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Mis Project sion Leader

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYConceptofOperations(CONOPS)forPoliceIntelligenceOperations(PIO)4March2009i

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FOROFFICIALUSEONLYAcknowledgements USAMPSProjectLeaderWorkingGroupFacilitators TigerTeamMembers iii

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ANSERCONOPSWritingTeam iv

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYTableofContentsExecutiveSummary.......................................................................................................................................11.Introduction..............................................................................................................................................21.1Purpose...............................................................................................................................................21.2Scope...................................................................................................................................................22.Background...............................................................................................................................................33.JointOperatingConcepts..........................................................................................................................43.1IrregularWarfare(IW)JOC..................................................................................................................43.2MajorCombatOperations(MCO)JOC................................................................................................43.3SecurityandStabilityTransitionandReconstructionOperations(SSTRO)JOC.................................43.4DeterrenceOperationsJOC................................................................................................................53.5HomelandDefense(HD)JOC..............................................................................................................54.MilitaryProblem.......................................................................................................................................65.Vision.........................................................................................................................................................86.PoliceIntelligenceOperations..................................................................................................................96.1PrinciplesofPoliceIntelligenceOperations........................................................................................96.2PIOIntegrationintotheOperationsProcess......................................................................................96.3PIOCapabilitiesinanExpeditionaryEnvironment...........................................................................156.4IntegratingPIOPrinciplesfortheGarrisonEnvironment.................................................................226.5LinkingPolice,ForensicandBiometricInformation.........................................................................297.RisksandMitigation................................................................................................................................317.1Regulatory.........................................................................................................................................317.2OperationalConditions.....................................................................................................................337.3InformationManagement.................................................................................................................347.4ForceManagement...........................................................................................................................358.DOTMLPFImplications............................................................................................................................368.1Doctrine.............................................................................................................................................368.2Organization......................................................................................................................................368.3Training.............................................................................................................................................378.4Materiel.............................................................................................................................................378.5LeaderDevelopment.........................................................................................................................388.6Personnel..........................................................................................................................................38v

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY8.7Facilities.............................................................................................................................................398.8PolicyImplications............................................................................................................................39Appendix1–References............................................................................................................................40Appendix2–Glossary.................................................................................................................................42Appendix3–Acronyms..............................................................................................................................47ListofFiguresFigure1–CivilAuthorityTriad......................................................................................................................8Figure2–OperationsProcess....................................................................................................................10Figure3–PIOIntegratedintoMDMP........................................................................................................11Figure4–IntelligenceProcess....................................................................................................................13Figure5–CriminalIntelligenceProcess.....................................................................................................14Figure6–PoliceIntelligenceProducts.......................................................................................................19Figure7–PoliceInformationFlowforaTheaterofOperation..................................................................20Figure8–TheIntelligenceFusionProcess.................................................................................................26vi

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYExecutiveSummary 1

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY1.Introduction1.1Purpose 1.2Scope 2

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY2.Background Vignette:DepartmentofDefense(DoD)CriminalInvestigationTaskForce(CITF)specialagentsandanalystsworkingwithataskforcewerepreparingcriminalcasesagainstdetainees.Thecasessupportedthetaskforce’sfocusonidentifyingthoseresponsiblefortheMosulDiningFacilitybombingandeliminatingtheAlQaidainIraq(AQI)cellinMosul.Analystsbegantopreparelinkanalysisdiagramsofthecellanditsconnections.Meanwhile,CITFspecialagentsreceivedarequestfromanotherunittohelpthemprepareacriminalcaseagainstaforeignfighterdetainedinFallujah.Whileinterviewingtheforeignfighter,CITFspecialagentsdeterminedhewasaMosulcellmember,whowassenttoFallujah.Theforeignfighterwaswoundedinthefightingandabandonedbyhiscompanions.HewasangrywithhiscompanionsforleavinghimandagreedtoprovideinformationabouttheFallujahcell.Withtheforeignfighter’shelp,thetaskforcewasabletoidentifytheentirecellstructure,safehouses,cachelocations,andotherinformationabouttheMosulcell,toincludeitsEmirandthechiefbombmaker.Asaresult,thetaskforcebegandetainingmembersofthecell.TheforeignfighterwaspresentedtoaninvestigativejudgefortheCentralCriminalCourtsofIraq,andheprovidedcompleteinformationonthecellanditsactivities.Usinglinkanalysisdiagrams,CITFspecialagentswereabletoobtainconfessionsfromothercellmembers,whowerealsopresentedtotheinvestigativejudge.Asaresultoftheoperation,theEmirofthecell,alongwithseveralothermembers,waskilledduringraids.Theremainingmembers,includingthemasterbombmakerforAQI,weredetainedandpresentedtotheinvestigativejudge.CITFagentswereabletoidentifyinsurgentvideosofbombingoperationsthatweretiedtothebombmakerandthecell.Thisevidencewaspresentedtotheinvestigativejudgewhochargedthemen,whowerelaterconvicted. 3

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY3.JointOperatingConcepts 3.1IrregularWarfare(IW)JOC 3.2MajorCombatOperations(MCO)JOC 3.3SecurityandStabilityTransitionandReconstructionOperations(SSTRO)JOC Vignette:DuringtheearlytransitiontoCOINandStabilityOperationsduringOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF),siteexploitationreceivedpriorityinattemptingtocurtailinsurgentoperations.Duringtheexploitationofaweaponscache,IEDweaponsmaterialwasdiscoveredandseized.Theforensicprocessingofthematerialrevealedlatentfingerprintsonseveraldetonatorsthatboreidentificationnumbersoriginatingfromstockmaterialshippedfromaneighboringcountry.Becauseofbiometricinformationalreadyonfile,asuspectwasidentifiedasapossibleconspiratorinanimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED)bombmakingcell.Thisconsolidatedinformationwasprovidedtomilitarycommanders,hostnationlawenforcement,militaryintelligence(MI),policeagencies,andprovostmarshals(PM).Asaresult,awarrantwasissued;thesuspectwasidentified,arrestedandinterviewedbyhostnationpolice.ThesuspectwaslaterprosecutedwithinthehostnationjudicialsystembaseduponinformationderivedfromUSmilitarypoliceinformationandbiometricdata.4

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY3.4DeterrenceOperationsJOC 3.5HomelandDefense(HD)JOC 5

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY4.MilitaryProblem Vignette:Aseasonedlawenforcementprofessional’sdirectparticipationinsiteexploitationresultedintheseizureofweaponscachesandhomemadeexplosives(HME)sourcediscoveries.Onespecificcaseresultedinthesuccessfulidentificationandrecoveryofacacheof168explosivelyformedpenetrators(EFP)fromamosqueinBaqubah.6

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:Duringstabilityoperations,informationobtainedduringanarrestinterviewandpreviousinformationcollectedduringcombatoperationsyieldedananalyticalproductthatproducedcredibleinformationimplicatinganewsuspect’sinvolvementinanIEDcell.Asaresultofthisinformation,anarrestwarrantwasobtainedandthesuspectwaslaterdetainedatabordercrossingoftheadjacentcountry.Subsequentbiometricandpolicedatabaseinformationconfirmedthesuspect’sidentity,andanarrestwarrantwasissued.ThesuspectwasdetainedbyUSmilitaryforcesandjointlyinterviewedbyHNandUSlawenforcement.HeadmittedtobeingtheEmirofthisIEDcellandstatedhepurchaseddetonatorsfrommilitarysourceswithinneighboringcountries,aswellasreceivedfinancialsupportfromlocalsinthosecountries.ThisinformationwasprovidedtoUSandmultinationalforceintelligenceagenciesandhostnationprosecutors.Asaresult,thesuspectwasprosecutedandimprisoned.Intelligenceagenciesutilizedthisinformationasmeanstotargetstatesupportedterroristcellsthatoperatedoutsidetheboundariesofthehostnation. 7

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY5.Vision Figure1–CivilAuthorityTriad8

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY6.PoliceIntelligenceOperations 6.1PrinciplesofPoliceIntelligenceOperations6.2PIOIntegrationintotheOperationsProcess 9

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYFigure2–OperationsProcess P O L I C E10

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYFigure3–PIOIntegratedintoMDMPVignette:MultinationalforceexperienceinIraqandAfghanistanhasshownthatifanycomponentofthelegalsystem(police,prosecution,judiciaryorpenal)ceasestofunction,theentiresystembreaksdown.Example:asoflate2008,Afghanistanhadarobustcorruptioninvestigationsunitwithover300activecriminalcases,yetthesystemasawholefailedtoprocesscasesthroughjudicialreviewduetoalackofprosecutorialfollowthroughandappropriatecourtwithvenue.Vignette:In2007inFallujah,localjudgesfailedtoreportforworkandperformtheirdutiesduetoalQaidaintimidation.Asaresult,detentionfacilitiesremainedintolerablyovercrowded,andthepolicebecamefrustratedandsawnopointinmakingadditionalarrestsorconductingthoroughinvestigations.Absentdueprocess,manyinnocentdetaineeslanguishedinsubstandardprisonfacilitiesandbecameprimerecruitmentcandidatesforalQaida.Furthermore,duetoovercrowdedconditions,somedetaineeswerereleased. 11

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FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Figure4–IntelligenceProcess 13

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Figure5–CriminalIntelligenceProcess 14

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 6.3PIOCapabilitiesinanExpeditionaryEnvironment Collection 15

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY16 ActiveCollection PassiveCollection

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYPoliceInformationSources KeyThemesinMPCollectionofInformation 17

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Analysis 18

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Figure6–PoliceIntelligenceProducts 19

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYVignette:DuringclearingoperationsinZandubahr,elementsof23Infantrylocatedacachewhichincludedasuicidevest,plasticexplosives,weapons,ammunition,GoogleEarthmaps,andmorethan150piecesofphotoidentification.Thecachewasprocessedforevidentiarypurposesandlaterthesuicidevest,mapsandpiecesofidentificationweresubmittedtoCEXCforforensicexamination.Theresultsoftheexamrevealedmultiplesetsofidentifiablelatentfingerprints.Threelatentfingerprintswereidentifiedasbelongingtopersonsprocessedthroughahostnationdetentionfacility,withoneofthesubjectsstilldetained.Furtherexploitationofthecacheindicatedthat,inadditiontobeingasuicidebombcell,itsmembersplannedandexecutedkidnappings. Figure7–PoliceInformationFlowforaTheaterofOperation20

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:Thevastmajorityoftheinformationanddatacollectionisperformedatthesmallunitlevelwhereunitshavedirectinteractionwiththecommunityandhostnation/indigenoussecurityforces.InformationgatheredisreviewedandreceivesinitialanalysisatboththeMPandmaneuvercompanylevel,whereadditional,focusedcollectioneffortscanbedirected.Informationfromthelowestlevelisenteredintoauniversal,networkeddatabasefollowingastandardizeddataentryprotocoltoenablerapiddataanalysisandexploitation.Battalionandhigherlevelheadquartersaccesstheinformationviatheuniversaldatabase.EachunitleveltakesappropriateactionwithintheirAObasedondevelopmentofintelligence,and,inturn,addsadditionaldataandanalyticalproductstotheuniversaldatabase.TheresultisawideareanetworkcriminalintelligencepicturetosupportMP/CID,BCTanddivisionoperationsandcontinuousanalyticalprocesses.DatafromthelowestlevelsisaccessiblebytheJEFFlabsforsynchronizationandexploitation.Byusingauniversal,networkeddatabase,unitsatthetacticallevelcanactoncriminalactivitieswithintheirAO,whileoperationalandstrategiclevelsidentifyorganizedcriminalelementsthatcrossgeographicalandnationalboundaries.Theendresultfacilitatestheeffectivetargetingoftheentirenetwork(fromtacticaltostrategiclevels)consistingofplanners,financiers,supporters,trainers,andfacilitators. 21

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:TheDoD’sCriminalInvestigationTaskForce(CITF)hasauniquemissionofcombiningintelligencewithlawenforcementinformationinordertodevelopprosecutablecasesagainstterroristsandwarcriminalsinvenuesthatrangefrommilitarycommissiontothecentralcriminalcourtofIraqandtheAfghanistannationalsecuritycourt.OverthealmostsevenyearsofitsexistencetheCITF’sinvestigativemodelhasevolved,andtheynowusethe“agent,analystandattorney”(A3)model.Earlyinitsevolution,CITFlearnedthatspecialagentsandanalystsprocessinformationdifferently,andtheyachievethemostefficientinvestigationbyhavingspecialagentsandanalystsworkinpeerteamswherebothreviewthesameinformationandcollaborateonwhatitmeansandhowbesttodevelopinvestigativeleads.Byaddinganattorneytothemodel,CITFlearnedthatthiskeptinvestigationsfocusedandbroughtanotheruniqueskillsettobearoncasedevelopment.Ascurrentlystaffed,CITFisorganizedwithoneanalystforeverytwospecialagentsandoneattorneytoeveryinvestigativeunit.WhethertoinstitutionalizetheA3modelasanenduringArmycapabilitywarrantsfurtherreview. Vignette:AseasonedlawenforcementprofessionalcoachedandmentoredtheimplementationofacommunitybasedpolicingprogramwiththeeldersinMetrLam,Afghanistan,whichfocusedonthesecurityofbridgesandculvertsandthepreventionofimprovisedexplosivesdevice(IED)attacks.Thesecurityprogram,ledbyAfghancitizens,includedthedailyinspectionofover600bridgesandculverts.TheprogramreducedtheoccurrenceofIEDsfromthreeperweektozero.6.4IntegratingPIOPrinciplesfortheGarrisonEnvironment 22

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:AVCSAreportconcerningsexualassaultsandreviewsoftheMilitaryPoliceDailyBlotterandJournalpromptedaSeniorCommanderandGarrisonCommandertocreateaSexualAssaultTaskForce(SATF)toexaminesexcrimesimpactingthelife,health,andsafetyoftheinstallationcommunity.TheInstallationCommandingGeneraltaskedtheGarrisonCommandertoprovidesexualassaultinformationinanIPBformat.ThefusioncellwastaskedastheleadfortheSATFIPBeffort.Thiswaspossiblebecausethefusioncellincludedpersonnelfromtheintelligenceandpolicedisciplinesandwasabletonotonlyfuseinformationintointelligence,buttofusetypesofinformationanalysis(actionablepreventiveandprosecutorial).Thefusioncellusedvariousdatabasestoconductdataminingtoidentifysexualcrimes,personcrimes,andpropertycrimes.Productsincludeddevelopinggraphicproducts(maps)thatpinpointedcrimelocationsandidentificationofthetopcrimeareasontheinstallation,withassociatedsecuritylightingdata.Thisprovidedtargetareasforlightingefforts,installationofCCTV,andadjustmentstolawenforcementpatroldistributionplans.Throughanalysis,thefusioncellwasabletodefinethecrimeenvironment,acriminalandvictimprofile,aswellassocialbehavioralfactors.Solutionsaddressedandrefinedinitialattemptstosolvetheissuewithoutanalysis.Analysisprovidedtheabilitytopinpointspecificproblemlocationsandspecificsocialissues,whichinturnallowedthefocusoflimitedfunding.Thesolutionswentbeyondtraditionalpoliceandincludedrecommendedenvironmentalandsocialchanges.Informationcollectedincludedpoliceinformationaswellasnonpoliceinformation.Analysisincludesthecomparisonandcorrelationofbothunrestrictedandrestricteddata.Theprocessfusedintelligencetoolsandmethodsthroughapolicelens. Vignette:At0345hours,6March2008,abombwasdetonatedattheTimesSquare(NewYorkCity)RecruitingStationcausingdamagetothefrontofthefacility.Atthetimeofthebombing,lawenforcementagencieswereconductinganactiveinvestigationofthreeallegedanarchistswithtiestoFranceandCanada.Weekspriortothebombing,aNewYorkCityPoliceDetectiveinformedamemberoftherecruitingstationofapossiblethreat.AccordingtotheDetective,duringavehiclesearchattheCanadianborder,lawenforcementofficialsdiscoveredanarchistpamphletsalongwithphotographsofTimesSquare,includingseveralphotographsappearingtoshowtheTimesSquareRecruitingStation.NoimminentthreattotheRecruitingStationwaseveridentified.Moreover,theDetectiveinformedtherecruitertherewasnodirectthreattotheRecruitingStation,butNYPDwasincreasinglawenforcementpresenceintheareaandwouldcontinuetomonitorthesituation.HealsoindicatedtheFBIandNYCJTTFwereinvestigatingthecase.On27February2008,theTimesSquareRecruitingStationCommandersubmittedan23

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYofficialincidentreporttotheUnitedStatesArmyRecruitingCommandforsituationalawarenessandimplementedinternalsecurityandawarenessmeasures.ThereportwasforwardedasaSuspiciousActivityReport(SAR)throughAT/FPstaffchannelstofourArmyCommandsandtheServicesforsituationalawareness(SA).TherewerenospecificidentifiedthreatstowardsanyparticularlocationwithintheTimesSquareareaofNewYorkCity.On3March2008,USARNORTHreceivedadditionaldetailedLawEnforcementSensitiveinformationconcerningtheongoinginvestigationfromJTTFchannelsbutheldreleaseoftheinformationawaitingFBIapprovalforaredactedreleaseoftheinformation.OfconcernwasthefactthatthereportrevealedthethreeindividualswereactuallystoppedbyCanadianlawenforcementofficialsattheUSCanadianborderon31January2008,fourweekspriortotheTimesSquareRecruitingStationbeinginformedofthesituation.Althoughthereisnopositivelinkbetweentheinitialsuspiciousactivityreportandthebombinginvestigation,andnoknownassociationbetweenthevehiclestoppedandsearchedattheCanadianborder,theincidentshowsexcellentcooperationandpoliceintelligencesharingatthelowestlevels.OrganizingforIntelligenceFusionwithintheGarrison Vignette:AStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam(SBCT)waspreparingtomoveequipmenttoaportofembarkation(POE)fordeployment.Theshipmentrequiredthemovementof300vehiclesacrosseightlawenforcementjurisdictions.Basedonpreviousthreatfusionexpertise,thegarrison’sforceprotection(FP)fusioncellwasuniquelyqualifiedtobetheleadintelligenceproducertosupportthemovement.Thefusioncellcoordinatedpoliceinformation,intelligenceandciviliansecuritywithover22local,federal,andDoDagencies.ThefusioncellproducedindepthanalysisofthethreattotheSBCTequipmentandadvisedtheSBCTandgarrisoncommandersonprotection.Thecoordinatedeffortgavelawenforcementagenciestheknowledgetoidentifyand24

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYpreventdisruptiveactionsbyviolentprotesters.TheoperationwasconsideredbyCorpsleadershiptobeawatershedeventforindepthinvolvementofagarrisonbasedFPfusioncellinsupportofunitdeployments.Moreover,theCorpsheadquartersintegratedthefusioncellintootheroperationswheretheG2isconstrainedbyintelligenceoversightrules,orthereisaneedforpoliceinformation/intelligenceassessmentsandanalysis. NationalCriminalIntelligenceSharingPlan(Fusion Center Guidelines) InformationFlowandIntelligenceFusion 25

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Figure8–TheIntelligenceFusionProcess26

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:Armycriminalinvestigationsspecialagents receiveinformationfromasourcethatanunknownsubjectistraffickinginlargequantitiesofillegaldrugsandsellingthemtoaviolentcriminalorganizationoperatingincloseproximitytoanArmyinstallation.Thesourcerevealsthemethodoftransport,transferlocations,storageanddistributionmethodsoftheillegalnarcotics.Coordinationwithlocal,stateand federallawenforcementagencies revealsapriorcriminalrecordandmultiplepoliceengagementswiththesubjectandidentifiesthestructureandindividualswithintheviolentcriminalorganization.Analysisandfusionofnewlydevelopedpoliceinformation,inconjunctionwithpreviouslycaptureddatabyother civilianlawenforcement agencies,linksthesubjectwithpossibleassociatesandthecriminalnetwork.Theanalysisidentifiesspecificinformationgapswhich,ifanswered,couldassociatekeyfigures.Theanalysisleadstoatargetedpoliceinformationcollectionplandesignedtogatheradditionalinformationanddocumentevidencetocorroboratecriminalactivityandlinkspecificcrimestoawidergroup,aswellasimplicatekeyleadershipfigureswithinthecriminalorganization.Armyinvestigators,withtheassistanceandsupportofa violentcrimetaskforce,continuetoinvestigateand collecttheadditionalinformationneeded.Afterthenewinformationisenteredintothe crimedatabase,furtheranalysisrevealsapatternthatallowsanalystsandinvestigatorstolinkaforeignsourcetothedrugs,tiesillegalweaponssmugglingtothecriminalorganization,andimplicatesthreeknowncriminalsinmultiplehomicides.Theresultoftheinteragencyinvestigationisthedismantlingofaviolentcriminalorganizationandthearrest,prosecutionandimprisonmentoffivehighrankingmembersoftheorganizedcrimegroup.Further,overtwo27

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYdozenothercriminalassociateswereidentified,leadingtotheinitiationofseveraladditionalcriminalinvestigations. AdditionalVignettes:Vignette:ThePuertoRicoBranchOffice[3dMPGroup(CID)],hasgeographicresponsibilityfortheCaribbean.Thisisalargeanddiversearea,coveredbyonlyafewagents.Assuch,agentsrelyheavilyuponarobustcriminalintelligencenetworktopolicetheareaeffectively.OneoftheagentsdevelopedasourceworkingattheFortBuchanancommissary.Thecommissaryalsohasalargewarehouseoperationthathasbeenplaguedbyfailedeffortstoautomatetheinventory.Initialanalysisassumedwarehouseworkerswereintentionallymovingpropertypalletsaroundafterinventories,makingitimpossibletocompleteaccuratedailycountsofcurrentstock.Thesourcewastargetedtocollectinformationregardingwarehouseoperations.Thesourcereportedthatawarehouseemployeewhohadpreviouslybeenonthedayshiftwasmovedtoanothershiftfollowingargumentswiththesupervisor.Theemployeetoldthesourcethattheentireshiftwasinvolvedinlargescaletheftfromthewarehouse.Driversdeliveringitemspaidtheshiftsupervisorincash,andheinturnhademployeesloaditemsthedriverwantedontotheirtruck.Thedriversthensoldtheitemtolocalmerchantsforareducedprice.Thesupervisorsplittheillegalprofitswiththeemployeesattheendofeachday.AftercoordinationwiththeFBIandtheUSattorney’soffice,thesourceagreedtoweararecordingdevicetocaptureanotherconversationwiththeemployee.ThesourcelaterarrangedameetingbetweentheemployeeandCIDagentswheretheemployeewasconfrontedwiththeevidenceagainsthimandagreedtoassistwiththeinvestigationaftertheAssistantUSAttorneyagreedtogivehimimmunityfromprosecutioncontingentonhiscooperation.TheemployeewasthenpresentedtotheGrandJurywherehedetailedthemagnitudeofthetheftscheme,whichwasoperatingundetectedinthewarehousefor10years.Thegrandjuryhandeddownfiveindictments,andtheassetforfeiturebranchoftheUSattorney’sofficeseizedfourhouseswhichwerepurchasedwiththeillegalproceeds.Vignette:AspecialagentattheAberdeenProvingGroundResidentAgencyreceivedarequestforassistancefromanagentinKorea.TheagentinKoreareportedageneralofficer’sidentitywasstolenthroughtheofficer’sbankinginformation.Theagentsetupameetingwithasecurityspecialistfromthebank.Duringtheconversationthesecurityspecialiststatedthathehadworkedonseveralcasesinvolvingseniormilitarymembersdatingbacksixmonths,andthebankcorporatestaffwastryingtocoveruptheproblem.Heagreedtoworkasasourcefortheagentandprovidedaninitiallistof127seniorrankingDoDofficialswhowerevictimsofidentitytheftandprovidedtheaddresswherethecardsweresent.TheagentnextcoordinatedwiththeUSPostalInspectionService(USPIS)whointerviewedthelocalcarrieranddeterminedthathedeliveredhundredsofcardstoaspecificresidence.Theresidencewascurrentlyabandoned,butUSPISprovidedidentityinformationoftheoccupant.Sincethevictimsspannedallbranchesofthemilitary,coordinationwasconductedwithAirForceOfficeofSpecialInvestigations(AFOSI)andtheNavalCriminalInvestigativeService(NCIS).TheAFOSIreportedtheydiscoveredaweb28

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYsitewherethenamesandsocialsecuritynumbersof4,700DoDofficialswerelisted.Becausetheinvestigationwasexpanding,aJointInvestigativeTaskForcewasformedwithCIDasleadagency.CIDagentscontactedtheUSAttorney’soffice,whowishedtoinvestigateandprosecutethecase.TheUSAttorney’sOfficeassistedintheformationofataskforcewhichincludedallthemilitarycriminalinvestigativeorganizations,SocialSecurityAdministration,USPostalInspectionService,theInternalRevenueService,andtheUSSecretService.Alistofthecompromisedsocialsecuritynumberswasgiventothebank,whichproducedalistof11,000potentiallyfraudulentaccounts.CIDagentsthencontactedtheRegionalIntelligenceSystemService(RISS)andprovidedthedatafromthebank.ThroughlinkanalysisRISSwasabletoidentify32identitytheftringsoperatingin26states.Thesubsequentinvestigationresultedinnumerousprosecutionsandconvictions.6.5LinkingPolice,ForensicandBiometricInformation 29

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:AnArmymaneuverunitoperatinginIraqdevelopedaverygoodrapportwithalocalvillagerwhotheyencounteredregularlyduringpatrols.Whileononeoftheirroutinepatrols,thevillagerapproachedtheunitandprovidedinformationregardingthelocationofapossibleenemyweaponscache.Thepatrolproceededtothedescribedlocationanddiscoveredaburiedcachecontainingweapons,currencyanddocuments.Theunit,previouslytrainedonsiteexploitation(SE)andbattlefieldforensics,collectedandprocessedtheevidenceastheyweretrainedtodo.Muchoftheevidence,toincludethedocuments,wasdeliveredtoforensicsunitsforanalysisandexploitation.Asinglelatentfingerprintliftedfromoneoftheseizeddocumentswassenttoastatesideforensicslaboratorywherethefingerprintwasrunthroughadatabaseforcomparisonandresultedinamatch.Thispieceofevidenceledtotheidentification,subsequentarrestandprosecutionoftheindividual.Noteworthyisthefactthattheoriginalfingerprintonfileatthestatesidefacility,andusedforcomparison,wassubmittedseveralyearspriortothecachefindbyanothermaneuverunitastheresultofaBiometricsAutomatedToolset(BAT)record.Duringtheinterveningyears,theindividualbecameahighvaluetargetandwasplacedonseveralwantedlists.30

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY7.RisksandMitigation 7.1Regulatory LegalConsiderations 31

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Due to AR 38110 restrictions on U.S. personinformation, consolidated (MI and criminal intelligence data) threat statements cannot befiled,storedormaintainedasanintelligenceproduct.Thesestatementsmustbefiled,storedand maintained within law enforcement or operations channels (i.e., Provost Marshal (PM),DirectorofEmergencyServices(DES),USACIDC,DCSOPS/G3/DPTMS). Commanders’AuthorizationandJurisdiction JurisdictionofPersonnel 32

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYIntelligenceOversight CivilLiberties 7.2OperationalConditions33

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 7.3InformationManagement 34

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 7.4ForceManagement 35

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY8.DOTMLPFImplications 8.1Doctrine 8.2Organization 36

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 8.3Training 8.4Materiel 37

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 8.5LeaderDevelopment 8.6Personnel 38

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 8.7Facilities 8.8PolicyImplications 39

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYAppendix1–References TheArmy OperationalTermsandGraphics IntelligenceSupporttoUrbanOperations, Operations Counterinsurgency MilitaryPoliceOperations LawEnforcementInvestigations PoliceIntelligenceOperations ArmyPlanningandOrdersProduction TheOperationsProcess TheArmyUniversalTaskList IntelligencePreparationoftheBattlefield AcquisitionofInformationConcerningPersonsandOrganizationsnotAffiliatedwiththeDepartmentofDefense DoDIntelligenceActivities ProceduresGoverningtheActivitiesofDoDIntelligenceComponentsthatAffectUnitedStatesPersons USArmyintelligenceActivities CarryingofFirearmsandUseofForceforLawEnforcementandSecurityDuties CriminalInvestigationActivities Acceptance,Accreditation,andReleaseofUSArmyCriminalInvestigationCommandPersonnel InformationSecurityProgram DisclosureofClassifiedMilitaryInformationtoForeignGovernmentsandInternationalOrganizations40

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY DoDIntelligenceInterrogations,DetaineeDebriefings,andTacticalQuestioning UniversalJointTaskList DepartmentofDefenseProtectionJointFunctionalConcept CapstoneConceptforJointOperations, JointOperationsConcepts(JOpsC)DevelopmentProcess27,2005. MilitarySupportforStability,Security,Transition,andReconstruction(SSTR)Operations, DepartmentofDefenseMajorCombatOperationsJointOperatingConcept JointFunctionalConceptforBattlespaceAwareness DictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms ForceOperatingCapabilities CapstoneConceptofOperationsforDoDForensics41

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYAppendix2–GlossaryAdversary.Analysis(Intelligence). Coalition.Biometric. Biometrics. Collecting. CollectionPlan. Combatant Command (COCOM). Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). 42

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYConceptofOperations.CriminalAnalysis. Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT). CrimePattern Analysis. Data. Database. Detainee. Detention Operations. Exploitation Forensics. HomelandDefense.Homeland Security. 43

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYHost Nation (HN). Informant(Source)Information Requirement. Intelligence. Intelligence Cycle. Intelligenceled Policing. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). IntelligenceProcess. Interagency Coordination. Joint Force. LawEnforcement(Police)Intelligence.44

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYOperationalEnvironment(OE).Operations Process. PoliceInformation. PoliceIntelligenceOperations(PIO). Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). Processing (Intelligence). Production (Intelligence). Raw Data. Rule of Law (RoL). SpecificInformationRequirement(SIR).Specific Orders or Requests (SOR). Stability Operations. 45

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYVignette46

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYAppendix3–AcronymsA3ACICAFOSIAOAQIASIAUTLBATBCTBFTCACBRNECCIRCEXCCIDCOACONOPSCONUSCOPCRIMINTCTCDADCGS-ADESAgent, Analyst and Attorney (CITF investigative model)Army Counterintelligence CenterAir Force Office of Special InvestigationsArea of OperationsAl Qaida in IraqAdditional Skill IdentifierArmy Universal Task ListBiometrics Automated ToolsetBrigade Combat TeamBlue Force TrackerCivil AffairsChemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield ExplosivesCommander’s Critical Information RequirementsCombined Explosives Exploitation CellCriminal Investigation CommandCourse of ActionConcept of OperationsContinental United StatesCommon Operational PictureCriminal IntelligenceCombat Training CenterDepartment of the ArmyDistributed Common Ground System-ArmyDirector of Emergency Services47

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYDHADMSDNADODOCEXDoDDOTMLPFDPTMSDSCAEFPFBCB2FPFSOHDHIIDEHMEHNHTTHUMINTIAIALEIAIEDIMINTIPBIRDetainee Holding AreaDetainee Management SystemDeoxyribonucleic AcidDetention OperationsDocument ExploitationDepartment of DefenseDoctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development,Personnel and FacilitiesDirector of Plans, Training, Mobilization and SecurityDefense Support to Civil AuthoritiesExplosively Formed PenetratorForce XXI Battle Command Brigade & BelowForce ProtectionFull Spectrum OperationsHomeland DefenseHandheld Interagency Identity Detection EquipmentHomemade ExplosiveHost NationHuman Terrain TeamHuman IntelligenceInformation AssuranceInternational Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence AnalystsImprovised Explosive DeviceImagery IntelligenceIntelligence Preparation of the BattlefieldInformation Requirement48

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYIREISRIWJEFFJIEDDOJIMJOCLELEPLEPPMASINTMCOMIMPNCISNGOOCONUSOEOEFOGAOIFOPLANOPORDPIOPIRPMTIntelligence Running EstimateIntelligence, Surveillance and ReconnaissanceIrregular WarfareJoint Expeditionary Forensic FacilityJoint Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat OrganizationJoint, Interagency, and MultinationalJoint Operating ConceptLaw EnforcementLaw Enforcement ProfessionalLaw Enforcement Professional ProgramMeasurement and Signatures IntelligenceMajor Combat OperationsMilitary IntelligenceMilitary PoliceNaval Criminal Investigative ServiceNon-Governmental OrganizationOutside Continental United StatesOperational EnvironmentOperation Enduring FreedomOther Government AgenciesOperation Iraqi FreedomOperation PlanOperation OrderPolice Intelligence OperationsPriority Intelligence RequirementsPolice Mentorship Team49

FOROFFICIALUSEONLYPMOPODPOIPOLICEPSYOPPTTRISSRoLSBCTSIGINTSIRSJASORSSTROTDATHTTIFTOETSPTTPUSACIDCUSCENTCOMUSPISWMDProvost Marshal OfficePort of DebarkationProgram of InstructionPolice/prison, Organized crime, Legal systems, Investigations, Crimeconducive conditions, Enforcement mechanisms and gapsPsychological OperationsPolice Transition TeamRegional Intelligence System ServiceRule of LawStryker Brigade Combat TeamSignals IntelligenceSpecific Information RequirementsStaff Judge AdvocateSpecific Orders and RequestsSecurity and Stability Transition and Reconstruction OperationsTable of Distribution and AllowancesTactical HUMINT TeamTheater Internment FacilityTable of Organization and EquipmentTraining Support PackageTactics, Techniques and ProceduresUnited States Army Criminal Investigation CommandUnited States Central CommandUnited States Postal Inspection ServiceWeapons of Mass Destruction50