LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Lamb with Franco
would not be able to operate in a manner that would achieve success over the
longer term by reducing the popular support that sustains the enemy’s cause,
organizations, and agendas.
Concerning the first level of intelligence required, the United States was
able to produce a quantum leap forward in all-source intelligence integration
with ongoing operations. A major effort was mounted to develop new types
of intelligence and share more intelligence—that is, to move from the “needto-know”
principle to a “need-to-share” approach. Over time, the fusion of
timely all-source intelligence and operations became a great success. When
mistakes were made—and many were—it was generally due to poor command
decisions about whether the available intelligence justified a decision to launch
an operation or, in the midst of an operation, which targets to engage. Despite
some notable and all-too-public failures during raids on enemy leadership
cadres, the fusion of timely all-source intelligence and operations allowed U.S.
forces to keep enemy organizations on the defensive and gave the United States
tremendous leverage.
How well we penetrated enemy plans and programs is shrouded in secrecy
for obvious reasons, but some general observations are possible. Best intelligence
indicated that 9/11 was just the first of a series of attacks against the
United States that al Qaeda wanted to execute. So in general, the dearth of successful
follow-on strikes against the U.S. homeland suggests the United States
did a good job of disrupting or anticipating enemy plans. The same can be
said for the U.S. ability to overcome organized resistance in Afghanistan and
Iraq. However, there are major exceptions. One was the failure to anticipate
the switch to guerrilla tactics following the defeat of the adversary’s organized
military forces. CIA Director Tenet testified to Congress in March 2002 that
we were entering a second, more difficult phase of operations in Afghanistan
“with smaller units that intend to operate against [us] in a classic insurgency
format.” 241 However, DOD did not act upon this insight.
Similarly, DOD was slow to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to the rise of
an insurgency in Iraq. Numerous experts warned of the potential for large-scale
civil unrest following the occupation of Iraq, including Secretary Rumsfeld’s own
staff. 242 Secretary Rumsfeld argues DOD had to prepare for many possible calamities
in Iraq, and that the first mention of possible “protracted guerrilla war”
was an op-ed by someone “removed from the intelligence community.” 243 CIA
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