LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq
assistance of 100,000 or more Iraqi soldiers to assist the coalition in the postcombat environment.
125
Feith, 475–477.
126
For a precis on organizational and personnel problems, see Bensahel, “Mission Not
Accomplished,” 460–466; and Bensahel et al., After Saddam, 115–119.
127
Ironically, some psychological operations and counter–command and control activities
encouraged the Iraqi army to dissolve and for the soldiers to desert, while other plans
were relying on Iraqi army units to remain intact to be used for reconstruction. See, for
example, Gordon and Trainor, 145–146; and interview, former NSC official, August 15,
2007. The poor staffing and consequent bureaucratic surprise generated by the orders on
de-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi army were associated with a lull in NSC staff
activism in managing day-to-day activities in Iraq. Sadly, Bremer was unfairly blamed for
these decisions, which he had brought with him from Washington.
128
Published as an advertisement on the op-ed page of the New York Times, September 26,
2002, emphasis in the original. The author thanks Christoff Luehrs for reminding him of
this important statement.
129
The National Defense University report of its November 2002 workshop “Iraq:
Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule” highlighted the complexities of the postwar era and
recommended a strong emphasis on postwar security. Copies of this report were provided
directly to selected offices of OSD and Joint Staff leadership by memorandum on
December 16, 2002. The author participated in the conference; his office funded it and
helped to design it.
130
Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and
Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, February 2003), v–vi.
131
Discussions with a former senior NSC staff official in September and October, 2007.
132
Feith, 362–364.
133
Intelligence Community Assessment: Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January
2003, as summarized in an unpublished document of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and in the Washington Post, May 20, 2007, A6.
134
In the OIF Study Group interview.
135
Gordon and Trainor, 462. In a postwar interview with the Combat Studies Institute,
General Franks admitted that he made a mistake in off-ramping the 1 st Cavalry Division,
an action that previously had been suggested by Rumsfeld. See Connors, interview with
Franks, 9.
136
OIF Study Group interview with General Abizaid.
137
Ibid.
138
See, for example, the transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld’s July 13, 2003, appearance on
85