Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013 - Woodrow ...

ELECTIONS ANDCONFLICT INSUB-SAHARANAFRICA 2013SOMALILANDCÔTE D’IVOIREKENYAForero w Owens w Pierce w Pitea w RameyRosenbaum w Tesfaye w Vu w YiProject Advisor: Jeff FischerPrinceton University w Woodrow Wilson SchoolFebruary 2013

ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT INSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 2013SOMALILAND v CÔTE D’IVOIRE v KENYASOMALILAND TEAMJoshua Owens w Beza Tesfaye w Eugene YiCÔTE D’IVOIRE TEAMCamilo Forero w Roberto Pitea w William VuKENYA TEAMCaitlin Pierce w Elizabeth Ramey w Robert RosenbaumProject Advisor: Jeff FischerWoodrow Wilson School of Public and International AffairsGraduate Policy WorkshopFebruary 2013

The Somaliland team meets with civil society leaders in Boroma, Somaliland (photo courtesy of Eugene Yi)ABOUT THE GRADUATE POLICY WORKSHOPThis Princeton Policy Workshop is a unique project sponsored by the Wilson School of Public and InternationalAffairs that allows students in the Master in Public Affairs program to examine a complex policy problem andprovide relevant clients with analysis and recommendations.In 2012, nine students with a wide range of experiences working on African issues organized a workshop toexamine electoral conflict in Africa. Under the direction of Jeff Fischer, we spent several months studyingAfrican electoral systems and interviewed numerous stakeholders, such as election commission administrators,the International Criminal Court, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and United Nations (UN)agencies.In October we chose three case studies – Somaliland, Côte D’Ivoire, and Kenya – and traveled to these locationsfor field research. Through nearly 100 interviews with political parties, candidates, UN agencies, electoralmanagement bodies, government ministries, security officials, civil society groups, donors, and NGOs, weidentified specific challenges for each country and developed policy recommendations for UNDP, USAID, localelectoral stakeholders, and other international partners.While the entire workshop contributed to the preparation of this report, the combined assessments presentedhere do not necessarily reflect the views of any individual author, Princeton University, the project advisor, ororganizations interviewed for this report.This project would not have been possible without the expertise of our advisor, Jeff Fischer, and his years ofexperience facilitating elections in fragile states. We would like to thank Karen McGuinness, Melissa Lyles,Joanne Krzywulak, and everyone at the Woodrow Wilson School who assisted with this project. We would alsolike to thank the Democratic Governance Group at UNDP and the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict,and Humanitarian Assistance/Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance/Emerging Pandemic Threats fortheir constructive feedback. We particularly appreciate the field research assistance we received from Interpeace;Marguerite Roy, Political Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Cote d'Ivoire;and Lazarus Kubasu, Senior Specialist with the World Bank/Government of Kenya on Watery Security andClimate Resilience. Finally, we are grateful to all of the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this projectthroughout Somaliland, Côte D’Ivoire, and Kenya.Cover Photo: Voting at a Somaliland Polling Station in November 2012. Photo Courtesy of Dustin Turin.

KenyaCRECOCPJCDFIDECKELOGGOKICCIDPIEBCIPYFKEPSAMRCNDINSCTATJRCUNDPUSAIDConstitution and Reform Education ConsortiumCatholic Peace and Justice CommissionDepartment for International Development (UK)Electoral Commission of KenyaElections Observation GroupGovernment of KenyaInternational Criminal CourtInternally Displaced PersonIndependent Electoral and Boundaries CommissionInter Party Youth ForumKenyan Private Sector AllianceMombasa Republican CouncilNational Democratic InstituteNational Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict ManagementTransition AuthorityTruth, Justice and Reconciliation CommissionUnited Nations Development ProgramUnited States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYElections play a critical role in democracy, allowingcitizens to articulate their interests and holdgovernment accountable. Yet, in many Sub-SaharanAfrican countries with weak institutions and a historyof conflict, high stakes electoral competition leads toviolence and threatens the stability of democraticinstitutions. In these contexts all stakeholders mustcollaborate in a robust security framework thatrecognizes the underlying causes of electoral conflictand mitigates the risk of violence.This study identifies drivers of electoral conflict andproposes policy responses for three diverse casestudies—Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya—which face some risk of future electoral violence.Common themes also emerge, and comparisons canhelp answer broader questions about electoralsecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa and identify commonpolicy solutions. Within this general framework, thereport considers the following key questions:1. What are the patterns of past electoral violencewithin a country and how do these change givenrecent alterations in its political structure?2. What are the underlying causes of electoralviolence, and how can international actors mosteffectively support peaceful elections?3. What is the appropriate sequencing and timing forinstitutional reforms and conflict mitigationmechanisms and how can donors promote peacefuland fair elections in the longer term?SomalilandSituation AssessmentSomaliland has held five democratic elections sincetransitioning to multi-party democracy in 2001. Themost recent occurred at the district level inNovember 2012 to select (a) three national politicalparties for a ten-year term and (b) members forSomaliland’s 23 district councils. Despite the calmand success of past electoral cycles, the incidence ofconflict is increasing, and several emergingvulnerabilities threaten the peace of future elections.VulnerabilitiesVolatile and vague electoral laws lead toconflicting expectations and interpretations amongvoters and candidates; undermine the ability ofElectoral Management Bodies (EMBs) to establishpredictable, permanent electoral processes; andperpetuate dependence on informal, clan-basedmechanisms for resolving electoral disputes.The weak political party system mostly serves as avehicle for fluctuating clan interests and individualambitions. Thus, parties and associations have lowcapacity for developing permanent, broad-basedconstituencies and policy agendas. This situationincreases the risk for violence since political contestsare truly an expression of clan and personal divisions.Lack of a valid voter registry contributes towidespread voter fraud. Moreover, the lack of voterregistration undermines the National ElectoralCommission’s (NEC) ability to equitably distributepolling stations and allocate sufficient materials.The low capacity of EMBs feeds public suspicionsof bias and weakens confidence in electoraloutcomes. Poor public relations and transparency andnonexistent inter-agency coordination marred thereputations of the NEC and the Political PartyRegistration and Approval Committee (RAC) in 2012.Though NEC’s past successes bolsters its credibility,RAC’s status as a new agency with questionableneutrality and an unclear mandate undermines itslegitimacy.Poor security force training aggravates electoralconflicts. The 2012 elections revealed that police donot know how to control crowds properly and mangespontaneous demonstrations. Police often respondwith excessive force, which intensifies the conflict.Al-Shabaab’s losses in Somalia may be driving theIslamist group north, and it has singled outSomaliland’s elections as a prime target.Territorial disputes in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn(SSC) between Somaliland, Puntland, and the newseparatist administration in Khatumo inhibit voting inthese areas. NEC’s attempt to create polling stationsin SSC aggravates tensions and incites violence.Recommendations1. Parliament should form a commission with allrelevant stakeholders to conduct a comprehensivereview and reform of electoral laws. If Parliamentcan eventually produce a cohesive, clear electoral legalframework, it will minimize the risk for conflictcreated by volatile and vague electoral laws.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 1

If sufficient political concessions are not offered tothe PDCI before 2015, this political relationshipcould be easily severed and the confusion it generatescould spark electoral violence in 2015.Security – Proper security sector reform (SSR) anddisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(DDR) have not occurred. The demobilization offormer combatants and the integration of pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces into the nationalarmy (FANCI) has not proceeded as planned andafter a string of attacks in the second half off 2012,substantial doubts remain as to whether security willbe permanently restored in the country before the2013 local elections.Firearms remain widespread in Cote d’Ivoire andneighboring countries. While few incentives exist forthe ex-combatants on both sides to relinquish theseweapons, bilateral cooperation with the Liberian andGhanaian governments is starting to bear results onthe delicate issue of cross-border violence from rogueelements in the opposition.Socioeconomic – Stability is a necessary conditionfor the economic recovery. Main causes of conflictare rooted in the inappropriate use of state resourcesand unequal access to wealth and income. TheOuattara administration must address these long-termissues to mitigate deep-rooted drivers of conflict. Inparticular, land tenure is a divisive issue - especially inthe western region, where foreigners are viewed withsuspicion. Without proper awareness and applicationof the land laws by state and customary authorities,this problem will persist into 2015 and triggerelectoral violence.Recommendations1. The government should enhance the capacityand neutrality of CEI and CC tasked with theelectoral process by reforming their composition,instituting a new appointments process, and ensuringthat the institutions have the proper mandate andresources to update the voters list for 2015.Implementing mechanisms to improve the structuralimpartiality of these bodies will help de-politicizetheir decisions and reduce potential backlash andviolence.2. The government should facilitate politicalreconciliation through dialogue at the executive levelwith the FPI and seek justice for those on both sidesof the violence. An essential preliminary step is torelease or bring to trial pro-Gbagbo supporters heldin detention centers. The government should alsocommit to decentralization of the Dialogue, Truthand Reconciliation Committees (CDVRs) and assistlocal actors who have already initiated the process.Concrete steps towards reconciliation and impartialjustice will reduce tensions and help normalizepolitical life.3. The government should properly implement theDDR process to reduce the quantity of arms incirculation and incentivize alternatives to violence.4. The government should build the capacity ofFANCI forces to monitor and secure the 2015elections by giving them adequate financial andpersonnel resources. A unified and robust force willensure public confidence in the national army anddeter electoral violence.5. Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Ghana should enhancecross-border military and judicial cooperation toarrest perpetrators of electoral violence.KenyaSituation AssessmentIn March 2013, Kenya will hold its first presidentialelections since the post-election violence (PEV) of2007/08 that left over 1,500 people dead and 660,000displaced. The International Criminal Court (ICC) hascharged four instigators of the violence – two ofwhom are currently running together for presidentand vice president. However, few individuals havefaced domestic prosecution for their involvement inPEV, raising concerns that the pattern of electoralviolence has become further entrenched in Kenyanpolitics. Additionally, Kenya held a peacefulreferendum for a new Constitution in 2010 thatestablished a devolved local government structurewith 47 new counties of administration. Thereferendum was lauded for its peacefulness, but itremains unclear whether that will translate to peacefulpolitical elections.Despite a pervasive “never again” mentality regardingelectoral violence among Kenyans, most stakeholdersexpect some violence in the upcoming elections; thequestion is whether it will be contained. Kenya boastsa strong civil society and has begun to implementsecurity sector reforms. Still, the country faces manysecurity vulnerabilities both recurrent and new.VulnerabilitiesSocio-Economic vulnerabilities that have marredKenya’s past remain present in 2013. These includeElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 3

the challenges of a youth bulge, diasporainfluence, tension over land and resources,unemployment, and inequality.The new system of devolution also poses a majorthreat. When Kenyans go to the polls in March, theywill be voting for as many as six new positions,including County Governor and Senator. Much of thecountry is still uninformed about the responsibilitiesof each position. There are even reports thatcandidates for these positions are unaware of theduties. An uneducated electorate, coupled with thepoorly managed Transition Authority, the bodyresponsible for overseeing the devolution process,create medium to long-term security threats as electedofficials begin jockeying for power. Already, this hasresulted in a return to the patterns of pre-electoralviolence witnessed in the 1992 and 1997 elections,albeit at the county level.Security vulnerabilities also remain prevalent due tosecurity sector capacity constraints. Some reformshave been passed to help the police transition to thenew structure outlined in the Constitution, but fewhave been implemented. There are major concernsfor the short-term about the security sector’s capacityto keep the peace on Election Day, as well as longtermconcerns about its ability to merge into acohesive new police force to function throughout thefull electoral cycle.Finally, transitional justice vulnerabilities havedeveloped. Judiciary reforms remain incompleteand the electoral management body, the IEBC, hasyet to set up the necessary system to adjudicateelectoral crimes. The ICC trials have become adivisive point, especially with two indicted candidatesrunning for office. It remains unclear what role theICC will play in the elections, but the trials couldpossibly destabilize the post-election period,particularly in the event of a presidential run-off.violence in the upcoming election as well as improvethe long-run competency of the security sector.3. To mitigate socio-economic vulnerabilities, providevictim services, particularly related to mental health,for victims of electoral violence in past and futureelections.4. Undertake political party reforms to help movethe country away from ethnic and personality-basedpolitics. Effective reforms will bring issue-basedpolitics to the fore and mitigate some of the mostdivisive lines along which electoral violence isperpetrated.Unifying Conclusions1. A rich understanding of the historical patterns ofelectoral conflict, as well as emerging dynamics insituations of political change, is necessary for theeffective mitigation of electoral violence.2. International actors most effectively supportpeaceful elections through a combination of technicalassistance and the promotion of accountability for theperpetrators and orchestrators of violence.3. Donors and domestic stakeholders should work inpartnership to implement medium and long-termstrategies to strengthen elections and governancesystems.Recommendations1. Continue support for civic education programsin the post-election period to mitigate medium andlong-term security vulnerabilities associated with thedevolution process.2. Implement security sector reforms on an ongoingbasis, including police training and peacebuildingforums between police and localcommunities. Also, clarify the role of the ProvincialAdministration in security provision at the countylevel. These actions will help prevent post-electionElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 4

INTRODUCTIONAim of the ReportElections play a critical role in democracy, allowingcitizens to peacefully articulate their preferences andhold government accountable. Yet in many Sub-Saharan African countries with weak institutions anda history of political conflict, intense competition inhigh stakes elections leads to periods of violence andturmoil. Violent elections, in turn, threaten thestability of democratic institutions and processes,particularly in transitional democracies. Managingelections in this context necessitates collaborationbetween various institutions—government, civilsociety, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),and the international community—to establish arobust security framework that recognizes theunderlying causes of electoral conflict and mitigatesthe risk of violence.The purpose of this study is to shed light on thefactors that contribute to electoral conflict in diversetransitioning democracies and to proposeinterventions that can prevent or mitigate violenceduring elections. The three case studies used in thisreport—Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya—allface some risk of future electoral violence. Not onlydo these countries have diverse political histories anddemographics, but they also exhibit varying patternsand degrees of electoral violence, with differenttimetables for upcoming elections. Thus, this reportprovides a separate analysis and set ofrecommendations for each case.Nonetheless, common themes emerge, including ahistory of political instability, entrenched socialcleavages, and low institutional capacity for managingelectoral conflict. These comparisons can help answerbroader questions about electoral security in Sub-Saharan Africa and provide common strategies thatcan help mitigate or prevent conflict in differingcontexts. Within this general framework, the reportconsiders the following key questions:1. What are the patterns of past electoral violencewithin a country, and how do these change givenrecent alterations in its political structure?2. What are the underlying causes of electoralviolence, and how can international actors mosteffectively support peaceful elections?3. What is the appropriate sequencing and timingfor institutional reforms and conflict mitigationmechanisms, and how can donors promotepeaceful and fair elections in the longer term?Research MethodsThis report is based on research undertaken by thenine authors over the course of five months. Inaddition to secondary resources related to each casestudy, the bulk of the analysis is based on interviewsin six locations. Between October 25 and November3, 2012, the authors held nearly 100 meetings withcivil society organizations, political parties, candidates,electoral management bodies, international donors,government officials, security forces, and religiousand tribal leaders. Meetings were held in Abidjan andBrussels for the Côte d’Ivoire study, Nairobi andNakuru for the Kenya study, and Hargeisa andBorama for the Somaliland case study. A list of theindividuals interviewed can be found in Appendix A.Structure of the ReportThe report is divided into three case studies and aconclusion that identifies cross-cutting themes andlessons. Each case study consists of 1) a briefsituation assessment describing the context of theelectoral systems under consideration; 2) a summaryof the stakeholders involved in electoral security andconflict and a description of their roles; 3) an analysisof key vulnerabilities that increase the risk forelectoral violence; 4) an overview of factors that mayhelp mitigate electoral conflict; and 5)recommendations that can help address electoralviolence in these three countries in the medium andlong-term, depending on the election calendar.The order of the case studies follows levels of pastelectoral violence and the ability to address electoralviolence at different stages. Somaliland is the firstcase study, representing a low/moderate level ofelectoral conflict with sufficient time to implementkey reforms before future elections. The second studyis Côte d’Ivoire, which has experienced a high level ofelectoral violence but also has adequate time toimplement reforms prior to the next round ofpresidential elections in 2015. Our final case study,Kenya, has faced the highest level of electoralviolence in the past and will hold elections in March2013. Thus, its ability to implement new programs tomitigate electoral violence in the short term is limited,but it may instead undertake long-term reforms.The conclusion highlights broad lessons that mayapply in other contexts. It calls for practitioners toconceptualize electoral security as a complex systemthat requires assistance throughout the entire electoralcycle (before, after, and during elections) and toappreciate the evolving political and social context.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 5

CASE ONE – SOMALILANDI. SITUATION ASSESSMENTThe first section examines elections in the selfdeclaredRepublic of Somaliland, in northwesternSomalia. This case study aims to (1) assess systemicvulnerabilities that may lead to violence in futureelections, (2) profile the potential threats of electoralconflict, and (3) propose solutions to avert futureelection violence. Recent district elections will serveas a timely reference.Although unrecognized as a sovereign state,Somaliland has achieved what only a handful of othercountries in Sub-Saharan Africa have attained –peaceful elections and democratic transitions ofpower. Despite Somaliland’s past successes, severalemerging security, political, and socio-economicvulnerabilities threaten the peaceful and democraticnature of future elections. These concerns havecontributed to increasing violence and instabilityduring electoral periods.Within this context, Somaliland held its seconddistrict-level elections on November 28, 2012.Though observers described the elections as relativelypeaceful and transparent, widespread voter fraud,allegations of vote rigging, and electoral violenceexposed problems in the electoral process. Futureelections are at risk for further instability if thevulnerabilities discussed below are not addressed.1. Political and Electoral HistorySomaliland’s system of governance is based on amixture of traditional tribal arrangements anddemocratic practices. Though the tribal and religiouscomposition in Somaliland is more homogenous thanin Somalia – most people are Sunni Muslims fromone of three major clans – there is significant diversityand complexity in clan relationships at the sub-clanlevel (see Appendix C for maps and clan geography).The Isaaq clan is the largest in Somaliland, mainlysituated in the central areas. The western region ofAwdal has the highest population of the Dir Clan.Finally, the Darod Clan is the largest Somali clan, andits population is distributed across eastern Somalilandand the semi-autonomous region of Puntland inSomalia. A significant part of the Darod Clan ineastern Somaliland prefers to remain united withSomalia, rather than Isaaq-dominated Somaliland.These tribal affiliations contribute to border disputesin the regions of Sool, Sanaag and the district of Cayn(collectively known as the SSC areas) between theSomaliland Government and local militias supportedby Puntland.Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland hasfunctioned as a de facto state, with regular, democraticelections since 2001. The 1993 Borama Conferencecrafted the basic structure of government, which, atthe federal level, includes: (1) a Parliament (House ofRepresentatives and House of Elders – comprised ofelders from the various sub-clans), (2) an executivebranch, and (3) a judiciary, including a Supreme Court.The 2001 Constitutional referendum reaffirmed thetransition to multi-party democracy and establishedan electoral process for district councils, Parliament(both the House of Representatives and the House ofElders), and the Presidency.During the past four elections, Somaliland hasmanaged to overcome logistical challenges andpolitical crises through informal clan negotiations andan entrenched collective commitment to peace. In thefirst district elections in 2002, six political associationsfielded candidates for a closed-list proportionalrepresentation (PR) ballot, and Somalilanders votedfor party-lists. The results were used not only to electthe members of district councils but also to determinethe top three political associations, which becameSomaliland’s national political parties for a ten-yearterm. Because the Somaliland Constitution limits thenumber of national political parties to three, only thethree most popular political parties in the districtelections are allowed to contest Presidential andParliamentary elections for a ten-year period.Presidential elections in 2003 remained peacefuldespite the narrow margin of victory – a mere 80votes. Similarly, the 2005 House of Representativeselections faced no major incidents of violence,although the House of Elders (Guurti) voted toextend its term of office and delay Guurti elections.Though tensions arose again when the 2010Presidential elections (originally set for 2008) wererepeatedly delayed due voter registration challenges,the peaceful transfer of power from UDUB toKulmiye was a major achievement. Despite these pastsuccesses, the lack of a civil registry, ambiguouselectoral laws, budgetary constraints, limited externalsupport, and a largely illiterate population remainmajor weaknesses in the electoral process.2. Conflict Profile: 2012 District ElectionsPrior to the district elections on November 28, 2012,Parliament passed a law permitting new politicalElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 6

associations to form. Five new associations and twoexisting political parties competed for the threenational political party slots. In addition, the groupsfielded candidates for open-list ballots, which allowvoters to directly select candidates fromparty/association lists, in order to increase localaccountability. As a result, an unprecedented numberof candidates contested the elections – a total ofabout 2,400 contesting around 350 district seats. 1 Dueto delays, the preparation time was constrained, andthe election encountered several challenges, includingthe lack of a voter or civil registry, funding delays forthe National Electoral Commission (NEC), andchallenges in designing a complex open-list ballot fora largely illiterate population.Conflict marked the pre-electoral period, beginningwith complaints about the Registration and ApprovalCommittee’s (RAC) lack of transparency in theprocess of qualifying new political associations andthe NEC’s methodology for polling station placement,which the opposition criticized as being biased. Theatmosphere remained tense in the week beforeElection Day, and several violent incidents occurred –particularly clashes between protestors and securityofficials. For example, in reaction to sporadicdemonstrations against the NEC in Sanaag, Togdheerand Awdal regions, security forces fired uponprotestors, leading to civilian deaths and injuries.Voting on Election Day proceeded calmly. Apreliminary statement by the international electionobserver team, led by Progressio, Somaliland Focus,and the Development Planning Unit of the UniversityCollege of London, called the elections a “largelypeaceful and transparent expression of democraticwill” but raised concerns about “weaknesses insafeguards against multiple voting.” 2 The team alsoexpressed concerns about fraudulent and under-agevoting due to the absence of a voter registry and theinsufficient supply of materials such as indelible inkand ballots at some polling stations.Violence re-emerged after the elections, due todisputes over preliminary results in some districts.Allegations of electoral manipulation by the rulingparty, Kulmiye, were first raised by the opposition1 Voice of America, “Somaliland Voters Go to the Polls,”November 28, 2012.http://www.voanews.com/content/somaliland-elections-28nov12/1554518.html.2 Somaliland Focus/Progression/DPU, “InternationalObservers Statement on the Somaliland Local Elections,”Press Release, December 3, 2012.http://www.somalilandfocus.org.uk.political association, Xaqsoor, which claimed that theruling party not only rigged votes in its favor, but alsocheated to help an allied political association,Waddani, win support. Other political associationsfollowed suit, condemning the ruling party andaccusing the NEC of being under the influence of thegovernment. When results for Hargeisa district werereleased in early December, opposition supportersdemanded a recount. The revised vote cote forHargeisa district decreased seven percent (adiscrepancy of over 16,000 votes), further fueling newprotests and suspicions of manipulation. 3 In lateDecember, the NEC announced the long-awaitedfinal results of the elections, declaring Kulmiye,Waddani, and UCID as the top three parties. Thus far,at least eleven people have been killed in violenceduring the post-election period. 4 A full profile ofelectoral violence in 2012 is shown in Appendix D.II. STAKEHOLDERSState, non-state, and international stakeholders areinvolved in electoral security. They include regulatoryand security institutions that organize the elections, aswell as potential perpetrators and victims of electoralviolence. Below is a description of the main electionstakeholders and their role in electoral security.1. State StakeholdersNational Electoral Commission (NEC)NEC is the lead state institution for electoraloperations. Composed of a national secretariat andregional and district sub-offices, the NEC’s roleincludes: organizing polling stations, designing anddistributing ballots, coordinating voter education, andregulating campaigns. The NEC Secretariat includesseven members – three nominated by the President,two by the House of Elders, and two by registeredopposition political parties. They serve five-yearterms. Informal discussions with political parties andcivil society prior to the elections revealed that theNEC is generally seen as an experienced andobjective institution, with a very technical (rather than3 Yusuf Hassan, “Somaliland NEC Reshuffles List ofSuccessful Hargeisa Municipality Councilors,” Somalilandsun,December 15, 2012,http://somalilandsun.com/index.php/politics/1963-somaliland-nec-reshuffles-list-of-successful-hargeisamunicipality-councillors.4 Somaliland Press, “Anti-election protest escalates andspreads in Somaliland,” December 17, 2012.http://somalilandpress.com/anti-election-protestescalates-and-spreads-in-somaliland-38710.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 7

political) role. However, in the post-election period,delays in announcing results and poor handling ofallegations of vote rigging may have raised concernsabout its capacity and impartiality.Registration and Approval Committee (RAC)The 2011 Political Parties Law created RAC toregister all new political associations, judge whichwere eligible to contest district elections, anddetermine which political parties/associations wonthe three “National Party” slots based on theoutcomes of the district poll. RAC played acontroversial role in the 2012 district elections due toits lack of transparency during the qualifying roundsfor political associations. Given that RAC is a newinstitution with low capacity and an unclear mandate,it has not yet earned the trust of opposition partiesand CSOs. Additionally, the president appoints all ofRAC’s seven commissioners – subject toparliamentary approval – which undermines thepublic perception of RAC’s independence.Ministry of Interior (MoI)The MoI works closely with the NEC and othergovernment bodies to coordinate security effortsthrough weekly security meetings during electionperiods. On Election Day, MoI aims to station two tothree soldiers or police officials at each polling stationto protect ballots and ensure public order. To preventvoter intimidation, the Presidential and Local DistrictCouncil Elections Law (Article 43) allows thesesecurity officials to enter polling stations only uponthe request of the Polling Station Chairman. In 2012,security officials were also deployed to maintain orderduring peaceful demonstrations in Hargeisa, Awdal,Togdheer, and Sanaag regions, which resulted incivilian deaths due to excessive use of force.2. Non-state StakeholdersCivil Society Organizations (CSOs)Civil society contributes to electoral conflictprevention through civic education, peace-buildingand conflict resolution initiatives. Through votereducation and mobilization, many CSOs advocate forvoter participation as a peaceful and democraticmeans of choosing leaders and peacefully effectingchange. The Somaliland National Youth Organization(SONYO) and other youth groups successfullylobbied to reduce the minimum age for candidatesfrom 35 to 25 and are active in supporting youthcandidates and mobilizing voters. Other localorganizations focus on creating a peacefulenvironment for elections by organizing forums anddialogues. For example, the Academy for Peace andDevelopment (APD) organized a successful dialoguebetween RAC and political parties prior to the 2012elections to negotiate the 2012 Electoral Code ofConduct. Traditional and religious leaders have alsolong played a role in dispute resolution by buildingpeace between various sub-clans.Political Parties and AssociationsIn 2012, seven political parties and associationscompeted for the three national political party slotsand fielded candidates for district elections. Thisincluded two of the three existing political parties –Kulmiye and UCID – and five new politicalassociations – Waddani, Xaqsoor, Umadda, Rays, andDalsan. Kulmiye and UCID retained their positionsas national parties, while Wadaani won the thirdposition. Since political parties must gain strong votersupport in all six regions, all political parties andassociations claim to have cross-clan and crossregionalsupport. However, members of the Isaaqclan from the central regions often dominate politicalparty and association leadership posts. Furthermore,political parties tend to be personality-driven and/orbased on sub-clan alliances negotiated throughtraditional leaders. Finally, allegiances to parties arefluid – for example, the dissenting factions of UCIDsplit to form Waddani. Thus, political parties havefew policy or ideological differences and often invokeclan identity to mobilize voters, which heightens thepotential for electoral violence.3. International ActorsInternational Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)Interpeace is the main international organizationproviding technical support for NEC and forelections. It provides assistance in logistics, NEC stafftraining, voter registration, and dispute resolution –often through its local partner APD. Interpeace hasalso engaged Creative Associates to examine civil andvoter registry issues. The International RepublicanInstitute (IRI) works with political parties andcandidates to strengthen outreach, communications,and campaign strategies. The British NGO Progressiocoordinates international observation teams.International DonorsDonors hesitate to provide direct support forelectoral assistance, given that Somaliland is notinternationally recognized. The DemocratizationSteering Committee (DSC), based in Nairobi andcurrently chaired by representatives from USAID andthe EU, plays an advisory role for the Government ofSomaliland in the democratization process. UNDPsupports democratization through Somalia-wide ruleElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 8

of law and governance programs, including a programthat facilitates community consultations on localdevelopment projects and helps build the capacity oflocal government. UNDP’s programs also strengthenthe Ministry of Justice, which helps improve electoralconflict resolution mechanisms.III. VULNERABILITIES1. Political VulnerabilitiesAd-Hoc and Ambiguous Electoral LawsParliament has so far failed to produce a cohesivelegal framework for elections and multi-partycompetition. Although ongoing improvements areexpected in new democracies, the haphazarddevelopment of Somaliland’s electoral lawundermines its stability and integrity. MPs hastilyoverhaul the electoral law before each election, withnew procedures that often last for only one electoralcycle. For example, Parliament has rewritten 57% ofthe articles in the Presidential and Local DistrictCouncils Elections Law – some multiple times – sinceinitial ratification in 2001. 5 In the 2012 electoral cyclealone it passed three major tranches of amendmentswhile polling preparations were already underway.Parts of the law are also inconsistent and ambiguous.For instance, the 2011 Political Parties Law sketchesRAC’s mandate and the process for selecting threenational political parties. Yet it fails to provide for theappointment of the next RAC, and it leavesunanswered questions on politically sensitive issuessuch as penalties for political organizations and theprocess for merging individual election winners fromlosing political associations into the three winningparties. One especially complicated legal topicdeserving special attention is the set of proceduresand vote tabulation formulas used to determine thethree winning political parties. Appendix E examinesthe problems in this system. These legal ambiguitiescompelled political parties/associations, RAC, andNEC to negotiate an eighteen-page “Electoral Codeof Conduct” shortly before elections to clarify theseissues. However, one month prior to polling, partyand association leaders were still confused aboutmany vital procedures such as vote tabulation.Compounding these problems is the weakness of thejudiciary and its widely presumed bias in favor of theruling party. Though anyone may file a complaint5 Ibrahim Hashi Jama, “Unofficial Consolidation andTranslation of the Presidential and Local District CouncilsElections Law,” Somalilandlaw.com, September 15, 2012. with the Supreme or regional courts, oppositionparties do not trust the judiciary. Moreover, theMaroodi-Jeex Regional Court’s refusal to arbitrate thedispute between the NEC and the political partiesover the district election recount in December 2012suggests that courts may simply decline to hear a case.Thus, the NEC processes most complaints internally,and clans negotiate settlements to major politicaldisputes outside of formal institutions.A poor electoral legal framework increases the riskfor electoral conflict in three ways. First, it impedesthe development of NEC, RAC, and stable electoralinstitutions. Without clear, permanent guidelines, it isdifficult for the NEC to establish consistentprocesses for voter education, registration, polling,tabulation, security, and dispute resolution. Oneformer NEC member reports, “I remember each ofthe three articles [laws] had its own shortcomings andgaps which became apparent while we were at thebeginning of the election process.” 6 Such limitationsweaken public confidence in the system’s legitimacy.Second, this uncertain legal and institutionalenvironment leads to conflicting expectations andinterpretations among voters and candidates, andthese discrepancies can easily incite conflict. Ifpolitical actors do not have a common, basicunderstanding of the basis for electoral outcomes oradministrative decisions, political contenders or theirsupporters may prematurely raise accusations ofcorruption or bias and respond violently.Finally, this poor legal framework for electionsperpetuates Somaliland’s reliance on “negotiateddemocracy.” 7 Despite increasingly robust democraticnorms, Somalilanders often defer to clan or politicalleaders to negotiate solutions to controversial questions(such as the vote tabulation formula in 2012 fordetermining the three national political parties).Unclear electoral procedures perpetuate this customand undermine the rule of law and institutions.Although “negotiated democracy” has helpedmaintain peace for two decades, negotiated solutionsmay not always be attainable as the political systemgrows in complexity and the collective memory of thecivil war fades.6 Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SONSAF),“Somaliland Elections Review Report,” March 2011, 22. 7 Note that political observers in both Somaliland andKenya use the term “negotiated democracy” to referbroadly to political solutions and electoral outcomesnegotiated by tribal leaders. However, as the Kenya Sectiondemonstrates, the concept of “negotiated democracy” hasslightly different meanings in the two contexts.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 9

Weak Political Party SystemSince 2001, Somaliland has combined elements of itsclan-based social order with multi-party democracy.Yet, political parties are still impaired by undevelopedpolicy agendas, narrow personalistic interests,unstable political allegiances, the dominance of claninterests and norms, and weak regulatory oversight.Field interviews with leaders and candidates from thethree established parties and five new politicalassociations revealed few ideological or policydistinctions. Besides clan and regional interests,prominent political figures often drive parties andassociations, and most groups fail to articulate welldefinedobjectives and ideas. The formation of newpolitical associations for district elections in 2012exacerbated the problem, as the process encouragedpolitically ambitious individuals or groups to financethemselves and form an association. Althoughregistration requirements (see Appendix E) made itmore difficult for groups with narrow constituenciesto advance, opening up the political process stillprovided a platform for individual interests. OneNGO leader noted that the associations simplyrepresent a “reshuffling of the deck chairs” – thesame players just with different fronts. 8Consequently, the political party system is very weak.Parties focus on Hargeisa, with minimal outreach toperipheral regions. This exacerbates Somaliland’sproblems with separatist movements and outbreaksof violence in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. Moreover,according to a 2012 study by SONSAF, parties andassociations lack properly registered membership, andthey retain few permanent supporters betweenelections because of their poor constituencymaintenance efforts. Groups spend huge sums ofmoney to create a transitory base of followers eachelection cycle, which breeds corruption, and bothvoters and politicians constantly shift their allegiances.For example, prior to the 2012 elections a riftoccurred in the UCID party between long-time leaderFaisal Ali Waraabe and his deputy, who broke awaywith the majority of the membership and formed theWaddani Association (which became one of the threewinning parties in 2012). Then, the former rulingparty UDUB imploded, losing its primary financier toUCID and much of its grassroots support to Kulmiye.Moreover, parties and associations are still beholdento clans. The constitution restricts the number ofnational political parties to three in order to mitigateclan-based fragmentation, and the national8 Interview with INGO leader in Hargeisa, Somaliland,October 30, 2012.competition among all political organizations everyten years for one of those three spots – which forcesthem to garner support across all regions – helpsensure that political parties are diverse. However,most parties represent a careful coalition of claninterests, and traditional leaders still largelyorchestrate the political process behind the scenes.For example, interviews with traditional leaders andindividual candidates just prior to the 2012 districtelection revealed that most candidates need clanendorsement. Progressio’s report on the 2005parliamentary election asserts that “clan leadershipplayed a key role in selecting the candidates and infinancing their campaigns,” with the aim of buildingclan representation in Parliament. 9 Additionally, the“open-list” ballot for parliamentary and districtcouncil elections, whereby voters choose individualcandidates, facilitates clan-based voting.This weak party system increases the risk of conflictbecause differences between parties/associations arenot based on issues or ideology but on personal andclan divisions. For example, during the recent internalUCID struggle, Faisal Ali Waraabe explicitly calledupon his clan for support, and in parliamentary anddistrict council elections traditional leaders jockey toensure their clan is represented. Also, during the 2012elections, disputes about the NEC’s methodology forlocating polling stations almost escalated into a crisisafter clans began comparing the number of stations intheir respective territories. Without political groupsthat cut across clans, the electoral system merely pitsclans against one another in an inherently conflictivesituation and exacerbates the risk for violence.Finally, as RAC is a new institution with low capacityand an uncertain mandate, supervision of politicalorganizations is weak. One prominent manifestationof the permissive political environment is the lack ofcampaign and political finance regulations. Currently,the 2011 Political Parties Law contains only twospecific provisions. Article 19 bans foreign funding,and Article 20 requires only the three national politicalparties to submit an annual statement of accounts tothe NEC. Otherwise, parties and associations are notsubject to any restrictions on how they acquire or usemoney. The law does not specifically ask the threenational political parties to disclose donors, fundingamounts, or itemized expenditures, and associationsface no requirements. Thus, financial abuse such asvote buying and bribery is currently undetectable,undermining voter confidence in the system. Lastly,9 Adon Yusuf Abokor et al., “Further Steps to Democracy:The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections September 2005,”London: Progressio, 2006, 9.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 10

These problems were particularly acute during the2012 poll. For example, the NEC’s decision to locatepolling stations on the basis of 2010 voter turnoutstirred up considerable controversy and promptedallegations that the NEC was favoring certain politicalparties or clans. Also, due to the complexity an“open-list” ballot and the lack of a voter registry, theNEC encountered several logistical problems. Forinstance, some polling stations reported ballotshortages and long queues on Election Day. Politicalassociations and the media also strongly criticized theNEC’s vote tabulation process and its strategy forannouncing results. Claiming massive vote rigging,supporters of Xaqsoor and other political associationsprotested the results on December 6. The NEC thenfailed to reach an agreement with these organizationson the terms of a recount, and the Maroodi-Jeexregional court refused to arbitrate. Finally, the NECwas forced to recount Hargeisa district votes andrelease a revised vote count, which decreased by 7%.The recount altered individual winners for twodistrict council seats, but it did not alter the numberof seats won by each party. The NEC explained that27 ballot boxes from the Faroweyne district werecounted twice due to an administrative error. 12Although it does not appear that the NECdeliberately manipulated election results, the episodereveals insufficient capacity to mitigate major errorsand a lack of transparency.The 2011 Political Parties Law created RAC toregister new political associations, establish qualifyingcriteria for competing in the 2012 district election,determine the three winning parties on the basis ofthe election outcomes, and regulate the parties afterthe election. RAC has been a magnet for criticism,and several problems have plagued the institutionsince its debut.First, many stakeholders suspect that RAC may notbe a neutral body because the president nominated allseven members (with Parliamentary approval). Theseperceptions of partiality are exacerbated by the highlysubjective and political nature of RAC’s work. RAC’sprimary responsibility is to determine an association’seligibility to contest local elections and to referee theactivities of both parties and associations during theelectoral process – on the basis of a very ambiguouslegal framework. The 2011 Political Parties Law setsbroad guidelines and assigns RAC several challenging12 Somaliland Sun, “NEC Reshuffles List of SuccessfulHargeisa Municipality Councilors, December 15, 2012.http://somalilandsun.com/index.php/politics/1963-somaliland-nec-reshuffles-list-of-successful-hargeisamunicipality-councillors.responsibilities, as noted in Appendix G. Yet, RAC’scapacity to oversee this mandate is limited, not onlybecause it is a new institution, but also because thegovernment was its only source of initial funding.Poor public relations have also hindered RAC’seffectiveness. On April 20, 2012, after a second roundof reviews, it disqualified nine of the fifteen politicalassociations it had initially registered in late 2011. 13RAC provided no justification for its decision, andimmediately after this announcement it disappearedfor nearly two weeks. Interviewees noted that itliterally did not answer phones or respond to inquiries.Finally, on May 3, RAC provided a brief explanationof the disqualifications – emphasizing the groups’failure to meet round two requirements (seeAppendix E). However, it did not provide details foreach association or evidence. The nine associationsunsuccessfully appealed RACs decision to theSupreme Court and attempted to stir up violentprotests; however, these demonstrations quicklydisbanded – reportedly because these groups lacked astrong base of support anyway. Ultimately, althoughRAC may be following the law and judging politicalorganizations fairly, this lack of transparency onpolitically sensitive matters perpetuates the public’sperception that it is distorting the process.Finally, RAC’s long-term mandate is tenuous. On theone hand, RAC’s term expires after two years, withthe NEC assuming its outstanding responsibilities,and the 2011 Political Parties Law does not providefor RAC’s reappointment to manage the registrationand selection process again in ten years. Yet, thepresident has the authority to renew or extend RAC’sterm, and it is lobbying to position itself as a stronger,permanent stakeholder. This uncertainty about itsmandate undermines RAC’s authority to fill thecrucial role of political party regulator. Moreover, ithinders coordination with other key stakeholders.The relationship between RAC and NEC wasnonexistent during the 2012 elections. Both bodies –but particularly RAC – are concerned aboutsafeguarding their own turf given the unclear legalboundaries between them. As one observer noted,the lack of willingness to cooperate comes “morefrom the resistance of the RAC who clearly want to13 RAC accepted applications from new politicalassociations from 12 November 2011 to 28 December2011. It announced on 29 December 2011 that 15 politicalassociations fulfilled round one requirements and weregranted provisional registration – including Ummada,Gurmad, Jamhuuriga, Damal, NDP, NASIYE, Xaqsoor,NUUR, SSCD, RAYS, Horyaal, Badbaado, UDHIS,DALSAN, and Waddani. Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 12

establish themselves, but are meeting resistance fromall sides, have few resources, and have gained noconfidence from the parties or the NEC.” 14 If RACand NEC are not cooperating on election planning ordelivering unified public messages on sensitivepolitical processes, it could lead to confusion aboutthe rules of the game and exacerbate electoral conflict.2. Security VulnerabilitiesAl-Shabaab ThreatAl-Shabaab – a militant Islamist organization thatemerged in Somalia in 2006 – has consistentlycondemned the conduct of elections in Somaliland.Before the 2010 presidential lections, al-Shabaab’sSupreme Leader Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr warnedSomalilanders that they would “face theconsequences” if they cast a ballot, and he sent thefollowing message to local media: “We are warningthe people in Somaliland against taking part in theelections, because democracy is totally against Islamiclaw and what we are fighting for is to implementIslam in Somalia.” 15 Somaliland security forcesthwarted two known attacks in the month leading upto the 2010 election. 16Under pressure from AMISOM and the Somaligovernment, al-Shabaab’s influence has waned insouthern and central Somalia in recent years, and ithas lost many key strongholds. However, rather thandefeating al-Shabaab, these attacks may be pushingthe militants north into Puntland. Both Puntland’sgovernment and the international community haveexpressed serious concerns about this relocation. 17Al-Shabaab’s presence around Bossaso in Puntlandwould be particularly dangerous because of thepotential for establishing safe havens in the nearby14 Steve Kibble and Michael Walls, “Preparing for LocalElections in Somaliland,” London: Progressio, August2012, 14.15 African Press Agency, "Al Shabaab threatens to disruptSomaliland elections," June 25, 2010.http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2010/jun/al_shabab_threatens_to_disrupt_somaliland_elections.aspx;Kulmiye Party, "Somaliland: Peaceful presidential electiondefies al-Shabaab," June 28, 2010.http://kulmiye.com/6619/6619. 16 Jacob Zenn, “Al-Shabaab’s Unavoidable Clash withSomaliland Democracy,” The Jamestown Foundation,August 19, 2010.http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36766. 17 Reuters, "Somalia’s al Shabaab, squeezed in south, moveto Puntland," November 9, 2012.http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/somaliapuntland-shabaab-idUSL5E8M96UZ20121109.Galgala mountains. Moreover, Puntland provides themilitant group with closer proximity to the Gulf ofAden, which may facilitate easier access to arms andstronger cooperation with al-Qaeda in the ArabianPeninsula. Especially since Bosasso is very close tothe border with the disputed Sanaag region inSomaliland, the possibility of militants spilling intoSomaliland is strong.Although al-Shabaab has not carried out a majorattack in Somaliland since the 2008 Hargeisa attackson UNDP, the Ethiopian consular mission, and thePresidential Palace, it remains a major threat. Indeed,Zubayr has often indicated his desire to expand al-Shabaab to his native Somaliland. Given the growinglack of employment opportunity and the youth bulge,al-Shabaab could also attempt to expand recruitmentefforts inside Somaliland.Territorial Disputes in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC)Territorial disputes between Somaliland and Puntlandover the SSC areas exist mainly because of the widegeographical distribution of the Darod/Harti clanfamily throughout eastern Somaliland (Sool/Sannag),Puntland, and Somalia. With some internationalsupport, Puntland launched a semi-autonomous statein northeast Somalia in 1998, which – unlikeSomaliland – is non-secessionist and affirms the unityof Somalia under a federal system. (See Appendix Cfor a map of the disputed territories.)Puntland is based on the idea of a unitedDarod/Harti territory, and thus it claims sovereigntyover parts of Sool and Sanaag in Somaliland.Although the Darod in these regions (theDhulbahante and Warsengeli clans) originally agreedto join Somaliland in 1993, Hargeisa failed toestablish effective support and governance in theseregions, and the dominance of the Isaaq inSomaliland has alienated many Darod. However, thedispute is very complex because loyalties vary by subclan.Moreover, although the inclusion of Sool andSanaag is important to Somaliland because it validatesthe notion of Somaliland as a plural, multi-clan state,control of the region is equally important forPuntland in order to ensure Darod unity. 18 Electionsexacerbate these territorial conflicts. Even thoughmost residents of this region refuse to participate, theSomaliland government sees them as disenfranchisedvoters and pushes the boundaries to hold elections inSSC. However, when the NEC and Somalilandsecurity forces push their way into disputed areas to18 Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, London: Progressio,2008, 129-130; 197-199.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 13

citizens of a geographical town or region, but asmembers of a social group, clan, or sub-clan. Thus,clan allegiances are still the fundamental organizingprinciple in society. Clans seek their own interestsfirst and emphasize strength in numbers in order togain a political and economic advantage. Moreover,geographic political representation merely provides afaçade for clan-based representation. Clans vie toensure that they obtain adequate representation inParliament and other elected bodies, and citizens onlyfeel truly represented when a fellow clan member is inthe government. This mentality motivated the disputein the 2012 elections over the distribution of pollingstations. Moreover, it is the fundamental driver of theSSC territorial disputes with Puntland, whichessentially pits the Isaaq against the Darod/Harti.Youth frustrationsSomaliland youth (under 35) comprise over 70percent of the population. 20 A recent change in theelection law that lowered the political candidacy agerequirement for district council elections from 35 to25 years has empowered them. One youth candidatestated, “Somaliland has achieved the equivalent of ahundred years of democratic development in only adecade.” 21 However, frustrations still exist. Jobopportunities are sparse, and the thousands of youthwho graduate from university each year have troublefinding jobs. Unless the government addressesunemployment among youth, these frustrations couldeasily spark social instability. Moreover, due to strongclan identities, youth are particularly susceptible topolitical or clan-based mobilization by their leaders.IV. MITIGATING FACTORSElection Monitoring CommitteeOne key outcome of the 2012 Electoral Code ofConduct negotiated by parties/associations, RAC,and NEC was the creation of a National ElectionMonitoring Committee. In October 2012 the NECappointed experienced and widely respectedindividuals to monitor compliance with electoral rulesand make recommendations to the NEC concerningviolations and penalties. The commission is also amechanism for conflict resolution betweenparties/associations and has the authority to deal withcomplaints regarding the code of conduct. Thecommission consisted of twenty members splitbetween national and regional offices to be activeduring the campaign season and Election Day.Strength of Civil SocietySomaliland has numerous, well-developed CSOssupported by the international community. TheAcademy for Peace and Development is the leadpeace-building organization and is widely respectedfor facilitating dialogue, contributing to thedevelopment of electoral institutions, and resolvingsocial and political conflict. Another group isNAGAAD, which advocates for women’s rights andis involved in training candidates and electionobservers. Youth organizations are also very strong.Recently, they helped lobby the government to lowerthe candidate eligibility age to 25 for district elections.Furthermore, IRI has a program to pair MPs withlocal NGOs to build the capacity of MPs on policyand governance issues. These examples display therobustness of the sector.Aversion to ViolenceBecause of the devastating impact of the civil war inthe 1980s and 1990s and the collective memory ofthese events, there is a deeply ingrained nationalaversion to violence. Indeed, during field research,stakeholders repeatedly affirmed that peace andstability is the first priority, and clan and politicalleaders have upheld this commitment at all costs.Somaliland should leverage these sentiments toestablish programs that will pass on the ‘lessonslearned’ from the past to a new generation.Informal Dispute Resolution Through Traditional LeadersThe clan system is very strong and enjoys widespreadlegitimacy and respect. 22 As a result, clan leaders inSomaliland have been in a much better position –compared to Somalia – to use their authority topreserve stability and settle conflict. Moreover,Somaliland is much more homogenous and unified –with only three main clan families and a more robustsystem for managing inter-clan relations. Thus, it ismuch more difficult for al-Shabaab to exploitdivisions and gain influence in Somaliland.Rotating Campaign ScheduleArticles 28 and 29 of the Presidential and LocalDistrict Councils Elections Law prescribe strictprocedures for campaigns. The NEC provides arotating schedule granting only one party/association20 Interpeace, "Giving Somaliland Youth a Voice," PressRelease, December 12, 2012.http://www.interpeace.org/2011-08-08-15-19-20/latestnews/389-sonyo21 Ibid.22 Some observers, however, have argued that theirlegitimacy may be under question because of its alliancewith the ruling party. Moreover, the Guurti has votedunilaterally to extend the president’s and its own termsmultiple times. Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 15

per day the right to publicly campaign. Thismechanism prevents confrontational encountersbetween rallies and groups of supporters of rivalpolitical parties. Moreover, the NEC must alsoapprove all campaign materials.V. RECOMMENDATIONSStrategic Objective 1: Strengthen the ElectoralLegal FrameworkRecommendation 1: Conduct ComprehensiveReview and Reform of National Electoral LawsActors: House of Representatives and Guurti withinput from CSOs, Political Parties, NEC, RACAction: Somaliland must update, clarify, andconsolidate its various electoral laws. This goal cannotbe achieved overnight, but a concrete first step is theestablishment of a National Electoral Law ReviewCommittee to review all existing laws; identifyinconsistencies, ambiguities, and gaps; and proposeoptions for passing a new, consolidated electoral legalframework.Many key stakeholders already have recognized thisneed. The Secretary of the Guurti has stated, “Insteadof drafting and enacting these laws one at a time andin haste, all the electoral laws should have beendrafted together as package, after proper nationwideconsultation.” 23 Parliament should lead this process,and it can build political support for the review andeventual reform by substantively involving all majorstakeholders impacted by the electoral law – NEC,RAC, and political parties – with input from CSOs.Clear, consistent electoral laws will reduce the risk ofelectoral violence by (a) minimizing confusion andthe variance of expectations in the electoral process,(b) creating the basis for stable electoral institutions,and (c) encouraging reliance on formal institutionsand the rule of law (rather than informal clannegotiations) during political crises or disputes.Recommendation 2: Increase support and trainingfor the judiciaryActors: Judiciary, International NGOs, local CSOsAction: Strong judicial institutions are essential forimpartially resolving electoral disputes and mitigating23 Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SONSAF),“Somaliland Elections Review Report,” March 2011, 19. the use violent tactics. However, many stakeholdersin Somaliland perceive the judiciary as partial towardsthe ruling party and weak in capacity. Skills trainingand capacity building programs are needed –particularly for the regional courts and the SupremeCourt, which consider electoral disputes. UNDP haspreviously provided similar programs in the past.Other organizations such as IRI, Interpeace, andAPD may be well positioned to engage the judiciarywith additional capacity-building programs such ason-going education for judges, training to recognizehidden biases and improve judicial integrity, and anexchange program to observe electoral disputeresolution mechanisms in other countries.Special attention should be given to strengthening theintegrity of the appointment process for judges andfunding for the courts in order to minimize executiveinfluence over the judiciary.Recommendation 3: Institute ComprehensivePolitical and Campaign Finance RegulationsActors: House of Representatives, Guurti, NEC, RACwith input from political parties and CSOsAction: Currently, the only regulations are the ban onforeign funding and the requirement that the threenational parties must submit an annual statement ofaccounts. To enhance political finance regulation,Parliament should enact three improvements. First, itshould require political parties to publicly disclose thesource and amount of funding from donations thatexceed a certain threshold. Second, it should imposesimilar reporting and disclosure requirements onindividual candidates in national elections and newpolitical associations. (However, it would be infeasibleto require such reporting from all individualcandidates in district elections). Third, it shouldstipulate that candidates and parties/associations mayonly accept funds from entities that are majorityownedby Somalilanders. Although the current lawbans funding from foreigners, it does not set aminimum threshold for Somalilander ownership inentities controlled jointly with foreigners. Technically,this loophole may permit the inflow of foreign funds.These modifications will limit the influence of illicitfunding sources and reduce the use of political moneyfor vote buying, voter intimidation, or electoralviolence.RAC and NEC should create a joint working groupto enforce these regulations. This cooperation willhelp avoid any “turf wars” between the two bodies,take advantage of their combined capacity, and helpbuild public confidence in fair enforcement.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 16

Recommendation 4: Develop a Civil RegistryActor: Ministry of Interior with input from the NECand other end users, CSOs, political partiesAction: Major voter registration flaws in 2010 followedby nonexistent registration and identificationprocedures in 2012 spurred most of the instabilityand violence during the past two elections. To boostpublic confidence in the legitimacy of electoraloutcomes, Somaliland must develop a civil registry.First, Parliament should appoint a Civil Registrar tobe housed within MoI, who will oversee the creationof a Joint Civil Registration Committee comprisingrepresentatives from the NEC, other end users, anddistrict civil registry offices. Second, the Committeeshould appoint a civil society and political partyadvisory council to provide input on the planningprocess and share information about implementationwith their constituencies. The district offices willserve as the point of entry for data collection, publicrelations, and management of the civil registry.However, provisions must also be made for mobileregistration units to register nomadic pastoralists andpopulations living far from the nearest district office.After the registry is active, the NEC will need toreplicate these mobile teams for polling purposes.Significant investment should be made in trainingstaff – particularly at the district level – as poortraining and hasty implementation led to disastrousoutcomes during the 2009 attempt to create a civilregistry. The Committee should also run pilotregistration projects in select districts.It is important to sell this project politically as notonly another attempt at voter registration but also as avaluable national asset that will improve servicedelivery, contribute to a sense of national identity,clarify the population and demographics ofSomaliland, allow for a more fair delimitation ofgeographic and political boundaries, and strengthennational security.Furthermore, by involving stakeholders from civilsociety and political parties, the registrationcommittee can ensure strong communication with thepublic and build support from diverse constituencies.Finally, Parliament and MoI should sufficientlyseparate the Registrar’s Office from other MoIbranches to ensure strong political independence. 2424 The substance of Recommendation 4 is based on ananalysis and concept paper prepared by Creative AssociatesInternational for its ongoing efforts to provide technicalStrategic Objective 2: Build Capacity of EMBsRecommendation 1: Establish RAC as a permanentinstitution with a reasonable term of office similar tothe NEC’s (e.g. five years).Actors: Parliament, RACAction: The weakness and uncertainty of RAC’s longtermmandate hinders capacity-building in thisinstitution and, thus, undercuts its legitimacy as aregulator and mediator among political groups. RACcan play a major role in strengthening the politicalparty system and can establish clear procedures thatreduce the risk of conflict; however, it cannot fulfillthis role without a permanent and clear mandate.The Regulation of Political Associations and PartiesLaw (2011) undermines RAC because it only providesit with a temporary two-year term. This same lawrequires RAC to not only register politicalassociations and manage the process that determinesthe three national parties, but also to monitor thebehavior of political parties. This secondary roleincludes monitoring the internal processes of politicalparties (Article 25), resolving inter-party disputes(Article 27), and financial oversight and auditing(Article 23). However, RAC cannot fulfill these dutiesunless it is a permanent institution with a clearmandate and support from all stakeholders.Recommendation 2: Clarify RAC’s role vis-à-visNEC and establish coordination mechanismsbetween the EMBsActors: Parliament, RAC, NECAction: Parliament should specify RAC’s role vis-à-visNEC and increase RAC-NEC coordination, especiallyin areas where their responsibilities overlap, byestablishing formal coordination mechanismsbetween RAC and NEC. Such mechanisms willprevent misunderstandings that could spark conflictand help the institutions better address security risks.Developing a comprehensive electoral law thataddresses ambiguities in the system may partiallysolve these RAC-NEC issues. For example, the 2011Political Parties Law mentions in Article 7 that, “Noassociation/party shall use or utilize for its ownassistance for the development of a civil registry inSomaliland. See Jeffrey Fischer, “Development andAdministration of a Civil Registry: Somaliland ProgramAssessment and Concept Paper, 2011-2013,” CreativeAssociates International.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 17

electoral activities the assets of the Somalilandnation.” One common complaint during the 2012elections was that Kulmiye candidates were unfairlyadvantaged in the campaign because their party couldmobilize state resources. 25 These allegations were notaddressed, since it was unclear which institution(whether RAC or NEC) should take up the issue,perpetuating the perception that the ruling party wasgetting a free pass from the EMBs.Recommendation 3: Increase transparency of RACand NEC decisions and procedures through capacitybuilding and improving public outreach.Actor: International NGOs, CSOs, RAC, NECAction: Much of the turmoil during the 2012 electionsstemmed from popular perceptions that EMBs weremanipulating the process in favor of one group oranother. These problems arise primarily from twosources: weak internal capacity and a lack oftransparency combined with a poor publiccommunications strategy. Weak capacity appliesmostly to RAC, which, as a new institution, needsgreater financial and technical assistance in effectivelyfulfilling its mandate. RAC staff would benefit fromtechnical trainings, exchange programs, organizationalmanagement support, and assistance in establishingproper institutional procedures, funded by theGovernment of Somaliland and International NGOs.RAC and NEC should also build transparency byholding weekly joint press briefings during thecampaign and election season. Similarly, bothinstitutions should allocate resources forcommunications and public outreach staff, which willensure that relevant information is disseminated tothe press and political parties in a timely andprofessional manner.Strategic Objective 3: Strengthen the PoliticalParty SystemRecommendation 1: Provide political partydevelopment programsActors: INGOs, CSOs, Political PartiesAction: Somaliland’s weak party system increases therisk of conflict because differences between politicalgroups are not based on issues or ideology but onpersonal and clan divisions. In order to combat clan-25 Opposition political association members in discussionwith authors, November 1, 2012.based politics and mobilization, Somaliland muststrengthen the political party system and turn thefocus of political parties and voters to issues/policiesrather than group identity. INGOs and CSOs shouldsupport capacity building for political parties andassociations including training in platformdevelopment, effective messaging, public outreach,and coalition building. IRI has provided technicalassistance to the three national political parties in thepast. INGOs and CSOs should continue this workand scale it up with long-term programming. This willensure that the three new national political parties willgain from these programs in advance ofParliamentary and Presidential elections in 2013 and2015, respectively. Technical trainings and capacitybuilding should also be decentralized – for examplethrough Training of Trainers (TOT) – so that districtofficials and local members will understand andpromote the policy platform developed by theirnational political party.RAC can also play a role in strengthening politicalparties by clarifying and holding political partiesaccountable to their responsibilities under the 2011Political Parties Law regarding membership, finances,and internal procedures.Recommendation 2: Enhance Civic EducationActors: INGOs, CSOs, MoE, MoRAction: Strengthening the political party system alsonecessitates transforming the nature of citizens’political participation through civic education.Changing political behavior cannot happen overnight;nonetheless, CSOs and INGOs can spur this processby promoting a sense of national unity and raisingawareness about democratic principles, rights, andgovernment accountability. Civic education programscan be implemented through various venues includingschool curriculums, religious institutions, and publicforums, such as debates. To have a far-reachingimpact, INGOs and CSOs with technical expertise indesigning civic education programs should partnerwith government institutions such as the Ministry ofEducation and the Ministry of Religion.Recommendation 3: Support the development ofindependent radio channels for political discourseActors: Government, INGOs, CSOs, the mediaAction: The media also plays a role in shaping politicalparticipation. It can help promote the maturity ofpolitical discourse, turn the public’s attention towardElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 18

policy issues, and hold political actors accountable.However, this requires a professional andindependent media. The Government of Somalilandshould deregulate radio, allowing independentstations to emerge. Moreover, media supportinitiatives are needed to improve journalisticstandards, as journalists will often write anything theyare paid to write. 26 Media organization such as theSomaliland Journalists Association and other CSOsand INGOs can foster partnerships between localand international media and supporting training onmedia standards to reduce inaccurate, prejudiced, andimproper reporting.Strategic Objective 4: Address SecurityConcernsRecommendation 1: Train Riot PoliceActors: Government and International PartnersAction: The Somaliland Government should providestronger training to security forces in order to preventexcessive use of force and future clashes with civilians.Specifically, the government should consider enlistingthe support of international partners such as the UKfor these capacity building programs. Foreignpartners can help design police training and share bestpractices for conflict resolution, crowd control, andrules of engagement.Recommendation 2: Encourage GrassrootsDialogue between Puntland and SomalilandActors: Civil SocietyAction: CSOs, religious leaders, and clan leaders canuse Track II Diplomacy – also known as citizendiplomacy – to increase dialogue and cooperationbetween Somaliland and Puntland. Track IIDiplomacy involves informal exchange betweenmembers of the civil society, religious, or privatesectors. It should include CSOs, traditional leaders,women, youth groups, and others who are inpositions to discuss common governance and securityissues, encourage peaceful co-existence, and combatpolitical and clan-based mobilization. Theseinteractions may be a catalyst for dialogue betweenSomaliland and Puntland on border disputes andbasic security and economic cooperation.Track I dialogue between government officials issensitive because it invokes complicated questionsabout recognition and sovereignty. However, covertTrack I dialogue between Puntland and Somalilandcould still be beneficial in some areas, such asintelligence collaboration on al-Shabaab.Recommendation 3: Explore the Development ofSocial Programs for YouthActors: INGOs, CSOs, Somaliland GovernmentAction: Youth (under 35) are susceptible to appealsfrom clan and political leaders seeking to mobilizethem to violence for political purposes, as well asfrom extremist groups like al-Shabaab. The allure ofthese opportunities and the financial, social, or otherbenefits they sometimes offer becomes increasinglystronger as legitimate opportunities for employmentand education in society wane. Though youth inSomaliland have not been particularly drawn topolitical violence or extremism in the past, growingunemployment and frustration – in combination withthe youth bulge – are increasing these risks. AlthoughSomaliland cannot strengthen its long-term economyand job market overnight, it can explore vocationaland educational programs that deter youth fromviolence and extremism. Some options may includeapprenticeship programs, support and incentives forhigher education, greater access to financing forentrepreneurs, microfinance programs, or a strongernational investment in vocational/skills trainingopportunities. The Government of Somaliland, civilsociety groups, youth organizations, and internationalpartners should begin to explore these alternatives.26 Somaliland Journalists in discussion with authors,October 29, 2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 19

CASE TWO – CÔTE D’IVOIREI. SITUATION ASSESSMENTAfter years of sustained conflict, the 2007Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OAP) facilitated asettlement between President Laurent Gbagbo andthe Forces Nouvelles (FN) and installed former FNleader Guillaume Soro as the Prime Minister underGbagbo. Moreover, it established a timetable forelections, which ultimately led to presidentialelections on November 28, 2010. (See Appendix Hfor a historical summary of the conflict.)Despite consensus on the contested issue of voteridentification, the delayed election between the Rallyof the Republican’s (RDR) Alassane Ouattara and theIvoirian Popular Front’s (FPI) Laurent Gbagboresulted in a serious political crisis. Although both theUnited Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)and European Union (EU) certified the election asfree and fair, Gbagbo pressured the ConstitutionalCourt to invalidate over 660,000 votes in sevendepartments favorable to Ouattara and withholdcertification of Outtara’s victory. After months ofwidespread clashes, Ouattara and FN forces launchedan offensive and eventually arrested Gbagbo, a movefacilitated by UN and French military forces. Theseelections precipitated a political and humanitariancrisis that left approximately 3,000 people dead, atleast 350,000 displaced, and 200,000 as refugees inneighboring countries.Two years later, former president Laurent Gbagboawaits trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC),and some key leaders of his Ivoirian Popular Front(FPI) are exiled in neighboring countries or detainedin Côte d’Ivoire. Political reconciliation has beenlimited, perpetuating a climate of political instability.As a result, progress has been slow on electoralcommission reform, the work of the truth andreconciliation committee, security sector reforms, andlonger-term growth and development planning.This case study examines the evolution of the Ivoirianconflict and the dynamics that create instability duringelection cycles, with the objective of helpingpolicymakers prepare for and prevent conflict in localelections in 2013 and presidential elections in 2015.II. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS1. State StakeholdersIndependent Electoral Commission (CEI)The CEI has a mandate to organize, supervise, andmonitor all electoral operations as defined in theConstitution and outlined in the electoral code. Mostimportantly, the CEI will be responsible for updatingthe electoral list to prevent cases of fraud and toensure that all citizens of voting age are registered tovote. Because the CEI’s certification of the 2010election triggered the Gbagbo-Ouattara standoff, theCEI will remain the subject of heavy scrutiny through2015. Moreover, since the CEI is now composed ofpolitical appointees chosen by the current rulingparty, the opposition in 2015 may question itsimpartiality, which could trigger conflict.Constitutional Council (CC)The Constitutional Council adjudicates electoraldisputes. Since it is currently composed of Ouattaraappointees, any judgment in favor of the incumbentparty has the potential to spur opposition-ledelectoral violence.Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR)The CDVR was created in May 2011 to addresstensions and grievances generated by the electoralviolence in the 2010 electoral cycle. 1 With a sixtyperson staff based in Abidjan, its principal mandate isto promote forums for dialogue through localdelegations. However, the commission hasaccomplished little, and the thirty-six localcommittees planned in five geographical areas inNovember 2012 are not in a position to start work. 2This inaction is partially a result of inadequatefunding. Although CDVR has received severalexternal grants, the government has failed to providethe rest of the funding. 3 In its absence, local religious1 The CDVR was created by ordinance No. 2011-167 on13 July 2011, which is 3 months after Gbagbo was arrestedand Ouattara assumed power. See “CDVR en bref,”http://www.cdvr.ci/comprendre-la-cdvr/cdvr-enbref.html.2 International Crisis Group. “Côte d’Ivoire: faire baisser lapression,” Group N. 193. November 26, 2012.http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/westafrica/Côte-divoire/193-Côte-divoire-defusingtensions.aspx.3 It has obtained several external grants, including one ofFCFA 2 billion ($3.9 million) from the West AfricanEconomic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). 3 InternationalElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 20

and traditional leaders have initiated the reconciliationwork. However, it remains to be seen whethersufficient political will exists to equip this institutionwith the resources and public support to advancereconciliation.2. Security StakeholdersDefense and Security Forces (FDS)Formerly the standing army of Côte d’Ivoire, the FDSbecame a highly politicized fighting force underGbagbo, largely because of recruitment policies alongethnic lines that favored pro-Gbagbo groups. Manysenior officers and commanders remained loyal toGbagbo until his capture and actively engaged inviolence during the 2010 elections. The majority ofthe senior leaders are now incarcerated, and there ismuch discontent among remaining soldiers andofficers who have been integrated into the FANCI.Forces Nouvelles (FN)The FN was a coalition of rebel forces establishedduring the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis talks to end thefirst Ivorian Civil War. 4 Since its inception, the FN’spresence as an armed and political force has grownsignificantly. Leading up to the 2010 elections, theFN comprised nearly 40,000 troops and effectivelycontrolled the northern half of the country. It alsosupported President Ouattara in his rise to power in2010, but still operates independently. Their leader,Guillaume Soro, served as Prime Minister and is nowthe President of the National Assembly. Althoughmost FN forces joined the FANCI, a large contingentof non-integrated ex-combatants still exists.Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI)After the Ivoirian conflict, President Ouattaraestablished a national army, the Forces Républicainesde Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), recently rebranded asFANCI. This force is composed mostly of formermembers of the Forces Nouvelles (FN). In October2011, the FANCI were integrated with the troopsfrom the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS), theprevious national army under President LaurentGbagbo. International security cooperation officialshave remarked that the integration of FN membersinto senior positions without formal training hascreated discontent among former FDS officials, whobelieve they have been marginalized for politicalrather than professional reasons.National Police and GendarmesBefore the 2010 elections, the police and gendarmeswere highly politicized agencies due to ethnicrecruitment perceived to favor pro-Gbagbo groups.The post-election insecurity, which led to a temporarydisarmament of the police and gendarmes, added alayer of complexity and confusion to security sectorreforms. While responsible for general security indesignated zones, their redeployment and equipmenthas been slow and uneven. Redeployment hasoccurred in major cities of Abidjan and Bouaké buthas been limited in the smaller and medium-sizecommunities. Lacking arms and munitions, the policeand gendarmes often must request FANCI assistance,leaving them at times in a humiliating position.Furthermore, Dozos (traditional hunters), haveemerged since the 2010 election as an auxiliary policeforce to provide general security. While originallyfrom the north, they currently have a greater presencein the south. 5 The multiplicity of security actorsweakens the presence of the police and gendarmes,and it is likely that FANCI will lead electoral securityefforts in 2015.Youth Militias and Other Militia GroupsYouth Militias are easily mobilized for politicalviolence and can create havoc when incited bypartisans, particularly in the cities. 6 The primarygroups include the pro-Gbagbo Jeunes Patriotes(Young Patriots) and the youth wings of theDemocratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and theRally of the Republicans Party (RDR). In rural areas,the aforementioned Dozos, contribute to Côted’Ivoire’s violence. These militias and youth groupsare often overlooked as a security threat.3. Non-State StakeholdersCivil Society Organizations (CSOs)Despite the popular perception of CSOs as highlypoliticized, many are effective and neutral (i.e. WestCrisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: faire baisser la pression,”Group N. 193. November 26, 20124 The FN is comprised of Patriotic Movement of Côted'Ivoire (Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire, MPCI),Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (Mouvementpopulaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest, MPIGO), Movement forJustice and Peace (Mouvement pour la justice et la paix, MJP).Mike McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, London:Hurst & Company Publishing , 2011.5 In February 2012, UN Police counted 10,167 Dozossouth of the demarcation line and 8,132 to the north ofthis line. International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: fairebaisser la pression.”6 Katrin Eder, “Voting for Disorder: Post-ConflictElections as a Challenge in Peace Process in Africa: TheCase of Côte d’Ivoire,” University of Bradford School ofSocial and International Studies, Division of Peace Studies,2011.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 21

Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). Thesegroups can help mitigate violence and promote civicand voter education, particularly in under-servedcommunities.MediaThe country’s private press is relatively free but notpolitically independent. Despite an abundance ofprinted press in major cities, newspapers do notpenetrate the rural areas, which comprise the vastmajority of the country. State TV and radio, whichhave the widest reach, are often criticized for theirbias in favor of the ruling party.Political PartiesThree parties dominate the Ivorian political system:the FPI, the PDCI, and the RDR. All parties areheavily dependent on their leader’s personality andthe re-distribution of state controlled rents,particularly among their ethnic base. However, thedecline of traditional leaders such as Bédié andGbagbo may help parties move away frompersonalistic politics. A new party, LIDER (Liberté etDémocratie pour la République), led by former FPIinterim president Mamadou Koulibaly, is attemptingto break the historical pattern of personalistic politicsand may became a model of the future of Ivoirianpolitics. The 2013 local elections will serve as a litmustest for this new model of political participation.4. International StakeholdersUnited Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)The UN certified elections in 2010 and providedtechnical, logistical, and financial support for voteridentification, voter registration, and ballot delivery.Due to the continued incidence of violence, the UNSecretary General asked the Security Council topostpone the reduction of UNOCI’s militarycontingent until an early assessment in 2013. 7However, the budget of the electoral assistance unithas reportedly already been trimmed. 8 It remains tobe seen whether government and opposition figureswill request the UN’s presence as an independentelection certifier in 2015. The opposition still distruststhe UN and international community for their role inthe 2010 crisis. 97 Current UNOCI security sector figures shows a total of11,033 uniformed personnel. This includes 9,360 troops,181 military observers, and 1,492 police (including formedunits). UNOCI, “UNOCI Facts and Figures.”http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/8 Meeting with UN officials in New York, December 2012.9 Interview with FPI officials in Abidjan, November 2012.Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)ECOWAS supported the CEI’s verification of theelection results proclaiming Ouattara as president in2010. Given ECOWAS’s interest in seeing Côted’Ivoire return to a leadership role in regional politics,the regional body will likely remain heavily involvedin the country.Ghana and LiberiaAfter the 2010 election, thousands of refugees fledinto neighboring Ghana and Liberia. Many served aspro-Gbagbo militiamen and participated in theatrocities. 10 Most of these figures were also senior FPIofficials and hardliners. Since their move to theneighboring countries, cross-border raids on Ivorianterritory and attacks on infrastructure have beenattributed to these figures and Liberian mercenaries. 11Ghanaian and Liberian leaders made symbolicgestures to bring these perpetrators to justice after theattacks, but substantive action has occurred onlyrecently. The two neighboring countries have startedto arrest cross-border militants, and Ghana has evenextradited some. While cross-border attacks couldoccur during the 2015 electoral cycle, electoralsecurity will be partially contingent on thecooperation of Ghana and Liberia.International Criminal Court (ICC)The ICC’s verdict in Gbagbo’s trial will most likelydetermine the FPI’s 2015 presidential candidate. Thetrial is scheduled to start in February 2013. It remainsto be seen whether the ICC will open investigationsinto the atrocities committed during the post-electionphase by pro-Ouattara supporters.European Union (EU)An important trade and international partner of Côted’Ivoire, the EU supported for the CEI’s verificationof the election results proclaiming Ouattara asPresident. The EU will most likely continue sendingelectoral observers and providing technical assistancefor Côte d’Ivoire, both in the recovery phase and inthe preparation phase for the 2015 elections.Multilateral security and trade cooperation will likelycontinue, with France as the strongest bilateralpartner.10 Human Rights Watch. “Liberia Takes Action on Cross-Border Attacks into Côte d’Ivoire,” January 3, 2013.http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/03/liberia-takesaction-cross-border-attacks-cote-d-ivoire.11 Attacks occurred at the Azito power station in theYopougon district of Abidjan and the installlations of theIvorian refinery company.International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: faire baisser lapression.”Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 22

The United StatesThe United States is one of the primary funders ofthe UNOCI mission ($133 million in the fiscal year2010) and has provided election support through theCarter Center, the National Democratic Institute(NDI), and the National Endowment for Democracy(NED). These organizations have assisted in voterregistration efforts, deployment of long-termobservers, conflict resolution, and community-basedvoter education. While Côte d’Ivoire is not a strategicpriority for the United States, as opposed to Europe,American officials do have an interest in regionalsecurity developments.III. VULNERABILITIES1. Security VulnerabilitiesDemilitarization, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)The 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OAP)demonstrated that security was a priority for allparties. DDR was supposed to address the largenumber of combatants involved in Côte d’Ivoire’sdecade-long conflict and prevent their involvement inthe electoral campaign. The DDR program aimed todemobilize the pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattaramilitias, including up to 23,777 members of the FN.Yet national and international estimates of thenumber of armed men demobilized vary greatly fromas a few a couple hundred to as many as 18,000. TheDDR program failed largely because of the mistrustbetween the two sides, with neither side feelingcomfortable relinquishing their weapons as long asthe other side remained armed. Few weapons wereactually collected, which enabled soldiers who heldonto weapons to enable a quick return to the militias.Another problem is that the DDR organizationalstructure itself hinders progress. Some observersblame the lack of political will as the main reason forthe poor design of the DDR process. Rather thanimplementing DDR as part of the National DDRProgram, the mandate was split between theIntegrated Command Center (CCI, co-led by FN andFDS representatives) and the National CivilianReinsertion Program (PNRC), which led tobureaucratic rivalries, delays, and policy divergence.Electoral violence erupted during the 2010 electionsbefore completion of the program, and subsequentprogress on DDR has stagnated. 12 Weapons and12 Reintegration has had poor results: 3,000 ex-combatantswere given jobs in labor-intensive sectors, such asconstruction and infrastructure maintenance. In the west,1,000 men were given training courses but failed to finddisgruntled combatants remain widespread in Côted’Ivoire and neighboring countries, creating asubstantial security risk.Security Sector Reform (SSR)SSR remains an intractable problem. The two maingroups involved in SSR are the FN and the pro-Gbagbo FDS, which was the standing army in theGbagbo era. Before the 2010 elections, the FN andFDS formed sizable armed contingents: the FN hadnearly 40,000 members while the FDS claimed nearly43,000. 13 Following the 2010 elections, Ouattaracreated by decree the Republican Forces of Côted’Ivoire (FRCI), later renamed Forces ArméesNationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI). Many seniorFDS officers have since pledged their allegiance toOuattara and the new military institution, and manyformer FN combatants have been integrated into theFANCI. Nevertheless, several senior FDS leaders,who were once loyal to Gbagbo, have beenimprisoned on charges of electoral violence, while FNleaders have escaped prosecution. The FANCIremains a poorly trained force, and the forcedintegration of the FDS and FN has highlighted thestark differences in training and skills. Morale alsoremains low, particularly among former FDS troopswho feel that former FN members are givenpreferential treatment.Other Armed GroupsOther militia groups, particularly in the west, remainactive and present a security threat. They have notbeen demobilized or integrated into the army. Youthmilitias remain ready to act. The police and thegendarmerie are still highly politicized, and their rolesoften overlap with that of the FANCI, which createsconfusion. Dozos, a considerable force of traditionalhunters who supported Ouattara in 2010 andparticipated in electoral violence, also have not beeninvolved in SSR.2. Political VulnerabilitiesThe reintegration of the FPI in Ivoirian politicsCurrently, the FPI leader, Laurent Gbagbo, isawaiting trial in The Hague, while many seniorofficials are in exile or in prison. Leaderless andgeographically and ideologically split, the FPI maystable jobs. International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire:faire baisser la pression.”13 This total includes the 14,000 members of the armedforces, 16,000 gendarmes (rural police), and 13,000 police.Interview with diplomatic official in Brussels, October2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 23

hinder the country’s recovery process. Despite someprogress on political reconciliation with small non-FPI opposition parties, the FPI has refused toparticipate--demanding Gbagbo’s return as aprerequisite. This precondition is the primary obstacleto political dialogue. 14In April 2012, the FPI sent an observer delegation tothe first national summit for political dialogue inGrand Bassam. However, the five-member delegationwalked out of the summit, and the FPI was the onlymajor party that did not sign the final declaration. FPIofficials in Abidjan claim that the government onlypretends to want political dialogue. 15 Moreover, theirperception that the international community is biasedtowards Ouattara compounds their animosity. 16Many FPI supporters and sympathizers feel a strongsense of victimization and unfair persecution. OneFPI official noted that their headquarters was lootedin 2011 and in 2012. Furthermore, FPI officialshighlighted that on three recent occasions the policewere not able to secure their party meetings due tothe aggression of their political opponents. 17 Whilethis sense of abuse and marginalization may reflectthe entrenched views of many supports, the FPI –and especially its exiled hardliners – has an incentiveto polarize the political discourse by appealing tothese sentiments. 18 As a result, they cling to the beliefthat justice is uneven and reconciliation on the side ofgovernment is insincere.It is difficult to determine whether the FPI’spreconditions are genuine or just an attempt to buytime until the party finds a way to function withoutGbagbo. As the case against Gbagbo advances in TheHague, the FPI may feel more compelled to join the14 Interview with UN officials in Abidjan, October 2012.15 FPI officials in Abidjan complain that the PermanentForum for Dialogue (CPD) gets lost in dialogue and wouldprefer for top FPI officials to be invited for talks at thehighest level, namely with the Presidency itself. RadioFrance Internationale. “Le dialogue politique ivoiriens'achève sans la signature du FPI,” April 28, 2012.http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120428-le-dialogue-politiqueivoirien-s-acheve-signature-fpi.16 Interview with senior FPI officials in Abidjan,November 2012.17 Interview with FPI officials in Abidjan, November 201218 Personal ties between FPI senior members in exile inGhana and Ghanaian political officials, along with the lackof an extradition treaty between the two countries makecontrolling FPI hardliners in Ghana highly dependent onthe political will of the host government. “Côte d’Ivoire:faire baisser la pression,” International Crisis Group, “Côted’Ivoire: faire baisser la pression.”political process, as recent events suggest. InDecember 2012, senior FPI leaders met with thePresident of Senegal, their first meeting with a headof state since the arrest of Gbagbo. On January 18,2013 the office of the Prime Minister announced anew working group between the Government and theFPI, which senior FPI officials greeted as a positivedevelopment. Though similar initiatives have beenattempted in the past, these moves may signal adétente and a climate conducive to the reintegrationof the FPI into political life. 19The status of the RDR-PDCI ruling coalitionOn November 14, 2012 the RDR-PDCI governmentwas dissolved and the Cabinet reshuffled. While thePDCI retained the prime minister’s post in the newgovernment with no substantive change in thebalance of power, the move underscored the inherentfragility of the ruling coalition. The RDR-PDCIcoalition is an ideological oddity, since it evolvedfrom an alliance created to oust Gbagbo. The PDCIoriginally championed the concept of ivoirité used tobar Ouattara from the presidency. Moreover,international observers have asserted that thecoalition endures solely because it would be morecostly for the parties to separate than to stay together.The perception amongst those in the PDCI is that theexpected rewards of this coalition have notmaterialized. Specifically, there is growing discontentwith the distribution of posts within the bureaucracy– which appears to favor the RDR. On the basis ofthis perceived unfairness, the PDCI accuse the RDRof doing “everything that we used to accuse the FPIof.” 20 These allegations fuel the tension between thetwo parties.A major indicator of the future of the coalition will bethe PDCI congress in April 2013. 21 The PDCI’sleader, Henri Konan Bédié, is 78 years old, and theparty may want to find a younger leader. As a result,most observers agree that Bédié will likely relinquishhis executive role and take on an honorary position.A new, younger figure may have political aspirationsbeyond playing a secondary role to the RDR.Despite the tensions and political uncertainties, theRDR and PDCI coalition will likely persist providedthat the February 2013 local elections and Bédié’s19 Abidjan Net, “Reprise du dialogue politique en Côted’Ivoire: Le satisfecit de l’ONU,” December 15, 2012.http://news.abidjan.net/h/446884.html.20 Interview with PDCI official in Abidjan, October 2012.21 Interview with civil society members in Abidjan,November 2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 24

successor do not significantly alter the balance ofpower within the PDCI and between the PDCI andthe RDR. PDCI officials admit that in many parts ofthe country, including the instable region of Moyen-Cavally, the PDCI may break from the alliance andside with FPI candidates. This realignment wouldentail either running as independents or with the FPIif it decides to participate in the election. 22EMB Legal Framework and Voter Registry ProblemsThe ambiguities in the legal framework governing theIndependent Electoral Commission (CEI) and thevoter identification and registration processes – inaddition to the commission’s reputation forpoliticization – are key vulnerabilities that may lead toelectoral violence in 2015. For the 2010 election,multiple actors were involved in voter identificationand registration. Once political negotiations came to astandstill, the CEI outsourced these responsibilities tothe private French company SAGEM. It alsodelegated the provisional list appeals process to theNational Identification Office and the NationalCommission on the Supervision of Identification.Despite the logistical and technical challenges in thisprocess in 2010, the CEI produced a final voters listafter much controversy. Complications arose from aprovisional voters list published in two parts: (1) a‘cleared’ list of 5,300,586 individuals for whompositive matches could be established against publicrecords and (2) a ‘grey’ list of 1,083,667 names forpeople with no records confirming nationality. 23 Thefinal list included the names of 5,725,721 voters,which comprised 73 percent of the eligible votingpopulation. 24 While the latter figure may appear high,thousands of voters were excluded from the electoralprocess due to delays and political disagreement,particularly manifested during the appeals process ofthe provisional voters list. 2522 Interview with PDCI official in Abidjan, October 2012.23 Names on the ‘cleared’ list could be reviewed throughnormal public display and verification. Names on the ‘grey’list had to be subject to a special verification process. TheCarter Center, “International Election ObservationMission to Côte d’Ivoire Final Report: 2010 PresidentialElections and 2011 Legislative Elections,” October 30,2012.24 The National Statistics Institute proposed an estimatedvoting population of 7,835,768 in 2008. Ibid.25 Due to the extension to review the appeals process forthe provisional list, President Gbagbo accused thepresident of the CEI, Beugré Mambé, of attempting to add429,000 petitioners of the final list without regard to theagreed procedures and without the consent of the centralcommission. This crisis led to the recomposition of theCEI and the appointment of a new president, YoussoufAccording to the Carter Center, the voters’ list hasnot been updated since April 2010, and there are noplans to update it in the near future. 26 This impliesthat minors who will have reached the voting age of18 will probably remain disenfranchised in the 2013local elections. If this problem is not resolved,protests and potential violence could occur.The composition of the CEI is currently notrepresentative of the political landscape. 27 At the timeof its creation, a compromise allowed political parties(including opposition parties) to choose a number ofcentral CEI members in proportion to the parties’seats in Parliament. Then, the compromise alsospecified that the president should select the majorityof the remaining positions. 28 Now that the oppositionis not represented in Parliament, the President and hismajority have appointed a significant proportion ofthe central CEI’s membership. This appointmentprocess does not provide for consensus building inthe nomination process. Reform of the compositionand appointment process is necessary, but will requiretremendous political will to make such changes by2015. In the absence of these reforms, the oppositioncan claim that any electoral decisions, especially thepublication of the voters’ list and the announcementof election results, represent preferential treatmenttoward the RDR. The opposition could use thesevulnerabilities as an excuse to spark electoral violence.Bakayoko. Furthermore, it delayed the election by 4months, which is crucial given the limited time-frameavailable in 2010. Ibid.26 Interview with UN officials, Abidjan October 2012.27 The CEI in its current form is based on the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. It is comprised of 32 members.One stipulation is that there should be two representativesof each of the 10 signatories of the Linas-MarcoussisAgreements. Four opposition political parties -- PartiDémocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), Rassemblementdes Républicains (RDR), Union Démocratique, pour laPaix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), Mouvement des Forcesd’Avenir (MFA) —formed an alliance namedRassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie etla Paix (RHDP) for the presidential elections planned forOctober 2005. They decided to present one candidate forthe first round and support whoever emerged from thefirst round against Gbagbo. The RHDP also formed analliance with the three movements of the FN, and namedthemselves the G7 (Group of 7: 4 political parties and 3movements of the FN). The Carter Center.28 The central commission is comprised of 31 members.Twenty members are reserved for each of the 10signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements. Ibid.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 25

3. Judicial VulnerabilitiesWeak judicial institutions and the ambiguity of thelegal framework are major vulnerabilities that mayspur electoral violence. Although the ConstitutionalCouncil (CC) is not a part of the judicial branch, isthe final arbiter in the electoral process if the CEI isunable to meet the deadline for announcing thepolling results. However, the ambiguity in theelectoral law for adjudicating electoral outcomes givesthe CC incredible power. For instance, the CCoverstepped its mandate and overturned the CEI’sprovisional results in the second round of the 2010election. The institution is highly politicized becausethe President and the National Assembly (controlledby the President’s party) make appointments.Moreover, the opposition also views the justicesystem as one-sided. Amnesty International, HumanRights Watch, and the International Federation ofHuman Rights reports have denounced widespreadarbitrary detentions and inhuman treatment, includingthe torture of suspected Gbagbo supporters afterattacks on the military in August 2012. These humanrights abuses exacerbate tensions between the RDRand the FPI supporters. In the absence of judicialproceedings in these cases, the opposition remainsoutraged. 29 Furthermore, there have been no seriousinvestigations of the atrocities committed by pro-Ouattara forces. President Ouattara must balance theshort-term risk of altering the balance of powerwithin his coalition with the long-term gain of a fairtruth and reconciliation process. Thus, Ouattaraappears hesitant to prosecute one of his ownsupporters – a group he owes a huge political debt.As the case against Gbagbo moves forward in TheHague, the ICC may come under pressure toinvestigate atrocities committed by pro-Ouattaraforces as well. 30 Still, the ICC’s decision to investigatethe alleged atrocities of Gbagbo-supporters first andthen the crimes of Ouattara-supporters later isproblematic. This sequencing exacerbates theopposition’s suspicion and distrust of theinternational community. Moreover, Soro used theICC’s order of investigations as an excuse for notinvestigating crimes committed by Ouattarasupporters.Unless the ICC impartially investigatesthe crimes committed by both sides, the process ofpolitical reconciliation will remain deadlocked.29 Interview with FPI officials in Abidjan, Nov 2012.30 Interview with diplomatic officials in Abidjan,November 2012.4. Socioeconomic VulnerabilitiesPoor Economic Growth and Youth FrustrationsDecades of political instability have wreaked havocon the economy. Since 1993, the living standard ofIvoirians (as measured by GDP per capita) has grownon average by 1.6 percent every year, with significantfluctuations in years with major conflict (seeAppendix I). While Côte d’Ivoire was economicallymore developed than other West African countriesuntil the early 1990s, since then the country haslagged behind some of its neighbors such as Ghanaand Senegal (see graph 2 in Appendix I).These poor economic conditions have given rise tosocial instability among youth, 31 who are oftenperpetrators of violence. The current youthpopulation has experienced a decade of conflict.These youth are easily mobilized by inflammatoryrhetoric and the prospect of social mobility. The latterresulting from a career with an armed group and/orits affiliated political party. Because many youth havenever been formally employed, they are regularlyreferred to as Côte d’Ivoire’s “lost generation.” 32In response to these concerns, the Ouattaragovernment has prioritized economic growth. Itsgrowth agenda implicitly assumes that if growthtrickles down to the Ivoirian population, theeconomic frustrations that spur youth and others toparticipate in violence will disappear. However,growth will mitigate conflict only insofar as it issomewhat equitably distributed.Cocoa RentsThe economic model of long-time president FelixHouphouët-Boigny rested on the development of aplantation industry, whose rents were distributedamong various vested interests in order to enablegrowth and stability. The cocoa plantation industry(filière) grew to $1.4 billion by 2006, representingapproximately 35 percent of Ivoirian exports. 33Unfortunately, these revenues became a fundingsource for violence. Between 2001 and 2006, anestimated $20.3 million of the revenues from cocoa31 While the definition of “youth” varies dependent on thesource, Cote d’Ivoire’s Ministry of Youth considers thisclassification to encompass anyone between the ages of 15and 35. Selay Marius Kouassi, “Cote d’Ivoire: Who YouCalling Young,” All Africa, January 8, 2013.http://allafrica.com/stories/201301080567.html.32 Interview with UN official and Ivorian civil societymembers in Abidjan, October 201233 Global Witness, “Hot Chocolate: How Cocoa Fueled theConflict in Côte d’ Ivoire,” June 2007.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 26

exports were used to finance the official war efforts.Moreover, Gbagbo and his supporters relied on atleast $38.5 million in profits from their stake in thecocoa industry to finance their own ‘private’ warefforts. At the same time, the parallel export taxduties imposed on cocoa transiting through FNcontrolledzones during the conflict purportedlyraised approximately $30 million for the FN.Ouattara’s arrival into power gives him access to thecash cow of the cocoa industry, which could besource of funding for future conflict.Land TenureThe fusion of traditional customary rules for landtenure with written colonial land laws has exacerbatedconflict. Colonial agriculture was based on a form oftutelage, whereby an allogène (foreigner) was requiredto find an autochtone (indigenous) host to sponsorhim. 34 A similar arrangement comprised the core ofHouphouët-Boigny’s policy, which was predicated onthe notion that the “land belongs to those who workit.” This policy spurred the internal migration of theBaulé (Houphouët-Boigny’s ethnic group) from thecenter and the Joula from the North to the West – aregion traditionally inhabited by the We and the Bétéindigenous people (Gbagbo’s ethnic group). Thesegroups were often portrayed as primitive andincapable of properly using the land. This massivepopulation movement prompted the ‘Ivorian miracle’and created an ethnically homogenous, Baulé landedbourgeoisie, which supported the PDCI (Houphouët-Boigny’s party).However, once the cocoa industry collapsed, manyyoung Bété who had migrated to the city returned totheir rural areas to see that “their old fathers are poorwhile the strangers are rich…The fathers have soldtheir land to strangers.” 35 Since then, various attemptsto codify land tenure have led to a confusing array ofland ownership and usage rights. While national andinternational observers seem to agree that the currentland laws are technically sound, many acknowledgethat their complexity renders implementation difficult– especially when customary and statutory land rightsare closely intertwined. Moreover, in some areas, thevast majority of the land is not registered (cadastré),making it difficult to arbitrate land disputes betweenpast and current owners. Intractable land disputes34 Everyone not born in a village is technically a ‘stranger,’even if coming from a village 20 km away who share thesame ethnicity, because rights to own or use the land aretypically shared among a small number of lineagesconsidered indigenous (autoctonous) to the village. MikeMcGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 2011.35 Ibid.also arise between previous owners and peasants thathave been granted the right to use the land. Thesepeasants become targets of violent resentment,especially if perceived to be non-Ivoirians. 36IV. MITIGATING FACTORSHighly Centralized Political PartiesThe fragile balance of power between parties is a riskfactor. However, the centralization of political partypower means that if consensus is reached at thecenter, party leaders can usually manage tensions onthe ground more easily. Thus, the potential forpolitical parties to mitigate conflict depends on thewillingness of key personalities to promote andmaintain peaceful conduct during the electoral cycle.Legitimacy of the FANCIThe media and public have largely accepted theFANCI as the legitimate successor to the previousarmed forces. This legitimacy gives Ouattara’sgovernment the impetus to proceed with SSR anddesignate FANCI as the electoral security force in2015.Strong Civil Society and MediaCôte d’Ivoire’s civil society is vibrant with manyimpartial organizations. They are largely respecteddomestically and by the international community(which often finances them) and can help mitigateelectoral conflict through education.Moreover, the media regulatory bodies – the NationalPress Council (CNP) and the High Authority forAudiovisual Communication (HACA) – have madesignificant progress since the previous presidentialand legislative elections towards ensuring equal accessfor political parties and coalitions. One result is thatopposition and ruling party papers may publishwithout much harassment. Thus, all political actorsare able to express their views and political platformsto the population.Due to the penetration of mobile phones throughoutCôte d’Ivoire, social media and telecommunicationsemerged as tools to report and stem incidents ofelectoral violence in 2010. Websites such as Ushahidiand Wonzomai were utilized in 2010 and should bepromoted and used by authorities and the public in2015 to report electoral violence and preventincidents from turning into serious atrocities.36 Interview with diplomatic officials in Brussels andAbidjan, October and November 2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 27

V. RECOMMENDATIONSBefore attempting to implement any recommendation,stakeholders must recognize that the essence of mostproblems is political. Solutions that do not address thepolitical aspects of any issue will fail, even if the policyis technically sound.Furthermore, the Cabinet and the National Assemblyare the main bodies that can legislate the institutionalchanges necessary to reform the electoral process.Because the RHDP dominates the National Assembly,the lack of political will is the main stumbling block tosecurity and electoral management reforms. Since themajority of the opposition has boycotted the legislativeelections, it is important to build consensus aroundthese reforms both inside and outside the NationalAssembly through dialogue with the opposition.Strategic Objective One: Enhance the capacity andindependence of the Independent ElectoralCommission (CEI) and the Constitutional Council(CC) to prevent electoral violence and to seek justicefor victims.Recommendation 1: Restructure the composition ofthe CEI and the CC and develop a new appointmentsprocess to strengthen the impartiality of theseinstitutions. These reforms aim to de-politize thedecisions of these bodies, and thus reduce the potentialfor backlash and violence.Actors: CEI, CC, National Assembly, Civil Society,Executive BranchActions: The composition of CEI and CC should berestructured to reflect the current political landscape,with checks and balances to prevent one-partydomination. The CEI should include civil societyrepresentatives at both the central and local levels toincrease its representativeness and independence.A new confirmation process for the remainder of theseats is also needed. One option is to require theapproval of two-thirds of the members of the NationalAssembly for nominees. These reforms will requireamendments to the Constitution.Political Considerations:Since these actions require legislation from the RHDPdominatedNational Assembly, it will be difficult topass any measure that will diminish the RHDP’sinfluence. If the government wants to promote politicalreconciliation, the President should introduce thismeasure and rally members of the legislature to pass it.Recommendation 2: Establish a clear and realistictimetable to update the voter registry prior to the 2015elections. Reducing delays and confusion reduce therisk of protests from disenfranchisement.Actors: CEI, National Assembly, UNOCI, NationalStatistics Institute (INS), National Office ofIdentification (ONI), SAGEM (French privatetechnical service provider), National Commission forthe Supervision of IdentificationActions: A streamlined mechanism should be designedto eliminate outdated and duplicate entries on thevoters’ list and include voters who have turned eighteensince 2010, some of whom were already pre-registeredfor the 2010 election. An independent panel of nationaland international experts should be established to reacha pragmatic but fair solution to the issue of “grey lists.”Political Considerations: Updating the voter registry,especially at the appeals process phase, became apolitically contentious issue in 2010 since the majorityof voters on the “grey list” were considered“foreigners.” However, since Ouattara is now in powerand the institutions responsible for updating the voterregistry are largely controlled by the RHDP, fewerpolitical bottlenecks are expected for this process.Recommendation 3: Develop a medium and longtermstrategy to increase voter and political partyeducation to ensure compliance with electoralprocedures and rules. Reduced confusion andfrustration from actors understanding the rules of theelectoral cycle serve as a deterrent to conflict.Actors: CEI, CSOs (i.e. WANEP, etc.), National PressCouncil (CNP), National Council for AudiovisualCommunication (CNCA), media, political parties,Wonzomai, UshahidiActions: The CEI should establish a medium and longtermstrategy to increase voter and political partyeducation incorporating civil society, the media, andpolitical parties. In particular, education on voterprocedures should target areas that witnessed thehighest levels of violence in the 2010-2011 electioncycle and remote rural areas where there was asignificant information gap. Meetings and variouscommunication mechanisms should be used toproperly inform political parties about the proceduresfor registering candidates, operating campaigns, andreceiving financing. Sanctions should be applied ifpolitical parties violate these rules.Information and communication technology shouldalso be incorporated into electoral violence reporting,Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 28

such as the Ushahidi and Wonzomai platforms. LocalCEI commissioners can serve as verification nodes forviolence reported to these platforms.Political Considerations: Many political parties breachedthe codes of conduct in 2010. Thus, in the future theCEI should set an example by sanctioning all parties ifthey disregard electoral procedures. Since the CNCAprovided more airtime to the FPI in 2010, the rulingparty might provide an unfair media edge to itscandidate in 2015.Strategic Objective Two: Foster political and socialreconciliation in order to reduce the root causes ofelectoral conflict among political rivals and socialgroupsRecommendation 1: Seek justice for perpetrators ofviolence, which includes both pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces, committed in 2010. Justice, that isapplicable to all sides, will lead to accountability anddecrease the perception of victor’s justice.Actors: Executive, Judiciary, FN, FDS, NationalCommission of Inquiry, ICC, political parties, theinternational community.Actions: The government should seriously consider thefindings published by National Commission of Inquiryexamining the abuses by pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattaraforces and allow for the legal redress of violations inIvoirian courts. As a preliminary step, pro-Gbagbo excombatantsheld in detention centers should bereleased and fairly tried. Also, the ICC must promptlyinvestigate the abuses of pro-Ouattara forces, and thegovernment should comply with issued arrest warrantsfrom the ICC.Political Considerations: President Ouattara and the rulingparty will be hesitant to investigate the abusescommitted by their supporters. Threats to withdrawpolitical support in 2015. from FN leaders and pro-Ouattara militias might prevent investigations, Thus,the international community should threaten to reducefunding if progress is not made on this front.Recommendation 2: Open high-level dialogue withmoderate FPI leadership; decentralize and sufficientlyfund the Dialogue, Truth and ReconciliationCommission (CDVR). These two steps forge a stablepath to political normalization and should sideline theviews of the hardliners to incite violence.Actors: President Ouattara, moderate FPI leaders,CDVR, local officials, civil society, and theinternational communityActions: Open high-level dialogue, starting with thePresident, with moderate FPI leadership to identifyways to integrate it into the political process, especiallyin the upcoming local elections. The governmentshould provide adequate funding for the CDVR toexecute its mandate, supplementing the funding thatinternational actors have already contributed. Thescheduled installation of 36 local committees in fivezones should be cancelled, and the CDVR shouldsupport existing local committees comprised of localofficials and civil society. 37Political Considerations: Although dialogue may havestarted again between both sides, the presence ofPresident Ouattara will be required. Inaction on thepart of the administration will be perceived by the FPIas indifference and could lead to further isolation of theFPI from the political process.Recommendation 3: Expand political participation ofwomen, both as voters and candidates. This addressesthe gender inequity in political and civic life, and servesas a deterrent to conflict.Actors: National Assembly, CEI, CC, PresidentOuattara, Coordination of the Women of Côte d’Ivoirefor the Elections and Post-Crisis Reconstruction(COFEMCI), civil society, media, internationalcommunityActions: Pass legislation that institutes a 30 percentquota for women representatives in elected offices andallocate 11 seats of the 31 in the central commission towomen. In his public statements, President Ouattarashould emphasize the poor representation of women inall levels of government and decision-making bodies. 38The CEI and civil society must design targetedcampaigns to encourage women and inform themabout voter and candidate registration.37 International Crisis Group. “Côte d’Ivoire: faire baisser lapression,” 2012.38 EU report, Women represent 8.5% in the NationalAssembly, where 20% female representation is the averagefor sub-Saharan countries. Only 4 of the 31 members of theCentral Commission in 2010 were women. European Union.“Côte d’Ivoire. Rapport Final - Election Présidentielle 31octobre – 28 novembre 2010.”http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/missions/2010/ivorycoast/index_en.htm.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 29

Political Considerations: Although COFEMCI called for30 percent representation of women in elected offices,it was not received favorably, nor did it elicit a politicalreaction. 39 The President must prioritize and promotedialogue on this issue with all political parties. Theinternational community should threaten to withdrawfunding if this issue is not addressed.Strategic Objective Three: Enhance the capacity ofsecurity forces to enforce electoral security and demobilizeformer combatantsRecommendation 1: Properly implement the DDRprocess. This reduces the amount of arms in circulationand provides disincentives to committing violence.Actors: Ministry of Planning, international and localNGOs, UNOCI, leaders of pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces, ex-combatants, youthActions: The government should renew its focus on theDDR process, preferably under the control of onesingle entity to avoid bureaucratic rivalries that doomedprevious attempts. In addition to demobilization,weapons collection and a compensation package thatincludes a livable stipend and educational programs (i.e.vocational school training) should be provided to thosere-entering civilian life. For volatile areas, especially inthe West where the economy is concentrated in cocoa,resources should be devoted to teaching ex-combatantshow to enter this established industry.Political Considerations: It will be difficult to force excombatantsto relinquish their arms given that politicalleaders are still willing to pay them to obtain positionsof power. President Ouattara should urge militialeaders and their troops to give up their weapons andensure that adequate incentives are available.Recommendation 2: Enhance the capacity of FANCIand ensure proper planning of security forces for the2015 election. A unified and robust force will ensurepublic confidence in the national army. Adequateplanning, that takes into account financial andpersonnel needs, will best position security forces torespond to violence during the electoral cycle.Actors: FANCI, European Union, French, UNOCI, US,Ministry of InteriorActions: The government and partners should providelarge-scale training programs to professionalize the newFANCI and smooth the integration of the FN with the39 The Carter Center.FDS. International military cooperation can provideimpartial technical advice. High-level cadres in theFANCI and security forces should be vetted to ensurethat those who gave orders or committed crimes in2010 are not in positions of responsibility. The processshould be implemented transparently in collaborationwith the judiciary to restore public confidence in thesecurity forces. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Interiorshould allocate sufficient FANCI forces and resourcesto provide electoral security in 2015 to avoid the levelof international intervention experienced in 2010.Political Considerations: commitments made in previousSSR meetings by the FDS, FN, the government, andpolitical parties should be kept. The internationalcommunity, especially the EU and France, will be morewilling to offer technical expertise than forces tomonitor the election in 2015.Recommendation 3: Enhance cross-border militaryand judicial cooperation to arrest perpetrators ofelectoral violence. Increased action on this front willweaken hardliners’ efforts to destabilize and orchestrateviolence in Côte d’Ivoire from abroad.Actors: Governments of Ghana, Liberia, PresidentOuattara, Judiciary, ICC, pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara supportersActions: Governments of Ghana and Liberia need tocontinue arresting the perpetrators of violence andextradite them to Côte d’Ivoire. Once in Côte d’Ivoire,the suspects need to receive a fair and timely trial.Political Considerations: President Ouattara has beenworking with the neighboring countries to arrest theperpetrators, but combatants on both sides should befairly tried to diminish the perception of victor’s justice.If hardliners in the FPI are arrested, moderates shouldbecome more influential and the political discourse canshift to the center.VI. CONCLUSIONThe promise of stability in Côte d’Ivoire over the pasttwo decades has never been fully realized. Presidentialelections have either been delayed or have involved thesame three political parties. While violence, andspecifically electoral violence, has not reached the levelsexperienced by other post-conflict African nations, the3,000 fatalities in 2010 revealed that tensions still existin Côte d’Ivoire. With the 2015 presidential electiononly three years away, the drivers of conflict remainunaddressed. This report highlights the potential for aElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 30

eturn to instability and violence in 2015 if the rootcauses of the conflict are not addressed.The responsibility for mitigating the underlying causesof conflict rests primarily with Ouattara. He must makethe bold and difficult choices to break with the ways ofthe past and facilitate a second Ivoirian miracle.However, regardless of the amount of good will fromhis part, the two other political actors (PDCI and FPI)also must participate in reconstruction. They mustabandon the destructive political competition of thepast.International actors likewise face a difficult conundrum.On the one hand, the heavy-handed involvement of theinternational community helped break the impasse in2010. On the other hand, by stepping in the middle ofa zero-sum game, the international community has lostits credibility as a neutral interlocutor. As the countryrecovers from the crisis, fatigue with Côte d’Ivoire andfiscal austerity in Europe and the United States suggestdecreasing international involvement. While it is truethat Côte d’Ivoire has the human and financialresources to proceed quickly towards recovery,destructive and myopic political dynamics risk draggingthe country away from a peaceful recovery. Newmechanisms for cooperation and engagement must bedevised for all national and international players inorder to address the root causes of the conflict andshare the benefits of recovery equally among allIvoirians.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 31

CASE THREE – KENYAI. SITUATION ASSESSMENT1. History of Electoral ConflictKenya has witnessed some degree of violence in eachof its four elections since the transition to multipartydemocracy in 1991. Electoral violence in 1992 and1997 largely occurred in the pre-election phase of theelectoral cycle as a means to displace – and therebydisenfranchise – the opposition to ensure PresidentDaniel arap Moi’s reelection. Armed militia groups,backed by government officials, attacked people fromethnic groups associated with opposition parties. Theviolence largely occurred in Kenya African NationalUnion (KANU) stronghold areas, especially in theRift Valley and Coast Provinces. In 1992, more than1500 people were killed and 300,000 had their homesdestroyed. The “success” of pre-electoral violenceand the subsequent failure of the Government ofKenya (GOK) to bring perpetrators and their backersto justice institutionalized violence as a means ofsecuring political power in Kenya.Violence in 2002 was significantly less pronounced,partly because the main presidential contenders camefrom the same ethnic group, the Kikuyu. However, in2007, electoral violence erupted on an unprecedentedscale, particularly in the Rift Valley and certain areasof Nairobi. Unlike pre-election violence in previouselections, the 2007/08 electoral conflict largelyoccurred in the post-election phase after incumbentPresident Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner andhastily sworn in, despite massive electoralirregularities. High level officials supporting both ofthe top contenders mobilized youth militias to attackmembers of rival ethnic groups, resulting in the deathof 1500 people and displacement of 660,000.Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) hascharged four instigators of the violence, very fewindividuals have faced prosecution for theirinvolvement in the post-election violence (PEV),raising concerns that electoral conflict has becomefurther entrenched in Kenya. Moreover, the scale andpacing of changes to the security, political, andjudicial systems under the 2010 Constitution raise thepossibility that conflict could occur in the mediumterm,as the country transitions from the electoralperiod to daily governance.2. Profile of 2013 Electoral ConflictThe 2013 elections present new security concerns,including the role of ICC and the upcoming trials ofUhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, a poorly definedand managed devolution process, and the changingrole of the Provincial Administration in securityprovision. Many of the socio-economic vulnerabilitiesthat contributed to electoral conflict in the pastremain relevant in 2013, including a youth bulge,diaspora influence, tension over land and resources,unemployment, and inequality.II. STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS1. State StakeholdersIndependent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)The IEBC is Kenya’s electoral management body,replacing the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK),which was widely blamed for mismanaging the2007/08 election. Kenya’s 2010 Constitution and theIndependent Electoral and Boundaries CommissionAct (2011) laid out the framework for the IEBC’sroles and management. The IEBC is responsible forvoter registration, delimitation of constituencies andwards, regulation of political parties, settlement ofelectoral disputes, political party and candidateregistration, voter education, facilitation of electionobservation, monitoring and evaluation of elections,campaign finance regulation, development ofelectoral code of conduct for political parties andcandidates, and monitoring of candidate nominationwithin political parties. Despite poor publicperception of the previous ECK, the IEBC hasmaintained high public approval ratings since itsinception. 1 The public’s confidence in the IEBC’sability to effectively conduct the March 4th electionswill be vital to mitigating electoral violence on andimmediately after the elections. The IEBC will alsohave a role in long-term stability through its mandatein voter and civic education.Transition Authority (TA)The TA was established in 2012 as the primaryinstitution to implement the Transition to DevolvedGovernment Act. A chairperson and eight additionalmembers, appointed by the President (in consultationwith the Prime Minister) and approved by theNational Assembly, comprise the leadership.Members are selected from ministries of Finance,Public Service, Planning, Justice and the President’s1 “The Status of Governance in Kenya - a Baseline SurveyReport 2012,” The Society for International Development,Nairobi, Kenya, 2012. Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 32

office. While the TA does not have an explicitresponsibility in electoral security, its role in allocatingpower and resources to the newly elected countygovernments make it a key actor in stability.National Steering Committee on Peace Building & ConflictManagement (NSC)The NSC (part of the Ministry of State for ProvincialAdministration) is an inter-agency committeeresponsible for coordinating and consolidating peacebuildingand conflict management efforts throughoutKenya. It has also established peace committees inevery county, using models adopted from pastoralistcommunities, such as engaging community elders (orleaders) with formal government bodies, andexplicating customary law for local securityinstitutions. The aim of these committees is tomitigate conflict through local informal structuresbefore it escalates into widespread violence.Security ForcesCurrently, there are two distinct internal securityforces in Kenya: the Administration Police, under theMinistry of State for Provincial Administration, andthe Kenya Police, a national force. The newconstitution unites these forces under the umbrella ofthe National Police Service, which will report to theInspector-General, with a Deputy Inspector-Generalfor each of the two forces.2. Non-State StakeholdersSecular Civil SocietyA plethora of CSOs and domestic NGOs operate inKenya. Among those most directly involved withelections are the Elections Observation Group(ELOG), a coalition of nine partner organizationsengaging in domestic monitoring of the electoral cycle,including voter registration, campaigns, and electionday polls. Partner organization Constitution &Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) hasconducted an electoral violence risk assessment at thecounty level. Other organizations provide a range ofservices to various segments of the Kenyanpopulation, including women and youth, with the aimof strengthening their political involvement.Faith-Based OrganizationsThe involvement of faith-based organizations inelectoral violence in Kenya has been complicated. Onthe one hand, certain religious leaders were criticizedfor failing to denounce acts of PEV in 2007/08. Insome cases, the Waki Commission found thatpreachers actively stoked violence throughinflammatory language, particularly in CentralProvince. On the other hand, organizations like theCatholic Peace and Justice Commission (CPJC) andthe Inter-Religious Forum provided direct assistanceto the Waki Commission to investigate the violence,including the provision of testimony, records,contacts, and victims’ services. Many suchorganizations have undertaken peace building effortsin the lead up to the March elections.Private SectorBoth domestic and international businesses in Kenyahave invested in conflict mitigation programming.The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) hasspearheaded the MKenya Daima (“Kenyan Forever”)public education campaign, aimed at promoting asense of personal ownership over the resources andsuccess of the nation. Coca-cola and other multinationalcorporations have likewise targeted fundstowards peace initiatives and have partnered with thepolice to increase CCTV coverage in certain areas.3. International StakeholdersInternational Criminal Court (ICC)The ICC has been involved in Kenya since the2007/08 PEV. Their particular involvement with the2013 elections is circumstantial: two of the candidatesrunning for office (Uhuru Kenyatta as President andWilliam Ruto as Vice President) have been indicted,and their trials are set to begin in April 2013. Ofparticular concern to the ICC is what will happen ifthe indicted candidates are successful in the Marchelections; the ICC remains dedicated to fulfilling itsmandate, but the trials could prove destabilizing.United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDP has been working in Kenya since 1964. It hasbeen particularly involved in peace-building andconflict resolution post-2007, with a focus onimproving the coordination of early warning systemsin Kenya, primarily through UWIANO PeacePlatform project. UWIANO was launched to preventreferendum-related violence, and has since become amain coordinating body for the many conflict earlywarning systems being scaled up in advance of the2013 elections.US Agency for International DevelopmentUSAID has been working in Kenya since the Agencywas first established. Kenya is the largest USGassistance Mission in Sub-Saharan Africa ($688million in FY2010).. Since June 2008, Kenya hasreceived assistance from USAID’s Office ofTransition Initiatives, which focuses on improvingpublic institutions’ ability to undertake fundamentalElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 33

eforms and manage instability/uncertainty, as well asmobilizing the public (in particular, youth) as changeagents.US Department of State/Conflict Stabilization Operations(State/CSO)The US government has a keen interest in security inKenya, both as an economic partner and potentialpromoter of stability in the region. As such, Kenya isone of four priority countries in the Department ofState’s Bureau of Conflict and StabilizationOperations. Specifically, CSO’s engagement in Kenyais focused on the electoral process andimplementation of reforms necessary to preventingviolence up to and beyond the election, particularly inthe security sector.United. Kingdom’s Department for International Development(DFID)The U.K. government’s main focus is on supportingstability in Kenya, with an objective towards businessledgrowth and improving service delivery for thepoorest. DFID is also one of the key supporters ofthe Kofi Annan process, which brokered the NationalAccord peace agreement following the disputed 2007elections.National Democratic Institute (NDI)One of NDI’s strongest initiatives has been providingtechnical assistance to the Inter-Party Youth Forum(IPYF), established at the request of youth membersof the country’s political parties (excluding ODM)with funding from USAID. Through the IPYF,members meet together and receive trainings onadvocating for platform-based party reform. NDI hasalso been working on conflict early warningassessments, including additional factors in theiranalysis beyond past incidents of violence.International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)IFES has provided technical assistance to the IEBCon a range of electoral management capacities,including electoral dispute resolution, draftingelectoral regulations, voter education, procurement,and constituent boundary division and mapping.IFES also provided assistance during the 2010Constitutional Referendum.III. POST-ELECTION VULNERABILITIESAND CHALLENGESIn addition to recurrent social and economicvulnerabilities, the 2013 election involvesunprecedented security, political, and transitionaljustice vulnerabilities and challenges that may have asignificant impact on the potential for electoralviolence and the transition from Election Day tostable governance.1. Security VulnerabilitiesSecurity factors include the police forces, theMombasa Republican Council, al-Shabaab, theavailability of weapons, and high crime rates. Of these,the extent of reform and capacity building of thepolice forces will have the greatest impact on electoralsecurity.a. Police ForcesPolice forces face capacity and training issuesNumerous stakeholders interviewed asserted that theprimary security concern is not early warning systems,but rapid response to those warnings. Delays inresponding result from a variety of factors, includingdifficult terrain in parts of the country and a limitednumber of responders relative to the number and sizeof potential hotspot locations. In addition, reforms topolice training curricula and human resources policies(such as compensation and benefits) remainincomplete. Some suggest that higher level officialshave been reluctant to undertake reforms, preferringto protect the current system and believing thatexisting crowd management techniques are alreadysufficient – although mid-level officers may be moreopen to change. Others have noted that police forcestend to think of electoral security in terms of the daysimmediately before, during, and immediately after theelection, rather than viewing it as an electoral cycle.Recently, the police performed poorly during a mockelection held by the IEBC. If it appears that theinternal security forces are unable to manage theirrole during the election, it is possible that theNational Army will be called in to assist, althougharmy resources may be constrained by their ongoinginvolvement in Somalia.Police may be slow to intervene in violenceIn addition to capacity issues, police forces mayhesitate to intervene in violent situations because theyfear indictment of themselves or their superiors forviolations of constitutional and/or human rights,particularly in light of the ICC indictment of formerCommissioner of the Kenya Police MohammedHussein Ali. Many officers feel they are not wellinformed about the provisions of the 2010Constitution, even as community members declarethat they know their constitutional rights regardingarrest and harassment, for example. PoliticalElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 34

considerations may also influence the speed withwhich police respond to electoral threats, as the slowresponse in Tana River demonstrated. While logisticaldifficulties certainly explain some of the delay inpolice intervention, many have noted the higherpolitical priority of threats from the MRC inMombasa over community disputes in Tana River.Community relations remain strainedDespite initiatives like the Peace Cops program(discussed below) and efforts to network with CSOsto establish trust between communities and policeforces, negative relations between communities andsecurity personnel persist in many areas. The killingof 42 police officers in Samburu in November 2012underscores the magnitude of the tensions thatremain. 2 Some Kenyans still view the policenegatively for their failure to halt PEV in 2007/08, orin some cases, for their active perpetration ofviolence. Perceptions of corruption within the lawenforcement field remain.The role of the Provincial Administration (PA) in securityprovision remains unclearThe PA has historically played a significant role insecurity provision at the local level, both through itscontrol of the Kenya Police and through themediation role that many chiefs assumed, mostly inrural communities. However, with uncertaintysurrounding the role of the PA under the devolvedcounty structure, it remains unclear whether and howthe chiefs will be involved in the maintenance ofsecurity. Some have suggested that chiefs may fosterviolence, either directly or indirectly by failing toprovide local intelligence to police forces, if they areexcluded from the devolution process.b. Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)The MRC is a separatist organization based inMombasa, Kenya’s largest port and an importanteconomic center for the entire Horn of Africa. TheMRC was formed in 1999 to address what it viewedas the political and economic discrimination ofMombasa natives, in particular related to real estateand land ownership by large companies and“outsiders.” In 2008, the group declared thatMombasa should become an independent state andmore recently won a challenge in the High Courtagainst being labeled as unconstitutional and illegal.Leaders of the MRC have called for a boycott of theupcoming election and have begun carrying out2 BBC News Africa. “Kenya police attack in Samburu:More bodies found,” 12 November 2012.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20294747. hostile acts, such as collecting MRC members’ IDcards to prevent individuals from voting and breakingup regional meetings of the IEBC. This instabilityalso creates possible openings for al-Shabaab tofurther infiltrate the area. While the grievances theMRC cites are longstanding, and the organization isgenerally believed to be using the elections simply tobring these issues to a head, their reaction seems amissed opportunity to engage with, and possiblybenefit greatly from, the devolution process.c. Additional Security FactorsThe possibility remains that al-Shabaab or itssympathizers will utilize the electoral period toperpetrate attacks on Kenyan targets, following thedeployment of 2,000 Kenyan troops in Somalia inOctober 2011. Already more than 20 explosionattacks have occurred in the former North Eastern,Coast, and Nairobi Provinces since mid-2011, oftencoinciding with military developments in Somalia.Similarly, the availability of weapons - particularlyordinary machetes or pangas used for daily tasks -poses an ongoing risk for popular violence. Finally,violent crime remains high in many parts of thecountry, particularly Nairobi. A significant body ofpsychological research has demonstrated thatexposure to violent acts can cause individuals tobecome desensitized to violence, increasing aggressivebehavior and reducing their propensity to interveneon behalf of victims.2. Political VulnerabilitiesPolitical factors in the upcoming elections and periodof transition to governance include devolution underthe 2010 Constitution and recent changes to thepolitical party system.a. DevolutionThe devolution of the Kenyan government representsperhaps the most fundamental and far-reachingreform of the country’s new constitution. Thisprocess will reorganize the current 8 provincialadministrations and 175 local authorities and transferthese responsibilities 3 to 47 new counties. 4 Throughthis process, it bestows many of the service delivery,revenue collection, and budgetary powers previouslyheld by the national government to the county-level3 Disaster management, water treatment, etc. 4 The re-delimited boundaries were highly contentious andwere ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court, underliningthe degree to which devolution has become a source ofconflict. Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 35

administration. The new county governments willhave both executive and legislative branches, therepresentatives of which will be determined in theupcoming March elections. In these elections, voterswill elect the positions of County Governor, DeputyGovernor, County Senator, County Women’sRepresentative to the National Assembly,Constituency Representative in the NationalAssembly, and Ward Representative in the CountyAssembly.Potential for inter- and intra-tribal violenceThough the goal of devolution is to bringgovernment accountability to the local level, with somuch power historically tied to who controlsgovernment, devolution will increase the stakes oflocal elections. In ethnically heterogeneous counties,we can expect to see inter-tribal conflict for thevarious seats, especially that of governor, alongsimilar dividing lines seen previously in nationalelections. In more homogenous counties, however,there is the potential for intra-tribal conflict betweendifferent factions of the same ethnic group. Thiswould constitute a new dimension of electoralviolence in Kenya.Devolution could also increase the number ofinternally displaced persons (IDPs) as ethnic groupsseek to carve out political territory. The possibility forautonomously run counties could inspirecommunities to attempt to remove opposing ethnicgroups from their jurisdiction. This pattern hasoccurred throughout Kenya's recent history. ManyIDPs from the 2007/08 PEV have still not returnedto their homes. However, perhaps a more appropriatehistorical analogy for Kenya comes from 1992 and1997. In those years, politicians instigated violence todisplace people associated with opposition groups.The newly developing risks associated withdevolution make these types of violent actions morelikely, although the potential for violence is moredecentralized than in the past.Vulnerabilities result from poor understanding of the devolvedsystemThere is a general consensus that most of the Kenyanelectorate is unaware of the roles and responsibilitiesof each of the new county posts. Indeed, reportsindicate that many aspirants for these positions maynot even know precisely the responsibilities of theposts they are contesting. 5 This uncertainty creates5 It is expected the senators’ seats will be largely contestedby current or former MPs, whereas the professional classrather than career politicians will mostly controlgovernorships. substantial vulnerabilities in the post-election phase.In the medium term, elected officials could usemisinformation to their advantage as they jockey forpower. For instance, if a county elects a Kikuyugovernor and a Kalenjin senator, violence could eruptover who has authority over different aspects ofservice provision. In the long term, if poor precedentsare set in the first general election, it will be difficultto alter the pattern later. Specifically, if it becomesclear that certain seats have greater access to power,and that these seats can be won through violence, thecountry may witness violence used as a tool insubsequent county elections, as has occurred innational level elections since 1992.Transition Authority (TA) lacks capacityThe institution tasked with oversight andadministration of the devolution process (TA) lacksthe capacity necessary to carry out its mission. TheTA has three phases of responsibility. The work ofPhase I is primarily concerned with county audits, thedevelopment of county-level governance, and timingdecisions about when each county will gain autonomy.Phase II will take place over the course of the threeyears succeeding the first elections. During this timethe TA must oversee the transfer of functions tocounty governments and facilitate the countygovernments’ performance of these functions. (Thespecific tasks that this will entail have not yet beenmade public.) Phase III will be the process wherebythe TA is phased out and its authority handed over tothe Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat.According to the Transition to DevolvedGovernment Act of 2012, the TA is responsible fordetermining what functions each local governmentwill take over, when that will happen and how muchfederal money it will receive before the March 4thelections.By all accounts, the TA is far behind. There have alsobeen complaints of poor transparency in the TA’sdecision-making procedures. A poorly managedtransition poses more than just technical andadministrative challenges; it creates securityvulnerabilities. To date, the TA has not made clearwhat criteria it will use to determine if a county isready to take on these new responsibilities, and it hasnot yet made any of those decisions public. Thus, wecould face a situation where a local government iselected only to find that it does not have expectedautonomy.Added to this vulnerability are high expectations thatdevolution will solve many of each community’sneeds. This is in part due to misconceptions thatElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 36

devolution will necessarily bring more money intoeach county. Some counties will receive largerbudgets, but some will receive smaller ones. Localpopulations have placed significant hopes in devolvedgovernment. When these expectations are not met –and worse, if failures are blamed on officials’ethnicities – it could lead to social unrest and possiblyviolence.b. Political Party SystemNew regulations are insufficient to ensure political party reformThe Political Parties Act of 2009 required all politicalparties to re-register with the IEBC Registrar ofPolitical Parties (RPP) according to certainguidelines. 6 Thus far, the RPP reports that partieshave complied with the regulations for filing andgender requirements; however, others have notedworrying tendencies in the registration process.Certain parties have allegedly drawn up a supporterlist based on old copies of the voter register, withoutverifying the desire of individuals to join their parties.Yet the RPP lacks the resources and the mandate toverify every signature on a party’s registration list,unless the behavior of the party veers into criminality.Moreover, the prohibition on the formation of ethnicparties is not explicitly checked; instead, verification isbased on membership from 24 of the 47 counties,which is assumed cannot be achieved if a partymaintains a narrow ethnic base. However, particularlywith increasing mobility in Kenya, it is possible thatnational political parties could target a narrowcoalition of ethnicities across 24 counties, suggestingthat additional criteria for evaluation may benecessary to mitigate ethnic politics.Personalistic politics and shifting alliances make predictionsdifficultDespite the above regulations intended to reform thepolitical party system, parties remain highlypersonalistic, organized around prominent candidatesand identity politics. However, rapidly shiftingalliances raise questions about the assumption thatethnic groups automatically follow their leaders in theelection. Although Uhuru Kenyatta and William Rutohave announced an alliance as the Presidential andVice Presidential candidates, respectively, some haveexpressed doubt over whether their respectivebackers will be willing to unite across previouslyhostile ethnic lines. At the same time, supporters ofRuto have reportedly rejected the possibility ofaligning with Raila Odinga, whom they perceive as6 According to the RPP, only about 3 million Kenyans, orless than 7 percent of the total population, are registeredmembers of political parties. having betrayed Ruto following his ICC indictment.The instability of alliances, coupled with thisuncertainty about ethnic bloc voting, complicate theprediction of electoral violence, including the likelyperpetrators and victims, as competing sides maychange. Furthermore, the failure of one side to honorthese alliances might in itself spark conflict.BOX 1: Negotiated Democracy in NakuruThere has been much discussion of the NationalCohesion and Integration Commission’s (NCIC)facilitation of so-called “negotiated democracy”in ethnically heterogeneous counties. The termrefers to a process where the elders of differentethnic groups meet to decide on a power-sharingarrangement and division of elected seats. Whilethe extent of the NCIC’s role is unclear, the ideahas gained momentum at a grassroots level. Thisraises the possibility of an escalation of violenceif voters fail to follow their elders’ directives.Even if the exact terms of the negotiation are notknown in advance, the mere perception ofnegotiated democracy could become politicizedfor violent mobilization.In Nakuru, a group of elders came together todesign the Nakuru County Peace Accord, withthe help of Center for Humanitarian Dialogue.Many see it as a major step forward in interethnicdialogue, as it states grievances and plansactions to overcome past disputes. While it is nota power sharing arrangement and does not evenmention the upcoming elections, many haveinterpreted it as a form of negotiated democracy.If the Kikuyu win all of the countywide seats,Kalenjin cohorts may see this as a violation oftheir perceived settlement and take to the streets.Furthermore, if a minority group is left entirelyout of the process, it could decide to resort toviolence during the elections to disrupt thearrangement.Funding loopholes remainThe GOK has allocated 0.3 percent of the nationalbudget to public financing for political parties whosecure at least 5 percent of the national vote and havegender parity in their leadership. 7 Party finances andexpenditures must be filed with the Registrar forPolitical Parties and may be audited by the Auditor7 15 percent of these funds are divided evenly acrossqualifying parties, while 80 percent is allocated according totheir respective vote counts.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 37

General. Parties are prohibited from receiving moniesfrom foreign sources, and no individual ororganization may contribute more than 5 percent of aparty’s spending. However, no such ceiling is placedon donations to individual candidates. Given thepersonalistic nature of political parties, this representsa significant loophole in party finance reform, asdonors may effectively channel all their funding tospecific candidates from a single political party.Moreover, the 5 percent mark creates a moving target,whereby parties with greater resources are eligible toraise more money from individual contributors,whose contributions then further increase theabsolute amount of funds the party is permitted toraise. Thus current funding regulations may actuallyexacerbate the electoral advantages that wealthy andhigh-profile candidates possess.3. Transitional Justice VulnerabilitiesIn addition to the above electoral vulnerabilities inKenya, the 2013 elections are further challenged byissues of transitional justice, as many of those mostbelieved to be responsible for the 2007/08 PEV arecontesting seats at both the national and county levels.Not only are these unresolved justice issuesinfluencing campaign tactics and alliance formation,but these processes may potentially destabilizegovernance as newly elected officials try to build upthe nascent institutions of a newly devolved state.a. International Criminal Court (ICC)In the wake of the 2007 electoral violence, the WakiCommission recommended that Kenya establish aspecial tribunal to try those responsible; failing theestablishment of such a tribunal, the WakiCommission submitted a list of those most likely tobe culpable in the violence for consideration by theICC. While the Prosecutor gained public supportfrom President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga toopen an investigation and agreed to cooperate fullywith the ICC, the relationship between the GOK andICC has been strained over the course of theinvestigation. Many of the same government officialswhose job it is to provide information requested bythe ICC to further its investigation have submittedwitness statements in defense of the accused.The ICC has served as a divisive point in localcampaign efforts, with politicians using approval or(more often) disapproval of the ICC process to raisesupport and tensions. In November 2012, the twoICC-indicted candidates, Kenyatta and Ruto, enteredinto negotiations to create a political alliance for theMarch 2013 elections. It is believed that this may be amove to avoid ICC trials, set to begin in April 2013, ifthey are successful in winning the elections. Thoughthe ICC has received criticism from the internationalcommunity for the timing of the trials, the trial dateswere set at the request of the defense council and atthe earliest convenience to the Court’s calendar.There is no clear answer as to the best course ofaction. The ICC cannot postpone the trials foranother 5 years until their terms are up, nor can theCourt drop the cases. Conversely, Kenya cannot havea president in absentia sitting at the Hague; even if hewere to be found innocent, the one case the ICC hasresolved (in a conviction) spent six years in court. Ofcourse it is anticipated that this alliance would seek todelay or squash the ICC proceedings or simply refuseto go to trial; though some argue that this wouldmake the President of Kenya akin to Omar al-Bashirof Sudan, it is hard to imagine that would truly be thecase. Unlike Sudan, Kenya is a rapidly growingdemocracy, and strong strategic ally of the Westernpowers with interests in the region. At best, thePresident would go to trial, necessitating anemergency election to occur, replete with many of thesame vulnerabilities of the upcoming one. In any case,this will deprive Kenya of the stability and strongexecutive power that it needs to implementdevolution in a transparent and accountable process;those who have the most to lose from devolution are,after all, Ministries and Administrations of theexecutive branch.b. Domestic InstitutionsKenyan judiciary reforms remain incompleteUnder the guidance of the Ouko Taskforce onJudicial Reforms, major reforms to the Kenyanjudiciary have been underway since the 2007 elections.In particular, the 2010 Judicial Service Bill outlinedthe reforms that a newly created Judicial ServiceCommission would undertake; namely, new financialautonomy of the judiciary; procedures forappointment, discipline and removal of judges andother judicial officers; and a national level Councilthat will bring together all players involved in thejustice system.Overall, stakeholders believe that the judiciary hasmade marked improvements in the past five years,particularly at the national level. Currently the KenyaHigh Court is hearing petitions initiated by the KenyaYouth Parliament and Kenya Youth League todetermine whether Ruto and Kenyatta should bebanned from running, given that they are underElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 38

indictment by the ICC. Kenya Law prevents thosecharged/convicted with a crime from serving asPresident.At the local level, reform has been slower, with aserious backlog in caseloads. Of close to 5,000individuals charged with crimes in 2007, only threehave been prosecuted. These cases have been metwith temporarily heightened tensions between ethnicgroups. The delay in prosecution of so many suspectsnot only raises questions of due process, but also maycomplicate the process of reconciliation by openingpast grievances at the same time that the country istrying to move forward with post-ethnic governance.The credibility of the Truth, Justice, and ReconciliationCommission (TJRC) Report has been questionedThe Kenyan Parliament unanimously passed a bill tocreate the Truth, Justice, and ReconciliationCommission in 2008. The mandate of the TJRC is toinvestigate and recommend “appropriate” actionsregarding abuses committed between Kenya’sindependence and the beginning of the power sharingdeal between President Kibaki and Prime MinisterRaila Odinga in 2008. Since its creation, the TJRC hasoperated by holding hearings across the country,seeking testimony from victims, perpetrators,witnesses, and the general public, in order to compilea report and recommend prosecutions to the judiciary.Unfortunately, the credibility of the TJRC hassuffered: first, its Chairman (Bethuel Kiplagat)resigned under allegations of involvement in landdisputes and the murder of Kenya’s Foreign Ministerin 1990; later it missed deadlines to release thereport/findings.As a result of these events, Kenyan CSOs have pulledback from supporting the process, some even statingthat at this point it would be best for the report tonot be released. Without being assured of itscredibility, rushing to release it in the lead up toelections may be another trigger for conflict; waitingto release it after the election risks the possibility thatthose who have recently gained office will be amongstthe perpetrators named, at best destabilizing anddelaying the transition to new governance systems,and at worst generating violence, especially in districtsthat may have been strongly contested in the 2013election round.IEBC hesitant to exercise its investigatory powersThe IEBC has been granted investigatory andprosecutorial powers with respect to electoraloffenses by candidates, political parties, and theiragents. This includes the power to file criminalcharges against those violating the law and sanctionsagainst those who break the Code of Conduct.However, there are questions about the capacity andwillingness of the IEBC to exercise this authority, atleast partly due to its desire to avoid the perceptionsof partiality that plagued the former ElectoralCommission of Kenya (ECK). This leaves thechannels for dispute adjudication less clear for theMarch elections, which may increase the risk thatdisputing parties will resort to hostile or violenttactics.4. Socioeconomic VulnerabilitiesAs with previous elections, the potential for conflictduring the March 2013 electoral cycle involves socioeconomicvulnerabilities such as a large unemployedyouth population, the status of women, the role ofthe diaspora, and land and resource conflicts. Kenyais also one of the most unequal countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by the GINI coefficient.Inequality has provided a source of social tension thatoften serves to exacerbate other socio-economicvulnerabilities.a. Unemployed YouthLike most African countries, Kenya has a “youthbulge.” According to the Ministry of Sports andYouth Affairs, in 2005, 75 percent of the country’spopulation was under 35. Because of their economicmarginalization (national unemployment stands at 40percent), youth have been particularly susceptible tothe co-option by politicians and organized crime inthe form of gangs like Mungiki for involvement inpolitical violence. Youth comprised over 70% of theperpetrators of PEV in 2007/08. The Waki Reportcited Mungiki as perpetrators of violence and notedcollusion between the organization and politicians tocoordinate revenge against Luos and Kalenjins. Whilecertain programs have tried to promote peacebuilding among youth, their continued economicmarginalization implies that the risk for violenceremains.b. Status of WomenThe new Constitution provides that each new countywill have one “woman’s seat,” i.e. a position reservedonly for female candidates in the National Assembly.While this may serve to increase representation ofwomen in government in the short term, some areconcerned that these women will be co-opted by theirmale counterparts, and serve merely symbolic roles.Moreover, anecdotal evidence from Kenya revealsElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 39

that female candidates who contend for seats otherthan the “woman’s seat” may fall under great pressureby males in their communities to drop out of the raceand vie only for their “assigned” seat. There havebeen reports of intimidation of women vying for nongenderedseats, as well as electoral irregularities.c. DiasporaKenya’s US-based diaspora alone remits close to $2.5billion per year back to Kenya. Article 38 of the 2010Constitution enshrines the right of every citizen toenjoy the political rights enumerated therein,including the right to register as a voter and to vote ina free, fair, and transparent election. A current lawsuitagainst the Ministry of Justice and ConstitutionalAffairs, IEBC, Commission for the Implementationof the Constitution (CIOC) and the Attorney General(AG) seeks to delay the March 2013 elections until alldiaspora may be registered and execute theirConstitutional rights as citizens of Kenya. ANovember 2012 ruling found that the Constitutionalright to vote is neither absolute nor instantaneous. Itmay be implemented progressively, with prioritygiven first to those living in-country, and a future aimto providing diaspora suffrage for the 2017 generalelection. While this is not likely to manifest inviolence for the 2013 elections, it does createvulnerabilities if the expatriate vote is able toinfluence future electoral outcomes. This may lead totension if people feel that their elected officials arenot accountable to them, even under the new systemof devolution, but rather to those living abroad.d. Land and ResourcesLand rights have been a highly contentious issue inKenya since the colonial era. Since independence,there has been a perception that members of theKikuyu and related ethnic groups have benefitedfrom state patronage networks and access to land inareas outside of their historical base. Furthermore,during the 1990s, a wave of land grabbing occurred aspolitical elites sought to gain control of resourceswhile President Moi and KANU still retained power.Although the 2010 Constitution provides for thecreation of a National Land Commission to addresslongstanding grievances and the irregular allocation ofpublic land, the appointed Commissioners have notyet been gazetted. Thus, narratives of historicalinjustices with respect to land, often linked withethnic identities, remain a powerful source forpolitical mobilization.As with land, access to resources has been asignificant issue around which political leaders havemobilized communities under the guise of ethniccompetition. Activities like cattle rustling have been amajor source of tension between the Borana andMeru groups on one hand and the Samburu andTurkana on the other. In the Tana River region,Pokomo pastoralists have clashed with farmers fromthe Orma and Wardei ethnic groups over land use,grazing rights, and water access points. Such conflictsare vulnerable to manipulation by political aspirantsseeking to inflame hostilities for electoral benefit.IV. MITIGATING FACTORS“Never again” MentalityMany interviewees noted the pervasive “never again”mentality, the notion that Kenyans now recoil atviolence after the harrowing experiences andeconomic repercussions of PEV in 2007/08.Although the individuals expressing this belief maysincerely intend to maintain it, in practice people maynot sustain this resolution in the face of directprovocation or danger. Already, pre-election violencehas occurred in Mombasa and the Tana River region.Moreover, as noted above, violence has occurred inevery multiparty election in Kenya’s history, resultingin a death count in 1992 as high as in 2007/08.Therefore, psychological and historical evidence donot support optimism that the “never again”mentality will be an effective mitigating factor forelectoral violence in 2013.Presence of the International CommunityThe involvement of international stakeholders,including donors and the ICC, has narrowed thepolitical space for widespread organized violence.Although the ICC has become a rallying point forsupporters and opponents of the indicted candidates,its high-profile prosecutions have also raised thestakes of orchestrating conflict on the scale of2007/08. Police may fear intervening in violence lestthey be prosecuted themselves; however, by the samelogic, they should also fear perpetrating violence.More generally, 2007/08 focused internationalattention on Kenya to an unprecedented degree; theUN, donor nations, and international investors arewatching Kenya carefully for signs of instability. Thepotential for international condemnation and capitalflight reduces the incentives to engage in massiveelectoral conflict, at least for politicians at the highestlevels, who have significant business interests in thecountry.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 40

Robust Media and Civil SocietyMany of the non-state stakeholders identified aboveare actively working to promote peaceful elections in2013. ELOG has 600 observers on the ground acrossall 47 counties, with additional trained monitors to bedeployed in hotspots as election day approaches. Agroup of nine eminent Kenyans, including bishopsand academics, have engaged the political elite indialogue about electoral security and peacebuilding,based on ELOG’s findings. Meanwhile, the domesticprivate sector, under the KEPSA umbrella, seeks toencourage a stable business environment. Kenyacontinues to enjoy a relatively robust and unrestrictedmedia. National media outlets have begun exercisinggreater restraint in their reporting on sensitive issueslike ethnic hatred, attempting to balance theaccountability of public officials for offensive speechwith the potential for retaliatory violence if certainethnic groups are mentioned as the targets ofpejorative comments.Controls on Hate SpeechThe Waki Commission identified hate speech as asignificant contributor to PEV in 2007/08, whenincendiary language was broadcast through call-invernacular radio programs, spread via text message,and distributed in leaflets. Since then, the NationalCohesion and Integration Act of 2008 criminalizedthe use of hate speech. Also, the CommunicationsCommission of Kenya now requires screening of allbulk text messages prior to sending and bans the useof languages other than English and Swahili. The ICCindictment of radio announcer Joshua arap Sang alsosends the message that those who incite violence maybe prosecuted. These measures will reduce, thoughnot eliminate, the potential for ethnically chargedlanguage to fuel electoral violence in the pre- andpost-election periods.V. RECOMMENDATIONSAt this writing, the March elections are quicklyapproaching. As such, these recommendations areintended to bolster the electoral process beyond thelead up to the elections and strengthen the transitionfrom electoral outcomes to governance. They thusfocus on the medium and long-term post-electionperiods. Indeed, many stakeholders have suggestedthat insufficient effort, thought, and money arecurrently being given to the post-election period.There has not been enough of a focus on what willhappen next and how to transition peacefully fromelections to governance.Strategic Objective 1: Mitigate Political andInstitutional VulnerabilitiesRecommendation 1: Continue Implementing CivicEducation Programs in the Post-Election PeriodActors: IEBC and CSOs with Support from USAID,UNDPActions: Civic education programs across the countryhave been stalled due to funding and administrativechallenges. Therefore, the timing of any majorcampaign will coincide with the political campaignseason. Misinformation is common during politicalcampaigns and the airwaves will be flooded withpoliticians’ voices. Given the high security risksassociated with an uninformed population in the postelection period, civic education programs need tocontinue well into the new cycle of government.Kenyans need to learn who holds what authority andwhere to file grievances. Additionally, it will beimpossible to expect the electorate to hold theirleaders accountable if they do not know what theyhave the responsibility to do. These programs needboth funding and coordination.CSOs also play a strong role in mitigating violenceand should be bolstered in the post election period tocontinue in those efforts. A good example is YesYouth Can, an organization that works at thegrassroots level to organize youth-led parliaments.This type of engagement helps mitigate a range ofvulnerabilities, including the youth bulge, ethnicbasedpolitics, and an uninformed electorate.Political Considerations: Presently, there is no shortageof civic education programs; however, there isminimal coordination of these efforts. The IEBC isresponsible for voter education and their capacitymust be strengthened if it is to succeed. The IEBCprovides funding to CSOs for conducting civiceducation programs, but only in the form ofreimbursements. With high front-end costs, the IEBCshould consider providing some portion of its fundsupfront.Recommendation 2: Undertake Political PartyReformsActors: Political Parties & Youth Branches, IEBCRegistrar of Political Parties, NDI, IRIActions: In order to promote issue-based politics andstrengthen the political party system, three mainactions should be taken. First, the party financeElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 41

loophole should be closed. The RPP should place anabsolute, rather than percentage, limit on the amountof funding that supporters can contribute both to anindividual candidate and to a political party. Second,donors should continue to support forums andtraining programs for political parties and their youthmembers, such as the IPYF organized by NDI andfunded by USAID. IPYF focuses on three main areasof politics: countering the negative use of ethnicity,implementing the constitution, and conducting freeand fair elections. This program strengthens the nextgeneration of political party leadership and providesinternal pressure for issue-based party platforms.Likewise, programs to develop and enforce codes ofconduct and party constitutions should continue afterthe 2013 elections, in order to provide thegroundwork for more transparent political partyactivities in the post-election phase and the transitionto the next electoral cycle. Third, donors shouldconsider devising scorecards on elected officials’performance in order to increase voter attention togovernance issues rather than personalistic politics.This strategy has had some success in Uganda. Thescorecards could be simplified and potentiallydistributed via mobile phones to reach significantportions of the Kenyan population during futureelectoral cycles.Political Considerations: While some of the abovementioned programs are well underway, it remainsunclear if Kenyan politicians have the political will totake the steps necessary to move beyond ethnic-basedand personalistic politics. Indeed, the pressure willneed to come from the electorate, whom theseprograms can empower.Strategic Objective 2: Mitigate Security SectorVulnerabilitiesRecommendation 1: Implement Security SectorReforms on an On-Going BasisActors: TA, Kenya Police, Administration Police,former PA authoritiesActions: Efforts to train security forces in electoralsecurity provision immediately before an election aretoo limited. Instead, the police must continue thereform process in the medium term, prior to the startof the next electoral cycle. First, police trainingprograms and new curricula should continue to bedeveloped and implemented. This includes civiceducation programs designed specifically for policeofficers, particularly on the Bill of Rights and thedevolution process. Curricula should be coordinatedwith judicial reforms, such that law enforcementofficials understand how evidence must be collectedor arrests conducted in order to have validity in court.Trainings should also include electoral securityadministration and crowd control measures.Second, the professionalization of the service and theimprovement of police compensatory packagesshould continue. Officers with greater professionalskills and better compensation may be less likely toengage in corruption and more likely to carry outtheir responsibilities dutifully.Third, forums for dialogue between the police andthe community should be expanded. This may includeprograms like Peace Cops, who are police officersspecially trained as peace monitors in the areas ofnegotiation, mediation, and early warning. The aim ofthe program is to bridge the gap between the policeand the community, establish trust, strengthenchannels of communication, and encourageintelligence reports on security threats. Likewise,trainings on peacebuilding and conflict managementprovided by the NSC to officers at the Inspectoratelevel and above should receive additional support.Finally, the role of the PA in security provision at thecounty level must be clarified.Political Considerations: Without a clear designation oftheir role in the devolved government, members ofthe PA are nervous about their job security in thefuture. They could represent either a potentialpeacebuilding force or a destabilizing one, dependingon their actions (or lack there of). Whether or notchiefs become civil servants with a conflict mediationrole, as some have proposed, their localizedknowledge of community tensions should beharnessed for peacebuilding at the grassroots level.Strategic Objective 3: Mitigate Socio-Economic VulnerabilitiesRecommendation 1: Provide Victim ServicesActors: Community health workers with support fromdonorsActions: Managing the post-traumatic stress that manythroughout the country have experienced as a resultof the 2007/08 violence is a significantly underdiscussedissue at the moment. Understandably,efforts focused on the writing and implementation ofthe new Constitution, ensuring that the March 2013elections are peaceful and credible, and visible reformin the judiciary and security sectors. However,Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 42

especially as the processes aimed at reconciliation(TJRC, judicial reform at the local level) stall, theimpact that these processes may have on helpingindividuals overcome the psychological effects of2007/08 are reduced. Providing access to mentalhealth services is essential in helping people come toterms with their experiences of electoral violence andreducing tensions in the long term.Like many African countries, Kenya has a system ofcommunity health extension workers, mobile clinics,and other mechanisms for providing health servicedelivery in rural areas. Under Schedule 4 of the newConstitution, healthcare delivery will fall under themandate of districts, a change likely to complicate andreduce effective delivery for some time.Political Considerations: Working with the extensionsystem and training health workers in mental healthservices may be an effective way to scale up victimservices throughout Kenya, including in rural areasand towns most affected by election violence.Moreover, by working with the same group ofproviders with whom the communities areaccustomed to providing other services, this may helpto maintain some privacy and discretion forindividuals who seek out mental health services,reducing associated stigma. Still, there remain manychallenges, particularly with regards to mental healthprovision, including overcoming cultural norms thatdownplay mental health problems, garnering politicalwill to invest in mental health, and providing servicesfor victims of politically motivated sexual assaults.VI. CONCLUSIONThe Kenyan example demonstrates the importance ofrecognizing elections as part of a larger democraticgovernance process. Many of the vulnerabilities thathave existed in past elections remain. While the 2010Constitution and the devolution process areattempting to address certain vulnerabilities, in themedium term, they actually create additional ones.The extent to which the 2013 and future electionsexperience violence will be a function not only ofhow well the new electoral security and managementapparati work, but also of the success of translatingelection outcomes into meaningful improvements inliving conditions and political accountability for abroad base of the population. Focusing throughoutthe electoral cycle on a two pronged approach ofelectoral security and good governance is the best wayto achieve sustainable, peaceful outcomes.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 43

Conclusion: Common Themes and Lessons LearnedThe previous chapters have presented case studiesanalyzing the vulnerabilities and mitigation strategiesfor electoral conflict in Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, andKenya. This concluding chapter seeks to synthesizethe lessons learned from these case studies byexamining similarities, divergences, and cross-cuttingconclusions.A. SimilaritiesSecurity Vulnerabilities§ Greatest vulnerability to violence during the preandpost-election phases, rather than ElectionDay itself§ Weak or politicized enforcement role of securityforces monitoring elections§ Availability of firearmsPolitical Vulnerabilities§ Election Management Bodies that lack capacityor legitimacy§ High-stakes elections created by electoral system§ Personalistic political party systems§ Increased local competition due todecentralization§ Transitional justice through the ICC in two cases(Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya)Socio-economic Vulnerabilities§ High levels of poverty and inequality, creatingincentives for participating in organized violence§ Youth bulge and increasing frustration amongstyouthB. DivergencesSomaliland§ Not internationally recognized and receiveslimited international assistance and funding forelections§ Less electoral violence than other countries§ Proportional representation electoral system§ Clan-driven versus party-driven politics§ Formal role for traditional and religious leaders inthe political system§ Affected by spillover of regional conflicts inSomalia and most susceptible to insurgentviolenceCôte d’Ivoire§ UN as primary electoral and security assistancepartner§§§§§UN certification/verification of the last electoralprocessInternational military intervention used to endpolitical crisisNational resources as stakes in electionsCitizenship identity as a social cleavagePast electoral violence occurred in aftermath of adecade of violent conflictKenya§ Diverse international involvement throughUNDP and NGOs§ Ethnic dimension to electoral violence§ Confusion surrounding negotiated democracy inan electoral context§ New incentives for pre-electoral conflict at thecounty level under the system of devolutionC. General ConclusionsFinally, the case studies may help answer thefollowing questions raised in the introduction:1. What are the patterns of past electoral violencewithin a country and how do these change givenrecent alterations in its political structure?2. How can international actors most effectivelysupport peaceful elections?3. What is the appropriate sequencing and timingfor reforms and how can donors promotepeaceful and fair elections in the longer term?The findings suggest three general conclusions:Conclusion #1: To effectively mitigate electoral violence,concerned stakeholders need a rich understanding of both thehistorical patterns of electoral conflict and the current evolvingdynamics of the political system.Each case study highlights the importance ofanalyzing the historical patterns of electoral violencespecific to each country or region and to considercarefully the effect that changes in the politicalstructure are likely to have on the motive, means, andopportunity of potential perpetrators to engage inviolent tactics. This allows stakeholders to predictconflict hotspots more accurately and target resourcesappropriately.In Somaliland, major electoral violence has notemerged in past elections. This stability is at leastpartially explained by the strength of traditionalElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 44

conflict resolution mechanisms and the fervent desirefor peace and political consensus following the civilwar and independence. Yet as the 2012 electionsrevealed, these patterns may change as the collectivememory of the civil war fades and new electoral lawsand processes introduce added complexity.In Côte d’Ivoire, the country’s history of violence andconflict has often involved elections. Because thesame three protagonists of the political scene(Gbagbo, Ouattara and Bédié) have been vying forthe Presidency since the beginning of multipartypolitics in the 1990s, it is likely that dynamics andtactics of the past (e.g., Ivoirité and use of stateresources to fuel conflict) will still play a role in thefuture. However, due to anticipated changes in theleadership of two of the main parties, the politicalbalance in the country is bound to shift soon.Moreover, given the importance of personalisticpolitics, the future leaders of FPI and PDCI are likelyto set the tempo for the negotiations over longstandingissues such as security sector reform,electoral institution reform, and land tenure. WhileCôte d’Ivoire is experiencing a relative calm in theshort term, a weakened opposition and delicatepolitical alliances threaten future stability. Also, thecountry lacks political will needed to make progresstoward resolving simmering disputes.In Kenya, the post-election violence of 2007/08 hasserved as the primary reference for electoral conflictin the March 2013 elections. However, county-levelconflict dynamics that are emerging under the processof devolution suggest that the use of pre-electoralviolence as a means of electorate displacement, asoccurred in 1992 and 1997, may be the more relevantprecedents. Although the outbreak of violence inCoast Province in late 2011 was unexpected, theregion also witnessed cases of electoral violence in1997. Greater scrutiny of these histories of violencemay illuminate possible profiles of pre-electionviolence in future county elections. Still, significantpost-election violence as occurred in 2007/08remains a possibility, particularly in the event of apresidential run-off.Conclusion #2: International actors can most effectively supportpeaceful elections through a combination of technical assistanceand the promotion of accountability for the perpetrators andorchestrators of violence.Somaliland underscores the challenges of conductingpeaceful elections with limited resources andtechnical assistance. Because of its disputed status,international donors have hesitated to provide directelectoral assistance. Thus, Somaliland’s institutionscontinue to lack adequate capacity to manageelections. For example, the shortcomings of theNovember 2012 elections—voter fraud, ballotshortages, and disagreements over the distribution ofpolling stations—primarily stem from the absence ofa valid voter registry. Consequently, disputes haveemerged over electoral outcomes.In contrast, the examples of Côte d’Ivoire and Kenyaexpose the limits of technical assistance alone inmitigating electoral violence, as both countries haveexperienced major electoral conflict despitesignificant donor support. Nonetheless, in recentyears the international community has helped tocreate a degree of accountability for the perpetrators.In Côte d’Ivoire, the legitimacy afforded to Ouattara’svictory by the international technical assistance andcertification led most political actors to coalescequickly around the challenger. However, although theinternational community played a definitive role inthe 2010 electoral conflict, the future challenge will beto obtain legitimacy and neutrality without aninternational role in adjudicating high-stake issuessuch as election results. Looking forward to the 2015elections, domestic political will and impartialdomestic institutions are needed to mitigate violence.The international community can, however, play animportant role in the transition, through technicalassistance for election management and voterregistration, as well as for economic recovery. TheInternational Criminal Court (ICC) and otherinternational institutions can play a role in promotingaccountability, while being cognizant of thedifficulties of ensuring neutrality. Regional actors canalso play an important role in mitigating some of thecross-border issues and can assist Côte d’Ivoire inresuming its former role as the region’s economicpowerhouse.In Kenya, concerns over the country’s internationalreputation, the desire not to discourage foreigninvestors through political instability, and the everpresentthreat of ICC indictment for orchestrators ofhuman rights violations have reduced the returns tolarge-scale electoral violence as occurred in 2007/08.The primary challenge for the internationalcommunity in the March 2013 elections and beyondwill be to establish a similar level of accountability forthe perpetrators of violence at the county level as thedevolution process progresses, particularly duringpre-election phases. This may involve mechanisms tohold national leaders responsible for violenceperpetrated by members of their parties at the countyElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 45

level, as well as the promotion of judicial and politicalinstitutions that increase the accountability ofperpetrators to domestic constituencies.Conclusion #3: Donors and domestic stakeholders shouldwork in partnership to implement multi-sectoral strategies overthe medium and long terms, in order to strengthen elections aspart of robust governance systems.Often, practitioners and donors mobilize resourcesand implement electoral programs under tight timeconstraints in the months immediately precedingElection Day. Nonetheless, there is some recognitionthat elections involve institutions and processes thatcross many sectors, including civil society, the rule oflaw, and the security sector. Particularly for countriesor regions undergoing changes in their politicalstructures, electoral assistance programs should bebetter integrated with medium and long-term projectsaimed at strengthening governance institutions.As Somaliland continues to demonstrate itscommitment to democratic governance, internationalpartners should look beyond Election Day outcomesand help build the capacity of long-term institutionsthat will help sustain stability. In particular,government institutions like the judiciary and theParliament have low capacity. Several interviews inHargeisa revealed that NGOs and civil society areoften seen as playing the role of government, andcitizens—particularly youth—have little faith in stateinstitutions to deliver services. If this situationpersists, commitment to democratic processes andelections may gradually wane, creating an opportunityfor instability and extremism to emerge.In Kenya, both domestic and internationalstakeholders should continue many of their activities,or initiate new ones, after Election Day. For example,donors should strengthen the capacity of theTransition Authority and the IEBC in the monthsfollowing the election to provide additional civiceducation for ordinary citizens, newly electedofficials, and security forces expected to uphold thenew constitution. Lingering questions about themechanisms for electoral dispute resolution, thecapacity of the police to secure peace throughout theelectoral cycle, and the vulnerability of unemployedyouth to mobilization for violence should not bepostponed until the next electoral cycle. Instead,steady progress on these issues must be made in theintervening years as part of an integrated approach toelectoral management and democratic consolidation.Just as successful elections can build support fordemocratic principles, elections marred byirregularities and violence can erode public faith inthe potential of democracy to deliver freedom andprosperity for citizens. By understanding the riskprofiles of each round of elections, providing theresources and accountability necessary to ensureelectoral security, and integrating electoralprogramming with long-term strategies to strengthengovernance systems, the international community cansupport domestic efforts aimed at democraticconsolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa.Despite a decade of conflict, Côte d’Ivoire remains acountry with the funds and the technical capacity toimplement needed changes and improvements tovoter rolls, land tenure laws, security sector reform,and other reforms. Moreover, multiple stakeholdershave identified technically sound solutions to many ofthese issues. Yet the country will remain at risk forelectoral violence if the actors cannot find thepolitical will to implement them. Donors and theinternational community should pressure domesticstakeholders to negotiate and begin politicalreconciliation. Political parties and other domesticstakeholders must be willing to engage in dialogue,and the ruling RDR party may have to makeovertures as gestures of good faith to convince theFPI that it is willing to negotiate and move thecountry forward on necessary reforms.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 46

APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWSCase One – SomalilandNEC (National Electoral Commission) – National Chairman and Commission MembersNEC Awdal Region Branch –ChairmanNEC Boroma District Office – Chairman and StaffNEC Polling Station WorkersRAC (Registration and Approval Committee) – Chairman, Deputy ChairmanElectoral Monitoring Board RepresentativesKulmiye – ChairmanXaqsoor – Operations ManagerRays – ChairmanWadaani – Member of Executive CommitteeUCIDPolitical Candidates – Kulmiye, WaddaniUDUB – Former Boroma District Party LeaderDSC (Democratization Steering Committee) – EU ChairmanIRI (International Republican Institute) – Resident Program OfficerNED (National Endowment for Democracy) – Senior Program OfficerProgressio – Executive DirectorInterpeace – Operations CoordinatorAcademy for Peace and Development – Program Coordinator; Democratization Program Lead ResearcherNAGAAD (Women’s Group) – Program Coordinator; Gender and environment coordinatorSOLJA (Somaliland Journalist Association) – Chairman; Former ChairmanShaqodoon (Youth Group) – Communication and Technology ManagerTraditional Leader – Gaboye ClanReligious and Clan LeadersAyoda Organization (Youth Group) – Executive Director; Program OfficerSONYO (Youth Group) – Borama Branch Council MemberCase Two – Côte d’IvoireBritish EmbassyConvention of Civil Society of Côte d’Ivoire (CSCI)Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI)Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)European Union (EU)International Crisis Group (ICG)Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI)Liberty and Democracy for the Republic (LIDER)Ministry of Interior of Côte d’IvoireNational Democratic Institute (NDI) in Côte d’IvoireRally of the Republican Party (RDR)United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)United States Agency for International Development in Côte d’IvoireWest Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP)Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 47

Case Three – KenyaLazarus Kubasu – World Bank ConsultantJørgen Elklit – Kenya Independent Review Commission (Kriegler Commission)John Burnett – NPR East Africa CorrespondentRaymond Kitevu, Ezra Chiloba and Martha Mathenge – UNDP, KenyaCassandra Scully, USAID/State Dept CSO: Daniel Blessington; John Smith-Sreen, Rick Hatler, Chris WendellMike Yard – International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)Neela Ghoshal – Human Rights WatchIEBC with IDEA team – Erik Asplund; Irene TulelImmaculate Kassait – Director, Voter Registration and Electoral Operations, Independent Electoral andBoundaries Commission (IEBC)Mary O’Hagan – Kenya Country Director, NDILucy Ndung’u – Registrar of Political Parties, IEBC; Bosire Nyamori – IFES consultant in the RPP officeWambui Ngugi – Political Consultant with the Office of the PresidentGeoffrey Kiarie Njuguna – National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict ManagementMercy Njoroge – Electoral Observation Group (ELOG)Felesia Muya-Odada and Maria Osula – Act!Joe Ageyo – Nation TVKassie Mcilvaine and Nikolai Hutchinson – PACT KenyaCarole Theuri – Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ)Rinah Ondego – Kenya Vision 2030Dr. Andrew Ladley – Center for Humanitarian DialogueZulheka Hassan – ODM Youth CoordinatorSamuel Musumba – Provincial Peace Forum, NakuruInter Party Youth Forum (IPYK) leaders from Nakuru (12 attendees)Job Masache – Mercy Corps; John Schroder – US State DepartmentPius Kamau – Yes Youth CanPatricia Buore – Police Inspector and Coordinator of the Peace Cops Program, NakuruThomas Too, Martin Brown, Albert Juma – Vote Smart InitiativeJoseph Mele – IEBC Election Coordinator, NakuruAndrew Yatich – Nakuru County Peace AccordLaila Macharia – Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 48

APPENDIX B: SECONDARY REFERENCESCase One – SomalilandAbokor, Adon Yusuf et al. “Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections September2005.” London: Progressio, 2006.African Press Agency. "Al Shabaab threatens to disrupt Somaliland elections." June 25, 2010. AccessedDecember 27, 2012.http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2010/jun/al_shabab_threatens_to_disrupt_somaliland_elections.aspx.Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. London: Progressio, 2008.Fisher, Jeffrey. “Development and Administration of a Civil Registry: Somaliland Program Assessment andConcept Paper, 2011-2013.” Creative Associates International.Forberg, Ekkehard and Terlinden, Ulf. “Small Arms in Somaliland: Their Role and Diffusion.” BITS ResearchReport 99.1, March 1999.Government of Somaliland. Constitution of Somaliland. 2001.Hassan, Yusuf. “Somaliland NEC Reshuffles List of Successful Hargeisa Municipality Councilors.” Somalilandsun.December 15, 2012. Accessed December 22, 2012. http://somalilandsun.com/index.php/politics/1963-somaliland-nec-reshuffles-list-of-successful-hargeisa-municipality-councillors.International Crisis Group. “Somaliland: A Way out of the Electoral Crisis.” Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing, No.67, Nairobi/Brussels. December 7, 2009.Interpeace. "Giving Somaliland Youth a Voice," Press Release. December 12, 2012.http://www.interpeace.org/2011-08-08-15-19-20/latest-news/389-sonyoJama, Ibrahim Hashi. Somaliland Electoral Laws Handbook. Somalilandlaw.com. 2009.Jama, Ibrahim Hashi. “Unofficial Consolidation and Translation of the Regulation of Political Associations and PartiesLaw 2011.” Somalilandlaw.com. April 21, 2012.Jama, Ibrahim Hashi. “Unofficial Consolidation and Translation of the Presidential and Local District CouncilsElections Law.” Somalilandlaw.com. September 15, 2012.Jama, Ibrahim Hashi. “The Emergence of the New Somaliland Three Political Parties, Part One: The Electionand RAC Determination.” Somalilandlaw.com. November 25, 2012.Kibble, Steve and Walls, Michael. “Preparing for Local Elections in Somaliland.” London: Progressio. August2012.Kulmiye Party. "Somaliland: Peaceful presidential election defies al-Shabaab." June 28, 2010. Accessed December27, 2012. http://kulmiye.com/6619/6619.Lewis, Ioan Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society. London: Hurst & Co., 2008.Reuters. "Somalia’s al Shabaab, squeezed in south, move to Puntland." November 9, 2012. Accessed December23, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/somalia-puntland-shabaab-idUSL5E8M96UZ20121109.Somaliland Focus/Progression/DPU. “International Observers Statement on the Somaliland Local Elections,”Press Release. December 3, 2012. http://www.somalilandfocus.org.uk/.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 49

Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SONSAF). “Citizens’ Dialogue: Pre-Election Consultation Forums onUpcoming Local Council Elections.” March 2011.Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SONSAF). “Somaliland Elections Review Report. March 2011, 22.Somaliland Press.“Anti-election protest escalates and spreads in Somaliland.” December 17, 2012. AccessedDecember 22, 2012. http://somalilandpress.com/anti-election-protest-escalates-and-spreads-in-somaliland-38710.Voice of America. “Somaliland Voters Go to the Polls.” November 28, 2012. Accessed December 22, 2012.http://www.voanews.com/content/somaliland-elections-28nov12/1554518.html.Zenn, Jacob. “Al-Shabaab’s Unavoidable Clash with Somaliland Democracy.” The Jamestown Foundation.August 19, 2010. Accessed December 27, 2012.http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36766.Case Two – Côte d’IvoireAbidjan Net. “Reprise du dialogue politique en Côte d’Ivoire: Le satisfecit de l’ONU.”December 15, 2012. Accessed on December 20, 2012 from http://news.abidjan.net/h/446884.html.Agence Ivoirienne de Presse (AIP), “Côte d'Ivoire : Le FPI veut rencontrer Alassane Ouattara pour discuter de lavie de la nation.” December 30, 2012. Accessed January 1, 2013 fromhttp://www.onuci.org/spip.php?article8505.Agence France Presse (AFP), “Côte d'Ivoire: nouveau gouvernement pour mieux tourner la page de la crise.”November 22, 2012. Accessed on December 20, 2012 fromhttp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gqOHn9-rEi7CtBAgelHhVGplUPg?docId=CNG.bd36a7aa78162055c5c7152d700722af.c1.AllAfrica, Kouassi, Selay Marius, “Cote d’Ivoire: Who You Calling Young.” January 8, 2013. Accessed onFebruary 4, 2014 from http://allafrica.com/stories/201301080567.html.Atwood, Richard, “How the EU can support peaceful post-election transitions of power: lessons from Africa.Briefing Paper for the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union.” Accessed on December 8, 2012fromhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=78651.Bouquet, Christian, Géopolitique de la Côte d’Ivoire, Armand Colin, Paris, 2005.Boutellis, Arthur, “The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace,” InternationalPeace Institute, May 2011.Bossert, Walter, D’Ambrosio, Conchita and La Ferrara Eliana, “A Generalized Index of Ethno-LinguisticFractionalization.” Accessed on December 11, 2012 from http://www-3.unipv.it/webdept/prin/workpv02.pdf.British Broadcast Corporation International Reports. “Ivorian president said takes stringent measures to dissuadeattacks on country.” November 09, 2012. Accessed on December 8, 2012 fromhttp://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-307992955/ivorian-president-said-takes.html.CDVR. “CDVR en bref.” Accessed on February 9, 2013 from http://www.cdvr.ci/comprendre-la-cdvr/cdvren-bref.html.Comité Central du Front Populaire Ivoirien. “Communiqué final du Comité Central Ordinaire du FPI.“ May 26,2012. Accessed on December 18, 2012 from http://www.fpi-allemagne.org/fpi-abidjan/.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 50

Cook, Nicolas, “Côte d’Ivoire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery,” Congressional Research Service. May 3, 2011.Eder, Katrin, “Voting for Disorder: Post-Conflict Elections as a Challenge in Peace Process in Africa – The Caseof Côte d’Ivoire,” University of Bradford School of Social and International Studies, Division of Peace Studies,2011.Embassy of the United States. “Constitution of Côte d’Ivoire.” Accessed on January 2, 2012 fromhttp://abidjan.usembassy.gov/ivoirian_constitution2.html.European Space Agency, GlobCover Land Cover dataset, 2008, Version 2.2.European Union. “Côte d’Ivoire. Rapport Final - Election Présidentielle 31 octobre – 28 novembre 2010.”Accessed on December 8, 2012 from http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/missions/2010/ivory-coast/index_en.htm.Human Rights Watch. “They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing: The Need for Justice for Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crimes.” October 5, 2011. Accessed on December 8, 2012 fromhttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/10/05/they-killed-them-it-was-nothing.Human Rights Watch. “Liberia Takes Action on Cross-Border Attacks into Côte d’Ivoire.” January 3, 2013.Accessed on February 4, 2013 from http://www.hrw.org/node/112258.Human Rights Watch. “What Will the ICC’s Legacy Be in Côte d’Ivoire?” July 19, 2012. Accessed on January 17,2013 from http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/19/what-will-icc-s-legacy-be-c-te-d-ivoire .Global Witness. “Hot Chocolate: How Cocoa Fueled the Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire,” June 2007.Government of Côte d’Ivoire. Consolidation du dialogue politique: le Premier Ministre met en place un groupede travail government-FPI. January 18, 2013. Accessed on January 19, 2013 fromhttp://www.gouv.ci/actualite_1.php?recordID=3141The Guardian. “Hague court issues arrest warrant for Ivory Coast's Simone Gbagbo.” November 22, 2012.Accessed on December 18, 2012 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/22/warrant-ivory-coastsimone-gbagbo.Independent Electoral Commission of Côte d’Ivoire. Email correspondence with senior official. November 27,2012.International Criminal Court. “Gbagbo case: confirmation of charges hearing to start on 19.“ December 17,2012. Accessed on December 20, 2012 from http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/Pages/pr864.aspx.International Crisis Group. “The War is Not Yet Over,“ Africa Report N. 27. November 28, 2003. Accessed onDecember 8, 2012 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/Côte-divoire/072-Côtedivoire-the-war-is-not-yet-over.aspx.International Crisis Group. “A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Côte d’Ivoire,” Africa Report. N. 176,August 1, 2011. Accessed on December 8, 2012 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/westafrica/Côte-divoire/176-a-critical-period-for-ensuring-stability-in-Côte-divoire%20.aspx.International Crisis Group. “Côte d’Ivoire: faire baisser la pression,“ Group N. 193. November 26, 2012.Accessed on December 20, 2012 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/Côtedivoire/193-Côte-divoire-defusing-tensions.aspx.Investir en Zone Franc (IZF). “La dévaluation du Franc CFA en 1994.“ Accessed on December 18, 2012 fromhttp://www.izf.net/pages/la-devaluation-du-franc-cfa-en-1994/2052/.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 51

IRIN News. “Côte d’Ivoire: Rebranding the Army.“ October 5, 2011. Accessed on January 18, 2013 fromhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/93886/CÔTE-D-IVOIRE-Rebranding-the-army.Ivoire Business. “REUNION DU COMITE CENTRAL DU FPI : Communiqué de Presse.“ May 26, 2012.Accessed on January 18, 2013 from http://ivoirebusiness.net/?q=node/11456.McGovern, Mike, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, Hurst & Company Publishing, London, 2011.Radio France Internationale. “Le dialogue politique ivoirien s'achève sans la signature du FPI.“ April 28, 2012.Accessed on December 18, 2012 from http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120428-le-dialogue-politique-ivoirien-sacheve-signature-fpi.Reuters, “Gbagbo party chief quits over Ivory Coast hardliners.” July 12, 2011. Accessed on December 20, 2012from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/ivorycoast-politics-idAFL6E7IC0ND20110712?sp=true.The Carter Center. “International Election Observation Mission to Côte d’Ivoire Final Report: 2010 PresidentialElections and 2011 Legislative Elections.” October 30, 2012.Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). “Georeferenced Event Dataset, Point Dataset. “Accessed onDecember 9, 2012 from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_ged/.United Nations Development Program (UNDP). “Human Development Index.” Accessed on December 21, 2012from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.UNOCI. “UNOCI Facts and Figures.” Accessed on February 9, 2013,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/facts.shtml.USAID. “Electoral Security Framework. Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and GovernanceOfficers.” Accessed on December 18, 2012 fromhttp://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdfWorld Bank. “Information and Communications for Development 2012: Maximizing Mobile. Accessed onDecember 25, 2012 fromhttp://www.worldbank.org/ict/IC4D2012. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0.World Bank. “World Data Bank.” Accessed on December 21, 2012 fromhttp://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/VariableSelection/SelectVariables.aspx?source=World%20Development%20Indicators%20and%20Global%20Development%20Finance#Case Three – KenyaBBC News Africa. “Kenya police attack in Samburu: More bodies found.” November 12, 2012.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20294747.BBC News Africa. 2012. “Kenya Restricts ‘Hate’ Texting for Elections.” October 24, 2012.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20075586Branch, Daniel. 2011. “Why Kenya Invaded Somalia: The Opening of an Aggressive New Chapter,” ForeignAffairs November 15, 2011. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136670/daniel-branch/why-kenya-invadedsomalia.Brown, Stephen. 2001. “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors HelpTo Keep Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi in Power.” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 5: 725-739.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 52

Cornell Advocates for Human Rights. 2012. “The Legal Status of Kenyan Women.” March 13, 2012.http://cornellhumanrights.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/the-legal-status-of-kenyan-women/.IRIN. 2012. “Analysis: Taming Hate Speech in Kenya.” August 24, 2012.http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96168/Analysis-Taming-hate-speech-in-Kenya.Kimenyi, Mwangi S. and Njuguna S. Ndung’u. 2005. “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya NotExperienced a Full-Blown Civil War?” in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. ed. Paul Collier andNicholas Sambanis. Washington, DC: The World Bank.Klopp, Jacqueline M. 2000. “Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya.”Africa Today 47, 1: 7-26.Leoschut, Lezanne. 2008. “The Influence of Family and Community Violence Exposure on the VictimizationRates of South African Youth,” Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 6, no. 3: 201-221.Lucheli, Isaiah. 2012. “Diaspora wants court to suspend elections.” Standard Digital. December 4, 2012.http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000072097&story_title=Kenya-Diaspora-wants-court-tosuspend-elections.Mullin, Charles R. and Daniel Linz. 1995. “Desensitization and resensitization to violence against women,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69, no. 3: 449-459.Mwiti, Lee. 2012. “Kenya’s Whining US Diaspora Should Just Get on with It.” Africa Review. Nation MediaGroup. October 9, 2012. http://www.africareview.com/Blogs/Kenyan-diaspora-should-get-on-with-it/-/979192/1528764/-/8p8qj9z/-/index.htmlNg-Mak, D. S., Salzinger, S., Feldman, R. S. and Stueve, C. A. 2004. “Pathologic Adaptation to CommunityViolence Among Inner-City Youth.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 74: 196–208.Petty, Richard E., and John T. Cacioppo. "The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion." Advances inexperimental social psychology 19, no. 1 (1986): 123-205.Quah, John S.T. “Preventing Police Corruption in Singapore: The Role of Recruitment, Training, anSocialisation.” The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 28, no. 1 (June 2006): 59-75.Republic of Kenya. 2008. Report of The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (The Waki Commission). October15, 2008.Republic of Kenya. 2004. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (NdunguCommission Report). Nairobi: Government Press.The Status of Governance in Kenya: a Baseline Survey Report 2012. 2012. The Society for International Development:Nairobi.UNDP, International Human Development Indicators, Income Gini Coefficient,http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/67106.html.Williams, Hubert. “Core Factors of Police Corruption Across the World.” Forum on Crime and Society 2, no. 1(December 2002): 85-99.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 53

APPENDIX C: SOMALILAND MAP AND CLAN GROUPSSource: James Dahl (Ingoman), Used with a Creative Commons License,http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Somaliland

The above map shows the geographic locations of the six Somali clan families, and thecorresponding chart details major sub-clans. Major clans in Somaliland (top left portion of the map)include the Dir, the Ishaak, and the DarodSource: CIA via Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin, “Somalia’s Clan Families,” 2002(https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_ethnic_grps_2002.jpg)

APPENDIX D: PROFILE OF 2012 ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN SOMALILANDPhases Actors Nature of Violence Victims LocationPre-ElectionElection DayPost-ElectionKhaatumoseparatists vscandidatesPuntlandForces vs.Govt.DelegationSomalilandSecurity forcesvs. KhaatumoseparatistmilitiasPolice vs.protestorsPolice vs.protestorsProtestors vs.police andNEC staffN/AKulmiye andWadaani vs.HaqsoorPolice vs.protestorsPolice vs.protestorsKhaatumo separatists a kidnapdelegation from Xaqsoorcampaigning in Hudun District.Puntland Forces block majorroads in Bahdan and Dhabar toprevent election ballots frombeing deliveredFour individuals were killed inclashes between local militias andgovernment soldiers who wereattempting to deliver ballot boxesto polling stationsTwo people were seriouslywounded after the policeguarding the voting station inErigavo opened fire on a mobtrying to enter the buildingOne civilian killed and severalothers injured after the policeopened fire at demonstratorswho were protesting against theNECAt least six people wounded afterpolice fired live ammunition toend clashes between protestorsand NEC staff and securityforces.No major incidences of violence;multiple and underage votingAllegations of widespread voterigging and ambiguities in ballottabulationProtests in after partial resultsreleased leave 10 civilians deadOne person killed and threeothers wounded when securityforces fire on protestors whothrew stones at the VicePresident's convoy and hotelresidenceCandidatesDelegation fromSomalilandtransportingballots, Voters,CandidatesUnspecifiedProtestorsProtestorsProtestors, NECstaff memberN/AHaqsoor andopposition partiesand associations(i.e. UCID,Umaada)ProtestorsProtestorsHudun District inSool Region(Disputed EasternAreas)Bahdan andDhabar Districts inSanaag Region(Disputed EasternAreas)Hudun District inSool Region(Disputed EasternAreas)Erigavo, capital ofSanaag Region(Disputed EasternAreas)Lughaye Town,Awdal Region(West)Burao, capital ofTogdheer Region(Central)N/AMaroodi Jeex,Awdal andToghdeer regionsHargeisa, MaroodiJeex Region(Central); Hudun,Sool Region(East) ; Lughaya,Awdal Region(West)Borama, AwdalRegion (West)Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 56

APPENDIX E: SOMALILAND'S THREE-PARTY SYSTEMArticle 9 of Somaliland’s Constitution limits thenumber of political parties to three as a mechanismfor preventing political fragmentation along clanlines. 1 In field interviews most stakeholdersacknowledged that this limitation is appropriate forSomaliland at this stage in its political developmentbecause it forces clans to cooperate and promotes thegrowth of stronger, more stable parties. Yet, publicdissatisfaction with the existing parties and a yearningfor greater political competition has intensified inrecent years. Thus, Parliament’s decision in 2011 toopen up the political process and allow new politicalassociations to form every 10 years and compete forthose three spots serves as an important “releasevalve” and mechanism for keeping the three nationalparties accountable.This process consists of two qualifying rounds fornew political associations and a formula to gaugepopular support based on the district elections – alloverseen by RAC. In December 2011, over 20associations applied. Fifteen met the preliminaryrequirements in stage one, and RAC gave temporarycertification to these. Next, both existing parties andnew associations were required to fulfill stage tworequirements by April. Then, on April 20, 2012, RACannounced that nine of the fifteen associations weredisqualified. Additionally, one current party (UDUB)and one new association dismissed themselves fromthe process – leaving two current parties and five newassociations to contest the 2012 district elections.For the third stage of the process, article 6 of the2011 Political Parties and Associations Law1 Some view this artificial restriction on the number ofpolitical parties as an infringement on the fundamentalright of association, as guaranteed in Somaliland’sconstitution, the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR), and other international humanrights treaties. Article 23(3) of the Somaliland Constitutionstates, “All citizens shall have the right to form, inaccordance with the law, political…associations.” However,Article 25(4) of the Constitution also asserts “the freedomsof the person shall not override the laws protecting thepublic morals, the security of the country.” Moreover,although the ICCPR enshrines “freedom of associationwith others” as a fundamental right, it makes provision forrestricting the exercise of this right for the purposes ofnational security, public safety, or public order (Article 22).This limitation on the number of political parties preventsa large number of parties fragmented along sub-clan linesfrom contesting elections and creating chaos, as occurredin the 1960s in the Somali Republic. Thus, to the extentthat this restriction preserves public order and security, it isa legitimate restraint on the right of association.ambiguously outlines the procedures for determiningthe three winning parties on the basis of districtelection results: the three winning parties must gain“20% of all the votes cast in every region” OR mustbe the "three parties that have gained the highestpercentage of votes cast in the regions of the country.”To preempt any conflict over the interpretation ofthese provisions, RAC and the politicalparties/associations established a detailed formula fordetermining the three national parties in the 2012Electoral Code of Conduct just prior to the election.This formula used a Borda count to rankassociations/ parties and assign them points on thebasis of their support in each of the six regions. Then,RAC added each party’s six regional rankings, and theparties with the three highest scores won (Kulmiye,Waddani, and UCID).Table A.1 - Political Association QualifyingRoundsStage OneSubmit the name of the association and its symbolSubmit the names of the founders and leaders,along with the procedures for their selectionPay a 150 million shilling ($20,000) registration feeto Ministry of FinanceSubmit details about the first meetingStage TwoHold a general assembly of the association andprovide details about the issues discussedElect party leadership and committees anddetermine the association’s structure, rules, andpolitical agendaOpen a national office and one office in each regionRegister 1,000 supporters in each of the 6 regionsAssociation members must present themselves atthe associations’ regional offices for verification byRAC during set windows of timeSource: 2011 Political Parties LawIn addition to these ambiguities in the legal procedurefor determining the three national political parties, the2012 elections revealed four major problems with thisprocess. First, the formula for determining the threewinners during local elections is not only unclear butis also very complex, and it was clear from fieldinterviews that many stakeholders did not understandit. Essentially, the Borda count uses a consensusbasedsystem rather than the more commonmajoritarian method for counting votes. The rationalebehind this mechanism is to ensure that the threenational political parties have broad support across allsix regions – rather than just concentrated support inone or two key areas. It is a fair standard – consistentElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 57

with the law’s intention to ensure broad, nationalparties (not regional, clan-based parties). However,under this formula, it is very possible that a partycould place second or third in the popular vote – forinstance, with strong support in the heavily populatedHargeisa region – but still lose due to inadequatedistribution of support throughout all six regions. Thus,this system requires strong candidate and votereducation efforts to combat perceived unfairness.Second, neither Article 6 nor any informal agreementspecifies what should happen in the event of a tie –though some interpretations suggest that RAC wouldrefer to the total number of votes received nationwide by theparty/association to break a tie.Third, the point system weights all regions equally.Thus, for example, an association that achievessecond place in the least populated region receivesthe same number of points as the association thatachieves the same rank in the most populated region.Finally, the three existing political parties retain theirstatus throughout this entire process, as the lawprovides the winning parties with ten-year licenses.These three parties continue receiving regulargovernment grants and likely have an advantage dueto their official status and access to state resources.Thus, some observers have argued that the lawshould suspend all the three national political parties’licenses – possibly up to one year prior to electionday – in order to afford new political associations alevel playing ground when competing with thenational parties every ten years. During this transitionphase, no parties would exist, and currentofficeholders would have the opportunity to supportthe party/association of their choice from anexpanded field.Addressing these concerns should be a key prioritybefore the next political party election process in2022 because there is a strong risk for electoralrelatedviolence if people believe this high-stakesselection process is unfair.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 58

APPENDIX F: SOMALILAND DISTRICT ELECTIONS POLLING STATION ACCESSIBILITY MAPZeylacLughayaBakiBerberaCeerigaaboBooramaCeel-­‐AfweinSheekhBuraoGabileyCaynaboXudun TaleexPopulationHigh : 45,739Low : 0HargeysaData Sources: Oak Ridge National Laboratory Population Database (2011);Somaliland National Electoral Commission Polling Station GPS Coordinates,Polling Station Per District, Average Voter Participation Per District in 2003,2005 & 2010, 2010 Election Results by District.OodweyneTextBuuhoodleLascaanodSUMMARYThis map depicts a two mile buffer around 894 pollingstations in 10 districts of Somaliland, with a totalpopulation of 1,830,326 according to 2011 populationprojections from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.Boundaries of overlapping buffers were dissolved inorder to compute the total number of people livingwithin and outside of a two mile distance from thepolling stations. The analysis yielded the followingresults, based on an estimate that 49% of the populationis 18 years and older (UNICEF 2010):Distance toPollingStationCoveredPopulationUncoveredPopulationUncoveredVoting AgePopulation(18yrs andolder)1.5 Miles(LowerBound)1,015,837(45.5%)814,489(44.5%)397,948(21.7%)2 Miles(ReasonableEstimate)1,135,741(62.1%)694,565(37.9%)339,365(18.5%)5 Miles(UpperBound)1,588,846(86.8%)241,480(13.2%)117,983(6.4%)

APPENDIX G: SOMALILAND RAC AND NEC COMPARISONResponsibilitiesNECRegister voters or implementmeasures to prevent voterfraud/multiple votingSet up polling stations and recruitand train officers and staffConduct polling and tabulationOversee voter educationSupervise campaign activitiesDesign ballotsMonitor compliance with electorallaw and impose penalties as neededProcess complaints on election dayRACSpecify the criteria for creating new politicalassociationsImplement verification procedures to determineassociations’ eligibility to participate in localelectionsDevelop regulations and monitoring mechanismsfor the internal democratic proceduresClarify political party rights and responsibilitiesEstablish penalties for parties that violate the rulesResolve political association and party disputesEstablish clear procedures for officeholders forjoining one of the three official partiesRegulate party financesFunding Government and international Government onlydonorsTerm of Office 5 years 2 yearsAppointment President, Guurti, and opposition President only (confirmed by House)Process parties (confirmed by House)Members Seven SevenElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 60

APPENDIX H: HISTORIC BACKGROUND TO THE IVORIAN CONFLICTThe development model pursued since the 1960s byPresident Félix Houphouët-Boigny 1 imploded whenrevenues from the cocoa industry decreased and theFranc CFA was devalued by half in 1994. 2 This, inturn, led to the collapse of a complex system of statesponsoredinvestment and patronage. Many speculatethat economic decline prompted Houphouët-Boignyto open up the political system and hold multi-partyelections in 1990.Multiparty politics did not act as a pressure valve. Thelackluster performance of the economy promptedHouphouët-Boigny to appoint former IMF officialAlassane Ouattara as the country’s first PrimeMinister in November of 1990. Austerity measuresallowed Laurent Gbagbo to mobilize his base, whichresulted in violent protests in the capital Abidjan in1991. 3 The opening up of the political sphere also sawthe birth of organized student politics on universitycampuses. Houphouët-Boigny suppressed the studentmovements, which led to retaliatory violence fromstudent groups. Through this conflict emerged a newcharismatic class of ‘political entrepreneurs’ such asGuillaume Soro, the leader of the Ivoirian HighSchool and University Students’ Federation (FESCI) 4who would later become the leader of the rebel militia1 Côte d’Ivoire pursued growth through export ofagricultural crops such as coffee and cacao. Migration (oras some would call it “state colonization”) fromneighboring countries and less fertile areas of Côte d’Ivoireinto cropland areas (especially in the West of the country)was encouraged under a policy that considered the land tobelong to those who work it. The windfalls from theplantation economy projected Côte d’Ivoire to become theeconomic miracle of West Africa, until the ‘cocoa wars’initiated by Houphouët-Boigny in 1987-89 to boycott theworld cocoa industry brought the industry to its knees.Mike McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 2011;International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: The War is NotYet Over,” 2003.2 The Franc of the Communauté Financière d’Afrique(CFA) is the common currency of Francophone WestAfrica. It operates with a fixed exchange rate (originallywith the French Franc, now with the euro) and itsconvertibility is guaranteed by the French Government.The 1994 devaluation was pursued by internationalfinancial organizations such as the IMF and the Frenchgovernment who made its support to West Africaneconomies contingent on adoption of economic reforms.In particular, the Franc CFA was thought to be overvalued,which increased imports and depressed exports, thusresulting in balance of payments imbalances. Investir enZone Franc (IZF). “La dévaluation du Franc CFA en1994,“ http://www.izf.net/pages/la-devaluation-du-franccfa-en-1994/2052/.3 McGovern, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2003.4 Féderation Estudiantine et Scolaire de la Côte d’Ivoire.Forces Nouvelles. The opening up of the politicalsystems coincided with the fast polarization of thepolitical discourse. Violence became a necessarymeans to pursue social mobility for a large number ofunemployed youth who had begun to return to ruralareas. They found that this land was held by a numberof ‘foreigners,’ including Ivoirians from differentregions and ethnic backgrounds. 5 On December 8,1994 the electoral law was modified, disenfranchisingnon-Ivoirians (even though some of them had beenvoting in the country since 1945) and barring fromthe Presidency those people whose father or motherwere not Ivoirian, ostensibly to disqualify AlassaneOuattara from running for office. 6After four years of disastrous rule, in 1999 a bloodlessmilitary coup led by General Guëi put an end toBédié’s government. In the aftermath of the coup, thequestion of nationality was once again put at thecenter of the political debate. Despite the fact that theFPI and RDR had reached a consensus on aninclusive definition of who is Ivoirian, it became clearthat Gueï was determined to stay in power when theSupreme Court announced that most candidates,including Ouattara and Bédié, would not be allowedto run in the October 2000 presidential elections. 7 In2000, after disputed elections where only 37 percentof voters cast a ballot, massive protests by Gbagbo’sFPI supporters forced General Gueï into exile. WhenGbagbo refused Bédié’s and Ouattara’s requests tohold new elections, violence flared up again amongthe three sides. 8 Intra-regional divisions that hadsurfaced in the aftermath of the presidential electionsseeped into local elections in December 2000. 9When former student leader Guillaume Sorolaunched an uprising in Abidjan, the conflict enteredits most violent phase that would leave at least 1,880people dead in the period 2002-2010 and 3,000 deadin the period 2010-2012, as show in the graph below.5 International Crisis Group, 2003.6 Christian Bouquet, Géopolitique de la Côte d’Ivoire. ArmandColin, Paris, 2005.7 International Crisis Group, 2003.8 Ibid.9 The most notable case was the accusation by RDRsupporters of having been targeted by pro-Gbagbo militiasafter the discovery of mass graves in the Yopougonneighborhood in Abidjan. McGovern, 2011.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 61

Graph 1: Number of violent incidents (top) and number ofdeaths (bottom), by year.60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Uppsala Conflict DataProgram (UCDP), 2011A number of militias and rebel groups led by Sorojoined ranks under the umbrella name ForcesNouvelles (FN) and negotiated a cease-fire with theGbagbo government and the Ivoirian armed forces inJanuary 2003. 10 Despite the intent of forming a unitygovernment, violence against civilians did notdecrease and international forces intervened toseparate the two sides, creating a buffer zone or zonede confiance in 2003.10 Ibid.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 62

APPENDIX I: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR CÔTE D’IVOIREGraph 1: Yearly GDP growth compared with number of violent deathsNumber of violent deaths 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 GDP growth (%) Number of violent deaths GDP growth Source: World Bank (n.d.)Graph 2: Human Development Index for select West African countries (1980 – 2011)0.600 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Senegal Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Index (n.d.)Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 63

APPENDIX J: PROFILE OF 2010 ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN CÔTE D’IVOIREPhases Actors Nature of Violence Victims LocationPre-ElectionElection DayPost-ElectionSupporters ofFPI, PDCI, RDR,Security ForcesSupporters ofFPI, PDCI, RDRSupporters ofFPI, PDCI, RDR,Security ForcesPro-OuattaraSection ofSecurity Forcesvs. OppositionMembersDozos vs. FPIsupportersFPI supporters,FDS vs. UNOCIIntimidation and physicalassault of voters to cast aballot for their candidateor to not vote at allAttacks on political ralliesof other partiesIntimidation and physicalassault of voters to cast aballot for their candidateor to not vote at allSecurity forces attackopposition members ifthey protest electionresultsPhysical attacks by Dozosto potentialretaliations/protests ofFPI supportersFPI supporters and FDS(if they split from FANCI)physically attack UNOCIpeacekeepers, and staff.This serves as retaliation ifthe opposition believes theUN sided with the rulingparty.VotersVoters, CandidatesVoters, PollingStation StaffSecurity Forces &Members of theOpposition (FPI)Dozos, FPIsupportersFPI supporters,FDS, and UNOCIstaff andpeacekeepersWest, Central,Abidjan areaWest, Central,Abidjan areaWest, Central,Abidjan areaWest, Central,Abidjan area(mostlyconcentratedhere)North, Central,WestAbidjanElections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 64