LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
challenges, such as shortages of U.S. trainers and equipment, are due in
part to competing global priorities, according to senior Defense officials.
Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full
capability may be delayed. 18
In its 2008 report to Congress, CSTC-A stated it was working closely with
the Afghan government on three lines of operation to develop the ANSF: “(1)
build and develop ministerial institutional capability; (2) generate the fielded
forces [sic]; and (3) develop the fielded forces.” 19 CSTC-A noted the target endstrength
for the ANA had been increased to 80,000 and the ANP to 82,000. 20
This was yet another in a continuing series of rapid increases in target endstrength
for the ANA. It would also require fielding different kinds of units:
“13 light brigades, a mechanized brigade, a commando brigade, a headquarters
and support brigade, enabling units and the initial operation of an air
corps.” 21
To assist in filling the shortage of trainers, the North Atlantic Council announced
the formation of NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) as
an integral part of ISAF on June 12, 2009. NTM-A stood up formally on November
21 of that year. The command was a NATO organization that included
personnel from 37 nations and was led by a U.S. lieutenant general who was
dual-hatted as the commander of CSTC-A, which remained a U.S. command
and was the administrative conduit for U.S. funds. 22 While providing a significant
reinforcement in personnel, NTM-A also had an expanded mission to:
provide higher-level training for the ANA, including defence colleges and
academies, and […] be responsible for doctrine development, as well as
training and mentoring for the ANP. This will reflect the Afghan Government’s
policing priorities and will complement existing training and
capacity development programmes, including the European Union Police
Mission and the work of the International Police Coordination Board. 23
However, NTM-A would not provide advice or training for the Afghan
ministries. That mission remained the responsibility of CSTC-A. Keeping
track of the collective NATO and individual national caveats concerning training
and funding added to the complexity of the mission.
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