LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
the new strategy defined the goals for enhanced governance in Afghanistan
and greater partnership capacity in counterinsurgency in that country’s growing
security force.
Given the lack of progress in Afghanistan, Secretary Gates believed that
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General David
McKiernan, USA, was miscast in a role that required a different mindset.
No one thought ill of McKiernan, but many thought a change in leadership
was warranted. Subsequently, Mr. Gates announced General McKiernan’s relief
on May 9, 2009, and President Obama announced the selection of Lieutenant
General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, to replace him. McChrystal, then
serving as Director of the Joint Staff, was quickly approved by the Senate and
took up his post. He was directed to conduct a thorough evaluation of operations
in Afghanistan and report back.
McChrystal formed a multidisciplinary team and oversaw a truly strategic
assessment rather than merely a campaign or an operational evaluation. His
strategic assessment was designed to be more than a purely military assessment.
104 The commander’s personal involvement and the nontraditional perspectives
from scholars and coalition members made this a notable effort. The
civilian academics brought in diversity and served as a valuable resource in
formulating and debating the contents of the assessment. 105 The end product
was a better plan for conducting a comprehensive counterinsurgency inside
Afghanistan, which the team perceived as its assigned task. 106
In late August 2009, McChrystal delivered his initial assessment. His strategic
review recognized the critical importance of the effectiveness of the Afghan
National Security Forces and sought to elevate the importance of governance.
The review made clear that additional resources were needed to blunt
the Taliban’s evident momentum but that those forces should focus on “those
critical areas where vulnerable populations are most threatened.” 107 This plan
stressed the importance of governance to the success of the campaign, not just
population security or other counterinsurgency related lines of effort.
McChrystal was told to wait until after the Afghanistan election and then
submit his report via the chain of command. 108 When he did, the report soon
found its way to the media, despite its classified and sensitive nature. 109 The
report did not skirt with niceties or hedge on its conclusions: “Failure to provide
adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher
115