulu and Amuru districts, which count 453.359 IDPs, 57% are estimated still tobe in camps, while 30% have moved to transit sites and only 13% are said to have movedhome. Gulu and Amuru are considered the most fertile districts in the Acholi su b region. InKitgum, which comprises 310.140 IDPs, 67% are still in camps, whereas 25% of them havemoved to transit sites, but only 9% have moved all the way back to their villages of origin 151 .The reasons for these trends are varied, but security concerns rank high. IDPs haverepeatedly said “we will only feel safe to return to our homes when Kony puts his hand on thepeace agreement” 152 . Even some leaders agree as one said “let there be peace and peoplewill walk away from the camps by themselves” 153 . But IDPs have also cited the lack ofproductive assets and the absence of social services in return areas as some of the overallimpediments to their resettlement and the reason why some of them continue to maintain apresence in the main camps and move back and forth.Indeed as the communities return, there is increasing pressure on the humanitariancommunity to meet the needs of those people remaining in the camps, those on the move,and those who have settled in new areas 154 . Conversely, there is a reduction in fundsavailable for humanitarian work, now that the emergency is over. As one agency put it “whenthe cameras stop rolling, so does the money”! 155Presently, on-going activities to support the recovery process, particularly with regards tosocial services and livelihood support, remain somewhat ad hoc and fairly fragmented 156 .Albeit there has been a blanket distribution of seeds and tools to most IDP camps 157 manystill lack substantial livelihood support activities 158 , technical support, income generatingactivities, market development and access etc.By the end of 2007 attempts were made to establish an early recovery cluster, now namedthe GIL cluster (Governance, Infrastructure and Livelihoods), which would be responsible forthe overall coordination of activities, including supporting local government to strengthenstructures to provide social services and plan for, implement and monitor recovery efforts.The GIL cluster would also have responsibility for supporting the livelihoods (non –agricultural) of returned communities. To date the effective operationalisation of this clusterremains to be seen.The late and not so visible arrival of the lead agency (UNDP) to head the recovery tasks plusthe uncertainty of the PRDP and the lack of guidance and leadership from Office of the PrimeMinister (GOU’s co-ordination point for the PRDP) have been mentioned as some of thereasons for creating a gap that has affected coherence in understanding as well as fundingof early recovery and recovery 159 . Moreover, it also seems to have affected the strongconcerted articulation of the importance of the recovery phase, if the situation in NorthernUganda should not suffer from a relapse.While humanitarian agencies are being encouraged to integrate recovery activities in to theirwork, they are constrained by technical limitations, lack of leadership and funding limitation.As a result NGOs such as AVSI that have been active in this region have stopped their foodsecurity activities because the funding available (6 months) is inadequate for the tasks150UNHCR IDP Population Movement Matrix, March 2008151Figures are from UNHCR matrix on IDP population movements from March 2008. It should be noted again that these figuresare estimates.152Focus Group with IDPs, Opit Camp, Gulu. Ref. to Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA.153Interview with district leader, Amuru154European Union, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme (NUARP) – An Identification Study, Volume 2155Interview with WFP, Kitgum156Interview with UNHCR, Gulu157Seeds and tools distribution carried out by ICRC – source: OCHA158Interview with UNOCHA, Gulu159Interviews with Country Director & Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC46
expected of them. From their perspective, ”supporting livelihoods during this transition periodis more complicated and requires more resources and expertise particularly given theweakened capacity of the district production department” 160 .While stakeholders (GOU, donors, UN agencies, NGOs) are in agreement on the need forthe concurrent implementation of relief and recovery activities to mitigate the impact of asudden withdrawal, the link between the two (transition) has become a ‘grey’ area affectedby the absence/slow release of funds. Attempts were made to include recovery activities inthe Consolidated Appeals Process, but as of May 2008, only 22% out of USD 400 millionrequested for has been realized (the Food security cl uster – excluding food aid - in particularappears to have attracted the least funds 161 ). It would appear that funding agencies, thattraditionally support either relief or development activities are struggling with this ‘transitionidea’ in terms of policy, programming and funding. This situation is a classical example of thecompartmentalisation between humanitarian and development work 162 . It is also worth notingthat hesitation to fund the transition could also be linked to the delayed signing of the peaceprocess and hence uncertainty on what is going to happen 163 .As mentioned earlier, the link between relief and recovery has also been affected by thedelayed and unclear implementation of the PRDP – which is supposed to establish thefoundation for the process i.e. through the various objectives. The total PRDP budgetcurrently stands at US$ 606,519,297, which has both created anticipation and someconfusion. Some of the common questions asked are: is this new money and how soon is itgoing to be available? And to whom is it going to be allocated, NGOs or districts? What isthe absorptive capacity of districts to handle this money? How exactly the PRDP will befunded is still being discussed, but it could involve either of these mechanisms 164 : i) reallocationof national expenditures; ii) international co-financing through budget support; iii)international co-financing through allocations at the district level by way of block grants; iv)establishment of a multi-donor trust fund; and v) parallel stand alone projects. This alsocreates uncertainty about the implementation mechanisms 165 , which will be determined bythe different modes of funding. The situation has put stakeholders in a ‘waiting position’ tosee GoUs next move. Consolidation of state authority an d specifically that of localgovernments appears particularly crucial to the recovery process and yet the formaladministrative structures are a long way off in terms of capacity to manage the recovery anddevelopment processes” 166 .9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards ConnectednessAdvocacy on Recovery: The GFD programme is developing an advocacy strategy thatrevolves around the issues under Strategic Objective 2 of the PRDP. GFD’s advocacy effortsare aimed at drawing the attention of other actors to the needs of the IDPs in the camps andthose in the return areas and thereby guiding recovery efforts. From its experiences in theprocess of food distribution as well as camp management, NRC has been able to identify anumber of issues affecting the communities and particularly during the resettlement process.Some of the advocacy messages that NRC is focusing on: the basic needs of the population;voluntary return; the security and protection concerns, particularly of vulnerable persons e.g.children left in the main camps. NRC is also particularly concerned about the articulation andthe lack of institutional clarity of the early recovery cluster 167 , and is considering various160Interview with Country Director, AVSI161Interview with UNOCHA, Kitgum162Interview with Advocacy Advisor, NRC163Interview with humanitarian stakeholder164PRDP 2007 – 2010: Funding165European Union, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme (NUARP) – An Identification Study, Volume 1166Interview with UNHCR167Interview with Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC47
Page 4 and 5: List of Contents1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Page 6 and 7: 9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards Connect
Page 8 and 9: tools; however it ensures food secu
Page 10 and 11: ♦♦♦♦With the ration reducti
Page 12: 1.4 CoordinationNRC’s approach to
Page 15 and 16: NRC coincided the field phase of th
Page 17 and 18: Juba talks have been perceived as t
Page 19 and 20: Table 2: 2004 Global Food Aid Deliv
Page 21 and 22: 4 PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FOOD - TH
Page 23 and 24: 5 PROJECT RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENE
Page 25 and 26: 5.3 Lesson Learned♦♦♦‘Being
Page 27 and 28: schedules and working long hours to
Page 29 and 30: The complaints about the failed ver
Page 31 and 32: 7 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESSHaving asses
Page 33 and 34: most and mothers observed the nutri
Page 35 and 36: 7.1.7 Lesson Learned♦ Food aid ha
Page 37 and 38: By 2005 the profile of the crisis i
Page 39 and 40: Recent studies 95 on global food se
Page 41 and 42: From the 2007 EFSA 104 it transpire
Page 43 and 44: 7.3 Project Objective 3:To safeguar
Page 45 and 46: 7.3.4 A Future Strategy for EVIs?Se
Page 47 and 48: 8 COORDINATION8.1 A Co-ordinated Re
Page 49 and 50: some extent also GoU through distri
Page 51: 9 RELIEF AND RECOVERY - CONNECTEDNE
Page 55 and 56: 9.4 Lessons Learnt♦♦♦♦♦St
Page 57 and 58: dependency among the IDPs and unwil
Page 59 and 60: establish the food security situati
Page 61 and 62: ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference for the
Page 63 and 64: • Desk studies. As a general back
Page 65 and 66: F. Time frame and budget considerat
Page 67 and 68: Annex 2: Evaluation Programme - inc
Page 69 and 70: Annex 3: List of Documents Consulte
Page 71 and 72: Expert OpinionsMr. Joe OloyaMr. Gra
Page 73 and 74: Typical Menu:BREAKFAST:• Millet p
Page 75 and 76: NRC objectives andTOR objectivesTo

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