LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq
Some analysts have criticized Franks for not being interested in postwar Iraq,
an area where many in uniform believed that civilians should dominate decisionmaking.
Most war planning was handled by Franks and his staff, but most
military postwar planning efforts were left to USCENTCOM’s land component.
Franks announced his retirement soon after the fighting, and this act negatively
affected perceptions concerning his enthusiasm for post–major conflict stability
operations. 98 Years later, Franks explained his focus on the combat phase of
the operation:
The key that unlocked the door in Iraq was the removal of the regime
and so the force level initially was planned to remove the regime. So we
said, depending on whether we see the left end of the continuum, peace
breaking out, or the right end, tending toward chaos, we will continue
to modify both the structure and the number of troops involved in Iraq
until we “win,” that is, that the Iraqis are able to take charge of their own
destiny. That was the plan from the beginning to the end and that is the
way that we looked at Phase IV in every iteration. . . . You don’t know
what you are actually going to find. 99
While USCENTCOM and its land component had Phase IV plans, some
of the divisions making up the force—including the 3 rd Infantry Division, the
main attack division—did not have them. Division planners wrote in their after
action review that the division had not been fully and completely briefed
on the highly detailed postwar plan of its higher headquarters, the land component
command. 100 The Marine headquarters, I Marine Expeditionary Force,
and its divisional element under Major General James Mattis did formulate
plans and standard operating procedures. After the seizure of Baghdad, however,
they were redeployed to the south, a less contested area in the immediate
postcombat phase. 101
The Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) plan did
not generate supporting division plans, and this represented a shortcoming.
In all, while the military did begin to plan for this issue before civilians did,
the USCENTCOM and CFLCC Phase IV planning efforts were not an effective
guide for immediate post–conventional combat military policy, were not
shared fully with implementing units, and did not make adequate allowances
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