LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
with training base throughput capacity increasing steadily. Efforts continued
to build effective headquarters above brigade level—that is, corps headquarters
and national institutions. By July 2005, however, the ANA had reached a
strength of only 24,300 trained and equipped, with 6,000 more in training—
less than half the force authorized in the December 2002 Bonn Conference.
Over this period, training for the newly raised infantry battalions was standardized
at 14 weeks (6 weeks individual training, 6 weeks advanced training,
and 2 weeks of collective training). Despite being undermanned and lacking
resources, OMC-A planned to complete training the then-authorized 46,000
soldiers by the fall of 2007.
In its June 2005 report on Afghan security, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) noted that U.S. funding for the ANA started at only $179.2
million in 2002 but rapidly increased to over $2 billion by 2005. Despite the
major increase in funding, the GAO stated, “efforts to establish sustaining institutions,
such as a logistics command, needed to support these troops have
not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are not clear.” It went on
to note the estimated total bill for police and army to be $7.2 billion, with $600
million needed annually for sustainment. 13 The GAO report also noted that
OMC-A struggled with the numerous changes in the plan for the ANA as well
as consistent shortages of training personnel. OMC-A had never been staffed
at more than 71 percent of its approved personnel level. 14
One of the key challenges was the steadily increasing level of violence
in Afghanistan. As attacks on Afghan and coalition forces increased, leaders
made the logical choice to increase the size of the Afghan army and police.
With each increase, more trainers were needed, but before each new requirement
was filled, the increased threat led to plans for further increasing ANSF
strength.
On July 12, 2005, OMC-A was renamed the Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan
(OSC-A). Despite the identified problems with manning
and planning, its responsibility was expanded to include the entire Afghan security
sector. In addition to training the ANA, OSC-A would assume responsibility
for reforming the Afghan National Police. 15 Inevitably, the expanded
mission required more resources. GAO noted that OSC-A requested $7.6 billion
for 2007, more than the estimated total bill in June 2005. 16 This amount
was to cover the cost of 70,000 ANA soldiers and 82,000 police, as well as the
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