The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMMission: Excess Fissile DestructionExcess fissile materials from burgeoning spent fuel and end of the Cold War should not be reason tocontinue the excessive consumption of uranium resources by current, inefficient Light Water Reactor(LWR) technology which are ad hoc adaptations of submarine reactors. Excess fissile from the end of theCold War should be viewed as an inheritance to invest wisely 6 . To take virtually pure fissile, either HighlyEnriched Uranium (HEU) or weapon grade plutonium, and 'blend it down' with depleted Uranium-238(238U) is to throw away many billions of dollars of enrichment, separation, and purification. Even thewasteful blending-down of plutonium with uranium to produce Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel elements is simplein concept, but can not be done by any American commercial MOX plants, as none exist due to the expenseand lack of market. Creation of an American MOX facility would be expensive, and politically risky asenvironmental and non-proliferation groups view the creation of a MOX facility as the necessary first steptowards creation of the hated "Plutonium Economy". It would also go against 2 decades of American policytowards the use of plutonium and non-proliferation.The issues and benefits of using a MSR for the destruction of excess fissile materials were explored byothers, who concluded that there were no technical reasons which prevent the construction of a MSR toconvert HEU and weapons Pu into proliferation resistant Uranium-233 (233U) fuel 7 . 233U is uranium, asare current LWR fuels, so there is no change needed in fabricating the fuel (except it must be doneremotely; this is the non-proliferation feature of 233U; see below for more information). Furthermore, 233Uan excellent thermal reactor fuel due to its lower parasitic capture cross-section and higher neutron yieldthan current Uranium-235 (235U) or Plutonium-239 (239Pu) fuels. 233U's superiority should allow forhigher burn-ups, and therefore lower fuel costs in existing reactors. Furthermore, 233U can be isotopicallydenatured to any level with 238U and provides significant deterrence in the form of the high energy gammafrom a daughter of 232U decay, and significant gammas produced directly from 233U decay. Thesegammas may prove lethal enough to absolutely prevent direct handling, even by the most suicidal ofclandestine bomb makers. Even if this turns out not to be the case, and more research into this area isdefinitely needed, the unavoidable contamination of all 233U fuels with 232U and 232U's Thallium-208(208Tl) daughter's 2.6 MeV gamma provides an effective means of locating 233U anywhere on the planet.An Example Pu Burning RegimeThe weapon material burning MSR could initially be fueled with ~2/3 HEU and ~1/3 Pu. This mixture iswell within the operational range of MSRs and is a minor extension of already demonstrated MSR operation8, 9 . This mixture will initially provide approximately half the fissions in 235U and the other half in the239Pu. Since there will be only minor amounts of 238U in the HEU (~8% 238U in HEU enriched to 92%),there will only be very small amounts of new plutonium produced, which will stop once the HEU make-upfeed is replaced with a plutonium feed. This MSR will not have the extensive chemical processing necessaryto be a full breeder, and will operate as a high converter; ~0.8 - 0.9 conversion ratio, which is well beyondLWRs and would greatly extend fissile supplies 10. For example, a conversion rate of 0.8 in a 1 GWe MSRwould only require a daily input of ~0.5 kg fissile / day F1 . This fissile material make up could be plutoniumhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 3 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMfrom excess weapons stocks or possibly spent fuel directly 11 . Just the recently declared 200 tons of excessUS weapons fissile material alone could provide for over 1,000 reactor years of 1 GWe MSR operation.Feeding the reactor pure 239Pu as the small amount of makeup material in a high converter MSR, with nochemical processing, would not compromise reactor safety due to reduced delayed neutrons or higher ratesof reactivity of plutonium because Pu would only account for ~20% of the fissile 12 , with the remainderfissile (the 0.8 of the conversion ratio) coming from the bred 233U from the 232Th salt, and 235U from233U fissions, within the core salt. Furthermore, the greater prompt thermal (negative) reactivity coefficientof the MSR allows for better control (safer), and the fluid nature of the fuel with the accompanyingdispersion of the Pu prevents hot spots or other areas of uneven burn up as is the case with MOX fuels 13 .Should the Pu feed rate of the MSR prove too small to achieve satisfactory rates of plutonium destruction,then the MSR could operate with a 'once through quickly' cycle (see Fig. 1), and temporary storage ofremoved salt (uranium removed via F 2 sparge, but with entrained Pu isotopes) for later burning. (see Fig. 1below)Fig. 1. A schematic of a possible processing scheme so as to increase the destruction and denaturing rate ofweapon's plutonium.This cycle has the advantage of allowing more weapon's plutonium to be processed through a MSR than ifcomplete Pu burning were done, because ~1/3 - 1/4 of the neutron reactions in 239Pu are captures and notfissions. Neutron capture by 239Pu degrades its usefulness as a bomb material so the mission of weaponplutonium destruction can be said to be partially met, much as the burning of Pu in LWRs does. There willalso be 238Pu, depending upon the salt's irradiation time and composition, due to buildup from 235Ucaptures and 239Pu (n, 2n) reactions. 238Pu complicates bomb design due to its large heat release.Representative compositions of various plutonium compositions are shown in Table 1. According toknowledgeable bomb designers, reactor grade Pu does not appreciably increase the difficulty in designing abomb, but it increases the amount of plutonium required 14 . Note, the MSR's values are "steady state"amounts entrained in the salt and are not removed from the reactor.Table 1: Plutonium compositions of various reactors compared to bomb gradehttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 4 of 28

PNUTRIENTS

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMof fissile fuels produced outside a MSR (such as IFR, Hybrid fusion breeders, Accelerator-based Breeders,etc.), the MSR has unparalleled flexibility to efficiently utilize those fuels without modification to the basicphysical plant or design, nor interruption in operation.Most of the attention on the production (breeding) of new nuclear fuel is usually focused on the rates andamounts of nuclear fuel produced by various arrangements of reactor devices and fuel cycles. Rarelyconsidered are the possible synergies between seemingly different energy sources, or of the quality of theproliferation resistance of the ultimately stockpiled, fabricated, and transported fuel. An excellent exampleof these synergies are between fusion and fission. Fusion is a neutron rich, but tritium poor reaction.Furthermore, producing sufficient tritium depends upon surrounding the fusion reaction with large amountsof Lithium-6 (less than 10% of the naturally occurring lithium) so as to "breed" tritium (or possibly helium-3 [He3]) via neutron reactions. Fission is a neutron poor reaction, and in the MSR's case, a tritium richreaction. Additionally, the MSR needs lithium enriched in Lithium-7 (the opposite of the fusion reaction,and 7 Li is >90% of the naturally occurring lithium), but the tritium is produced in ~50:50 ratios in both ofthe lithiums 26 . Therefore, the MSR is able to utilize the lithium the fusion reaction rejects and produce therequired tritium, and the fusion reaction is able to produce the 233U fuel the MSR needs from its excess,high energy neutrons!Although there has been some interest in the coupling of these natural synergies 27 , 28 , 29 little mentionseems to be made of the extremely proliferation resistant fuel that would result from the high-energy (fast)neutron regime common to all advanced 233 U producers. The fast neutrons will cause greater 233 Uproduction, than thermal MSRs, so as to not only produce sufficient quantities of makeup fuel for MSRs(thereby relieving MSRs of having to achieve their weakest ability; Breeding), but to allow for a fuel thatshould have excellent non-proliferation aspects due to extremely high levels of 2.6 MeV gamma radiationfrom the high levels of 232 U. Thorium based nuclear fuel production ( 233 U) in a fast neutron regimeenhances production of 232 U. 232 U is produced via a fast, 6.37 MeV threshold, neutron displacementreaction with 232 Th; a (n, 2n) reaction 30 . Not only do currently proposed fuel producing schemes such asIFR, Fusion-Fission Hybrids, and Accelerator-Based Breeders offer potentials of abundant future suppliesof fuel for consumption in simple MSR converter reactors, but also the inherent proliferation resistanceoffered by high levels of 232 U produced by the fast neutron spectra common to all. High 232 U levels shouldallow for storage, transportation, and common utilization of this future nuclear fuel, with minimal need todilute with 238 U, the world over.Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Fluid Fuels)Producing weapons grade plutonium requires that the 238 U fertile material be irradiated long enough so thatthere are sufficient neutron captures to create enough 239 Pu to make chemical extraction practical, but not solong that the newly produced 239 Pu captures neutrons and either fissions or transmutates into non-fissile240 Pu and 242 Pu 31 . Since there are no fuel elements in a Fluid Fuel Reactor {FFR} there is no mechanicaldamage done by neutron irradiation, and requirements {and therefore opportunities for clandestinediversions} for fuel fabrication, transportation or reprocessing are all but eliminated 32 . No mechanicalhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 8 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMdamage combined with the ability to constantly process the fuel means complete burn-ups are achievable.Furthermore, since the fluid is a homogeneous fluid, there are no subunits that can be specially treated orirradiated so as to clandestinely produce undetected fissile 33 . Uranium (the 233 U fuel) is easily removedfrom salts via the fluoride volatility process, so there need not be any fissile in any of the wastes, whichcould later be clandestinely "mined". Plutonium is not easily removed from the salt and due to its muchhigher neutron reaction rates suffers fission and isotopic conversion to non-fissile plutonium (non-bombgrade Pu) at a much more rapid rate than the uranium fuels; 233 U and 235 U. This is one of the reasons fluidfuel reactors have never been known to produce bomb material.Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Uranium Fissile Dilution)After many years of operation, the fuel salt will contain all the long-lived isotopes of uranium. It seems thatthis natural denaturing of uranium has not been fully considered, as when the MSR was studied as a nonproliferationsystem 238 U was added to denature (isotopically dillute) the salt. This has the disadvantage ofslightly reducing neutron economy and producing plutonium (although at levels far below LWRs). If theoriginal MSR is operating in a secure area on bomb grade material, there would be no need to denature thefissile within the salt. Instead, the Pu burning MSR would operate as a 'Pu to 233 U converter via thoriumneutron absorption. A rough approximation of how the uranium isotope composition would change overtime is shown in Table 4 which takes the data from Engel's "Conceptual Design..." in "Table 9. Actinideinventories in DMSR [Denatured MSR] fuel salt" and converts to percentage uranium compositions, butwith the amount of 238 U not considered as uranium, but as plutonium feed (which it ultimately becomes).This gives an approximation of the natural denaturing that occurs in a fuel salt since there is no need for fuelelement removals and reprocessing. Unfortunately, 232U buildups {see below for significance} were notcalculated as it was considered only of minor importance due to the minimal effect 232U has on the nuclearperformance of a reactor.Table 4: Uranium Isotopic Composition Changes in "Thermal" & "Epithermal Spectrum MSRsUraniumIsotopeBeginningComposition%ThermalMSR15 yearComposition%30 yearComposition%BeginningComposition%EpithermalMSR5 yearComposition%20 yearComposition%233U 0% 49% 40.3% 100% 66% 47%234U 0% 9.2% 12.6% 0% 27% 35%235U 100% 25.4% 26.4% 0% 5.4% 9.5%236U 0% 16.4% 20.7% 0% 1.3% 4.8%238USee notebelowSee notebelowSee notebelow0% 0.1% 1.0%http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 9 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMSource Thermal MSR: Page 23, Table 9 of ORNL/TM-7207, "Conceptual Design Characteristics of a Denatured Molten-Salt ReactorWith Once-Through Fueling", J.R. Engel, W.R. Grimes, H.F. Bauman, H.E. McCoy, J.F. Dearing, W.A. Rhoades, July 1980.Source Epithermal MSR: Pages 653-655, Table 14-6 of "Fluid Fuel Reactors" (1958), Ed. J.A. Lane, H.G. MacPherson, & F. Maslan.Note: Uranium-238 amounts were not shown for the Thermal MSR so as to obtain an approximation of the uranium isotopic changes,without the denaturing additions of 238U that were made to the Denatured-MSR from which the Thermal MSR data was obtained.It is beyond the scope of this paper as to the effect of this uranium isotopic changes upon bomb design, andif the "dirty salt's" uranium could even become critical so as to be a bomb. It should be pointed out that both234 U and 236 U have neutron absorption cross sections far higher than 238 U so as to make them much moreeffective dilutants than 238 U. Should 234 U and 236 U 's denaturing prove insufficient to dilute the fissile tobelow bomb capable, then 238 U (depleted uranium) is easily added so as to complete the dilution - whichdoes not have a large negative impact upon reactor economy or Transuranic Waste production 34 .It would be very desirable to have a "metric" of "allowable" uranium isotope concentrations based on the"threat" (likelihood) of bomb production diversions. Such a metric would greatly aid in the tailoring of thefuel mix (which is eminently possible with Fluid Fuel Reactors) so as to provide the desired proliferationresistance,yet without undue loss of neutron economy or production of Transuranic Wastes. It mayultimately be determined that 238 U isotopic dilution is unnecessary as the fuel salt will also contain amountsof 232 U which, as it will be seen below, render clandestine bomb manufacture and employment all butimpossible.Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Spontaneous Fission)It is well known among nuclear bomb designers that there are two basic types of bomb designs; "The GunType" and the "Implosion Type". Gun Type of bombs are generally considered simpler than ImplosionTypes (which are required if the rate of spontaneous fission is "too" high). Plutonium isotopes exhibit highenough levels of spontaneous fission so as to require implosion type bombs. Uranium isotopes, with thepossible exception of 232U, do not exhibit high spontaneous fission rates, which allows the construction ofeither gun or implosion type weapons.UraniumIsotopeTable 5: Spontaneous Fission Rates in Uranium and Plutonium IsotopesSpontaneous FissionRatePlutoniumIsotopeSpontaneous FissionRate232 U (8 ± 5.5) x 10 13 yr 238 Pu (5 ± 0.6) x 10 10 yr233 U ??? yr 239 Pu 5.5 x 10 15 yr234 U 1.6 x 10 16 yr 240 Pu (1.34 ± 0.015) x 10 11235 U 1.8 x 10 17 yr 241 Pu ??? yr236 U 2 x 10 16 yr 242 Pu (6.5 ± 0.7) x 10 10 yryrhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 10 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMThe graphs above shows the rate of 228Th, and the 232U and 228Th amount changes and resulting gammaradiation that would occur in a 6.7 kg mass of 233U, the approximate minimum to construct a weapon 2 , 41 .Figs. 3 and 4 illustrates the rapid gamma radiation increase, even though it comes from the secondary decayfrom the accumulated build up of 232U daughter, 228Th. One of the postulated means that fissile materialcould be clandestinely obtained is via the "Break-out Scenario", whereby a MSR is overtaken (due to directterrorist attack, overthrow of a previously benign government, etc.). The uranium within the MSR couldthen be easily extracted via the fluoride volatility method (which is one of the beautiful features of controland processing of a MSR). The uranium fluoride (UF 6 ) could be converted from the UF 6 chemical form toUF 4 , via vapor-phase reduction with hydrogen 42 , and then to uranium metal via reaction with calcium ormagnesium 43 . This uranium is considered bomb grade unless diluted by 238U, as in the Denatured MoltenSalt Reactor (DMSR; where 233U & 235U is kept below 13% & 20% enrichments, respectively) 44 .However, the undiluted MSR uranium would not be pure fissiles 233U and 235U, even if no 238Udenaturant were added as there would be significant quantities of 232U, 234U, 236U, 237U, 238U, and239U due to neutron captures and (n, 2n) reactions {See Table 4}; dependent upon MSR operatingparameters. The 237U and 239U would present the greatest early danger to the would be clandestine bombmakers due to their short half-lives and gamma emissions. 233U is also the most gamma active of thefissiles and would present some degree of danger to bomb fabricators, possibly with a surface radiation ashigh as 430 rems/hr 3 . This value should be considered highly speculative, but demands resolution as it is anhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 12 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMimmediate radiation from the 232U and not dependent upon the build up of a secondary, daughter material,such as 228 Th is for 232U. The better known and most significant deterrent would come from the 232Udaughter 208Tl, but since that radiation is "delayed" due to the buildup time for the 228Th precursor, thegammas from 233U, 237U, and 239U could provide enough of a early deterrent until the 228Th could buildup to the lethal level necessary to deter use of uranium derived from a MSR under breakout conditions (seeFig. 5). Further research is necessary to determine expected radiation levels from uranium derived from aMSR under a variety of operational conditions.Fig. 5 Conceptual Plot of Gamma Radiation from Recently Separated (Sparged) MSR UraniumUnfortunately none of these details were considered when the MSR was last considered during the late1970's and early 1980's because of its inherent proliferation resistant features. The great differences betweenthat earlier nuclear age and today's, 'Question and quantify everything' age, is illustrated by the followinganecdote:When "Old Timer" MSR specialists are asked, "Why didn't you better quantify the radiationhazard, and therefore the proliferation deterent of the 233U fuel?" Their answer isinvaribly, "We knew it was lethal. Who cared how lethal!"Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Gamma Radiation Detection & Shielding)Gamma radiation can be reduced by placing sufficient mass between the source and the object so as toshield the object from the full radiation dose. Furthermore, the source can be made more difficult to detectby shielding due to the obscuring effect shielding has on radiation {please see Appendix page 5 for furtherdiscussion}. To achieve a level of 1% of the original unscattered (more significant for detection preventionthan biological damage prevention) radiation amount, the bomb sized mass of 233U (6.7 kg 233U) wouldhave to be surrounded by a 0.49 meter (~19 ins.) thickness of concrete {Appendix page 5}. Whileachievable, it does greatly complicate bomb design and perhaps prevent clandestine construction ormovement a weapon constructed using 233U. Perhaps this is why no current nuclear weapon nation has anyknown 233U weapons, as secrecy of emplacement and number of weapons would be largely impossible, nothttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 13 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMto mention the hazard to weapon handling personnel.It should be noted that a reduction of 1% of the radiation of a 233U bomb was just given as an example ofthe difficulty and the amount of concrete necessary. There are no known open literature sources as to thesensitivity of gamma detectors that could be mounted on planes and satellites for the detection andmonitoring of 233U clandestine weapon creation and deployment. As any weapon designer, clandestine ornot, will always take the simplest route towards creating a weapon that meets the needs and abilities of thecreating organization, it is unlikely that anyone would choose the more difficult route posed by using 233Uwhen there are many tons of weapon and reactor 239Pu, and the possibility to enrich naturally occurringuranium via laser, centrifuge, or even old-but-tested Calutrons.Mission: Proliferation Resistance (232U build-up methods)Contamination of 233U fuels is unavoidable due to the multiple pathways 232U is formed.232 Th -(n, 2n)--> 231 Th --ß (25.5 hr)--> 231 Pa --(n, g)--> 232 Pa --ß (1.31 days)--> 232 U233 U -(n, 2n)--> 232 U233 Pa (n, 2n) -> 232 Pa --ß (25.5 hr)--> 232 UÝ 230 Th --(n, g )--> 231 Th --ß (25.5 hr)--> 231 Pa --(n, g )--> 232 Pa --ß (1.31 days)--> 232 U237 Np -(n, 2n)--> 236 Np --ß (22 hr 50%)--> 236 Pu --» (2.85 yr )--> 232 UÝ NOTE: 230Th is a variable naturally occurring thorium isotope that depends upon the amount of colocateduranium as it is a daughter of the 238U decay chain. It can vary from 0 - ~100 ppm of the thoriumisotope 4 , 45 .Utilization of Thorium and/or Uranium-233 (233U) makes it impossible to design a reactor or fuel systemthat does not have some degree of contamination with 232U, as there is always a neutron flux that willproduce 232U via one or more of the pathways above. The degree of contamination is entirely dependentupon actual reactor operation and overall system design. It is this lack of ability to quantitatively specifyexact production amounts of 232U contamination, prior to detailed design studies, that prevents Thoriumbased 233U's wholesale adoption for proliferation prevention. More research and better data is needed tobetter quantify 232U production under a variety of reactor operations and conditions.It should again be noted that there is no known way to easily extract Protactinium from molten salt fuels. Sohttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 14 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMthe proliferation danger posed by clandestine removals of Protactinium isotopes is moot as there are no easyways to remove Pa from molten salt; detection would be very easy. 46Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Salt Amounts to Steal)It is sometimes suggested that the salt containing the Protactinium (Pa) could be quickly and secretlyremoved from the reactor so as to produce a source of 233U without the 232U contamination problem. Thisargument is flawed due to many details that render such a scheme impossible. First, even in a reactor withvery high concentrations of Pa in the salt, such as a Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) design, therewould only be 1.54 x 10 -5 mole Pa/mole salt! 47 To remove a kilogram of 233U at least a kilogram of Pawould have to be removed and allowed to decay (assuming 100% recovery factors, and neglectingundesirable 231Pa, 232Pa, and 234Pa isotopes that will also be present to varying extents and whose decaywill produce 232U and 234U contaminates). This would require the removal of ~279,000 moles of salt. 5Based on the salt composition of the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) {see footnote 6 & reference 48}the salt had a mass of 62.2 grams salt / mole of salt. Since the 233U thief requires 279,000 moles of salt, wecan see they will have to steal 17,353 kilograms (17 tons) of red hot and highly radioactive salt to obtaintheir 1 kilogram of 233U.Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Protactinium separation difficulties)To overcome this rather difficult chore, it is often suggested that the 233U thieves will 'skim off' (on site)the Pa from the salt while the MSR operates. Although there may be vast future improvements in Paremoval from molten salts, it must be remembered that one of the reasons the MSBR was not consideredwas due to the difficulty of Pa removal at quick enough and high enough rates. A quick glance at the"Conceptual reductive extraction flow sheet for processing a MSBR" 49 will prove otherwise to those whosuggest Pa removal is a trivial task. Also, even with all of the complexity and optimization of the Paremoval system the efficiency with which Pa was removed was not 100% efficient 50 , and in fact"represented a steady state at very nearly optimal conditions" where "a small error in this amount [reductantflow into the system]" could cause the "return of all of the protactinium to the reactor", where it wouldproduce 232U due to 231Pa (n, g) and 233Pa (n, 2n) reactions. The exact amounts and rates of which alldepend upon the many reactor design and operation variables.Even if easier and more efficient Pa removal systems are developed, there would be an increase inproliferation risk only to the extent that the system could immediately remove Pa as it was formed withcomplete efficiency. Given this unlikely scenario, the thieves would then have to get access to the entireflow of molten salt, which in the planned 1,000 MWe MSBR was circulated through 4 circuits pumped by84,000 liters/min. (22,000 gal/min.) pumps 51 for a total of 43,000,000 kg (94,800,000 lbs) per hour. Since~1 kg of 233U is burned for 2.2 x 10 7 kWh (thermal) 52 , and the MSBR was expected to be of 2,250,000kW (thermal) size and have a breeding rate of 1.06, the thieves could, at most, obtain 0.006 kg/hr of 233U 7 ,53without impacting criticality conditions (stopping the nuclear reaction).http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 15 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMEven if the 233U thieves had complete access to the reactor chemical processing facility, they would stillneed to chemically process out parts per million quantities of highly radioactive Pa in a flow of 704 °C(1,300 °F) radioactive salt at a rate of 43,000,000 kg (94,800,000 lbs) per hour for 167 hours ( 1 kg 233U /0.006 kg/hr) at 100% efficiency to obtain their 1 kilogram of 233U. This will produce the purest possible233U, but it will still contain some 232U, which will largely depend upon neutron fluxes, energy spectrumdistribution, and ages and concentrations of thorium and protactinium. No known technology is able toprocess that much salt at such high efficiencies, but the development of this hypothetical process removesthe only real barrier a MSBR has to becoming an immediate economic reality. Any thieves with access tosuch a wondrous technology would do better to sell their services freely to legitimate reactor operators, anduse the cash they receive to buy the world versus blowing it up!Mission: Proliferation Resistance (Salt Heat & Radiation)Another hurdle for the pilferer of salt is the heat which is released by the salt. Even with a 1 hour coolingperiod to allow the decay of the high energy releasing, short lived isotopes, the salt still releases ~350W/liter (~10 kW/ft 3 ), not to mention the associated radioactivity 54 , 55 . Obviously not a material thatsomeone would put in their pocket. Even if the thieves attempted to steal the salt in the 200 ft 3 Pa DecayTank where the concentrations of Pa are highest 8 the heat release is 1 kW/liter (28 kW/ft 3 ), which makes iteven hotter. The 233Pa, which has a half-life of 27 days, emits a fairly strong gamma in 34% of the decaysof 0.312 MeV 56 . While not as strong a gamma as 208Tl's 2.6 MeV gamma, it still requires substantialshielding to avoid detection. There will also be a small amount of 234Pa in the salt, and it has a ~0.9 MeVgamma it emits in 70% of the time. 57Gamma emission of the salt was never quantified during the MSR's development period, as non-proliferationaspects of Molten Salt were assumed to be self-evident back then, but research conducted about radiationstability of the fluoroborate secondary coolant salt illustrates the radiation magnitude. The fuel salt (with thefissile) was estimated to give the fluoroborate salt a ~0.25 W/g dose (through the heat exchanger tubewalls). 58 The fluoroborate secondary salt was found to be very stable at that irradiation level, but humantissue would not fare so well, as a 0.25 W/g absorbed gamma dose is equal to 90,000,000 rads/hr (900,000grays/hr) 9 (1,000 rads whole body is 100% lethal; >5,000 rads, death occurs in hours) 59 .Mission: Excess Military Fissile (Plutonium) BurialTo avoid perceived high cost and long lead time obstacles to new reactor or even MOX fabricationfacilities, it is suggested that the Pu be mixed with already existing highly radioactive wastes and buried. Tobelieve that this option will be simple, cheap, and quick displays total ignorance of the history of buryingthe less controversial civilian nuclear wastes; burial of the much more emotional weapon materials isunlikely be quicker, simpler and cheaper. Furthermore, it is not clear in the scientific community if geologicisolation of nuclear materials can be assured for the 'beyond human time scales' involved, nor is it assuredthat buried fissile materials will be safe from either human thefts or natural accumulations and subsequentnuclear excursions. It should be pointed out that plutonium-239, with a half-life of 24,400 years, would stillhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 16 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMbe 87% present in the grave-robbed pyramids of Egypt had it be buried there, and its decay product wouldbe the easy to construct a nuclear bomb material, uranium-235!Any study of the ongoing Yucca Mountain debacle, with accusations by government scientists that it couldexplode 60 , 61 is decades late and billions of dollars over budget 62 , should disabuse those who believeweapons plutonium burial would be a quick, easy, cheap task. Meanwhile the spent fuel is piling up at thenation's utilities 63 so badly that 20 states are suing the Federal Government for failing to honor acommitment to developing a permanent waste storage area despite having collected a penny ($0.01) per 10kilowatt fee to pay for the repository. 64 Press reports of the thousands of shipments of nuclear materials thatwill need to be transported 65 , along with serious questions about the ability to retain hazards for the 10,000years the EPA requires, let alone the possible need to retain the nuclear materials for up to 250,000 years, assuggested by a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences 66 have eroded public confidence and ledSen. Richard Bryan (D-NV) to declare,"A repository will never be built at Yucca Mountain." 67"It's nothing more than a high level swindle ... a $10 billion scam perpetuated by our own federalgovernment,"said Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley 68 of the burial of spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain, andthe same might be said about any plan to bury weapons plutonium.Mission: Excess Fissile Burial (Quasi-Technical Issues)"Plutonium can only be destroyed by neutrons; burial only hides it. Plutonium needs to be vieweddifferently than it is today, perhaps best expressed by the statement; 'Plutonium should not be considered awaste, nor a resource, but instead, an endowment'."Professor Wolfe Häfele during a talk at The First Annual "Alvin Weinberg Lecture", Oak Ridge National Laboratory, April 25, 1995.Many arguments are made against the storage of nuclear materials. These arguments fall into 2 categories:Question about the form and composition of the materialsQuestions about the possible hazards of greater than human-time-scale storage.The first questions the current nuclear infrastructure and political/bureaucratic rules and the risks they mayallow. Such questions then lead to rules such as, 'No reprocessing of spent fuel due to proliferation hazards'.http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 17 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMHowever, if there are no fissile materials, nor long term heat producers such as Transuranic wastes, thenthere are no questions about unintentional criticality {nuclear "burnings" or explosions}, proliferation thefts,or transuranic heat powered migrations (also answers 2nd question). Plans to mix excess fissile (weapons'plutonium) with HLWs (High Level Wastes) so that the radiation can provide a barrier to possible futureproliferation underestimate the many possible present chemical separations methods (let alone future ones)or that HLWs decay faster than fissiles so that the weapons quality of the buried material improves, like afine wine, over time. 69The second question is the most difficult as there are a myriad of technical and social issues of the viabilityof waste packages, and the geological, hydrological, and social conditions for thousands of years are beyondour current ability to forcast. Because this questioning of long term safety operates at the boundary, orbeyond, of what is known about long term effects, the questioner can freely cause sufficient doubt as thereis little likelihood that we will soon find answers to questions that are beyond human experience. One of thebest examples of this is ORNL's Gordon Michaels' paper, "Potential Benefits of Waste Transmutation to theU.S. High-Level Waste Repository" [AIP Conference Proceedings 346, International Conference onAccelerator-Driven Transmutation Technologies and Applications, Las Vegas, NV July 1994, pages 8 - 21].This paper examines possible problems with long term storage viability of high level wastes (HLWs), suchas spent fuel [which the paper examines specifically] or the similar weapons plutonium mixed with HLWs,due to the heat released by the actinides (~80% of total in the first 1,000 years). The best way to eliminateworries and endless debates at the fringe of the known, such as the possibilities of fission excursions{nuclear reactions/explosions due to water and fissile self assembling}, or potential later thefts of bombmaterial, is to eliminate the root sources of such problems; the "un-natural" actinides, such as Plutonium,via neutron bombardment.To summarize the weapons' plutonium burial options; they are naive, more costly and will take longer toconduct than advertised, will not permanently remove the weapon material from later use, have long termconsequences, and do nothing to solve other vexing nuclear problems such as spent fuel.Mission: MSR DeploymentThe MSR is usually viewed by those unfamiliar with it as a single reactor type with the unusual andsuspicious, circulation of fuel through-out its primary loop. This view only serves to illustrate the generalignorance of MSRs, as the MSR can take many forms, and can be later modified by the addition ofchemical processing. Although MSR designs in the USA and Japan have generally been conservativemodifications of the reference ORNL MSBR design, the Russians have considered much more imaginativedesigns. These include; a MSR without graphite in the core (homogeneous core) and a graphite reflector, aHigh Temperature MSR using only graphite as the construction material and radiant heat exchanger, andnatural and gas-lift augmented circulation MSRs. 70Even once a physical design is built, the MSR can be functionally changed by changing the chemistry of thecirculating fuel, and by the addition of online fuel salt processing. This option, also confuses many, as it isgenerally unknown that there is a sort of "triage" of MSR processing. Some of the processing that can bedone (added later) are: 71http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 18 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PM¥ Sparging with helium {removes noble gasses and some tritium and noble metals}¥ Plating out on metal surfaces in reactor and heat exchanger {Semi- and noble metals}¥ Sparging with F2 gas {removes bromine and iodine}¥ Reductive extraction with Bi-Li alloy {other fission products}The minimum processing that should be done is the sparging with He, as that is simple and removes largefractions of fission products. The plating-out of the noble and semi-noble metals on MSR walls (or meshstrainers) will happen naturally, although its rate is sensitive to the UF 3 /UF 4 ratio, which is also controlledto prevent corrosion and uranium oxide formation should there be an ingress of air or water. 72 The othertwo processing schemes are only required if single salt breeding should become necessary due to largeincreases in fissile prices. Otherwise, the expense, especially the "Reductive extraction with Bi-Li alloy", isunwarranted with today's low cost fissile supplies.Basic MSR processing is simply allowing the natural (or usually accelerated by bubbling, or sparging, theliquid salt with helium gas) bubbling out of the noble gasses such as krypton and xenon. This feature hasthe benefit of not only removing important neutron poisons such as xenon-135, so that the need for excessreactivity for xenon and other fission product over-ride is all but removed, but also removes large fractionsof fission products that could create a radiological hazard should an unexpected type of nuclear accidentoccur. Other potentially dangerous fission products in an accident, such as iodine and strontium, "... showedno tendency to escape from the salt." 73Unlike other reactors, most of a MSR's fission products would not be present in the reactor, but in isolated,separate storage. 74 A large fraction of the decay heat caused by fission product decay is also continuouslyremoved when the fission products are removed, which minimizes, if not eliminates the core coolingproblems associated with emergency shutdowns. An additional level of protection is also provided by the 10times larger ratio of heat capacity of the salt versus a dry Light Water Core, thereby making the "Chinasyndrome" a moot point. 75 Even greater safety redundency is provided by fluid fuel reactors' option ofdraining a malfunctioning core into the drain tanks. This is in sharp contrast to solid fuel reactors whichretain all of their fission products and whose solid, fixed cores, with their large radioactive inventories havebeen dispersed during accidents. The worst postulated accident for a MSR is a leak. Given the experience ofthe MSRE where the salt was found to contain the fission products 76 , a leak would not be a major disaster.Of course some may argue that the MSR may never succeed as it does not adhere to the current model ofNuclear Energy as the "razor blade" business, whereby profits are made by selling the "razor" (the reactor)at cost, but charging dearly for the "razor blades" (the fuel elements and services). 77 However, it seemslikely that safe, clean, economical energy will ultimately win over narrower profit horizons.There are no technical obstacles for the deployment of a 'sealed' MSR that operates with no chemicalprocessing. Such a reactor could operate for ~30 years with no processing other than allowing the noblegases to naturally bubble out of the salt and periodic additions of fissile material. Since it would beadvantageous due to environmental, economic, and resource conservation concerns to achieve as muchreclamation of the expensive salt after (or during) the 30 year operation period, a parallel development ofvarious salt processing methods should occur 78 (much of which has already been done as part of theIntegral Fuel Reactor [IFR] project's fuel cycle studies). If this strategy of attempting to remove very longterm fission product buildups in the salt is pursued, the salt can continue service in another reactor after thehttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 19 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMfirst MSR has reached the end of its life. This would not only greatly reduce decommisioning costs anddifficulties (as the vast majority of the radioactivities go with the salt and removed fission products), butallow the expense of the salt to be amortized over >100 year periods!MSR Suggested DeploymentIn the past, the emphasis was always on the big power projects (such as 1 GWe power plants) so as to attainthe lowest unit installed costs. It is generally recognized today that large plants, while they may promise lowunit costs, have higher hidden costs in the form of expensive delays, supply-demand mismatches, disruptiveand expensive down-times, large financing requirements and risks, and unexpected scaling problems. TheMSR may be unique among reactors in that it does not seem to be as sensitive to lower unit costs via largersizes. Perhaps this is due to the material and component fabrication savings due to the lack of high-pressurevessels and pipes for reactor core, circulation, and safety systems. It is interesting to note that even a largeMSR as was planned for the breeding MSR (the 1 GWe MSBR) had 4 separate pumps and heat exchangersfor the salt. Each of these would have been ~250 MWe in size. It is for this reason, and the desire to avoidunnecessary risks, delays, and unknowns inevitably associated with large power systems, that I propose aseries of modular MSR converter reactors of about 250 MWe in size. Such a small size would lend itself tomodular, mass production where the first successful MSR deployed for the purpose of burning excessweapon material in Russia could also serve as a prototype for commercial production and deployment. Theonly obstacles are institutional, not technical.Footnote 1.Footnote 2.Footnote 3.Footnotes1,000 MWe * 1 MWth/44% MWe ÷ 925 MW-day / kilogram fissile = 2.457 g/day. Since theconversion ratio is 0.8, the net fissile feed would be 2.457 kg/day * (1-0.8) = 0.491 kg/day or179 kg/yr; NOTE: 925 MW*day/kilogram fissile from pg. 17, NUCLEAR REACTORENGINEERING (1981) (Back)~222 ppm U232 (232U) is most often the concentration mentioned in papers describingexperiments involving 233U fuels. It therefore seems to be a minimum, nominal amount; a sortof worst case scenario unless heroic measures are taken to avoid 232U buildups, e.g., irradiateThorium in 'pure' thermal neutron flux, choose thorium suppies that have no associated 230Th,irradiate for short periods to avoid 233U buildup & associated hard flux. (Back)Page 45 of "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-RelatedOptions", National Academy of Sciences, 1995, National Academy Press, gives the formula toapproximately calculate the surface gamma dose for a sphere as:http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 20 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMD (grays/hr) = 0.5 x D a x (u t / u m )"D a is the rate of gamma energy release in the solid material (J/kg-hr),u t is the mass-energy absorption coefficient for tissue" and u m is themass-energy absorption coefficient for the metal (uranium) at the 0.3MeV energy of the emitted gamma for U233. The 0.3 MeV gamma is asum of the gammas emitted by U233 in the range of 0.275 MeV to0.375 MeV as given by LANL's Internet site which has online thevalues from "ENSDF DATED 790323" & "NOTE: THE PRECISE E-GAMMA VALUES FOR THIRTY OF THE GAMMA RAYS ARETHOSE REPORTED BY C. W. REICH ET AL., INT. J. APPL.RADIAT. ISOT. 35, 185 (1984)."The values for mass-energy absorption coefficient for the metal (u m ) &tissue ( u t ) are from the CD-ROM American National StandardANSI/ANS 6.4.3-1991, pg. 14 & 15.The calculations for the surface gamma radiation of a bomb-sized 233U sphere are:D a = bomb mass x 1 mole U233/233 g x #atoms/mole x % emit x energy gamma x decayconstantD a = 6700 g x 1 mole U233/233 g x 6.023 x 10 23 atoms/mole x 21.6%% x 0.3 MeV x ln2/(159000 x 24 x 365) hrD a = 5.61 x 10 14 MeV/kg-hr x 1.602 x 10 -13 J/MeV = 89.8 J/kg-hrD = 0.5 x 89.8 J/kg-hr x (0.0317 cm2/g) /(0.325 cm2/g)D = 4.38 grays/hr = 438 rems/hr (Back)Footnote 4.The ratio of Th230:Th232 can be calculated by:Th230/Th232 = 1.76 x 10-5 * rU,Th.Pg 284, "NUCLEAR CHEMICAL ENGINEERING", Benedict,Pigford, & Levi (1981). (Back)Footnote 5.1 kg Pa = 1,000 grams Pa = (1000 grams Pa / 233 grams Pa / mole) = 4.29 mole Pahttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 21 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PM4.29 moles Pa = 4.29 moles Pa / 1.54 x 10 -5 mole Pa / 1 mole salt = 279,000 moles salt (Back)Footnote 6:Calculations of masses of various Molten Salt Constituents in the Reference ORNL Molten Salt BreederReactor (MSBR)0.717 mole LiF/salt mole x 2671.7% LiF18.64 g/salt moleg/mole LiF =16.0% BeF212.0% ThF40.30% UF40.16 mole BeF2/salt mole x 47g/mole BeF2 =0.12 mole ThF4/salt mole x 308g/mole ThF4 =0.003 mole UF4/salt mole x 309g/mole UF4 =(Back)7.52 g/salt mole36.96 g/salt mole0.927 g/salt moleFootnote 7:2.25 x 10 6 kW(th) / 2.2 x 10 7 kWh(th) / kg U233 = 0.1 kg U233 / hour. Since the breeding ratefor new U233 to consumed U233 is (1.06 - 1) = 0.06, the rate of new U233 produced is: 0.1 kgU233 consumed / hour * 0.06 new U233 / consumed U233 = 0.006 kg/hr. (Back)Footnote 8:1.41 x 10 -3 mole % versus the 1.54 x 10 -5 mole %, or 92 times greater (so as to reduce theamount they need to steal by a factor of 92). (Back)Footnote 9:0.25 W/g ¥ (1,000 g/kg) ¥ (3,600 J/W¥hr) =900,000 J/(kg ¥ hr) ¥ (1 gray/(J/kg) =900,000 grays/hr ¥ (100 rads/gray) =90,000,000 rads/hr(Source: Page 566, "Nuclear Reactor Engineering", 3rd Ed., Samuel Glasstone & Alexanderhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 22 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMSesonske (1981), Van Nostrand Reinhold Company). (Back)References1. Page 35, "Basis and Objectives of the Los Alamos Accelerator-Driven Transmutation TechnologyProject", C.D. Bowman, [AIP Conference Proceedings 346, International Conference on Accelerator-DrivenTransmutation Technologies and Applications, Las Vegas, NV July 1994, pages 22 - 43]. (Back)2. Page 97, "THE FIRST NUCLEAR ERA: The Life and Times of a Technological Fixer", A.M.Weinberg(1994), 291 pages. (Back)3. Page 33, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug. 72.(Back)4. Pages 377 - 378, "The Molten Salt Adventure", by H.G. MacPherson, NUCLEAR SCIENCE ANDENGINEERING, Vol. 90, pgs 374-380 (1985). (Back)5. Page 41, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug. 72.(Back)6. During a talk, "On Plutonium", for The ORNL Distinguished Lecture Series: The First Annual "AlvinWeinberg Lecture, 20 Apr 95, Professor Wolf Häfele said, "Plutonium should not be considered a waste, nora resource, but instead, an endowment." With this view, the plutonium can act as "a catalyst" to convert into233U using Thorium. (Back)7. "MOLTEN SALT REACTORS FOR BURNING DISMANTLED WEAPONS FUEL", U. Gat, J.R.Engel, & H.L. Dodds, Dec. 92, Nuclear Technology, pages 390 - 394}. (Back)8. Page 41, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug.72.} (Back)9. Page 31, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation", J.R.Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov 1979.(Back)10. Page 33, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979. (Back)11. Page 35, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 23 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMJ.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979; Where denatured U was assumed for the calculations, & pg 379, "The Molten Salt Adventure", byH.G. MacPherson, NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, Vol. 90, pgs 374-380 (1985) (Back)12. Page 36, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979; because the 239Pu would substitute for the depleted, or natural, uranium feed which becomes 239Pudue to neutron absorption. (Back)13. Pages 118 - 121, "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-RelatedOptions", National Academy of Sciences, 1995, National Academy Press. (Back)14. Page 44, "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options",National Academy of Sciences, 1995, National Academy Press. (Back)15. Page 41, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug.72. (Back)16. Page 337, "The Development Status... ORNL-4812} table of fission product mole fractions in the fuelsalt assuming 25 day removal times. (Back)17. Page 112, NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS & TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 8 February 1970. (Back)18. Page 35, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug.72. (Back)19. Page 118, "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options",National Academy of Sciences, 1995, National Academy Press. (Back)20. Page 29, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug.72. (Back)21. Page 9, "The Liquid Metal FAST BREEDER REACTOR: An Environmental and Economic Critique",by Thomas B. Cochran (1974). (Back)22. Page 141, "The Results of the Investigations of Russian Research Center - "Kurchatov Institute" onMolten Salt Applications to Problems of Nuclear Energy Systems", Vladimir M. Novikov [AIP ConferenceProceedings 346, International Conference on Accelerator-Driven Transmutation Technologies andApplications, Las Vegas, NV July 1994, pages 138 - 147]. (Back)23. Page 122-123, "Radioactive Waste: Politics, Technology and Risk", by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, A Reportof the Union of Concerned Scientists, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.(Back)24. Page 514, "Nuclear Chemical Engineering", 2nd Ed., by Manson Benedict, Thomas H. Pigford, & HansWolfgang Levi, published by, McGraw Hill Book Company, (1981). (Back)25. Page 112, "MOLTEN-SALT REACTORS - HISTORY, STATUS, AND POTENTIAL", by M.W.Rosenthal, P.R. Kasten, and R.B. Briggs, in NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS & TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 8, Febhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 24 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PM70. (Back)26. Page 65, "Conceptual Design Characteristics of a Denatured Molten-Salt Reactor With Once-ThroughFueling", J.R. Engel, W.R. Grimes, H.F. Bauman, H.E. McCoy, J.F. Dearing, & W.A. Rhoades, (1980),ORNL/TM-7207 , 156 pages. (Back)27. "Symbiotic system of a fusion and a fission reactor with very simple fuel reprocessing", BLINKIN, V.L.; NOVIKOV, V. M., AB (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Atomnoi Energii, Moscow, USSR), NuclearFusion, vol. 18, July 1978, p. 893-900. (Back)28. "Optimization of the fission-fusion hybrid concept", SALTMARSH, M. J.; GRIMES, W. R.;SANTORO, R. T., Oak Ridge National Lab., TN., Plasma Physics, April 1979. (Back)29. "Design of a helium-cooled molten salt fusion breeder", MOIR, R. W.; LEE, J. D.; FULTON, F. J.;HUEGEL, F.; NEEF, W. S., JR.; SHERWOOD, A. E.; BERWALD, D. H.; WHITLEY, R. H.; WONG, C.P. C.; DEVAN, J. H., TRW Energy Development Group, Redondo Beach, Calif., GA Technologies, Inc.,ORNL, Presented at the 6th Topical Meeting on the Technology of Fusion Energy, San Francisco, 3-7 Mar.1985, Nuclear and High-Energy Physics, 02/1985. (Back)30. Page 378, "Nuclear Chemical Engineering", 2nd Ed., by Manson Benedict, Thomas H. Pigford, & HansWolfgang Levi, published by, McGraw Hill Book Company, (1981). (Back)31. Page 28, "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options",National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 1995, National Academy Press. (Back)32. Page 31, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979. (Back)33. Page 94, "Conceptual Design Characteristics of a Denatured Molten-Salt Reactor With Once-ThroughFueling", J.R. Engel, W.R. Grimes, H.F. Bauman, H.E. McCoy, J.F. Dearing, & W.A. Rhoades, (1980),ORNL/TM-7207, 156 pages. (Back)34. Page 34, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization Without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979. (Back)35. Page 31, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979. (Back)36. Page 807, "URANIUM-233-BEARING SALT PREPARATION FOR THE MOLTEN SALTREACTOR EXPERIMENT", by J.M. Chandler and S.E. Bolt, in NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS &TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 9, Dec 70. (Back)37. Page 126, "EXPERIENCE WITH MSRE", by Haubenreich & Engel, in NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS &TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 8, Feb 70. (Back)38. Page 807, "URANIUM-233-BEARING SALT PREPARATION FOR THE MOLTEN SALThttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 25 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PMREACTOR EXPERIMENT", by J.M. Chandler and S.E. Bolt, in NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS &TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 9, Dec 70. (Back)39. Pages B-478 & B-487 , CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 53rd Ed. (Back)40. Page B-506, ibid. (Back)41. Page 550, " Nuclear Chemical Engineering", 2nd Ed., by Manson Benedict, Thomas H. Pigford, & HansWolfgang Levi, published by, McGraw Hill Book Company, (1981). (Back)42. Page 274, " Nuclear Chemical Engineering", 2nd Ed., by Manson Benedict, Thomas H. Pigford, & HansWolfgang Levi, published by, McGraw Hill Book Company, (1981). (Back)43. Page 275 - 279, ibid. (Back)44. Page 34, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Nov1979. (Back)45. Page 378, "NUCLEAR CHEMICAL ENGINEERING" (1981) & pg 515, "NUCLEAR REACTORENGINEERING" (1981). (Back)46. Page 94, "Conceptual Design Characteristics of a Denatured Molten-Salt Reactor With Once-ThroughFueling", J.R. Engel, W.R. Grimes, H.F. Bauman, H.E. McCoy, J.F. Dearing, & W.A. Rhoades, (1980),ORNL/TM-7207, 156 pages. (Back)47. Page 173, fig. 3, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812,Aug. 72. (Back)48. Pages 143, & 192 Table II, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS",ORNL-4812, Aug. 72; MS mole wt. is ~64. (Back)49. Pages 173, fig. 3, ibid. (Back)50. Page 175, ibid. (Back)51. Page 192, ibid. (Back)52. Page 17, "Nuclear Reactor Engineering", ibid. (Back)53. Page 196, TABLE IV, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS",ORNL-4812, Aug. 72. (Back)54. Page 170, ibid. (Back)55. Page 350, ibid. (Back)56. Page B-514, CRC Handbook. (Back)http://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 26 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PM57. Page B-515, CRC Handbook. (Back)58. Page 145, "The Development Status..." ORNL-4812. (Back)59. NOTE: The measurement "Rad" was used, where Rem (Radiation equivalent in man - an adjustmentmade by multiplying by the radiation's Quality Factor, which for gamma radiation is 1; therefore my"sloppy" interchangeable usage of rad & rem, and gray & sievert.) is actually the appropriate unit as itmeasures absorbed dose's effect on human tissues. Page 580 - 581, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons",Dept. of the Army Pamphlet #50-3, (Mar 77). (Back)60. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Atomic Waste May Erupt", AP 4 Mar 95 22:22 EST V0431.(Back)61. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Nuclear Waste Could Blast", AP 23 Mar 95 20:27 EST V0715.(Back)62. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Gov't Nuclear Plan Threatened", AP 25 Jun 95 12:20 EDTV0750. (Back)63. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Nuclear Waste Piling Up", AP 24 Jun 95 11:34 EDT V0405.(Back)64. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "States Sue Over Nuclear Waste", AP 06/20 18:05 EDT V0167.(Back)65. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Nuclear Fuel Shipments Rapped", AP 17 Jan 95 20:09 ESTV0557. (Back)66. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Scientists Wary Of Nuke Waste", From Message-ID: ,Date: Wed, 2 Aug 95 0:40:17 PDT. (Back)67. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Gov't Nuclear Plan Threatened", AP 25 Jun 95 12:20 EDTV0750. (Back)68. Associated Press (AP) Online Report: "Nuclear Waste Piling Up", AP 24 Jun 95 11:34 EDT V0405.(Back)69. Page 238, "Potential Role of ABC-Assisted Repositories In U.S. Plutonium And High-Level WasteDisposition", David Berwald, Anthony Favale, and Timothy Myers of Grummand Aerospace Corporation,and Jerry McDaniel of Bechtel. AIP Conference Proceedings 346, International Conference on Accelerator-Driven Transmutation Technologies and Applications, Las Vegas, NV July 1994, pages 236 - 247. (Back)70. Page 142, "The Results of the Investigations of Russian Research Center - "Kurchatov Institute" onMolten Salt Applications to Problems of Nuclear Energy Systems", Vladimir M. Novikov [AIP ConferenceProceedings 346, International Conference on Accelerator-Driven Transmutation Technologies andApplications, Las Vegas, NV July 1994, pages 138 - 147]. (Back)71. Page 33, "Molten-Salt Reactors for Efficient Nuclear Fuel Utilization without Plutonium Separation",J.R. Engel, W.A. Rhoades, W.R. Grimes, and J.F. Dearing, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 46, Novhttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 27 of 28

The Multi-Mission Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)6/6/10 3:18 PM1979. (Back)72. Page 94, "Conceptual Design Characteristics of a Denatured Molten-Salt Reactor With Once-ThroughFueling", J.R. Engel, W.R. Grimes, H.F. Bauman, H.E. McCoy, J.F. Dearing, & W.A. Rhoades, (1980),ORNL/TM-7207, 156 pages. (Back)73. Page 411, "The Development Status..." ORNL-4812. (Back)74. Page 406, ibid. (Back)75. Page 403 , ibid. (Back)76. Page 370, ibid. (Back)77. Page 29, "The Development Status of MOLTEN-SALT BREEDER REACTORS", ORNL-4812, Aug.72. (Back)78. Page 94, "Conceptual Design Characteristics of a Denatured Molten-Salt Reactor With Once-ThroughFueling", J.R. Engel, W.R. Grimes, H.F. Bauman, H.E. McCoy, J.F. Dearing, & W.A. Rhoades, (1980),ORNL/TM-7207, 156 pages. (Back)History of above paper:© Copyright, Bruce Hoglund, 1995This paper was to be my contribution for part of a joint paper & international conference. Dueto personal, institutional, political reasons, it never was. Therefore, it has never had the sort ofediting or peer review it should have. However, I believe its contents are accurate and factual. Iam placing it into the public domain of the Internet so that others may learn about otherwisepoorly known subjects: Molten Salt Reactors, the Thorium-Uranium-233/232 Fuel Cycle, andProliferation features of both. I give free, responsible use of this material so long as it isproperly attributed.Comments or Questions? Please email me, Bruce Hoglund Go Back Homehttp://home.earthlink.net/~bhoglund/multiMissionMSR.html#BR46Page 28 of 28