LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
disenchantment with the assessments process.” 194 As noted by another study
on deficiencies in operational assessments:
The disconnect between counterinsurgency theory and the assessments
process that had plagued operations assessment in Vietnam re-emerged
and the result has been equally frustrating. The promise of technological
advancement and the effects-based framework to help make sense of
the vast amount of data coming from both theaters has fallen short.
Once again, the pitfalls in trying to quantify complex dynamics has [sic]
made the production of accurate and useful assessments a persistently
elusive aim. 195
In particular, these analyses question the transparency and credibility of
the operational assessments. One scholar concluded, “The flaws in the currently
used approaches are sufficiently egregious that professional military
judgment on assessments is, rightfully, distrusted.” 196 The challenges in Afghanistan
were the complexity of the counterinsurgency effort and complications
of a large coalition. An extensive effort was put into data collection,
but it was focused on operational and tactical data and was difficult to raise
to strategic audiences. The ingrained optimism of the U.S. military may be an
additional complicating factor. 197
In Afghanistan, General McChrystal knew the critical important of assessment
and indicators at both levels of war and for different audiences. He
specifically understood that ISAF needed to identify and refine appropriate indicators
to assess progress, clarifying the difference between operational measures
of effectiveness critical to practitioners on the ground and strategic measures
more appropriate to national capitals. 198 Both strategic and operational
assessments in Afghanistan were clouded by uncertainty over the mission. In
the presence of confusion over policy aims and strategy, the component agencies
tended to define their contributions and metrics in terms of inputs or
traditional tasks. 199
McChrystal’s strategic review, augmented by volunteer scholars, is an exception
that warrants more study. That report proved to be a truly strategic assessment,
even if its orientation focused narrowly on defining the requirements
for a fully resourced counterinsurgency effort. It answered the presumed ques-
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