Cooperation in East Asia the Cases of APT and EAS (1997-2009) LIU Qianqian

China’s Activism in Regional Economic
Cooperation in East Asia: the Cases of APT and
EAS
(1997-2009)
LIU Qianqian
IPRCC
Feb 2012

Contents
• Definitions & Research background
• Overview of the existing theoretical debates
on China’s rise and its regional activism
• China’s participation in APT and EAS
• Conclusions
• Future studies

Definitions
• East Asia
10 Southeast Asian states + 3 Northeast Asian states
• APT or 10+3
‘ASEAN Plus Three’
Regional cooperation mechanism
• East Asia Summit (EAS)
2005:10+3+3
2011:10+8

Multi-dimensional levels of APT
APT
10+3 10+1 +3

Definitions
• East Asia
10 Southeast Asian states + 3 Northeast Asian states
• APT or 10+3
‘ASEAN Plus Three’
Regional cooperation mechanism
• East Asia Summit (EAS)
2005:10+3+3
2011:10+8

Context
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998

Asian Financial Crisis
• Asian Financial Crisis
• The Role of the IMF/ the US
– Tightening Monetary Policy
– Restructuring the Financial System
– Opening Up Economies

China and Asian Financial Crisis
China’s Role in the Asian Financial Crisis
and regional response
• Non-devaluation policy
• Financial Support through IMF
-$2 billion to Thailand and Indonesia through IMF
package

What were the impacts of the Asian Financial
Crisis on regional cooperation?
• Politics of Resentment
• Close interdependence
• Existing international organizations cannot help get
out of trouble
• A sense of the region (East Asia or Asia Pacific)
The creation of Asian Plus Three
(APT, 10+3)

Debates
• Exclusive nature of 10+3
• It was the first time that China and Japan coexisted
in the same regional framework which the US was
excluded.
• China’s proactive posture in 10+3 and Asian
Financial Crisis
• The sharp difference between China’s involvement
in regional cooperation groupings before/after the
Crisis.

Overview of Existing Literature
Three Main Paradigms in IR
• Realism
• Liberalism
• Constructivism

Realism
• Key Points:
• The structure of international system is anarchic
• Sovereign state (not IO, corporation, NGO) is rationale.
• To survive, power is important.
• Struggle for power
• Conflict, suspicion and competition
• Zero-sum game

Realism
How do realists explain China’s rise and its regional
behaviour?
Offensive Realism (John Mearsheimer)
• Historical analogies: the US
• A dissatisfied power
• Maximize its share of world power
• The world hegemony Global hegemonDominate the
region
• Zero-sum game between China and the US
• Regional cooperation to exclude the US
• ‘China threat‘ theories

Realism
• Critique
– Historical Analogies
• Not causes or explanations
• Unique historical experience

Liberal approach and economic
interdependence
• Key points:
– Complex interdependence
– Decrease the likelihood of political conflicts
– Make the use of force costly
– Spill-over effect: low political spheres high political
spheres (Domke 1988: 30 states 10 years)

Liberalism
How do liberals explain China’s involvement
in regional cooperation in East Asia?
• The degree of economic interdependence
• An engine of growth
• A catalyst for regional integration
• Play by the rules of the game
• Cooperative Behaviour

Liberalism
Are the liberal arguments accurate?
Limitations
• Oversimplify the complicated nature of international
relations in East Asia
• Ignore some of the potential problems behind
economic interdependence

Constructivism
• Key points:
International politics is a ‘world of our making’.
(Nicolars Onuf 1989)
- Norms, beliefs, identities and values influence the
behaviour and actions of political actors

Constructivism
How do constructivists explain China’s
foreign policy and the rise of China?
- It depends on how other states view China’s
behaviour (Alagappa 1998)

Constructivism
• Limitations:
– why is the ideational factor more important than
material interests?
– Little attention has been given to the Chinese
view.

Our Theoretical Framework:
Analytical Eclecticism
Power
Interests
Ideational
factors

Regional cooperation
Set in a Broader Context
China’s WTO accession
Sino-US relationship
US attitude towards APT

China-ASEAN FTA
• Why were ASEAN states interested?
– More dependent on China’s market
– Expand its presence in the Chinese market
– The economic stagnation of Japan
• ASEAN’s worries
– The same third-country markets in US, Japan and EU
– FDI competition
• China’s Response
– Early Harvest Programme
– Economic concession for the four newer members

Source: ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation (2001:149)

Question: Why did China make an ultimate
effort to promote the CAFTA with ASEAN?
Economic
Interests
Promoting a closer Sino-ASEAN
political relationship
great
geopolitical
&
strategic
significance
Alleviating China Threat Theory
Limiting Taiwan’s attempts to
extend its international legitimacy

China-ASEAN FTA
China’s FTA strategy
Negotiate with
ASEAN states
as a whole
Japan’s FTA strategy
Negotiate with
selected
ASEAN states
individually

East Asia Summit
In the original design:
• Long-term goal
•Replace the APT
In reality
• Co-existence of APT and EAS
• The expansion of membership

The Membership Issue of the EAS
• The discord between China and Japan
China
The original
13 members of APT
Japan
13 APT members
+
India
Australia
New Zealand

Concerns of Japan
Japan’s
intentions
Balancing China’s
growing power
and
influence
Maintaining a good
relationship with
the US
Putting
‘democracy’
and
‘human rights’
into EA Community

Was China’s activism in East Asia at the
expense of the US?
• To push the US out of East Asia?
• The role of the US in China’s regional policy
Strategy: hedging strategy

Conclusions
• China’s activism in APT bears political significance. It served crucial
reassurance functions. Specifically, China aimed to assure others of its
peaceful rise and to enhance its political credibility and to establish itself as a
responsible power. Political credibility is important, as it largely determines
whether others view China as a threat or an opportunity. China’s reassurance
policy has been largely successful (CAFTA).
• At the systemic level, great power relations play a significant part in shaping
China’s regional strategy. The ideational factor adds an additional layer to the
material factors of interests and powers in understanding the complexity of IR in
East Asian regionalism, especially the Sino-Japanese relations in EA.
• The nature of IR in EA should not been be seen in traditional ‘balance of power’
or seeking regional hegemony. The competition is more in terms of ‘influence’.
It is balance of influence. China wanted to make use of the institutional
mechanisms of regional economic cooperation as a means to enhance their
own regional influence rather than to disturb the regional stability.
• Functional cooperation

Future Studies
• The US’s focus turns back to Asia-Pacific:
How it would affect China’s regional policy in East
Asia?
• China’s active involvement in other regions:
Evaluating how China’s regional policies in different
regions serve different functions in China’s FP.

Thank You.