LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
on rapid expansion of the army, in response to the growing insurgent
threat, could strain NTM-A resources and outpace the capacity of Afghan
leaders to manage an inherently unwieldy system. 27
In its 2009 report to Congress, GAO noted significant progress for the
ANA in that 18 of its 72 units were now rated fully capable and 26 were capable
with support. (It did not say why the total number of units had decreased from
the 105 reported the previous year.) It noted that DOD identified the primary
limitation on progress as the shortage of training personnel. It had only half of
the 2,225 personnel needed to train the ANA at the approved level of 79,000
soldiers. This shortage was likely to get more severe with the newly approved
strength increase for the ANA. 28
In 2010, the International Crisis Group noted that from 2008 to 2010, the
target date for 134,000 trained troops had been brought forward at least twice,
first from 2013 to 2011, and then to October 2010. While recruiting had kept
pace, shortfalls in NCOs and officers with specialized skills in medicine, transportation,
and logistics were hindering growth. 29
Lieutenant General William Caldwell, USA, who commanded NTM-A/
CSTC-A from November 2009 to November 2011, noted that the following
elements complicated NTM-A efforts to raise and train the ANA:
n eighty-six percent illiteracy rate: required teaching recruits
and officer basic reading skills
n eighteen years of conflict: led to hoarding and survival mentality
n focus on quantity over quality in recruiting and training: resulted
in need for retraining
n ANA negative growth: resulted in creating a recruiting command
n leadership shortfalls and challenges: led to creation of multiple
schools and courses (officer/NCO schools)
n minimal oversight and accountability: required top-to-bottom
review of inventory processes and the inculcation of an ethos
of stewardship
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