Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century

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Deterrence in the twenty-first century - Air University Press

ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE

to provoke the United States severely when they believe themselves

to be more or less vulnerable to US deterrence threats?

There are no a priori answers to such questions that can be

assumed to apply across a spectrum of opponents and circumstances.

In contemporary cases, however, as in the past—if the

complex variety of conditions necessary for deterrence to work

are present and the challenger is risk- and cost-tolerant—then

nuclear deterrence may be uniquely decisive in the challenger’s

decision making. Moreover, for deterrence to work on those occasions—whether

they are few or many—could be of great importance

given the potential lethality of emerging WMD threats

to the United States. To assert otherwise—that US nuclear

weapons now provide no unique added value for deterrence—

contradicts available evidence and lays claim to knowledge

about opponent decision making that domestic commentators

do not and cannot have. Such assertions reveal more about

what some commentators wish to be true than what available

evidence suggests should be believed.

There should be no presumption that nuclear threats always

will make the difference between effective deterrence or

its failure. The capability, however, to threaten an adversary’s

valued assets with great lethality and from afar—including

well-protected targets—may be critical for some US deterrence

purposes. Unless future leadership decision making is different

from that of the past, in some cases nuclear threat options

will contribute to deterrence. Given literally decades of experience,

the burden of proof lies with those who now contend that

nuclear weapons are unnecessary for deterrence; considerable

available evidence contradicts such a contention.

The decisions of Britain and France also suggest the continuing

value of nuclear weapons for deterrence. Both have reaffirmed

their long-term commitments to maintaining their nuclear capabilities

for deterrence purposes, including deterrence of rogue

states and other possible future unexpected contingencies. 40

Also indicative of the continuing deterrence value of nuclear

weapons are Russia’s and China’s decisions to modernize and

expand their nuclear arsenals 41 and the apparent desire of

North Korea, Iran, and possibly Syria to possess nuclear weapons.

42 North Korean officials have pointed to the value of nuclear

weapons for deterrence:

88

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