LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials claimed this number
had increased to 65 percent. 173 Afghanistan’s infant mortality rate was cut
by 25 percent. Schools are staffed by more than 180,000 teachers trained to Afghan
standards, and more than 52,000 candidates enrolled in Afghan teacher
training programs. 174 These education programs are limited, with many teachers
unqualified by U.S. standards. 175
Key performance parameters for other major objectives should also be
factored in, including improving the quality of national and provincial governance,
decreasing levels of corruption, and decreasing Pakistan’s negative
influence inside Afghanistan. Quantitative data for these objectives are not
evident, but most interviewees believe progress has been made. Progress on
the corruption front, however, has been limited. A September 2013 report
from the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction claimed
the United States has no discernable plan to fight corruption in Afghanistan,
following more than a decade of American involvement. 176
All in all, one could question whether the progress made to date is sustainable
given Afghanistan’s limited overall capacity of government, its limited
economy, and the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Reports
today, years after the 2010 troop increase and resulting influx of attention,
now depict greater violence or increased Taliban threats against civilians. 177
Yet the Afghan National Army (ANA) is still fighting and gaining competence
despite high losses. There is little doubt of the Surge’s impact on reversing
the Taliban’s momentum in 2010 or how the new strategy bolstered
ANA competence and confidence. 178 Whether it can sustain this capability
over time remains to be seen.
Overall, the campaign was similar to Iraq in that the military component
delivered what it was designed to do. It bought space and time required
for institutional development of a weak state and fragile leadership. It was
not strategically effective in that the Karzai government struggled to enhance
its capacity or minimize the perception of its corruption. The strategy
was sound in design but was dependent on both U.S. civilian capacity that
proved insufficient and changes from the Karzai leadership that were always
problematic at best. In this respect, Ambassador Eikenberry may have been
proved correct.
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