13.07.2015 Views

A history of Italian tiles - 7 (2001) - Infotile

A history of Italian tiles - 7 (2001) - Infotile

A history of Italian tiles - 7 (2001) - Infotile

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

A History <strong>of</strong> <strong>Italian</strong> Tiles - Part viiThe leopard changes its spots?By Garreth CruikshankSomewhere, someone was playingthe Mission Impossible theme on aclapped-out Hammond organ. I wishedthey would stop. As I roused myself t<strong>of</strong>ull wakefulness the true source <strong>of</strong> thenoise became clear - my cell phone.“Yes, hello.” Too late. I had missedthem. They’d call back. I looked around,bewildered. Where was I? Not Forli.Slowly it dawned on me - somehow Ihad managed to make my way homefrom the Opera House and put myselfto bed. The clock said 10.20 a.m. Iyawned and went back to bed. Ohh, Ifelt terrible.This was going to be a critical visit, ado-or-die meeting. I was determinedthat we should get to the bottom<strong>of</strong> this mystery. I was sure SignoraPoletta knew more than she wasletting on. I needed some answers.The phone rang. “Pronto.”“Ciao bello. It’s me. What time will Ipick you up?”“When are we meeting her?”“4.30 p.m.”“4 o’clock in the lobby then. I’llbe carrying a book and a painedexpression.”“So what’s new. O.K. Ciao,” and withthat Patrizia hung up. I had just overan hour.‘Volume seven <strong>of</strong> Bodkin’s research’was a small red leather tome. Whilethe handwriting was still recognisablyhis, it was more scrawled. It hadacquired an urgent, edgy quality. Gonewas the precise, self-controlled hand.‘With the exceptions <strong>of</strong> Lazio andVenice, Italy was unified in March1861, an event brought about bya number <strong>of</strong> factors: a fortunatediplomatic situation combined withCavour’s masterly ability to exploitit, and Garibaldi’s spirit <strong>of</strong> adventureto name but a few. But unificationcame at a price, both economic andpolitical. It had been achieved by aseries <strong>of</strong> annexations <strong>of</strong> Piedmont <strong>of</strong>the various pre-existing <strong>Italian</strong> states,so the new nation, from the start,developed more as an expansion <strong>of</strong>the old Piedmont rather than a new,original political organism. Until 1864Turin was the nations capital; projectsfor an administrative system basedon the autonomy <strong>of</strong> the regions wereabandoned, to be replaced by a rigidlycentralised system. Also the electorallaw favoured the economicallydeveloped regions, to the extent thatin more than one region <strong>of</strong> Italy thevote became the privilege <strong>of</strong> a fewnotabilities. This heavy bureaucratic,censorial character was at the heart<strong>of</strong> the new state’s prematureunpopularity, brought into being bythe gap between the government andthe governed. It was this unpopularitywhich was the heaviest price Italyhad to pay for the way unification hadbeen achieved.In June 1861, a few short monthsafter the proclamation <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom<strong>of</strong> Italy, Cavour unexpectedly died, andItaly was deprived <strong>of</strong> her great leader.The men who inherited his heavyresponsibilities were at pains not towander too far from the path he hadindicated.These men, who belonged to thegovernment <strong>of</strong> the ‘historical Right’,from 1861-1876, were obsessed withthe task <strong>of</strong> making up the state’sawesome deficit and balancing thebudget. From 1869, due to draconianfiscal measures, the condition <strong>of</strong> thetreasury improved and a balancedbudget was achieved in 1876.In the meantime the Cavour - inspiredpolicies <strong>of</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> publicworks and infrastructure continuedto gather momentum. Italy’s effort inthe area <strong>of</strong> railway building was themost impressive, with the networkexpanding from 2,175 km in 1870 to8,713 km in 1880.A policy <strong>of</strong> public works and budgetadjustment could only be achieved ina country <strong>of</strong> limited economicresources, by means <strong>of</strong> extremelysevere taxation. In fact, <strong>Italian</strong>s weresoon the most heavily taxed peoplein Europe. The effects were felt onthe level <strong>of</strong> consumption, was keptvirtually stationary - hence productiontoo was affected. The very lowbuying power <strong>of</strong> the great mass <strong>of</strong>consumers certainly did not favour thedevelopment <strong>of</strong> such manufacturingindustries as existed, which were, inany case, quite unable to competewith the cheaper foreign productsthat the liberal policies <strong>of</strong> the Rightallowed free entry to the country.In the south in particular, thiscombination <strong>of</strong> free trade and taxationpractically extinguished the scatteredlocal industry.Some scholars have maintained thatthe type <strong>of</strong> economic policy describedhere corresponds to the initial phase<strong>of</strong> capitalism preceding its true ‘take<strong>of</strong>f’,in which the initial problems arean ‘original’ accumulation <strong>of</strong> capitaland the construction <strong>of</strong> the necessaryinfrastructures; in short, a pre-industrialphase. And that is precisely what thegovernment did. The problem wasnot to encourage the development<strong>of</strong> industrial production, whichwould have been premature, but toencourage, rather, this accumulationand prepare the conditions in whichthe ‘take-<strong>of</strong>f’ could occur.For men like Cavour and FrancescoFerrera, who had grown up in theage <strong>of</strong> triumphant capitalism andfree trade, Italy’s development intoan independent bourgeois countrypresupposed her unreserved entryinto the great circuit <strong>of</strong> Europeantrade. Once exposed to the biting wind<strong>of</strong> competition, <strong>Italian</strong> agriculturalistsand businessmen would have tomake a virtue <strong>of</strong> necessity andtransform their concerns into modernorganisations able to compete onthe international market. Economicand social regeneration would, <strong>of</strong>necessity, advance from below,from the free initiative and individualproducers, as had happened in thegreat bourgeois countries <strong>of</strong> Europe.This would be a slow process, butits gradualness would guarantee itssuccess, theoretically.However, the unimaginativesuccessors <strong>of</strong> Cavour’s legacydid almost nothing to remove theobstacles that, in the new Italy,obstructed the free development <strong>of</strong>bourgeois energies from below.As the years passed and stagnationcontinued, the more perspicacioussectors <strong>of</strong> public opinion began to

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!